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JANUARY, 1884.

ARTICLE I.—THE U. S. SUPREME COURT AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT.

THE decision of the Supreme Court of the United States at the October term, 1883, adverse to the constitutionality of sections one and two of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, while quietly acquiesced in by the people in general, has created no small agitation among our colored citizens. They have held numerous meetings in the larger cities to express their sorrow and indignation, and at these meetings have been present many of their old-time friends, who were connected with the anti-slavery cause. For then, as now, an indignant protest was made, in the name of God and humanity, against caste, whether in India or America. Some, who were not in that renowned conflict, but have come upon the stage in the years since the war, have mistakenly said, that the old abolitionists warred only for the overthrow of slavery, and that their opinions and advice on the subject of the rights of the free colored people should now have little weight, when uttered against

the extreme views which are occasionally presented by colored men. But in that conflict caste and slavery were equally opposed, on the platform and in the pulpit, by resolutions adopted in anti-slavery conventions and by articles in the newspapers, through tracts and through books. Especially was there a continual quotation of the indignant words of James in the second chapter of his epistle, to condemn the unchristian prejudice against those of African blood, which made distinctions insulting to them in the very house of God, and at the Lord's own table! Slavery was at a distance, in the southern States; but caste was all around them, and they could not and did not forbear to rebuke it. The writer may be allowed, in illustration, to refer to his own experience on this very point. His direct and practical protest against caste began, in his college and theological seminary days, at the Presbyterian church, in New York city, which he was accustomed to attend. He often went and sat with the colored people in the seats to which they were confined in one end of the gallery, to express his sympathy with them, and to rebuke their exclusion from other parts of the house. While he was a pastor in Hartford, Connecticut, in the year 1847, he learned that no minister in the city had exchanged pulpit services with Rev. Dr. Pennington, of the colored Congregational church—a very black brother, as regarded the skin, but who was held in high esteem for his modesty and excellent good sense, and on whom, when he went abroad to a reform convention in London, the University of Göttingen, in Germany, on the recommendation of friends, bestowed the honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity. So the writer arranged an exchange with him, and the congregation were astonished one Sunday, to see Dr. Pennington's dark face in the pulpit; a fact which led some of them indignantly to leave the house. A little later, in the annual election of Moderator of the Hartford Central Association of Ministers, he voted alone, on the first ballot, for Dr. Pennington; but there being no choice, and Dr. Bushnell coming to his aid on the second ballot, a majority was induced to vote in Dr. P.'s favor. Two young theologues, who appeared before the body at that meeting to be licensed to preach, were astounded to have the examination conducted, and their licenses finally signed by a

black clergyman ; especially as one of them was going to the State of Tennessee ! And at that very moment Dr. Pennington was a fugitive slave, having escaped, years before, from Maryland. After the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law, in 1850, he was in such fear of detection and recapture that he retired to Canada, while one of the writer's church members (John Hooker, Esq.), corresponded with the old master, succeeded in purchasing Dr. Pennington for a small sum (having a regular bill of sale made out to John Hooker), and then, before executing the paper of freedom, took a walk down Main street, in Hartford, for a few minutes, as he said, "just to know how it felt to own a Doctor of Divinity !" In those benighted days nothing so offended our northern communities as to see abolitionists treating colored people as they did white people, and insisting that all others should do the same. They looked with horror and detestation upon such conduct, and an act which now hardly attracts attention or produces a ripple of feeling, then aroused a tempest of indignation. This question of the rights of the African race, slave or free, is thus a very familiar one to the veterans in the anti-slavery war.

And so it was with intense interest that they learned of the recent decision of the Supreme Court on the Civil Rights Act, and the colored people have their deepest sympathy in a natural feeling of alarm, as one of the trusted defences against insult and injury is suddenly leveled to the dust. To those of African descent it is a matter of personal concern, as it cannot be to others. The iron enters into their soul. Nor would it be strange or unpardonable if, in the excitement of the hour, some of them should, like Job in his agony, exceed the bounds of wisdom and of faith. It may not be without reason, then, that an old friend of the colored race offers his view of this decision so important to the American people. For it is really a case of national character, involving the reputation of our Supreme Court, and principles of law affecting many other interests than those immediately concerned ; and it is only as it is broadly and calmly viewed that we can reach an intelligent and just judgment as to its merits. But before proceeding further it may be well to cite the sections declared unconstitutional. They read as follows :

SECTION 1. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.

SEC. 2. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race or color and regardless of any previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall for every such offense forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, with full costs; and shall also for every such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than one year,

provided certain legal forms are to be observed, which the section proceeds to specify.

This legislation was supposed to be warranted by these words of the Amendments to the National Constitution :

ARTICLE XIII., Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Sec. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

ARTICLE XIV., Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 5. Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Two general aspects of the subject will consecutively demand attention, and the two need to be carefully distinguished.

First, we may consider what view we should take of the Supreme Court in connection with its decision as to the unconstitutionality of this part of the Civil Rights Act. Have we cause to assail the motives of that eminent body for its action

in this case, or to accuse it of weakness and inconsistency? Its decisions are indeed always open to criticism and dissent, though for the time being, they are the law of the land. Nor does it claim to be infallible, for it reopens subjects for a fresh argument, and reverses, if need be, its former decisions. One learned in the law may then question the correctness of a decision of the court, if he sees cause. It should always be treated, however, with respect, and its motives should remain unimpeached, even if we find ourselves unable to agree with a particular conclusion, unless in cases of an extreme character. The present writer is not a lawyer and it would ill become him, after having read and pondered the full text of the decision and the accompanying opinion of the Court, to pronounce against its arguments and conclusions on legal grounds. And if one takes an outside view of the matter, several things seriously impress a candid mind. They are such as these:

1. The decision was not made by a bare majority of a Court whose members were nearly equally divided; it was almost unanimous. But one judge of the nine gave a dissenting opinion. This fact will necessarily have great weight, as tending to show that the case was reasonably clear, so as to carry conviction to those who would have been certain to disagree, had the question admitted of very much doubt.

2. The decision was not a party one, nor made by those unfriendly to the interests of the colored race, or at a time of special prejudice towards them. Something of that kind might well be alleged against the Dred Scott decision of the Supreme Court, in 1856; for that was under the regime of slavery, and there was hardly a member of the Court in sympathy with the anti-slavery movement. But we are now in a new era. The moral atmosphere is comparatively clear. The current of opinion runs in favor of human rights. The overwhelming majority of the Court (eight out of nine judges) consists of those whose political affiliations are with the party which preserved the Union, abolished slavery, and passed this very Civil Rights Bill; and their prepossessions would naturally have been in its favor, and their sympathies with the colored people whom it was intended to protect. It had also, in a previous decision, sustained this Act in its application to

the composition of juries; because the exclusion of colored citizens from juries was by hostile *State* legislation, which is precisely the thing prohibited by the XIVth Amendment. Surely this indicates that the question was considered on its merits simply, apart from race-prejudice or political bias. Seven of the eight Republican members of the court voted for the decision, as well as the Democratic member. No party line was drawn.

3. The decision was solemnly made under oath and the pressure of heavy official responsibility, and pertained to the honest declaration of a simple matter of fact. It is easy for irresponsible spectators to criticise those who act in the necessary discharge of duty, and to tell of what they would do, in a case in which they will never be called to take part. Statesmen are known always to become more cautious and conservative, the moment they are clothed with official power, and are compelled to assume responsibility. And individuals who give advice to others very readily, are slow to decide in their own affairs. Now here is a Court, every member of which had sworn a solemn oath to decide all cases according to law, and to interpret and uphold the Constitution not as it might have been, or as some wish it had been, but as it is; and it acted, before God and the country, knowing that its responsibility was heavy, because the Constitution made its decision final. What right, now, has any man to call in question the conscientiousness of the Court in this particular decision? The one dissenting member has been loudly eulogized for following his convictions, even though he stood alone. That is well. Give him praise. But what proof is there, that the eight did not also follow their convictions with fidelity? They were equally intelligent, of the same high character, and under the same oath. Is the Court so rotten, that eight of the nine members are unprincipled? It were as easy to manufacture a slanderous aspersion of the one as of the eight, and to say, that he had an eye to future political popularity and advancement, and sought, as a demagogue, to appear to be the special champion of human rights. It may have cost some of the eight a much harder struggle to follow convictions of right, and to disappoint their colored friends, by a decision against the Civil

Rights Act, than it did the one to follow his conviction in its favor. It always takes more resolution and moral courage to offend friends, than to offend enemies ; and yet an honest man will not hesitate to do the former, when duty demands, cost what it may of confidence and regard. And apart from the injustice of the accusation, let the writer suggest, that it would be a very unwise policy for the colored people to persuade themselves or others, that the Supreme Court was hostile to their race, or even indifferent to their rights. We all need as many friends as possible, and it weakens our own confidence, as well as our position before others, unduly to magnify the number of our supposed enemies. That man feels and is strongest, who seems to have a great many friends. And all this appears still more plain, when we remember that the responsibility of the Court in this case was to decide a question of fact, with which feelings of friendship have nothing to do. If we asked a carpenter to tell us whether a certain box was six feet long and two feet wide, and he applied his rule carefully and pronounced it to be only five feet in length and eighteen inches in breadth, it would be simply absurd to become angry with him, because we were disappointed in the result of the measurement, having had the box specially made for us, and having set our hearts upon putting into it an article that it would not hold. Men would laugh at us, should we accuse him of not being our friend. Friendship could not alter the facts in the case. He told us the simple truth. Similarly the Supreme Court has simply a fact to declare. Were the XIIIth and XIVth Amendments to the Constitution long enough and broad enough to take in Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Bill? They applied the legal rule of measurement and said that these amendments were too short and narrow for the purpose. If they saw that to be the case, they could do no otherwise as honest men than say so ; and there is no question of friendship involved. A poor widow asks a Bank President to give her a little of the abundant bank money, that she may pay rent, and buy food, fuel and clothing. The Bank President replies, that he has no legal power to use the bank funds for charitable purposes ; whereupon the indignant widow charges him with hard-heartedness and enmity,

and insists that he ought to have such power, and that it is a disgrace that, in such a rich country, the poor are shut out from being relieved by the banks! Is she right? Clearly not.

4. A decision of this nature was anticipated by many of those who had studied the subject with care, and who were warm friends of the African race. Some of them voted against the Act, in Congress, because they believed it to exceed the power given to Congress by the Constitution; while others voted for it, knowing it was, at least, of doubtful constitutionality, but thinking it might do good, for a time, even should it be set aside, at last, by an adverse decision of the Supreme Court. Senator Carpenter of Wisconsin, one of the ablest lawyers in the land, not only voted against it, but plainly warned the colored people, that it would prove a delusive trust, as it would surely be declared unconstitutional in its application within the States when once a case should reach the Supreme Court. The same position was taken by the *N. Y. Independent*, as soon as the Act passed; and yet that influential paper has been doing battle for the colored people for thirty-five years, and is especially pronounced against all forms of caste. Surely, when some of the best friends of the Negro have thus, on legal grounds, expected this decision as the only one possible, it ill becomes any one to assail the integrity, or ridicule the supposed weakness of the highest judicial body in the nation, which has rendered it.

5. It is a somewhat curious fact, that this decision is made upon principles of constitutional interpretation which used to be affirmed by anti-slavery statesmen, and denied by the pro-slavery politicians and by the Supreme Court as it was, when controlled by the slave-power. It is this fact which enables the assailants of the Court to make it appear inconsistent in its present utterance. But it is the commendable inconsistency of abandoning a false and dangerous principle of interpretation, which had been repeatedly used of old by the Supreme Court, by inferior courts and by legislators, to strain the Constitution into an unwarranted exercise of power in behalf of slavery. It was a dangerous two-edged tool, which cut in harmful as often as in useful directions. The writer confesses

to a certain natural satisfaction, that the Supreme Court has been converted, even at this late day, to the very principle upon which others and himself used, in the year 1850 and subsequently, to oppose the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law. We then contended that Congress had no power to legislate upon any subject not referred to its legislative jurisdiction by the Constitution; and that while the 4th Article of the Constitution forbade indeed the several States to set free fugitives who "owed service," it gave to Congress no power whatever to make laws upon the subject, but left the matter wholly to the States. Many of the Northern States, on this very ground, passed laws, known as "Personal Liberty Bills," to protect colored citizens who might be unjustly claimed as fugitive slaves. But the pro-slavery Federal courts of that day refused to adopt that safe principle, which vindicated genuine State-rights—although the Southern politicians were always harping on State-rights—and they adopted the latitudinarian principle, that, without a direct grant of power, Congress might legislate about anything which the Constitution mentioned only negatively in the way of laying restrictions on the States. The Civil Rights Bill was unfortunately based on that same dangerous principle; which, if used to accomplish a good thing to-day, might be used for most pernicious purposes to-morrow, and might even work a total subversion of one of the chief and most valued characteristics of our American nationality, to wit: the division of power between the States and the Federal Government, and the strict limitation of the latter. For the Fourteenth Amendment, which was relied on to sanction the legislation of Congress in the Civil Rights Act is so broad in the subjects to which it refers, that if its mere prohibition to the States of abuses sanctioned by State law, is authority for Congress to legislate directly for individual and corporate action unauthorized by State law, there is scarcely a subject on which Congress may not interfere, and State rights will be quite swept away. Its language is: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Now if Congress may claim, under this Amendment, a right directly to legislate upon the unauthorized action of private parties on all the subjects related to the protection of citizens against injustice touching any question of life, liberty, and property, and the equal bearing of laws upon all persons and classes, what matter of State legislation would be left? Does not almost every offence committed in a State infringe justice as regards life, or liberty, or property, or the equal protection of the laws? State legislation would become superfluous, if not invalid, and State rights would cease to exist, under such an interpretation, although Article IX says: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people;" while Article X. declares: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." A thoughtful man can hardly say that he regrets the return of the Supreme Court to the strict construction of the Constitution from which it ought never to have departed; even though at times it may deprive Congress of the power to do very desirable things. This will be more than balanced by its depriving Congress of an unlimited power to intermeddle with State concerns, and to convert our Union into a great centralized authority, contrary to the whole theory of our government, and to the only method by which such an immense territory can be held in a national unity. Hence the ground would seem to be wisely taken by the Supreme Court, in this decision:

The XIVth Amendment is prohibitory upon the States only, and the legislation authorized to be adopted by Congress for enforcing it, is not *direct* legislation on the matters respecting which the States are prohibited from making or enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but is *corrective* legislation, such as may be necessary or proper for counteracting and redressing the effect of such laws or acts.

6. It is further to be considered that this decision has not a word against the equal rights of colored people, but simply remands them to the same legal protection as that upon which the whites rely. Every citizen, white or black, it has been said, owes allegiance, and has in turn a right to protection.

True; but our peculiar form of government divides the responsibility of furnishing the protection. In the District of Columbia, in the Territories, on the high seas, and in foreign lands, the Federal Government undertakes the protection; while within the several States, it is assumed by each of them respectively. A white man has no other protection in a State than State law. If he and a railway conductor fall into a quarrel, and the conductor wrongfully puts him off the car (as is often done) his redress is to sue the company under the common law, or the statute law of the State. If he is a Jew, and the Grand Union Hotel at Saratoga refuses on that account to receive him, his remedy, if he seeks one, must be a simple action under State law. Congress does nothing to protect him. Nay, further, there is no law of Congress, and there could be none constitutionally, to prevent the murder of a citizen within a State. The protection even of life is left by the Constitution to be furnished by each State to all who may be within its bounds. Now this decision of the Supreme Court does not deny or question a single right of a colored man; but it says that the special kind of Federal protection sought to be thrown around him by Congress, in Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act, was, however well meant, in excess of the power of Congress; and that the colored man in a State must fall back, as does the white man, on the protection of that State; which, as a citizen, he has a plain right to demand.

7. Once more, the decision has valuable positive features in reference to the preservation of the equal rights of the colored race. Let us notice four. (1.) It declares that should any State venture to pass laws infringing the equal civil rights of the negro, then Congress would have a right to legislate on the subject. The language of the opinion of the Court is: "If the [State] laws themselves make any unjust discriminations amenable to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has full power to afford a remedy under that amendment and in accordance with it." The effect of this is to prevent any person or corporation from taking shelter under a State law, when maltreating a colored man. No such law can be passed and stand. The wrongdoer will thus be left as an offender without the protection of State law, and subject to the

result of a civil suit. Furthermore, it is noticeable that the good will of the Court toward the colored race, and its anxiety to protect their rights has even led it at this point to strain to the utmost the meaning of the word "law" in the Fourteenth Amendment; so that the prohibition to the States, and the opportunity for Congressional legislation, shall extend not only to formal laws on the statute book against negro rights, but to executive and judicial acts and customs having the force of law. The formal decision specifies "making or enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts," while Justice Bradley, in the accompanying official opinion of the Court, says that the Fourteenth Amendment "authorizes Congress" "to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and *the action of State officers, executive or judicial*, where these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendments." Again he says: "Until some State law has been passed, or *some State action through its officers or agents* has been taken adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation can be called into activity." And in referring to what had been cited as analogous badges of servitude under serfdom, and which necessarily fell with serfdom, the opinion says: "But these were servitudes imposed by the old law, or by *long custom which had the force of law*, exacted of one man from another without the latter's consent," and it declares that such servitudes so exacted would come under the amendment.

(2.) The decision re-affirms the validity of the Civil Rights Act in the fourth section, which secures in the States equality to colored men in the composition of juries, because the encroachment on their rights in this respect took the form of hostile State legislation, and therefore came under the Fourteenth Amendment. This maintains a great safeguard of the colored citizen in all cases which arise before the courts.

(3.) It also asserts that the judgment given has no reference to the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act in its application to the District of Columbia and the national territories, where the Constitution gives Congress full powers; this question not having been raised before the court. There have been

repeated outrages on colored persons in the District, and in the territories, by the refusal of hotels and restaurants to entertain them ; and as the arguments used by the Court could not apply there, it is reasonably certain that in such cases they have a legal redress, under the Civil Rights Act. The moral effect of this fact, if it hold good, will be of great importance, as will also be its direct practical bearing, speaking as it does in the name of the nation. For many railroad routes begin in the District, or in the Territories, and run into the adjoining States ; and others, which come from States, run into the District, or into a Territory. It will be very difficult in such cases for the railroads to have two systems of passenger arrangements, one based on caste and the other on equality, to apply in turn, as the cars change from one part of the route to the other. To avoid confusion and infringement of the law, they will naturally and necessarily apply to the whole route, especially in through-cars, the principle of equality required by law in the part of the route which lies in the District or in a Territory.

(4.) The decision shows its good will toward the colored race by giving a significant hint of a possible general Civil Rights Act, which might have force under another and for this purpose hitherto unused provision of the Constitution, to wit: the 3d clause of Section viii. of Article I., which gives to Congress power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States." The sixth point of the formal decision reads: "Nor is it decided whether Congress under the commercial power may, or may not, pass a law securing to all persons equal accommodations on lines of public conveyance between two or more States." This in form is non-committal, as no case had been presented under that power ; but that the idea should be mentioned by the Court is not without weighty significance. It looks much as if the Court wanted to suggest that Congress should try another road to reach the same destination.

But turning now from the Supreme Court, let us briefly consider, *secondly, the situation in which the decision leaves the colored race, and the action which becomes thereupon appropriate.* The loud and general wail of lamentation and the outcry of indignation against the Court which went up

from the colored people, when the decision was first announced, were natural; but it would have been better if some of their superserviceable and impetuous friends, both white and colored, who are fond of assuming to be the peculiar advocates and guardians of their rights, had not encouraged the feeling and the expression. It is always well to keep cool, if one wants a safe judgment. To fly off the handle, in a passion, never mends matters. Sober, second thought has prevented many a grave mistake, and it is not always wise to rush after the politicians, white or colored, before whose imaginations possible nominations loom up in the future, and whose personal ambitions are served by loudly expressed sympathy with alleged wrongs, and by being brought forward as the representative men of their race. Lately a very intelligent colored man said: "The misfortune of the colored people is, that they have not now in the country a single leader whom they dare to trust." It is well to remember how the cunning Absalom spoke to the common people, when he wanted to become king: "Absalom said, moreover, 'Oh, that I were made judge in the land, that every man who hath any suit or cause might come unto me and I would do him justice.' And it was so, that when any man came nigh to him to do him obeisance, he put forth his hand and took him and kissed him."

Sometimes a panic takes place in an army from an exaggeration of danger. Let us allow the smoke of battle to clear away a little, and possibly there may not be so many dead and wounded men as we have supposed. There may be at first a few evil effects from this decision. The enemies of the negro race naturally received it with a shout of exultation, and the southern newspapers issued extras to communicate the welcome news. But that does not prove much. "The triumphing of the wicked will be short." The longer they study the decision the less comfort will they be able to extract from it. No State which now does justice to the negro will change for the worse, while others will steadily improve. The eight years since the passage of the Civil Rights Act have not left the colored people where that Act found them. There has been a marked advance in their intelligence, and in public opinion relative to their capacity and their rights, as also in the favor

with which both of the political parties begin to regard them. They are not to be any longer the helpless victims of outrage, at the North or at the South. They are to be recognized as equal citizens with all others. They have now reached a stage where special legislation for them in particular will daily become less necessary and less desirable. There is great force in the official words of Justice Bradley, as the organ of the Court, on this very point. He says: "When a man has emerged from slavery and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the irreparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation, when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen or a man are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected." This idea is really the key-note to which the public, of whatever race, is to adjust itself, and to which it will adjust itself. All talk about another amendment to the Constitution, or a new Supreme Court, is useless and unwise. It is based on too gloomy a view of the situation; it diverts attention from other and practical measures; and it has a savor of wild and unjust exasperation. Let us augur hopefully while we act earnestly and effectively. Several things may wisely be done.

1. Full use should be made of the Civil Rights Act, whenever a case of injustice because of race occurs in the District of Columbia or in the Territories. The practice of private persons and of corporations in such localities must be made to correspond with the demands of the law, and every infraction should be taken up promptly and prosecuted. And it would be well for the colored people to make common cause in this matter and have an organization to take charge of every case which may arise; so that the poverty and obscurity of the sufferer may not prevent the execution of the law. As the district contains the national capital, and as the territories are numerous, populous and extensive, the moral effect of such enforcement of the law will be widely felt in the States.

2. In the States there must be a steady agitation of the subject in the newspapers, in conventions, in political organizations, and where necessary, at the polls, together with a resort

to the Courts under the general provisions of law which protect all citizens. The opinion of the Supreme Court says: "Inn-keepers and public carriers, by the law of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodations to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them." This being so, let colored men make use of their rights thus affirmed, and carry cases of complaint to the courts of every State, till their equality with others before the law shall be everywhere judicially recognized and established. It may be urged, that though the general provisions of State law may be sufficient, and though the State judges may so declare, yet the juries will fail to convict the individual offenders. That may often be; but the misfortune is not at all peculiar to this class of cases. It is very difficult in many communities, North, South, East, and West, to secure juries that will convict offenders in liquor cases, to say nothing of gambling cases, and murder cases, and "Star Route" cases, defended by shrewd and eloquent lawyers, who can make criminals appear innocent, and a pure court appear corrupt! But after all, the prospect of success was no better in the same States under the Civil Rights Act; for juries to convict were equally necessary under it, and therefore it was largely a dead letter in certain sections. The matter can be no worse now, and a persistent appeal to the courts, with a healthful general agitation, will secure convictions. There is some ground for thinking that this decision of the Supreme Court, by removing that compulsory action of the Federal Government which so sorely offended State pride and a sense of State rights will facilitate a healthful State action, legislative and judicial. Men will often do voluntarily what they refuse to do under unjust compulsion. Thus the Atlanta, Ga., *Constitution*, after this decision had been rendered, said:

It now behooves the South to show that she is capable of doing the Negro justice without fear of impending statutes. The grand opportunity is now afforded the South to show, that she is as magnanimous as she has proved herself to be courageous. She will demonstrate, that while she could never have been driven by duress into doing what was clearly wrong, the removal of restraint will not tempt her into doing anything which is less than right.

And Governor Brown, of that State, has expressed himself to the same effect; though he favors separate yet equally good accommodations in rail cars—a plan which will not be found to work. The colored people must appeal, by oral discussion, by the press, and at the polls, to this better feeling in both parties, especially as both have put themselves on record in political conventions as favoring the equal civil rights of all races and colors. And if outrages by individuals and corporations shall still occur, and be found without redress, so that special statute legislation shall be needed in the States, then the colored people and their white friends must demand it, and must steadily enforce the demand at the polls. A million colored votes, distributed through the States, in many of which parties are nearly balanced, and in all of which they are loosely compacted and are threatened with disintegration, will not long be unheeded. For the words of the poet to oppressors were never more true :

There is a weapon firmer set,	And stronger than the bayonet ;
A weapon which comes down as still	As snowflakes fall upon the sod,
But executes a freeman's will,	As lightning does the will of God ;
And from its force, nor bars nor locks	Will shield you : 'tis the ballot-box !

3. It may not be amiss to take the hint given by the Supreme Court, and call upon Congress to pass a new Civil Rights Act, to apply in cases of unjust State action of any kind; and also under its undoubted power to regulate commerce between the States, to pass an Act securing equal accommodations on all public conveyances which run between two or more States, and if may be in all hotels for travelers having occasion to pass from State to State. This will afford a further test of the degree of legal protection which can be obtained for the colored race in this land of boasted freedom. It will also show, in the congressional debates and votes, what parties and what individuals are the sincere friends of the Negro, and believe in equal rights. Some men, no doubt, are tired, at the North and at the South, of the negro-question in religion and politics. They have said so, to our certain knowledge, for at least thirty years; and that has given them time to become very tired. But they cannot be accommodated by its withdrawal, till full justice is done. Payment by installments is

always a slow process. No question is settled, till it is settled right. Past experience might have taught the American people that lesson. The late war wrote it out in letters of fire! Providence ever finds some way to revive agitation, till the truth is vindicated.

Meanwhile, let our colored friends hope on, pray on, and labor on; not relying too much on political action, as a cure-all of evil, but seeking to rectify public sentiments, and remembering that their own progress in education, wealth, morals, and religion will have the most important part to play in overcoming the cruel prejudice of which they complain. It came in with the degradation of slavery, and it will eventually go out with the elevation of liberty. The higher they shall rise intellectually and morally, the more complete their divorce from whiskey and tobacco, from dirt and ignorance, the more absurd, undemocratic, and unchristian will caste appear, and the more numerous will white friends rally to their aid. Let us begin with the Christian church, appealing to conscience, and solemnly demanding, in the name of the Lord Jesus, as James did in the early days, in behalf of the poor, that no distinction of race and color shall be recognized in the sanctuary, where the words of Solomon surely should apply: "The rich and the poor meet together, the Lord is the Maker of them all;" and where should be a living exemplification of the doctrine of Paul, who said: "Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free; but Christ is all and in all." And then let us transfer the same argument to the civil State, and hold up to scorn and shame the idea, that any citizen, of whatever race and however personally obscure, should be denied protection from insult and outrage in any part of the country; whether the fault be in the absence of needed law or in a failure to enforce it. The cause is that of universal and impartial liberty, of pure, unadulterated Christianity, and in the end it must triumph. Let no man lose faith in God, truth, and righteousness, in republican government, and the church of Christ, because of temporary evils. There may be an occasional backward eddy along the banks, but the main stream rolls steadily onward to the ocean. Men will finally see the

absurdity and wickedness of caste, and withdraw from it all real or seeming support of Church and State. Till that day come, we must wage an unceasing warfare against it, avoiding wrath and hatred, uncharitableness and senseless clamor, and keeping in sympathy with God. As said Whittier, years since :

So let it be ! In God's own might
We gird us for the coming fight ;
And strong in Him whose cause is ours
In conflict with unholy powers,
We grasp the weapons He has given—
The Light, the Truth, the Love of Heaven.

ARTICLE II.—THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN EDUCATION.

THERE is an old irrational feud between the human heart and intellect. One form of it appears in the jealousies and antagonisms of religion and learning. Such conflict ought to be impossible where there is a worthy estimate of man. What man is determines the problem of his training. The capacity of his being is the measure of his becoming. A worthy idea of his person, place, use, and destination pledges a broad conception of his education. Education is nothing less than the development and training of all the potencies that have been lodged in man. It concerns itself with the full contents of his being and with all his possibilities. The claims of education are precisely the claims of manhood. If the ideal of manhood be low the product of training will be meagre and inadequate. The claims of religion upon education are precisely the claims of a complete manhood. If a man is worth educating at all he is worth educating roundly as a man. If the capacity of religion belongs to his manhood it is a crime against that manhood to ignore its rights or cripple its possibilities. It must be acknowledged that religion, in some form, has always been an immense power in the history of the human race. It has always been in fact the dominant power. Nor is it likely that it will cease to be in any most advanced period of the future. So long as man is forced by the necessities of his own being to recognize a power which is other and more than himself and other and more than the universe in which he lives, so long religion will hold its supremacy, and this supremacy will be hardly the less apparent in whatever effort to suppress, pervert or limit its claims. No healthy growth can ever ignore it or pervert it or crowd it into a place of subordination or insignificance. This meagre world-power can never successfully displace that which represents what lies beyond the world. It is too real and too essential. The religious seems to be the primitive consciousness of the race. The limit of primitive history

and tradition is primeval religion. Beyond this we have nothing but speculation. It may be that we do not know prehistoric or pre-traditional man. But primitive man so far as we know him feels the invisible long before he understands much of the visible. There is something in him that pushes him into the presence of a power behind the Universe, before the intellect has fairly grappled with the problem of such a power. The problem of origin and destination is summarily solved before the mind has had time to fairly comprehend the elements of the problem. Man does not attain to the idea of God by the action of the powers of nature upon his creative imagination. It is not the product of experience, meditation, teaching or even revelation simply. There were nothing to educate or cultivate "if there were not already presupposed an original God-consciousness as its practical basis and condition." A higher world and a higher power thrust themselves into the forefront of all our investigation of this lower world and all lower orders of existence. Mythology antedates history, and mythology is "religion gone mad." Religion is before philosophy or science or whatever highest product of the human intellect. Men begin to reflect, and generate philosophy, to investigate and generate science, to recollect and produce history, to utter their thoughts and produce literature, to give expression to feeling and the sense of beauty in the forms of imagination and produce poetry and art. But already they have begun to feel, in dim, vague fashion, the reality of an invisible realm and the presence of invisible personalities and powers, which they do not profess to understand and already religion is born. And they have presentiment of the invisible powers before they have understanding of them. Religion is before theology. All earliest attempts, so far as we know them, in science, philosophy, history, literature, poetry or art, are religious, and this because man can not crowd back from his highest and noblest activities the realm of the unseen and unknown that lies beyond the borders of the Universe. Before this earthly existence there stretches an ocean at whose shores man stands longingly. While he is thinking and speculating upon the origin of things he finds already within him the necessity to try the vastness of the ocean that lies before him and bring back some

report. Indeed there comes a report out of the great deep even before he has sought to launch. What we know of the invisible is given as revelation. And yet too, religion and theology are the necessity of the soul's outreach and striving to know what lies beyond. We are forever mingling these two realms. It is the vital force of a nature that has capacity for religion that effects this. Existence begins in religion, and it must end with it. It begins in the simplicities of undeveloped and untrained manhood. It must end in the complexity and completeness of the perfect man. It begins as a crude, confused product of nature perverted by finiteness and sin. It must end as the consummate product of a divine and human effort. It begins with spontaneity, it must end with conscious freedom and virtue. It begins in a garden. It must end in a city. Eden and the New Jerusalem! Here is religion without and religion with the developed contents of manhood. But always religion. If the Bible had intended to give a philosophical rather than a religiously historical and prophetic statement of the beginnings and endings of religion in the history of humanity, it could not have done it more successfully. Here we find the religious as the earliest historic consciousness. Man walks as a child with God. Without training he is not without religion. And in the consummation we behold still the dominance of religion. Intellect and power, art and achievement bring their glory and honor into the City of God, where religion is enthroned in all its fullness and majesty of power. The New Jerusalem is a city with all the splendors of decoration, but it is the city of God. Religion must crown as well as begin the history of the race. Man must be trained to the utmost of his capacity—and that means that he must be trained religiously. Education can never suppress nor displace religion. It can only pervert it, and in doing so perverts itself. Its highest aim is to develop religion into fullness of significance and power.

The end of history is the kingdom of God. Religion has often been a blind, dark power, but always a power, and one whose greatness might easily suggest that it will not take care of itself; will not take itself out of the way; cannot be explained out of existence; cannot be trained into permanent silence; will not be ignored, and cannot be majestically put to

confusion by the power of intellectual arrogance. If religion were only a coördinate factor in our education it would demand all that any other factor demands, for its rights are as great, and an education that would crowd it out of recognition would only be a garbled and false and so a dangerous education. Even those who allow it no higher dignity or significance than belongs to a product of feeling and imagination clearly see this. But if religion represents the realm of the absolute, and is the central and imperative power in man, the case is other and more. Religion does not come into man's consciousness simply as a product of his thought. It is not a product of the intellectual activity in its speculation upon the origin of all things, as Rationalism claims. It is not a theoretic, but a practical power. It is more than knowledge of the infinite. It is knowledge realized as obligation. In religion we do not find man exacted upon by the powers and mysteries of the universe over against which he stands in his weakness and ignorance and dependence. Nor do we find him exacting upon himself in his isolation and centrality and supremacy. Nor do we find one department of his being exacting upon another. We find the whole man subject to an authority without him. Nor yet is religion wholly in the conscience, as moralism holds. It is not in the feeling alone, as mysticism holds. Nor is it in the æsthetic faculty. Nor in the will alone. Religion is realized only as the "unity of the soul revealed in feeling, willing, and knowing," and that soul in its unity becomes the organ of the revealing activity of God. Religion, therefore, as an authority from the realm of the absolute claims the whole man. It is the "surrender of man to God in the thought of what is true, in the will for what is good, in the feeling of blessedness, as an immediate life from faith, in which man brings his life to God in order to receive true life from God." Religion, then, is the root of manhood, as well as its crown, and all rational and systematic development must proceed from this center. A something there must be in man which is to him what life is in the development of organism. This somewhat is the religious factor in him. Only as religion finds place in the growth and development of manhood do we attain to symmetry and completeness.

But religion not only furnishes material to be educated, it also furnishes material which educates. It not only demands a place, and a commanding place, in every comprehensive educational product, it also provides that which aids in the development of that product. Whatever educates, whatever quickens, develops and trains the elements of manhood, is the material of education. Every capacity as it develops itself yields a product which in turn becomes an agency not only for the still larger development of that particular capacity but for the development of many others besides. The linguistic and mathematical capacities have furnished a vast store of material for the further development of these capacities, and the same is true of all others. But it is more to the purpose that they have all furnished large material for general education, and the worth, by the larger estimate, of any particular educational product is not simply in what it does for the capacity to which it corresponds, but in what it does for the broader and completer education of men. We do not study languages and mathematics solely with reference to the attainment of a special linguistic and mathematical skill. They are necessary to any broad and thorough education. Religion also yields material for its own fuller and completer development and culture. Religion as an historic product is always necessary to the training and culture of the religious capacities. Without it the capacity for religion would deteriorate. But we claim for religion a larger place than this in the education of men, and the claim we make also illustrates its supremacy. Religion has furnished a vast amount of material for general education. No one capacity has contributed so much to the general elevation of man. No single department of learning has the educational record that religion has. It has made an impression upon every department of human activity. It has colored the world's thinking and influenced the world's training as no other power has or can. Often, no doubt, a bad discoloration and perversion. But this, not because it had no legitimate place in the direction of human development, but only because it was itself a perverted religion. A revival of religion has often proved itself necessary to a revival of learning. The best trained races are the religious races. The experience of

the power of religion quickens and expands the intellectual faculties. Dealing with the loftiest themes it furnishes material for the most eager striving of all the powers of the soul. He who should undertake to eliminate the products of the religious activity from the material of education would find how vast is its range and how vital its energy. No education of any sort is possible independently of the operation of certain fundamental energies of manhood which rightly interpreted have a religious significance, and which exist because man is a religious being.

All human development is conditioned by the activities of faith. We rest implicitly on certain first things that are given as the condition of all reliable knowledge, and these postulates of knowledge when rationally interpreted are found to have a religious significance, are found to refer themselves back to somewhat that lies outside the subject and outside the visible universe, and exist only because they run back and bed themselves in the religious nature of man, or that in him by which he attaches himself to a power beyond the universe. Faith in any form or relation is the gift of God to the nature He made dependent on Him. A religious significance must be found also in the outgoing of the energies of manhood that finds place in the processes of education. We are full of energies that are pressing with more or less of definiteness, although in large measure without conscious recognition towards some goal. They have a teleological significance. This significance is recognized in the necessity of man to seek after completeness, and it has more than an ethical meaning. It has its root in the religious nature, it bespeaks a beyond as the goal of man's perfection, and it implies a background of divine energy and intelligence. So also is it true that in the processes of education the action of conscience is necessary, and conscience must ever remain an enigma unless there be found in it a religious significance and the implication of a religious relation. Enter any department of activity that furnishes material for the higher culture of men, and note how large a place religion finds in it. Poetry for example, has always found its highest inspirations in religion. The domain of religion is its choicest foraging ground. The greatest poems of any age or

race are religious. We can afford to lose the poems that are earth-born, but the world were poor indeed without these products of a heavenly inspiration. The supernatural is necessary to the grandest emotions and imaginings of the human soul. The poet is the seer of more than earthly vision. Paganism crowns him priest of the gods, and Revelation recognizes him as the prophet of Jehovah. Men are already speculating as to the probable result, in the domain of imagination, of the decay of religion. As well speculate with respect to the flight of the eagle whose wings are clipped and from whose gaze the heavens are withdrawn. The best art touches the domain of religion, it finds there its choicest material and its strongest incentive. It is not its highest vocation to train the eye or cultivate the taste, but to nurture the higher capacities of the soul. It is not to reproduce material forms with mechanical correctness, but to embody ideas that are furnished from the higher realms of thought and feeling. That art which has had the mightiest influence in human life, has brought its creations from the realm of the invisible. Christianity has produced the highest art of all time, and it is this Christian art which in turn has educated Christendom.

Religion finds place in philosophy. A true science of man will contemplate him not as a fragment, but in his totality. No man takes correct account of himself or adequately understands himself, who does not know himself in his relations. No man can be understood in his isolation. The phenomena of consciousness contain religion. There is given freedom and law, duty and authority in the very idea of man. What can we know of him apart from that which is highest in him? A psychology is impossible without ethics, and ethics contain still insolvent enigmas without religion. To know the ground and law of duty is with Kant to know man, and the problem is still unsolved till he finds God. The larger and more important contents of consciousness are moral and religious. They are material for philosophic investigation and they furnish material which philosophy, as a product of human effort, uses in the work of education. Philosophy must of necessity concern itself with the same questions as religion and theology. What can a man know about himself who never raises the question of

his source and destination? What can he know about himself without understanding the nature and function of conscience, without some worthy conception of law and obligation and right, without some explanation of the unsatisfied longings and strivings of his being after an unattained ideal?

The different departments of social science touch upon the domain of religion. The epidemic of shallowness in political philosophy is passing away. It is recognized that the social sciences must deal with profounder than merely material questions, and that to have a rational, they must have a moral and even religious basis. Men cannot adequately apprehend their social relations without knowing something of what lies back of them. What is the genesis of government and what its sanction? Is it grounded in man's lower or in his higher nature? Is it wholly a product of man in his independence and isolation from a higher power, or does there appear in the very authority and majesty with which men invest it the presence of a higher power? Is government grounded in right, and does it strive to express and realize that right? And what is the ground and source of that right? What is the basis of obligation, what the source of authority, what the nature and sanction of punishment? These are questions which men are obliged to deal with. While men are discussing questions of prudence, questions of right thrust themselves into their faces; while they talk of privileges, questions of authority come to the front. These are the questions, questions that touch the domain of ethics and religion, that have shaken the very order of social life. Those who have supposed themselves to have gotten rid of these troublesome questions in their apotheosis of secularism, have found themselves thrust back into the domain of morality and religion. The political science which is to-day exerting the most commanding influence, cuts off secularism by the roots and takes us back into the realm of a divine authority, and finds there the ground of human authority.

Material science, too, cannot evade the realm of religion. This is seen in the very effort to avoid it. The problems which men try to work out of sight disclose themselves in the very effort. Science walks leisurely about the universe and seeks to understand it in its processes. And, long before it has

completed its circuit and brought back its report, religion has been beneath the surface and brought back its report with respect to its source and goal. Science must confront the same problem with which religion has dealt and evades it only by consenting or resolving to be unreligious, that is by allowing itself to be mutilated. It is only by a suppression or an affectation of indifference to the testimony of religion that science shuts it away from the results of its investigation. While science is at its investigation philosophy interposes itself. Not only the question of fact and law but of source and object presses for solution, and it is only by ignoring or affecting to ignore the claims of philosophy and going into the affectation of mental paralysis that science can avoid dealing with these momentous questions. The very effort to avoid them demonstrates that they should find place in rational science. Science will only then become most truly rational and will realize its largest and best work in the education of men when it takes into court the witness of religious philosophy.

It is still further to be considered that religion furnishes the best ideal of education. Not only the material but the pattern. A man in his becoming is as his ideal. Education is the work of training men after some standard. The worth of the education is the worth of the standard. The ideal of manhood is the ideal of education. Independently of religion education has never succeeded in fashioning for itself the best standards. The human intellect has proved itself incompetent to grapple with the grave question of the reconstruction of manhood. Of course historic religion has not always furnished the best ideals of manhood. Its ideals have often been caricatures. But religion has led the way. Somehow the pattern man has been lost to the race, men may differ in their explanation of the fact, but they agree in the fact. Men saw no perfect sample of their kind. They even lost a worthy idea of manhood. The evil that perverts character perverts also the very idea of character. History will testify. Secular history has never been able either to present a perfect man or the perfect conception of a man. But religion has made some approximation. At least it has not despaired. What do we find? A race conscious of a lost ideal. The Eden, the Golden Age,

the ideal hero are in the past. It turns back with longing eyes as to something lost. The intellect without the aid of religion has never been able to grapple successfully with the future. So far as men have followed the lead of the intellect alone they have despaired. They behold deterioration, decay, death about them and behind them. They see themselves the spoil of evil. The good are dead. The Greek cynic with his lantern hunting for a man is the human intellect, divorced from religion, hunting despairingly for the perfect manhood. Following the lead of the intellect men have not profoundly believed in their own greatness and possible perfection. They look backward rather than forward. Poetry sighs and philosophy sneers, but religion hopes. The race has in fact believed in its own deterioration. All mythologies give evidence. Neither poetry, nor philosophy, nor science divorced from religion has been able to develop strong faith in the higher possibilities of man. Mr. Bryant's suggestion that there is as good evidence of the ape's deterioration from manhood as of man's emergence from apehood is worth considering. In the darkest hours it has not been the intellect, but the heart of man that has looked hopefully to the future. It is the cry of man's heart God-touched that has uttered its longing for a nobler character and a nobler and completer life. The pessimism of modern agnosticism is a necessity. The optimism of the modern materialistic science is the product of something nobler than itself. Look at the early home of learning and the early home of religion. The ideal is not with the land of culture, but with the land of religion. The eye of the Greek is towards the past. The eye of the Hebrew is always toward the future. The man of learning is a realist. The man of religion is an idealist. The perfect man and the conception of the perfect man come not from Greece but from Palestine. It is not the product of secular life and training, but of religion. Hebraism indeed has not given us a complete ideal character, only its approximation. The ideal was greatly perverted in the perversions of the Hebrew religion. But we have here the beginnings. Be it that an objective revelation lodged the germs of the conception in the Hebrew mind. It nevertheless emerged as a growth through the Hebrew's religious consciousness, and

the gift of the Christ idea is the gift of religion. And what Hebraism began Christianity completes. Christianity has given the world the pattern man whose completeness is the proper goal of all human development. He is not a creation of the intellect. He is not a product of secularism. Nor yet is he the product of a historic race-culture, but God-sent to meet and fill the ideal that was already struggling into view from the religious consciousness of Hebraism and longed for blindly as the desire of all nations. It is Christianity that has given us the idealism of our modern schemes of education. It has given the world a new conception of man. It has given new hope for the future of the race. It has developed the thought of God-sonship and the kingdom of God, and enlarged the scope of education to meet these grand ideals. Modern education builds on foundations which religion has laid.

It is inseparable from what has just been said that religion furnishes the noblest inspiration for the work of education. This inspiration we may call the inspiration of faith. As religion furnishes the ideal, so faith is the ideal. The best modern learning is a product which has behind it the record of a lofty faith in an ideal of manhood which is the gift of Christianity. We are hardly conscious how greatly our work of education is influenced by a Christian faith in man. We are hardly conscious how greatly indebted is our broad ideal of education to the person of Christ and to the power he exerts in the human soul. If we should lose this faith in a high Christian ideal of manhood from our training we should soon see how it and how mankind would deteriorate. What saves education from a narrow utilitarianism, or a gross materialism, or secularism, is precisely faith in the ideal man. We can easily dwarf manhood and leave large tracts of its soil uncultivated by yielding to the clamor for a so-called practical education. There is nothing so mysterious about faith as an educative power. Its chief peculiarity is in its object. It is a rational self-committal to some ideal reality. If there be any such thing as an ideal reality, there is rational ground for confident self-committal to it.

It is only thus that we get practical connection with it; it is

the only way in which we attain to it. There must be an ideal back of all present, imperfect, outward reality, and a man must believe in it. Religion discloses itself as an act of faith because the soul commits itself to an invisible person who embodies its highest ideal of perfection. It is not claimed that every act of faith in an ideal is a religious act. But it is claimed that the faith which we have in the higher nature of man is largely the gift of religion. It is also claimed that it is necessary for a man to have faith in an ideal good in order to be a true man. All historic characters have been true characters in proportion as they have had faith in an ideal good towards which they were struggling. Patriarch pilgrims, true to the voices that uttered themselves within the soul, seeking a better country; reformers loyal to the truth, an ideal truth struggling after realization in the muddle of ignorance and strife of faction, seeking a purer state; martyrs true to conscience, resisting unto blood, striving against wrong, seeking the honor of God; educators sacrificing themselves that future generations may be blessed. All these have had an ideal of better things, have believed in it, have been true to it, and in so far as the ideal was worthy and the faith in it strong, they developed in themselves and helped develop in others noble characters. A faith that touches some ideal and holds the soul to it has always been the inspiration of noblest, truest character and achievement. This faith-element that grasps an ideal, as distinguished from a phenomenal, external, and partial reality, is necessary in all education. In all religious education, for example, faith in a religious ideal as distinguished from the formal and external, is the inspiring power. When worship loses the ideal presence and power behind its forms, it deteriorates, and the worshiper himself is degraded. The reason why paganism is incapable of the best religious culture, is that men cease to walk by faith and are content to walk by sight. The senses master faith. The visible displaces the invisible. The soul loses connection with an ideal beyond itself towards which it should strive. It is a lively faith, in what stands to us as representative of an ideal best and holiest, that saves men from a heartless and heathenish formalism in worship. But look at some of the departments of secular education. Faith in the simplicity, the reality and

dignity of manhood is a power in all social culture. When behavior becomes hollow and heartless and artificial, it loses all virtue and character deteriorates. The forms of society ought to represent an ideal reality. They ought to be as really the symbols of character as the forms of religion. Manners are morals in so far as they are real, and immorals if unreal. It is false ethics that identifies morals with manners. It is true which identifies manners with morals. Behavior is a language. It ought to disclose the real man. When men lose faith in the under reality of all social forms, society is corrupted and character deteriorates. Faith is a power in all industrial and professional education. All education is industrial in the larger sense, and all industry in any line is properly educational. Every student is a workman, and every workman should be so far forth a student as to seek the training of his own and others' manhood. Every man who has work to do should start with a worthy ideal and believe in it and hold to it. It is this which saves not only the work, but the workman. The want of an adequate ideal is a fatal objection to the doctrine of sphere education. No man values himself as he ought whose only idea of his education is that it must fit him for the practical duties of some particular department of activity. This places the workman above the man. Such notions ignore the higher claims of manhood. They lower men's conceptions of life. It may become an open question indeed whether "life is worth living" if its full significance is measured by one's relation to the machinery of the universe. A man with immortality within him can not safely crowd his whole being and life into the rut of his daily toil. Life loses freshness and range if it lacks a worthy ideal. The man who carries a worthy ideal into a particular line of work, in the long run, is most effective in that work and at the same time he saves his larger manhood. It is the ideal which marks the difference not only between the worthy and the unworthy, the true and false workman, but in fact, between the true and false man. The man who has no worthy standard and no faith in any, never can be an honorable journalist or man of letters in any sort. He is a sensational penny-a-liner, and his tribe is sufficiently numerous in American journalism. It is defective ideal that perverts the

man who might be an artist into an artisan, the lawyer into the pettifogger, the orator into the declaimer, the doctor into the charlatan, the preacher into the ranter, the merchant into the tricky huckster, the mechanic into a drudging machine.

All education for practical life ought to tend toward art. Every vocation ought to become a department in the art of worthy living. The high aim of all art is to develop true manhood and true life. The art of right living is the end of all art. A man's business is his calling from God. It is in intent the training school of his manhood. There is a religion in every legitimate calling that should save it from drudgery and dishonor. The man who puts a religious faith into the work to which nature and providence call him works with an inspiration that will make it an art before celestial eyes. To do one's best, according to a worthy standard, is well pleasing to a truth-loving God. To work with slattern hand is a degradation of manhood. There is a beauty in the truth which is acceptable to God. We shall have at once better educated men and less knavery when men carry the inspiration of religion into their callings. The so-called secular professions will be exalted and become sources of better training and larger use to the world, when men have more faith in the divine idea of life. When work is consecrated as the outgrowth of a more religious education, we shall have fewer Americans who like Carlyle's modern Englishman, are in league with the "great Lord of shoddy, adulteration and malfeasance" to help them do their work "with the maximum of slimness, swiftness, profit and mendacity."

In conclusion it should be considered that religion furnishes right principles of education. There is a somewhat general agreement as to the demand of education. What the world wants is *men*, full, complete, thoroughly trained men. No matter what the terminology, whether religious, scientific, or popular. What we want is complete men. The object of education is identical with the object of existence. One's theory of existence ought to be his theory of education. A philosophical statement of the aim of education should be nearly identical with a theological statement of the aim of existence. Aristotle would not differ from Paul. Matthew Arnold would

not differ from the Westminster divines. It comes to about this,—what we have in hand here is to develop and train a complete manhood, such manhood as God meant and the capacities of our own being demand. But men differ widely as to what constitutes a whole man. The standards of manhood are strangely variant. Just here the secular and religious world are likely to part company. Each, moreover, is at variance with itself. But we all agree as to the want, whatever the elements, methods, motives or principles of the work. We are after men. Dissatisfaction with educational processes generally means dissatisfaction with educational results. It comes from the conviction that somehow they do not accomplish the work. Secularism is dissatisfied with the work of religion, and little wonder. The caricatures of manhood which a perverted religion, in its control of secular education, has produced are worthy of no man's respect. It is only because human nature does not spoil easily that Ultramontane Christianity has not fatally crippled and dwarfed the manhood of the world. On the other hand religion claims, and with justice, that a purely secular education has not done and can not and will not do the work. It is an immense question. What are the agencies that shall reconstruct and train the manhood of the world? Secularism in our time has shown an immense pedagogic activity. It has made vast claims. It is in hand just here to criticise its claims and methods. Secularism lacks the requisite first principles. Religion, whatever be its defects in historic fact, nevertheless furnishes regulative principles, which are essential to the broadest education. This is a wide field. There is space but for a few points. And first let it be considered that religion emphasizes the importance of character as an end in all education. It claims to furnish not only the regulative impulses, but the determinative aims. Character and conduct are more than "three fourths of life." They are the end of all knowledge and the realization of all training. There are two dominant aims and two dominant schemes of education. The one is secular, the other religious. The one gives the intellect dominance. The other the heart and conscience. The one trains with reference to this world. The other with reference to the kingdom of God. The one is Hellenic, the other Hebraic. Historic Hebraism was incompetent for the successful training

of the race. But the Hebraic principle was right. The scheme that gives the moral and religious nature dominance is the only philosophical scheme and will prove itself competent to meet the wants of the world. Neither knowledge nor intellectual training can be an end. There is something higher and better. But nothing beyond character, conceived in its largest sense as the end of existence, can be rationally assumed. The end of education is character conceived as completeness of being and harmony with the mind of God.

Religion also emphasizes the spiritual conditions of the apprehension and appropriation of truth. Education encounters the weightiest problems of human existence. They are problems which the intellect cannot solve, although trained unto the utmost. Some sorts of knowledge refuse to enter the gateways of the intellect. The most momentous questions of existence touch the moral and religious nature of man. How we feel and how we behave are of some account in the solution of them. The truth is for the true. The man who is in sympathy with it and docile before it shall hear its voice. The profoundest questions of life are solved practically not speculatively. One may know in one sort what in another "passeth knowledge." Knowledge in the deepest sense is not simply the response of the mind, but of the whole moral and religious manhood to the truth. Some delicacy of moral fiber, some training of the higher power of the soul is necessary. There is a capacity of religious presentiment. The heart and conscience sense what the intellect does not yet fully see. There is a knowledge of feeling before that of seeing. The first truths are felt. The saint knows some things the philosopher does not. The soul of the Hebrew went deeper into the universe than the intellect of the Greek. Moses knew what Plato did not. Religion holds with confidence what perpetually bewilders science. It has found the heart of the universe while science has been looking up the bones and muscles. Religion, moreover, recognizes the existence of evil in man. There is, therefore, something to be undone as well as done. Immaturity is not the only barrier to be overcome. Men do not grow into completeness. Education in its comprehensive aspects must meet the fact of sin. Secular education would meet it by ignoring it, but still it remains to counter-work its best

efforts. Religion applies remedial agencies, introduces new principles and motives and develops life from a new basis. And in this connection it is to be observed that religion insists upon the control of the unselfish principle in the work of education. An education that makes the individual supreme and ignores the kingdom of God is fatally perverted. It is the unselfish principle that secures to the world at large the advantage of education and gives assurance that its results shall be a blessing and not an evil to the world. It not only gives us a conception of humanity, and faith in it, but love and devotion for it. It makes the kingdom of God in a humanity redeemed and trained into completeness the end of the individual effort, and keeps before men the fact that the individual never attains to completeness in isolation from humanity. The end of history is the education of a race. Unselfishness is necessary to any best personal training. A selfish scheme of education would be fatal to true manhood. How we feel and bear ourselves towards our fellows and towards a higher power is of more consequence to our own manhood than to anything else in the universe. It determines what sort of development and training we are getting. We are not isolated personalities. The background of our being binds us to the universe of being. God is training a race here on earth. Our training is inseparably linked to that of the race. Christianity with its philanthropy has wrought more mightily than any other agency towards the education of the race. It furnishes the mightiest of all incentives to the individual soul in its striving for the goal of its existence, but its highest good is humanity, "come in the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ," a "building fitly framed together grown into an holy temple in the Lord." It is good philosophy as well as religion that one must save life by losing it. We need in the secularism and individualism of the time more of the old Gentile Gospel of a redeemed humanity. We need more of the spirit of the great apostle who laid the products of his best training at the foot of the cross, and labored everywhere to lift men back into the dignity of their being and into fellowship with God. Education does not know itself till it understands the prayer of Christ, "Thy kingdom come, thy will be done."

ARTICLE III.—THE FUNCTION OF THE WILL IN KNOWLEDGE.

[From the French of EDMOND DE PRESSENSÉ ; by Rev. J. B. CHASE, Cherokee, Iowa.*]

THE CONDITIONS OF CERTAINTY.

THE participation of the will is absolutely necessary not only for the establishment of moral certainty, but even for that which is purely intellectual. I do not now refer to that merely permissive act which takes place every time we put forth a conscious effort; but I speak of that positive determination of the will in obedience to which the mind proceeds to the elaboration of knowledge, the object perhaps being entirely intellectual, and without consideration thus far of its moral truth properly so called. By this process alone can we attain to what can be worthily called knowledge. We attain the desired end through a degree of attention called reflection, and which implies both the concentration of our cognitive faculties, and the isolation through an effort of the mind of the object under contemplation. This effort puts the object under our direct mental vision, and sets up an energetic reaction against the dispersion of ideas by distractions from without.

2d. Every judgment which applies an attribute to any substance implies an act of the will; for the bestowal of this attribute implies comparison among other attributes and choice. There is no truth of any kind whatever that does not claim our assent before it can be appropriated or possessed. This assent or consent is more than a simple passive affirmation.†

* This extract is taken from chapter 1st of a work just published by Edmond de Pressensé, a name which has acquired some little renown in the modern struggles of French Protestantism. The book is entitled "*Les Origines*," and contains five principal chapters, viz: I. The Problem of Knowledge; II. The Cosmological Problem; III. The Anthropological Problem; IV. The Origin of Morality and Religion; V. The Primitive Man.

† Ollé-Laprune, "*La Certitude Morale*," chap. II.

An error is always caused by negligence or slothfulness of mind, which has paused too soon in its researches. We must not confound this pause with the simple limitation of our knowledge. Error begins from the moment when by a hasty affirmation we have drawn too hasty conclusions from an incomplete examination. Descartes makes some very wise remarks on this subject, showing the plane to which he descended to lay the foundations of liberty. "If," says he, "I abstain from giving my judgment on anything when my acquaintance with it is not sufficiently decisive and clear, I evidently do right and make no mistake. But if I decide to affirm or deny it, then I do not use my free will as I ought. It is in the bad use of the free will that I find the hindrance which constitutes the framework of error."*

Malebranche is no less explicit than Descartes concerning the moral defect implied by human errors. "We are free," says he, "in our false judgments as we are in our illicit loves. The human mind is not subject to error, merely because it is finite, and less extended than the objects which it considers; it is also subject to error from its own fickleness. To understand the cause of this fickleness, we must recognize the fact that the will controls the action of the mind; that it directs the mind toward objects which it loves, itself remaining constantly active and restless."†

No one has written more truly and more profoundly on this subject than the great theologian Schleiermacher in his posthumous articles on the life of Jesus. "Truth is man's natural condition. His faculties in their normal state ought always to tend in that direction. A condition of ignorance or doubt is not error. Error begins when the mind arrives at a false conclusion. To do this the mind must have too soon desisted in its search after truth. In other words, the mind has not loved truth as truth ought to have been loved; or perhaps it had some selfish interest in accepting this or that incomplete result. It is therefore impossible to detect with absolute certainty a malicious error, and still less one which concerns the order of truths as they present themselves to the consciousness and soul."‡

* Descartes, "Meditations."

† Malebranche, vol. i., p. 80.

‡ Schleiermacher, "Leben Jesus," p. 118.

It is indeed for this kind of truths that the function of the will is specially important, for we must not overlook the fact that when traced back to their most general form, even to the categorical imperative of Kant, they come into conflict with all the lower tendencies of our nature. These truths are obligations before they appeal to the senses. They command obedience but do not impose themselves upon the thought with any such sort of dialectic necessity as comes from the absolute result of reasoning. Their very nature implies that they can cease to exercise influence. The first duty is to think of the duty. But the duty is such that one can escape from it, and by so escaping the duty becomes lost to view. Moral truth appeals to the intuitions; but since the intuitions make no outward demonstration nothing hinders us from making our escape there. It is in this wide-reaching domain especially that reasoning often destroys reason. Practical reason is definitely accredited as pure reason by an *a priori* intuitive element of our nature beyond which we cannot go. Nothing is easier for us than to put ourselves out of condition to grasp moral truth by simply allowing its delicate sense to become blunted. Nothing is easier than to suppress it entirely by substituting dialectics and its subtleties in the place of immediate intuition. Dialectics shuts up liberty, as it were, in a network of contradictions. And then liberty never can escape, except when the mind suddenly, by its own spontaneous energy, regains the lofty regions of intuition where consciousness lays down law without discussion—where duty has sovereign authority.

As soon as we pass from the realm of intuition, we meet determinism, for the only principles which escape the latter are the ultimate principles—those which lie as the foundation of all things. Above them every thing is made captive and put into the hopper. These alone escape the fatal entanglement because they are fundamentals, which they would not be if they were links in the chain. Moreover these fundamentals are only perceived by intuition. As soon as we pass from that realm we find no trace of their existence. When we discuss moral truth, intuition is only rendered possible by purity of heart, or at least by an honest desire for it. Pure souls only

see God. If we ascribe moral truth to God, it is because, as we have seen, it cannot depart from Him without losing its reality and sanction. To show the relationship of moral truth to God, we need only call to mind the point at which it surpasses our capacities, and indeed overwhelms us. We, as creatures, are not only imperfect, we are frail and attainted; and yet we have a perception of the higher good, of the ideal of perception. This is manifestly above us and not the product of our conceptions; for if we were shut up within ourselves we could not conceive of anything better than ourselves. This living characteristic of moral truth which hinders us from comprehending it in a formula, and which in some sense gives it the grandeur of highest personality, is a new reason for giving a large place to the will and to the heart in its approbation.

“Thought can of itself grasp a formula; a personality escapes its grasp. It only lays hold of contours and limits; it can never attain to complete knowledge. It must love in order to know, and without harmony it is unintelligible. What shall be done then when we attempt to treat of a personality which is the Absolute Goodness? Living truth presents an infinity of aspects to the honest student. It is too wide to be contained within any given formulas. Its formulas are at best only symbols.”*

God is not known, according to Pascal's profound remark, except when He is manifest to the heart. “Moral truth that has been ignored or neglected is never thrust into the mind by the all-powerful virtue of a syllogism. Neither the excellence of the virtue nor the dignity of the soul could tolerate that. No, friendship demands something broader. And is it not a sublime and intimate association between the human soul and truth, when truth entreats the soul and gains its consent. It is an association, and at the same time it is a friendship. For in the moral order abstractions have only a provisional value. Behind the ideas there are genuine realities, and these realities are personal existences. At the very foundation every thing is included in this: God calls—man answers. This constitutes all the moral life. “Listen,” said Bossuet, “listen in your

* Ollé-Laprune, *Ouvrage cit.*, p. 351.

heart—listen in the place where truth makes itself heard, where pure and simple ideas are wont to congregate.”*

Moral certainty, then, implies: 1st, the exercise of the moral faculties; 2d, the firm decision of the will to submit to the categorical imperative, and to place the sacred intuition of duty above logical necessity. We cannot therefore avoid marking a decrease in moral power from the denial of any truth which consciousness has revealed; although we should note the many inconsistencies by which a man sometimes in himself rises above or falls below his theory. In the same way there are atheists who by their virtues and nobility of character compel us to believe in God—men who are atheists merely because under the name of God they have comprehended a monstrous idol of human creation—and just so we see professed adorers of the divine who are really only wretched profaners of the same. When we speak of a true moral certainty, we mean that which is at once a theory and a practice; which is at once, if we may so say, a sight and a life of the divine. This, according to our view, is possible to every person who has desired to make a legitimate use of his moral faculties. On the other hand, in spite of our respect for the liberty of opinion, we are compelled to reckon the denial of moral truth as a manifest transgression by the will.

Skepticism, which often under the most brilliant exteriors contests the moral order, and admits only a curiosity on the part of the soul—that refined Epicurism which wishes always to enjoy and never to obey—is a disease of the soul. That it doubts proves no excuse, because its foundation lies in the will. It is not sufficient to say, “What is truth?” to bring the soul into bondage to the uncertainties of unbelief. If one says it ironically, as Pilate did, he never gets an answer, or rather he does get just what he wanted, which is a denial. Skepticism proves no more against moral certainty than sickness proves against health, or the wilfully closed eyes against the sun. The world has long known that it is possible to have eyes without seeing, and ears without hearing.

“The action of the will is not centered upon a single moment of the moral life. Every one, in proportion as he has made a

* Ollé-Laprune, “*De la Certitude Morale*,” p. 385.

proper use of the former life shining into his soul, is thereby more or less perfectly prepared to make use of the new light which has been bestowed upon him. Former faithfulness is the best gauge by which to measure the present ability to recognize the pathway of to-day. To think is a natural gift. To think accurately depends in some measure upon our own free will."*

It would be difficult to speak more accurately concerning the moral side of knowledge than M. Liard has done in the following passage taken from his work on "Metaphysics and Science:"

"The metaphysical question has a vast moral interest. When we believe in duty, we demonstrate the need of thought for something more than mere logical and scientific order. We perceive within us two distinct authorities: the law of thought and the law of morality. The authority of conscience is greater than that of science. At the very beginning of metaphysics we are forced to acknowledge moral truth, and to ask of our consciousness an explanation of the world, conformable to this truth. Since moral metaphysics can only proffer the resources of consciousness in response to the ultimate speculative needs of the soul, it may offer itself to the minds of men; but it can lay them under no constraint. To accept it willingness is required, and a belief that moral truth is the Alpha and Omega of all things. One virtue, even though it be an obscure one, is a better helper to metaphysics than the most brilliant discovery of science."†
 "The personal act required of us," as M. Ollé-Laprune well says (p. 264), "is not to submit truth to the person, but to submit the person to truth." How large a place is given to the will, when people solemnly ask us (as they do) that we should not make any scientific concessions to unscientific mysticism! We profess to remain faithful to the general and universal laws of certainty. These laws which govern all experiment have been admirably stated in Claude Bernard's "Introduction to Experimental Medicine." He there most fittingly recognizes the fact that the experimenter should never assign a part to nature, but that he should subordinate entirely his own pre-conceived ideas to the phenomena presented.

* Ollé-Laprune, "De la Certitude Morale," pp. 368-376.

† Liard, "La Metaphysique, et la Science Physique," p. 48.

“As soon as nature speaks, let the experimenter keep silence. He never ought to answer for it, nor to listen in a partial way to its answers. In nature, what our theories call absurd, is not necessarily impossible.” The illustrious scientist just quoted lays down the rule that the steps of our experimenting should always vary with the subject-matter of our investigations. “In experimenting,” says he, “our methods ought to vary infinitely according to the different sciences, and the conditions more or less difficult, and more or less complex with which the experiment is engaged.” What is true in the kingdom of nature, strictly so-called, is equally true in the kingdom of consciousness and the lofty sphere of moral truth, although these last should have their own peculiar processes and methods of observation that are peculiar to themselves. Here logical deduction is no more in place than the scalpel or the telescope. Primitive truths appeal to the intuitions alone; moral truths appeal to the intuitions and to the assenting will. Intuition accompanied by the assenting will might be properly styled a moral faith; and this faith, far from superseding experiment, is only a superior example of it, the only one which can avail when we are considering the first principles—those which lie beyond the realm of demonstration and reason—because they are the basis of intellectual and moral order. The thing which demands proof is not the real beginning. “It is the light that determines faith to cross the threshold of that obscure region where it dare not be satisfied with the stupid possession of an unintelligible object, but where it must deserve and conquer new and better kingdoms of light.”*

The intuitive faith of which we speak is really an experimenting, the only one appropriate to this order of truths. Intuition, from its very nature, cannot be a simple deduction which draws one truth from another, as consequence from a premise; for it ascends to the principle itself. It ascends to this principle by the boldest of inductions, which bears it out from the finite world, which it has trampled under feet, or broken down like prison walls; and then bears it up to the divine infinity. Without any doubt the soul that would attain this infinite world must be attracted by it, must be vivified by it; for as P. Gratry well says: “There are advances which the

* Ollé-Laprune, “*De la Certitude Morale*,” p. 865.

isolated soul cannot make alone. The soul can make deductions; it cannot propel itself." We refuse, however, to admit with the illustrious orator the glaring dualism that discriminates between the first action of the soul in obtaining the moral truth through intuition, and the second action by which it unites itself to faith—the whole being based upon the theory that reason should be separated from faith.* The theory is not true. From its inception moral certainty is an act both human and divine. As soon as man comes into contact with living truth there is communion between himself and God. The light about him will doubtless grow brighter, but he will reach his noon-tide by the same path that brought him to the dawn. The primordial act of faith or of intuition which enables him to comprehend with the categorical imperative the God from whom it proceeds, is of the same nature as the act which afterwards unites him intimately with the divine. The first is no less mysterious than the second, for the mystery consists in that immeasurable fulness of the infinite which ever overflows our formulas as well as our minds. Fénelon has said with profound truth: "I depend upon grace alone to guide my reason within the bounds of reason."

There is great danger in establishing, as M. Gratry and Malebranche before him have done, an absolute distinction between the initial act of reason and consciousness, and what they have called the act of faith. Faith, in the sense in which we have used it, is active and present in both these phases of knowledge. The difference between them is quantitative and not qualitative, unless we take the risk of coming back by a simple detour to the skepticism of Bayle, whose great art is to let loose the reins of free thought in the kingdoms of nature and reason, by pretending to hold it in check before the reserved kingdom of faith. Respecting this kingdom of faith he freely says: "It is sacred because nobody has ever touched it. Reason has destroyed or will dissipate all religious doctrines. But rest assured they are intact up there in the clouds, in the empyrean of indiscussable faith."

We will not admit this contradiction. Faith is already active in the first operations of reason, and reason accompanies

* Gratry, "*De la Connaissance de Dieu*," vol. ii., p. 487.

faith in the development of religious knowledge. Clement of Alexandria, in the beginning of the third century, admirably defined their relations. According to his view, faith is a natural result of knowledge, which, far from suppressing experiment, alone renders it possible, when we are considering first principles which one only grasps by intuition. An axiom is not admitted except by an act of faith which is identical with what Epicurus called "an anticipation of the mind." This intuition of faith is really the very introduction of science, its true precedent condition. If this intuition is necessary, even for the first principles of all knowledge, how much more is it necessary when the subject of discussion is the highest of all principles, that Absolute Existence which is God. Clement of Alexandria says magnificently: "The mind transcending all worlds and all spheres of created being, ascends to that lofty plain where dwells the king of worlds. It has arrived at the unchangeable by a path itself unchangeable." Clement finds the legitimate function of the will in "that act of faith and intuition which lays hold upon the divine." The soul must first of all aspire after the higher truth. The beginning of wisdom is to cleave unto that which is useful. A steadfast decision is then of great value in the acquisition of the truth. The desire precedes everything. It is needful to rekindle in the depth of the soul the living spark which has been received, and to guard it from a vain curiosity, which might cause the mind, so to speak, to walk about in the midst of the truths for mere amusement, as one might walk about in a city to admire its buildings. More than that is necessary. The soul must be purified; for the temple of truth is like that temple of Epidauros on whose front these words were inscribed: "He must be pure whose feet cross the threshold of this sanctuary." Clement of Alexandria only developed the sublime method which should govern our searchings after truth when he traced back all his Apologetics to this principle: "To perceive the like by means of the like." Is not this fundamentally the basis of that experimental method which consists in applying the processes of observation to the nature of the objects to be observed? To push with one's whole soul toward existence and whatever is most marked in existence, that, said Plato, is *the good*. Clement, who believed

in a living and personal God, acknowledged His influence over the soul to clarify and vivify it. In his view this action commenced with the first illumination of reason or the primary intuitions. This action increases, develops, but does not change its character. Faith, in the supreme revelations of God in Jesus Christ, obeys the same laws as faith in the primary intuitions of consciousness and reason, by means of which they lift us up to God. Thus he escapes all the dangers of dualism. We never see him under pretext of strengthening human weakness setting up some wholly external power to impose its decisions upon the mind, and itself escape investigation. That implicit confidence which opens an unlimited credit at the tribunal of doctrine has no relationship to faith in the sense in which we have used it. Nothing is more dangerous than to rest upon the undoubted fact that reason as well as conscience is satisfied with what transcends its powers, in order to impose upon them what is decidedly antagonistic to them, and yet what as a simple result from its nature lies beyond all investigation or knowledge. M. Ollé-Laprune strangely compromises moral certainty, and at the same time makes it responsible for each individual item of accepted fact, when he turns it over to a pretended infallibility. Conscience never abdicates, under penalty of robbing us of that organ through which alone we can recognize moral truth. A person never closes his eyes in order to see farther or higher.

Thus far we have confined ourselves strictly to the problem of knowledge. We have in the first place regained by conquest its most noble domain from that positivism which forbade the investigation of the higher cause. We then showed how the principle of causality cannot be carried from within outward, and how it is lost in the simple association of ideas where we get only representations and sensations. After having again laid hold upon it in the reason as the essential element of the *a priori* which it finds nowhere but within itself, it has lifted us up to the very Cause of the causes of which we gain perception, and to which we aspire from the depth of our imperfection—an imperfection which proves that the great cause does not lie within us. Nothing has to our view weakened the great Cartesian argument, which has really derived benefit from the re-

action of French and German criticism; for that criticism has delivered it from the intellectualism which compromised it, by making intellectual certainty entirely subordinate to moral certainty. We have not felt ourselves obliged with the critics to admit a contradiction between metaphysical and practical reason. We have established: first, that they both require for their accomplishment the action of the will; and, secondly, that since the categories of reason are the object of experience in the activity of the Ego, practical reason implies the reality of a world where its imperative finds accomplishment. The principle of causality, which naturally stands as an element of pure as well as of practical reason, or, better still, of the human mind in its totality, leads us by a most irresistible deduction to God, who is at once the Infinite Being and the Absolute Good; and thus introduces us into that domain which is *par excellence* moral, and into which we can only enter by putting ourselves into harmony with Him. Thence comes the function of the will in moral certainty. It might be said that if we confine our discussion merely to the problem of knowledge, the problem of spiritual life is already solved. But we have no right to stop satisfied here. We ought to go out of the realm of the ego and investigate the realms of nature and history (=experience) to see whether they corroborate or contradict the results already obtained. Thanks to that great principle of causality, which we have endeavored to put beyond doubt or dispute, we now know how to question these new witnesses. We have concluded with Descartes, that there should be at least as much character ascribed to the efficient cause as to the effect; that the effect can only draw its reality from the cause; that denying this fact accomplishes nothing, since that which is more perfect can never be the result of nor dependent upon the less perfect;* to sum up all in one word, the greater cannot proceed from the smaller.

* Descartes, Third Meditation.

ARTICLE IV.—EASY DIVORCE: ITS CAUSES AND EVILS.
A SOCIAL STUDY.

SOCIAL changes go on slowly. Society starts on a tendency which is subtle and obscure, and the effect is not observed at first. It is only after years, perhaps generations, of unquestioned movement in the given direction, that it is discovered at length that the tendency was a bad one, and that society has been fostering within its own bosom a fatal principle.

One of the tendencies of our times, wherever the influence of modern thought is felt, is towards greater freedom of divorce. This is the most noticeable in the freest countries. It is very marked in America. In earlier times divorce was comparatively rare in this country. Forty years ago persons who lived in any of the older States seldom heard of an instance, and a divorce suit caused about as much sensation as a murder trial. Recent statistics, however, on this subject are startling.

I. THE FACTS.

According to statistics* gathered by Rev. S. W. Dike, of Royalton, Vt., of which I have made free use, it appears that there has been a great increase of the frequency of divorce during the last quarter of a century in our country, except in four or five States, where within five years a more restrictive legislation has been adopted. In 1849, Connecticut granted 91 divorces. During the next fifteen years the number suddenly rose to an average of 445 each year, giving a ratio of one divorce to 10.4 marriages. Then, after the repeal of what was called the "Omnibus bill," the number of divorces fell in 1879, to 316, and in 1880, to 382. Massachusetts, in 1860, sundered 243 marriage bonds, and then acquired such facility in the use of the legal shears that in 1878 she clipped 600 ties. the ratio of divorces to marriages in 1860 being as 1 to 51, and in 1878, as 1 to 21.4. Maine cut the knot 478 times in 1878, and 587 times in 1880, being, as estimated, 1 divorce to 9 marriages.

* Furnished to the New York *Evening Post*.

In Vermont, in 1860, 94 couples walked apart from wedlock with the sanction of the courts; in 1878, 197 couples;—being in the former year, in the ratio of 1 to 23.2, and in the latter, of 1 to 14, marriages. Rhode Island, in 1869, released from wedlock 1 to every 14.1 she bound in it; and in 1881, 1 to every 10.4. In Ohio, the ratio of divorces to marriages in 1865, was 1 to 26; in 1881, 1 to 17. In Michigan in 1881, there was 1 divorce to 13.25 marriages, in 24 counties. In one populous county in Minnesota, the ratio of divorces to marriages, in 1871, was as 1 to 29, and, in 1881, as 1 to 23. Louisville had a ratio of one divorce suit to 13.31 marriages, in 1881; and during the same year, St. Louis granted 263 divorces; and Cook County, the county of Chicago, had one divorce to 13.4 marriages.

Dark as these statistics are in the States east of us, the records of our courts in California disclose even a worse social condition. From inquiries addressed to the county clerks of the several counties of this State, I have gained the following facts: In 1882, Yolo County granted 77 licenses for marriages, and 4 divorces,—one divorce to 19.25 marriages; Nevada County, 121 licenses, 9 divorces,—1 to 13.44; Santa Clara, 283 licenses, 27 divorces, 1 to 10.48; San Francisco,* 2,605 licenses, 309 divorces,—1 to 8.41; El Dorado, 55 licenses, 7 divorces,—1 to 7.85; Placer, 86 licenses, 12 divorces,—1 to 7.15; Alameda, 598 licenses, 87 divorces,—1 to 6.87; Los Angeles, 348 licenses, 60 divorces,—1 to 5.6; Sacramento, 374 licenses, 81 divorces, 1 to 4.61; Butte, 112 licenses and 19 divorces,—1 to 5.89. Nineteen other counties have responded to the call, and sent in their divorce statistics for 1882. The two banner counties are, so far as reported, Marin and Sutter. Marin, having as its county seat, San Rafael, a snug and acceptable retreat, under the shadow of great cities, easy to flee to for the concealment or dispatch of the unseemly business, reports 57 licenses, and 27 divorces, one divorce to 2.11 marriages! Sutter County reports 25 licenses, and no divorces. Trinity County also granted no divorces, but issued only 13 licenses. The result in these 29 counties, out of the 52 in the State, is 5,849 licenses and 789

* The figures in San Francisco County cover the fiscal year, from July 1, 1881, to June 30, 1882, inclusive.

divorces, or one divorce to 7.41 licenses. It is possible that the number of marriages may have been even less than the number of marriage licenses, as there may have been some licenses issued without marriage, but no marriages without a license. This condition of things, in or near the larger and more accessible cities, whither these disturbed elements of the population are likely to congregate to hide or cure their domestic grievances, shows as great eagerness in portions of California to escape the bonds of marriage, as existed in Paris during the revolution. According to Burke,* "in the first three months of 1793, there were 562 divorces in that city alone, being about one to every three marriages, and the same ratio continued for several months." Nor is the evil abating. According to the *San Francisco Post*, ten applications were made on one day this year—July 25th—for a legal termination of the marriage tie—a larger number than ever before made in one day in that city.

In Europe the proportion of divorces is very much lower, but a rising tendency is observable there. In Papal countries the divorce is not absolute, but in the form of a legal separation, for the most part, without the privilege of subsequent marriage. In Denmark, in 1871, there was one divorce to 27.51 marriages; in 1879, 1 to 24.4. In France, in 1871, the ratio was as 1 to 222.21; in 1879, as 1 to 109.4. In Holland, in 1871, as 1 to 192.5; in 1880, as 1 to 122.46. In Sweden, in 1871, as 1 to 201.61; in 1880, as 1 to 134.66. In Belgium, in 1871, as 1 to 350.87; in 1880, as 1 to 135.12. In England and Wales, in 1871, as 1 to 1020.4; in 1879, as 1 to 460.83. In Russia, in 1871, as 1 to 751.87; in 1877, as 1 to 487.8. In Norway, in 1875, as 1 to 2857.14; in 1880, as 1 to 1428.57. And in Scotland, in 1871, as 1 to 9090.9, and in 1880, as 1 to 3448.27.†

From these facts, then, reported both from the New World and the Old, it is apparent that there is a rising tide of divorce among the progressive nations, though the main swell and crest of this dark tidal wave is in America, and this is nowhere higher than where it breaks into the Pacific.

It is a singular phenomenon. Do the facts indicate *easy*

* Quoted by Judge Jameson, *North American Review*, Ap. 1883, p. 320.

† These ratios I have calculated from facts collected by Rev. S. W. Dike, and published in the *New York Evening Post*.

divorce, or *necessary* divorce? We cannot suppose that society has suddenly become so much more corrupt in all the elements of moral character, and that the marriage tie rots off in all these cases. Certainly this is not the explanation of the greater frequency of divorce in America than in Europe. It is well known that in many European countries—e. g. in France—where divorce is infrequent, the marriage estate is often a very corrupt one, and there is much less virtue generally, than in portions of this country, as in New England for instance, where divorce is much more common. The facts clearly indicate *easy* divorce rather than *necessary* divorce, which implies an absolute dissolution of the moral tie between the parties before the law seals the separation.

II. THE CAUSES.

When we meet such a social tendency, we naturally inquire what are the underlying *causes* of it, the influences at work in society to make such a condition of things possible.

1. A fundamental reason is a loss of the popular discernment of the *divine elements* of marriage. Marriage, as God intended it, is a divinely constituted estate, altogether unique in kind and quality—two in one and one in two—each of the parties retaining his or her individuality, but raising it to a higher plane, while freely giving heart, will, self, to the other—the estate not made up of the sum of the two individualities, but a higher unity, differing from the two in kind. This high estate may not exist at the moment of marriage. It may be slowly brought about afterwards. God has so constituted our social natures—man's and woman's—that the natural experience of wedlock, where there is no natural barrier or wrong in the marriage itself, no false conceptions of its nature, and where the parties are faithful to each other and try to do their duty, gradually leads the married pair, if they have not reached it before marriage, up from the position of mere social addition, or marital neighborhood, in which the marriage ceremony placed them, to the high estate of mutual love and devotion and self-sacrifice for which God designed them. In many cases, beyond doubt, the true union only takes place after the

illusions and glamour of pre-marital love have been dissipated, and the parties have reached the sober realities of real acquaintance; yet it takes place.

Now this idea of marriage as a divine constitution, sacred and inviolable, seems somehow to have escaped the thought of the people; and they think only of the human elements put in front and substituted for it. These human elements are conspicuous and make themselves felt. They are such as these: the motives for marriage, the acquaintance made in quite a human way, the mutual liking springing up on a basis of nature, the offer and the acceptance altogether on the social level, the arrangements and the wedding as if only men and women were involved in the affair. This human and earthly cast thrown over the transaction hides from view the deeper, divine process by which two hearts, two wills, two lives, are silently and mysteriously to blend into one—a social crystallization more wonderful than the process by which carbon becomes changed to diamond, or particles of earth and air are taken up into the substance, the bloom and fruit of a tree. But in proportion as this is the prevailing popular sentiment, and the divine idea of marriage is slurred, and the human element put in front, the bonds of marriage become weak, and subject to easy rupture by human caprice, for not only, in that case, is there the natural fragility of a mere human compact, but persons united in wedlock under such a conception of the relation are not in a favorable condition to have their hearts unconsciously won to the true higher estate.

2. Of the same nature and tendency to easy divorce is the influence of the popular prominence given to marriage as a *civil institution*. In addition to the fact that marriage is a divine union, actual or possible, taking place before or after the initial rite, it is also a creature of the State. The State has an interest in it, and steps in to defend its interest. The laws take it up and regulate it, prescribing certain steps for its performance, and giving the whole proceeding quite a civil aspect. Now, whenever a divine institution is also a civil institution, and the civil institution has flexible forms, that often receive modification and bend this way and that, the divine side, after awhile, is likely to be overlooked, and the human side only be

thought of. Thus marriage after generations following generations have been legislating upon it, seems to many people to have no stronger bonds than those the State imposes. The whole relationship drifts down to the civil plane, and the public slowly become ripe for any modification of the law regulating marriage that may be demanded. And while in the order of nature and providence civil marriage is designed merely to be a human casket to hold the divine jewel, the casket is so made, in many cases, as easily to drop out the jewel, or not readily receive it, and to be itself thrown away with little trouble. As in Pharaoh's dream "the ill-favored and lean-fleshed kine ate up the well-favored and fat kine;" so the civil institution of marriage devours the divine institution, and prepares the way for easy divorce.

3. Another influence adverse to the permanence of marriage is the undue exaltation of *individual liberty*. No close observer can fail to perceive that there is a lessening of respect for authority, and growing restlessness under civil restraint, a larger demand for individuality among the people. Law has stretched the net-work of its complications and applications over the community to meet the various circumstances of society, but has weakened the power of its grasp on the individual will. There is more law about a man, but it is farther off, as when one passes from the enclosure of prison-walls to the enclosure of a race-track. Individuality now claims large ranges morally, and chafes under restrictions of liberty in that direction. The tendency in law is to throw off such civil shackles. Accordingly, what may be called moral legislation has slowly been falling into the back-ground for years, except in cases where society out of sheer necessity makes from time to time a violent and spasmodic movement against some one insupportable social evil, which is at once a moral and a civil wrong, as intemperance. It is quite in the line of this general tendency, of letting every one have things in his own way morally till the result becomes intolerable to society, that there should have sprung up a demand for freer divorce, and that the demand should be granted. The spirit of the age in this under-swell of liberty has been: Let those who do not wish to live longer together part, and let them go into full liberty with the blessing of the law.

4. Again, it can not be denied that there is not a little *Free Love* doctrine at work in society. It is not often acknowledged. It does not reach the dignity of an open system or a philosophy. It is not general enough to be called a social influence; but it lurks in society and influences many. It takes the form of a feeling among coarse and lustful natures that mutual passion somehow has on it the divine imprimatur; and that if it happens to run across the barriers of society, the worse for the barriers. Society in such cases must be held to be in the wrong, not those who have been set upon by this electing love, and drawn together. Of course, it is the doctrine of devils; but there is much of the doctrine of devils in the world. There is more of this apotheosis of lust working in depraved hearts, leading them not merely to apologize, but to glory in their shame, than is supposed. The doctrine in this form does little harm; it is too repulsive, too putrid. But when it takes the form of pity for those who find themselves unhappily mated, and shift off their companions by due process of law to assort themselves anew with parties already selected; and when this pity passes over into approval and justification, the doctrine becomes dangerous. It is this spirit, in its attenuated and disguised form, which among other influences has assisted in modifying divorce laws, and made them easy for those who desire other marriages. In some instances bills have been introduced in legislatures in this country—as in one case in France—general in form, but designed to open the door out of wedlock to individual parties, and facilitate the way for a new marital assortment. The Free Love influence thus acts, far in advance of its own acknowledgment, as an unperceived solvent of the intrinsic sacredness and inviolability of marriage, and causes many to regard the laws guarding it to be mere forms without adhesive substance.

5. Again, there is in our day a perceptible weakening of the *old social ties* binding the different groups of individuals together in the community. Family ties are not so compact and unbroken as they once were, in consequence of the removal of some of the members to distant places, or the breaking up of the early home and the migration of the family. Circles of friendship do not remain so close and warm. Societies are

more variable in their membership, and the society bonds are weaker. Society itself, everywhere, is pierced and penetrated with foreign influences, making it less homogeneous, less united, less coherent. In such a condition of things, no community quite at rest, individuals coming and going, many persons all the time in a state of feverish unrest, with the old social restraints thrown off and the new ones not felt, it is not strange that the marriage tie should become weaker, with the other social ties, and that individuals should be stepping through it, as they are through so many other social ties, with little hesitation. The unrest in marriage is only one symptom of the far broader and deeper general unrest of modern society.

6. Moreover, the fact that many married people have *no home*, and live in boarding-houses and hotels, insensibly opens the way out. The home is the natural center and support of domestic feeling; and they have no domestic atmosphere about them, none of that separate, quiet, common life together, which is necessary for the growth of the highest and purest mutual devotion. They are brought too much under the influence of the promiscuous associations of public places, the gossip circulating in such circles, the sensational stories and amusements which pander to unoccupied minds, the stimulus of high living without the necessity of work, and the constant temptation of desiring to please other eyes than those within the sacred circle of wedded love; and consequently the process of a true marital knitting of hearts goes on poorly. Too often, alas, it goes on cross-wise, and in an unlawful fashion. The modern manner of living adopted by many has much to do with the frequency of the breaking up of families.

III. THE FACILITIES AND HELPS.

We have considered the underlying causes and influences in society leading to easy divorce. What now are some of the things which *promote* it?

1. First among these, certainly, are the *divorce laws*. These in most of the States are framed in such a way as to afford an easy way out of wedlock to those weary of it. Instead of limiting divorce to a cause which implies the absolute dissolu-

tion of the marriage bond already, and the utter impossibility of marital oneness between the parties afterward, they allow many other causes, sometimes of frivolous and slight moment, and practically invite divorce for those who find marriage burdensome or distasteful. In this State—California—divorces may be granted for any one of the following causes: 1. Adultery. 2. Extreme cruelty. 3. Willful desertion. 4. Willful neglect to provide for wife. 5. Habitual intemperance, and 6. Conviction of felony. But these terms are legally defined in the code with such latitude, that a reasonable *apprehension* of cruelty, or of “the mental and physical *capacity* in the other to discharge well the duties of husband or wife,” is considered “extreme cruelty;” and “voluntary separation *one year*,” under certain circumstances, is considered “willful desertion;” and “that degree of intemperance for *one year*” which disqualifies for business, or “which would reasonably inflict a cause of great *mental anguish* upon the innocent party,” is considered “habitual intemperance;” and imprisonment in the States-prison for one year or a longer term, is “conviction of felony,” while a sentence to the States-prison for life itself, by statute, dissolves the marriage. Thus between the looseness of the legal causes, and the looseness of the appended, complicated legal definitions, there is a legal net-work of divorce with meshes so large that almost any pair who will consent together to try to get through, or if one will consent to let the other try alone, can pass through without any difficulty. It is only when one party opposes, and finds the other in the act, and lays hold and pulls back, that the obstruction of the net is of any avail. The case is made still worse by the diversity of the laws in different States on this subject. Persons can go away from their homes into States where there is great latitude of divorce, and after a brief residence, file an application, give a constructive notification to the absent party by publication in a local paper, and receive a decree dissolving the marriage, before the said absent party has heard of any dissatisfaction with the relation. The States, by their different, inharmonious, and often contradictory statutes have unintentionally set up hiding places, “cities of refuge,” to which weary husbands or wives can flee, cut off pursuit, and find a legal riddance of their com-

panions. In this way, the civil law, instead of being like a string on which beads are strung with the ends knotted together, an endless string, is like a string with the ends unknotted, from which the beads easily slip off.

Moreover, as shown by Judge Jameson in the April number of the *North American Review*, the laws make no provision, in due form, for the protection of the rights of children and society, in divorce suits. Only the married parties themselves have a standing before the court; whereas deep and vital interests of society and often of children are involved. Legally, it is only a question between the two; morally and civilly, it is a question of much wider and more fundamental moment, and this the law overlooks, as if willing to sacrifice the rights of other parties involved, in order to make the way out of wedlock as simple and unobstructed as possible.

2. But the only difficulty is not with the law. Its *construction by the courts* is apt to be extremely generous to the petitioners. Many courts, borne on by the modern popular tendency, press the possibilities of the law to the boundary of license. They have not been careful to ferret out collusion, have suffered constructive offenses and formal proofs to pass, have not cared to go behind the face of the pleadings, when a deeper sense of the sacredness of the marriage tie and a higher regard for the interests of the parties themselves or their children or society, and for the intent of the law, might have led them to exercise their discretionary power in a more conservative way. The haste and indifference with which divorce proceedings are sometimes dispatched gives no indication of the deep tragical nature of the transaction, morally and socially. It is stated that the Supreme Court in Connecticut occupies on an average about fifteen minutes only with each divorce case that comes before it.

3. But as if the laxity of the law and the liberality of the courts were not enough, there are *lawyers* also who take pains to inform the public of their readiness to simplify and expedite the business. They trade in ruined homes, disappointed hopes, alienated hearts; and offer their services to those in domestic trouble, to secure a decree, at a stipulated price, severing the marriage. They stand ready to take the party, at any

moment of temporary exasperation, before the cooler and better thought has come, and hurry them through a divorce suit with the least possible trouble or publicity. A clean decree of court and a blasted household, for so much gold! A ruined family with neatness and dispatch for a single fee! Who comes next?

4. Another thing, doubtless, which leads to divorce is the *facility* with which divorced persons can be *re-married* to other parties. Not only are there many persons who are willing to enter into wedlock with the guilty parties even, in such separations, regarding their previous marriage and their guilt in being the cause of the termination of it, as no serious objection, but there are many ministers and officers of the law authorized to perform marriage ceremonies, who marry all who come to them for their services, not stopping to inquire whether they were properly divorced, and morally free to enter again into wedlock. If those who officiate had more conscience on this point, and would refuse to re-marry those who had been legally separated for any cause that is less than an absolute sundering of the internal marriage tie binding the parties together, making true wedded life ever after an impossibility, the way out of marriage, to those in whom the internal bond is not dissolved, would not look so broad and inviting. May good men have thoughtlessly smoothed the way, as if it needed smoothing!

These are some of the facilities and helps. They provide an easy way; lay the train to the magazine; and then generally some spark of anger in the domestic circle fires the train. There are few families in which there are not at times causes for disagreement; differences of judgment, taste, disposition, temper, will. With proper patience and forbearance, the stream of domestic life which, when thrown against these rocky and precipitous headlands, is converted to a splashing, noisy, foaming torrent, if left to itself, soon settles down into its wonted quiet channels again, goes on smoothly, and only is heard in its own sweet and peaceful ripple. But there are persons, who, at the moment of passing the chafing points, thrown off their balance, not caring to be patient, reckless of the consequences, seeing the facilities and preparations for divorce before them, seize them, commit themselves and are too proud or

obstinate to retreat,—on the principle described by Shakespeare in *King John* :

“How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds,
Make deeds ill done !”

So the divorces multiply and fill the land.

IV. THE EVILS.

The effects of easy divorce are wide-reaching and serious. As it springs up from deep and broad social causes and tendencies, so it in turn reacts on and assails vital social principles and interests.

1. It *cheapens and degrades the idea of the marriage relation* among the people. This idea is found in the Word of God, the nature of man, and true love; and it is, that, in true wedlock, there is the highest surrender and devotement of a human being to another human being that is possible. This act, from the very nature of the case, implies permanency, endlessness in the relation, in the intent of the person who enters into it. The step must be taken without any reserve or qualification as to its duration. Now, easy divorce—or any divorce at all for a reason short of an absolute decay of the marriage bond already—assails this high conception of the relation in the public thought. It conveys the impression that the relation is one of convenience and expediency; that there is nothing sacred, divine, and permanent in it, as really as in the relation of parent and child; and that it is terminable at the will of the parties for selfish reasons; when God in his Word, which makes it a final union, says it is not, when the nature of the soul, which can not give itself supremely to another and then withdraw from such surrender, says it is not, and when true love, which can not pass from object to object, or even forsake its one chosen object, says it is not. It diverts attention from the divine elements of the relation, and makes married life a game of shuttle-cock at which society is playing, keeping marriage much of the time in the air, passing from person to person.

2. This cheapening and degradation of marriage as a social institution is attended by another evil, *precipitate and thoughtless*

marriages. Easy divorce means easy marriage. The parties feel that little is involved. They can try wedlock, and if they like it, continue it; and if they do not, dissolve partnership. It is a partnership affair. They have not as yet, so far as known, adopted the practice of a limited partnership, to expire by its own terms at the end of a specified period; but the tendency seems in that direction, and, that may come yet, unless easy divorce be regarded as having superior advantages as offering a way out at any time. The absence in the community of a deep and thorough conviction of the permanency and indissolubleness of marriage, leads many persons who have reasons for hesitation, to be willing to run the risk, and to marry across the very possibilities of happiness. The consequence is, with this looseness about the conception of the relation, with their eyes open, they voluntarily not only wed misery, but do not allow themselves to be more than half married—married in law, not in their hearts. They do not give themselves to each other. They keep back a large part of the gift. And half-married persons, living together on the partnership principle, on a basis of trial and experiment, are a degradation and desecration of the marriage estate. A woman, of this experimental sort, and having quite an eye to worldly prudence in view of the large possibilities of the case, who, one day, thought she would get married, told me a short time afterwards, she and her husband “had not gone to house-keeping yet, as they did not know whether the marriage would stick.” Thus easy divorce poisons the whole social atmosphere lying outside the portals of marriage, making the unmarried careless about their associations and friendships, and ready, in many instances, to enter into unwise marriages, from which they would be deterred if they knew the step must be a finality.

3. Again, the possibility of easy divorce interferes with the proper *assimilating* process of married life. Few persons, probably, when first married, in the idealizings and mirages of fresh love, have as yet reached the real, matter-of-fact, simple unison of hearts for which God designed them. Much that is unreal and imaginary, or real and obstructive, has to be cleared off and thrown away, on both sides, that the true marital oneness may take place. But that this process may go on,—the

real knitting of hearts,—the wondrous miracle of marriage,—the parties should feel that there is no escape; that they, their fortunes, their happiness, their welfare, are shut up to each other; that there is no retreat—even to a father's house, or a mother's willing ear—to which they can flee, for a way out; but that they must live and love and work together, till God separate them. The least sentiment in the community that domestic grievances are not to be patiently borne, that the rising tempest is not to be bravely outlived, that the married pair are not to bear their own troubles in silence, till they are absolutely unbearable, is destructive to the mysterious welding process. The divorce atmosphere in society is often fatal to it. The newly married enter on their union generally as a blessed, divine apprenticeship, to encounter the trials and disappointments, perhaps the pains and chagrins, of an untried but holy apprenticeship; and if they are to be put all the while upon the question whether they like it, and keep analyzing their feelings, and testing themselves, it is not strange that many do not survive the ordeal. The acceptance of the relation as life-long is the best condition and strongest motive for making of twain one flesh. Judge Jameson says:* “In far the greatest number of cases, no court listening to the narratives of the parties, can doubt that, had they been held together by an iron band making divorce impossible for any cause, they would at an early stage of their marital differences have effected a reconciliation; the fatal step of revealing to their friends their real or fancied wrongs would not have been taken, and so their mutual wounds would have been healed by the first intention.”

4. Easy divorce is also a great injury to the *home*. The home is the one sacred place of social life. As a training-school of character, it is the most primary, the most fundamental, the most effective of all. It is really the matrix, morally and in the quality of citizenship, of the State. Its purity and preservation is the safety of the Republic. Divorce absolutely destroys the home which is its immediate subject. It extinguishes it, not as a fire burns up a house leaving no part standing, but dividing it into two parties, and keeping

* *North American Review*, April, 1883, p. 323.

them alive as perpetual signs of the domestic ruin. A home broken up by death makes the feelings of the survivors and friends of the family simple and direct; but this perpetuates a cross-play of feeling, often bewildering and distracting to the children and other friends, and throwing them into unnatural relations, and putting their love and friendship to a perplexing strain. Death permits a natural and healthful process of healing and recovery to the survivors from the desolation of a perished home; this often long perpetuates the desolation and the sorrow, and makes a desolation and sorrow about which they must be dumb, and can receive few expressions of human sympathy.

But the ruptured home is not the only one that suffers from this practice. The pernicious influence enters other homes, becoming a social distemper, a brooding civic corruption, a disintegrating presence, leading many persons to feel that there is a weakening of the bonds of marriage, and to have less confidence in the stability and permanence of the marriage vows of their companions. The quality, the strength, of home life suffers. The practice throws out a subtle, noxious influence to invest every home.

5. Further, it is often a direct wrong to *innocent* parties. I do not refer to the wrong which is frequently done to one of the married couple. They have each a legal standing in court, and the forms of law for their protection. I refer to those whose rights are affected, but who have no opportunity, as we have seen, to defend them. The children and other relations and friends may have great interests involved. The action may affect their happiness, their prospects, their welfare, for life; and they have no opportunity to raise their voice or put in a plea. They can present no remonstrance; and say to the court this thing ought not to be. In law, it is a petty personal matter between a man and his wife, a question of their individual wishes; in fact, it is a social convulsion in the bosom of society shattering the interests of others as they are connected with them. The law permits these private explosions in the midst of society; but many innocent victims suffer from them, and have no redress. The wrong done to the innocent is very much as if custom and law should permit persons occu-

pying a single room in a large boarding house to get up a private explosion in their own room to blow themselves apart, and should only attempt to regulate the practice as between them, paying no attention to their neighbors whose apartments should also be shattered.

6. This practice is, moreover, responsible for not a little *social vice and crime*. When married people hold their marriage vows loosely, and see that society also holds them loosely, they are not always careful to check a rising interest in others. They regard the peril as no serious matter if they should form an outside attachment; for the old connection, they think, can be easily sundered, and the new alliance formed. Domestic fidelity does not increase with the facilities for divorce. If an oriental traveler knows there is but one caravan that can take him to Damascus, and that he must remain faithful to that and keep in company with it, or go alone and take his chances among the robbers and the other perils of the journey, he will be careful to be true to it and not stray off; but if he understands there are a plenty of other caravans, and that with little trouble he can pass from one to another, he may be tempted to make new acquaintances by the way, and to change his company; and sometimes he may make his bargain with the one before he has got his discharge from the other.

7. Lastly, there is a general wrong to *society*. Society has an interest, deep and wide-reaching, in maintaining the sacredness, purity, and inviolability of marriage. This is the basis of its hopes for the future. Easy divorce trifles with this sacred interest. It comes with its sharp, swift shears, and clips asunder, right and left, these superhuman ties,—clips them, when it has no right to do it, unnecessarily, often when, if left a little longer, the parties themselves would be deeply thankful; and is not mindful that it is making havoc of hopes, homes, and hearts. It is the State handling the things of God with wanton freedom, handling them low down on the plain of individual spleen, chagrin, impatience, expediency. This is a great wrong to society in one of its most sacred, tender, and precious interests.

These evils are of so serious a nature, threatening the foundations of domestic and social life, that there should be a gen-

eral combined effort on the part of good people to remedy or mitigate them. Religious teachers, moralists, legislators, judges, editors, citizens of all grades who love their country and good morals, should join to abate a source of so much social menace.

V. REMEDY.

On this subject I have time to make only a few suggestions.

1. A definite objective point in the way of remedy is more *stringent divorce laws*. The grounds of civil divorce should be much restricted, and limited to such as imply an absolute breach of the very principle of married life, the impossibility, within reasonable expectations, of its existence subsequently ; and the burden of proof of this state of things should be laid on the applicant in such a way as to require him to make his case clear beyond a fair doubt. The restrictive legislation in Vermont and Connecticut within the last five years, says Rev. Mr. Dike, has resulted in the falling off of divorces in Vermont nearly one-third, and in Connecticut nearly one-fourth. And Judge Jameson says :* “ It is our firm conviction that, if the truth could be ascertained, at least two-thirds, perhaps four-fifths, of the 714 cases of divorce in Chicago during the past year either were fraudulent in fact, or, with reasonably conciliating temper, on the part of the couples divorced, and under sufficiently *stringent legal* conditions, were avoidable or preventible.”

In one case, at least, the total prohibition of divorce has been practised with good results. It is the case of South Carolina. According to the author just quoted, “ down to the period of Reconstruction in 1868, no absolute divorce had ever been allowed in that State for any cause ; and the general opinion was that it worked well. During the first year of Reconstruction,” he adds, “ the old law was repealed and divorces were freely allowed. After a few years’ trial the old law was restored, experience having taught the law-makers of the State that the old law worked better than the new.”

2. Another objective point is to secure *uniform divorce laws* in all the States. As it is, persons can be divorced in some

* *North Am. Rev.*, April, 1883, p. 323.

States for causes for which they could not be in other States ; and persons who have been legally divorced and then been married again in some States, might be, if they went into another State, guilty of bigamy or adultery according to the laws prevailing there, and their children in the new State would be illegitimate. In some States the divorce is absolute and no restriction is placed on re-marriage by either party ; in other States, the innocent party only is allowed to marry again. This confusion of the divorce laws was not so serious a matter when the States stood far apart and had little to do with each other ; but now that the population of all the States are mingling together, it is vital that such fundamental interests of society as those of the family integrity should be everywhere the same before the law. This could be secured voluntarily if the States should appoint delegates to meet in an inter-State divorce convention, to discuss and recommend a uniform system of laws on this subject, which should afterwards be adopted by the several States ; or it could be brought about by an amendment to the United States Constitution, delegating the whole subject to Congress.

3. A minor legal restriction would be to prohibit divorced persons from *marrying again* within a definite period,—say, the innocent party, within a year, the guilty party, within five years, if at all. The desire for a re-marriage is often the reason of the hot haste to be un-married. If such re-marriage were impossible till after a long weary interval, the attempt to break up the old home would be less often made.

4. Moreover, the law should be framed so as to make the offence of the guilty party in breaking up the home a *separate specific crime*. Let there be in law, as there is in fact, the crime of marriage-breaking. Then let the wrong, whatever it is, which is regarded by the courts as sufficiently criminal to be a ground for divorce, be regarded and punished as a crime—a separate and independent offence—against society, also,—as much as any other social offence which first assails a person,—as burglary or libel, for instance. Surely marriage-breaking is as great a wrong in itself and to society, as house-breaking ; and there is no fitness in allowing a person to commit it, prove it against him, and then dismiss him, with no other penalty

than that he shall have nothing more to do with the person he has wronged. Make marriage-breaking a separate offence with a sharp penalty of its own, and divorces will be fewer.

5. Meanwhile, with the divorce laws as they are, an effort should be made to secure a more *conservative* administration of the law. The subject should be discussed. A higher and purer public sentiment should be aroused. The courts should be encouraged to apply the law in the interest of public morals, the stability of the home, the sacredness and inviolableness of marriage. Instead of yielding to the tendency to give all the possibilities of the law to laxity, they should be led to press the possibilities on the other side, making the instances of divorce as few and difficult as the law administered in the line of its intent will allow. Let them feel that in granting a divorce they are doing a great social wrong unless they grant the divorce on the ground of a great crime in the home; and let them move slowly and require the clearest proof that this crime exists and is irreparable, before they grant the decree.

**ARTICLE V.—UNBELIEF, HALF-BELIEF, AND A
REMEDY.**

PERSONS who are enthusiastic and successful in the pursuit of the natural sciences may appreciate them as a department of knowledge so much as in effect to undervalue other departments. And the theories of such persons will find favor with those of a larger class who are occupied especially in the practical application of material forces in the industrial arts.

In both these classes there are some who will look to nature's laws or the forces of nature for the solution of all phenomena. In as much as there has been a progressive discovery of those laws and forces; and as the primal cause of them seems to retreat before all attempts at analysis of it, they admit that they may not yet have found, and that possibly they may never find out the power that is fundamental; or that if perchance they should touch it at one or more points, they still may not comprehend it nor properly affirm that they know it in its entirety; its phases of development are so varied and so vast. They are not prepared to deny that there may be some force or power that is universal and supreme. Favoring the admission that there may be such a power and partially aiding an attempt to conceive it, they recognize for instance that electricity may be found to have identity or unity across a continent or around the world; and that the vehicle of light may pervade all space; and that volatile as it is, it is nevertheless an entity; and that its operation in infinite space does not interfere with its attendance and service upon the eye of an insect.

By such means and otherwise they are led to admit that there may be an infinite or all-pervading Power. This power they think constitutes the laws of nature, or is the force that operates through those laws as its channel.

They are disposed to accept the laws of nature complacently. They perceive that therein is a prevailing tendency toward the production and the conservation of that which by common con-

sent is called good—the survival of the fittest—that an assurance is given that whatsoever has occurred will recur under the same conditions—that the assurance that benefits will follow compliance with the law, more than compensates for the dread and the endurance of the evils that follow transgression—that the law's universal operation is equivalent to the publication of a just and consistent purpose—that its certainty makes it a prediction and directory to guide intelligent creatures, and is altogether beneficent. Although logic may find fatality in it, yet if the choice is between fate on one hand and caprice on the other, their experience leads them to fear the caprice and to trust the fate.

While under an ingenuous and non-combative state of mind, they may see no objection to the application of some proper noun as the name of the power they find under the laws of nature. They may even consent that the name shall signify the Supreme Good. Possibly it may occur to them that they could not aver, all things being considered, that any better arrangements would have been made if intelligence had been at work producing them.

But they will deny that there is a personal Creator, having intelligence, purpose, and will; or that there can be such evidence of his existence as ought to satisfy scientific and reasonable men. Yet, the Power that operates through nature's laws to produce phenomena, must have within itself all that it finally exhibits in phenomena. All effects must have adequate causes. Nothing can come of nothing. No effect can be greater than its cause. Nothing can come from thence to hence that was not or is not thence. New relations do not create new forces. Nothing can be constituted above the sum of its constituents. Whatsoever comes out of potency into phenomena must have been within the potency. Distance, obscurity, and inscrutability do not annihilate facts, nor detach effects from their causes. The proof of power is not in the perception and comprehension of its source and methods only, but also in its results. If man has a mind it is constituted of that and by that which is at least a mind. If these are only variations of the form of an axiom, they lead to the conclusion that there is One that is all that can be expressed or suggested by the name

of God. This reasoning, however, is of no effect if there is no mind; and the fact of there being any is questioned and an attempt is made to dispose of the fact and of its implications, by showing that thought and volition are only the movements of the molecules of digested aliment.

It can be admitted that there is a power, that is omnipotent and omnipresent, but not that it is also omniscient.

The materialists and theists diverge at this point, the first having assumed that there inheres in matter a self-moving potentiality that it has not been proved to possess.

Is there anything in the common thought and expression of Christian people that may tend to confirm the atheist in his position, and which may be amended?

Those who accept the Scripture revelation of God, have conceptions as varied as their individual experiences and characters; all possibly in some measure true, yet partial and leaving infinite truth before them unexplored. Throughout all this variety there appears at times more or less of instability and inconsistency. Those who have square and immovable convictions of the presence of the Creator in all his universe, are exceptions. Sincere Christians are often distressed at finding their faith in conflict with their every-day mode of thinking and acting in practical life—apparently in conflict with their reason in so far as they adopt the scientific interpretations of nature. Their knowledge of natural laws is enough to supplant or to shake the simple faith induced by miraculous manifestations in the past, and by such phases of truth as are adapted to a primitive or initiatory condition; but it is not sufficient to supply or to strengthen a conviction from nature's resources of themselves, of the presence of God.

If successful in holding firmly a conviction of the fact of a Creator, they still see that man is in contact with various intermediate agents and secondary causes. Man's relation to material things or to nature, is practical, real, present and tangible, whereas the Creator seems to be in the infinite distance as to space, and also as to time in the past and in the future, and inferentially is equally remote with regard to any positive influence or interest.

To nature's power they attribute the activities of material

things. To God is assigned another sphere. Nature is near but he is afar. Nature may be treated with under certain conditions, with assured results, but he perchance may not be treated with at all, or if he may, as he has freedom he may have the capriciousness which our experience leads us to associate with the use of freedom. There is trust in the return of the seasons and in the fruitfulness of the earth; such trust that the conditions upon which a good harvest depends are cheerfully complied with. There is belief that they who sow may reap, and they who sow know the quality of the seeds they scatter, but in the field of religious life many tread the furrow with weak and measured pace while they plant unwinnowed seeds.

Under the habit of conceiving of two sources of power and of two spheres of their operation, nature is sometimes assumed to be in antagonism to God. It is the wicked and consenting material that forms the weapons with which scientists assail or seem to imply an assault upon his special revelation to man. Looking at nature as an efficient power, they admit that in some departments at least it is sufficient for the production of phenomena, and they practically admit and are not prepared theoretically to deny, that it embraces the promise and potency of all substantial things. While admitting that the Creator established the laws of nature, and the forces that work in their channels; they imagine he gave to them propulsion and has since left them to work out their inexorable results as a machine does its work, while he seldom or never touches them—that they were all finished in the long-ago; and whereas there is now no necessity for his presence and activity, therefore he is not present and active—that his creative power has ceased even if it is not exhausted and his presence being superfluous is not to be expected unless exceptionally and at rare periods. As a consequence of such convictions “he is not in all their thoughts,” or, in all their thoughts *he is not*. The doctrine of the omnipresence of God is accepted as a dogma that it is not expedient to deny, but being an incomprehensible fact it is permitted to be nearly as ineffectual as a rejected theory.

Devout teachers sometimes say of the Creator that he cannot

do so and so, referring to the limitations "in the nature of things." Such statements may express absolute truth. The opposite of them may be inconceivable. They seem to imply that he will be exalted by having his subjection to nature's laws proclaimed and proven, or at least that he will thus be made more acceptable to minds familiar with science. There seems to be an impression that nature or nature's laws were anterior and superior to God himself—that he made all things in conformity and in subordination to those laws—that he is environed by necessities and limitations. Probably there is often the confused process of an attempt to conceive of the contradictory condition of an existence prior to the First and of a power superior to the Almighty. All expressions intimating, or habits of thought admitting that truth or necessity or nature is in any wise prior or superior to him, suggest limitations upon him, and they imply that he is not supreme. By such processes in many minds the infinite and omnipresent One is superseded; and having no relish for atheism, such minds accept only an anthropomorphic deity, into whose presence they hope the future may lead them. Upon such an unstable foundation the superstructure of conviction and character is weak, and a comparison makes atheism tolerable.

How may the foundation be amended?—At some point the mind must consent to surrender itself to the fact of an eternal and infinite being, though he is incomprehensible to finite faculties; and to abandon its pursuit of the beginning; for it can neither conceive of a beginning nor of no beginning.

Man with his highest endowment of moral freedom has allowed his will and imagination to become subject to his animal nature; to multiply its requirements by complex contrivances and indulgencies, until it has obtained the mastery; and it keeps his perception and his freedom impaired. His moral nature may be emancipated and developed to a high degree of utility and felicity if he may be led to admire and to imitate a perfect character. But he is not inclined to do this; and gratitude is the only bond that will lead him and hold him to such a course; and none short of his Creator is entitled to the requisite degree of gratitude or admiration; and his Creator is an invisible spirit;—and alas, man can have no conception of a

mode of existence, nor of the operation of character above such as he may form out of the poor material of his own experiences. He must have aid provided in accommodation to his weakness, his limitations and his abnormal disposition. Without such aid for him there is a chasm between need and supply that has no parallel and no analogy. Suitable aid is possible only through the divine man, God manifest in the flesh.

These two distinct processes of mind at least are involved in accepting God as he is revealed. First, assent to the fact that he is and is eternal, and is infinite in power, wisdom and presence; and second, such conception of his character and disposition as may be found in considering the person and the works of Jesus of Nazareth illustrated by all other attainable knowledge. The first process is the acceptance of facts that cannot be perceived by the senses nor grasped by the imagination, and which are therefore liable to be transient and evanescent to the mind.

The second process is the appropriation of material which has been furnished to meet human need. For direct effects upon practical life and character the use of this material is necessary and it may seem to be the most important. Yet a firm adherence to this will be best secured by an intelligent and constant use of the other. The appreciation of the person, life and mission of the Christ who came and has gone away, should not be allowed to depreciate the fact nor obscure the conception of the presence of the infinite Creator. Regarding the relation of the Creator to the works of his power, the character of the Christian will be invigorated if he will believe and affirm that wherever in nature efficient power operates, that power is God. This belief should not exhibit itself in obtrusive cant, but it should be infused in fundamental teaching and cherished in habitual thought. It need not operate to supersede the terms ordinarily used to describe the relations of things, but it should affect the significance of those terms. It should by no means seem to constitute matter, or force, or any ordinary conception of nature a substitute for an intelligent Creator, but it should always present distinctly to the mind the fact that God is everywhere Almighty—though he is revealable to man and to be comprehended by him only in the form

and character of humanity, yet is partially perceived as the mover in every motion of everything—invisible but not absent from any soul or any atom or point of space. The scriptures represent him as performing the work which we attribute to nature. May not such representations be accepted, not merely as poetry, nor as truth only by liberal construction, but rather as truth substantial in philosophy and in theology? The first requisite with which to meet and repel unbelief or doubt, is thorough theism.

If we claim that atheists attribute to matter power that it does not possess; and if we admit that Christians often do but little better in their conception of the functions of the laws of nature; and if we find that in pursuance of consistency Christians should habitually recognize the operative presence of God; we have only arrived at a familiar doctrine, with no special prescription to secure its practical observance. In pursuance of an amendment or reform in the ordinary conception of the relation of the Creator to his works, let there be a statement of certain deductions and inferences that flow from the fundamental doctrines of religion.

God is Omnipotent, Omnipresent, Omniscient and Eternal. It follows: Firstly, that the will of God operates directly upon and within every particular molecule or atom as well as upon and within the aggregate masses of the matter of the universe; now and from all the past to all the future; eternally. He not only has planned the proceedings and established the laws of nature, but he executes them. Secondly, in other words, chemical motions, gravitation, inertia, electricity, light, and heat, and all manifestations of power in and upon matter, and all forces whether latent or active, in their minutest subdivisions, as well as in their accumulated energies and results, are none other than the effect of the will of God in perpetual, direct and consistent activity. Wherefore,

Thirdly, there is no power in nature's laws nor in any force using such laws as channels, delegated from God, to effect his will. Fourthly, we cannot know that the relations between antecedent and consequent phenomena are necessary relations. We can only know that they are certain to be continued or repeated. We do know that under given conditions given re-

sults will certainly follow, but we do not know that such certain results are also necessary results. We cannot know that the conditions of conditional things are not all arbitrary appointments, chosen to be as they are in pursuance of freedom and wisdom.

It is not intended here to offer an argument, but merely to make suggestions of a mode of expression, and of some indications of its utility. These suggestions are thrown as a mite into the mass of material that is under agitation, with the hope that so far as they have any effect or tendency they may tend to clarify and not to confuse.

The first three parts of the statement are substantially the same; and they are only partial definitions of the preceding admitted doctrine. The third and fourth seem naturally to follow the other two, and only the fourth will meet with objections from those who accept the fundamental doctrine. If as a whole it is a radical form of statement, nevertheless it seems that nothing short of it will uproot the habit of thought that has grown upon the use of terms which imply that nature is an automatic power.

It may be worth while to notice briefly some of the most obvious objections that may be made to it.

It presents difficulties. It is safe to assert that no new difficulty occurs, and if it renders difficulties conspicuous, they are made so only in so far as they are beheld from a new point of view.

The effort to conceive of a person so diffused excludes all idea of giving to or receiving from him any sympathy or other emotion. Very true. Accept the fact however because it is a useful one to hold, and then turn with the imagination to the embodiment that has been given—given in order to express to us and to call from us the best emotions. It is at variance with the language in use with regard to science and phenomena, and would create confusion by diverting from terms their ordinary import. To this it may be replied that science and philosophy deal with the facts of the existence and relations of phenomena, and as no new thing nor new relation of things to one another is presented by this form of statement so no new terms are required to express such relations, and no disturb-

ance is given to former terms. The fact of the universal reign of law may be accepted and all the terminology referring thereto may be retained. There might be a modification of the conception of the efficiency or power of a law. It might also follow that the term law or law of nature should be used to designate the known processes of God's will, and to distinguish them from the unknown; leaving the unknown or spiritual or supernatural processes and effects still no more nor less truly and distinctly the results and manifestations of his will, than are ordinary or natural phenomena. It will be said that philosophy has already decided against this statement and has affirmed that apparent cause and effect are necessarily related. As a purely philosophical question dealing only with phenomena and their relations, upon observing universal and perpetual recurrence of the relations of antecedent and consequent events, it seems natural to infer that such relations exist of necessity. But if it be admitted that under all phenomena there is One infinite intelligent Power, that fact is sufficient to account for the relations of phenomena, antecedent, and consequent, without linking them together by necessity. Their constant recurrence is a beneficent notification to intelligent creatures whereby they may guide their plans. It is presumption for us to decide that He could not dispense with agencies and instruments.

Whether there is or is not necessity in the current processes of the laws of nature, or whether antecedent and consequent both issue direct from the will of God, is a question above our investigation and comprehension. Therefore it is not proper to dogmatize nor to assume that we know either that there is or is not a necessary relation between antecedent and consequent events. We can repeat and remember that we are unable to know that there is necessity in their relations, and we ought to do this in order to prevent errors that might flow from a mere assumption. If the certainty of the proceeding under nature's laws may be accounted for by attributing it to the constant action of the will of God in detail and in directness as well as in general modes and results, the probabilities are not against this solution. It is proper to accept as true that which will harmonize with other truth. Both science and religion may

stand upon the basis of this statement with ample room, and neither will be required to yield any vital point nor make any aggressive encroachments. It cannot be denied without incurring difficulties. The sole difficulty in accepting it is in that it transcends our comprehension, which fact if it be a bar in this case might as well be a bar to our acceptance of many familiar and accepted facts.

The distinction between necessity and certainty should be appreciated. It is essential. Certainty may be guided under freedom and wisdom. Necessity cannot. Any idea of necessity extraneous to God involves a limitation upon him, a subordination of him. All necessities as well as all certainties are of him and emanate from him.

But where does the being of God separate itself from his creatures?

Where does responsibility begin on the part of his creatures?

Where does evil originate? Is there any freedom for his subjects?

All these questions arise under any other theory as well as under this.

The human mind asserts its consciousness of freedom with equal tenacity whether confronting the rule of a Creator or the dominion of law over it and over its material tenement, and its antecedents and environments. It is not probable that human reason and language can brush away the mist that obscures the coöperation of logical fatality and moral freedom. It is not probable that human penetration will detect the line that divides matter from spirit. The mind cannot express even if it can form a conception, at once, of the distinctness and of the unity of force and its product.

In the mind of a theist there is ordinarily the conception that at some point the energy of the Creator is in contact with something that is external to Him, below which he does not interfere. That point is located variously by different persons. One will place it at an acquiescent coöperation with the laws of nature. Another at the establishment of those laws. Another, at the creation of material things under the laws of nature. Another at such creation, independent of such laws. And another will let the sphere of the Creator's supervision

and control include the most universal and the most minute elements in which any effect or energy is perceptible. Either of these persons may find his conception varied or modified as he may have changed his point of view. Each conception embraces a part of the truth. One extreme looks toward atheism and the other toward pantheism. We may let our minds incline toward one or the other of these extremes in view of such truth as we may gather, and yet not part altogether with a Creator. If we may choose, let us incline to that which shall keep us nearest to Him.

We are informed that chemical atoms are so composed that one can be distinguished from another not only by its different effect, but also by its difference in quantity, or in its number of constituent physical atoms. For instance, chemical atoms, each of which is composed of eight physical atoms, have a certain rule or mode of action to produce certain effects, giving them a character by which they are distinguished from such as are composed of six physical atoms. And we are told that physical atoms of themselves have no rule of action, no law, no character. They are homogeneous. Without force and without character they originate definite activity and force of themselves, or else they are acted upon by a force that is foreign to them. As Theists with no other way to account for the beginning and the results of their action, we assume that they are acted upon by a free power that has intelligence, order, and benignity. We can conceive that the Creator's will works to combine in various numbers the physical atoms, and continues to direct them and give them their forces up through all their activities, evolutions and developments until they constitute and present the phenomena of the whirling worlds, or the blooming flower, and the living man. Also that the initial combinations do not in themselves constitute new potencies, but they are the signs of the presence of a potency not otherwise observed, and that onward and upward all the enlarged and multiplied combinations and effects, chemical and mechanical, are tokens of the presence and proposed direction, of a wise and beneficent power, inviting trust and coöperation, and giving notice to intelligent creatures with regard to the use they may or may not make of the materials and opportunities at

hand, and withal embodying the divine idea of fitness and beauty. In accepting these facts we do not thereby conceive of physical atoms nor of any phenomena constituted of them, as God.

In aiming at a statement that shall not involve the ejection of the Creator from any part of the universe, perhaps the above paragraph or something like it may approach the truth and be of practical service, admitting, however, that the beginning may be lower than the physical atoms named. Yet any statement that involves as this does, the notion that the Creator primarily works upon material that is exterior to himself, implies that there was something prior to him and not of him, the contradiction that there was something prior to the First, and independent of the All-cause. In creating all things he has constituted the elements of all things, not an atom excepted. Of him and by him they consist and continue to be, and in him they move, and without him they would not move nor be. Is this Pantheism with its chilling tendencies?

If we retain the *ordinary notions* of nature, with all that the name is used to cover, and conceive that every movement of it is a movement of God, then to our minds he is merged and lost in blind necessities and inexorable laws, and we all are drifting with the current of fate on fragile ice-floats, and the depths of a cold ocean is our destiny.

But if we divest nature's laws of absolute necessity and of automatic power, so that necessities and laws shall appear, not as superior to nor as coördinate with, but as subordinate to God; and acknowledge without reservation his general and particular dominion with universal presence and activity, he then appears to our minds as the center and the dispenser of freedom, light, and life, and of law as well. Thus if there is any gold in pantheism we get it without the dross. Whether the relations of nature and created things to their Author as described, be named by the words intimacy, union, or identity, He nevertheless prevails and appears as a primal and active intelligence. Do we extinguish our individuality, and also that of all the substantial things we see? Our experience has given us the habit of distinguishing between the things we perceive and also between those things and the Creator, and no mental gymnastics will deprive us of the valuable habit.

We have no difficulty in perceiving a distinction for practical purposes between antecedent and consequent, cause and effect, force and product. Yet all that is in the product was in the force; and all that was given to constitute a product remains in it. We may take cognizance of things in their concreteness, and notice their relations and purposes, and give them their names; and we may do quite another thing in making an analysis of them to discover their constituent elements. In these processes there is no contradiction or inconsistency; and it is immaterial how deep and complete the analysis may be. If we shall find that no atom moves and no perceptible thing exists independently of the constructing, sustaining, and present power of the Creator; that He is universally immanent; we will avoid confusion and utter no contradiction if we nevertheless treat created things as distinct from the Creator. If in doing so we fail to convey or to conceive absolute truth, the failure is not peculiar to this case, and it does not occur on account of our choosing to use the word Creator rather than the word force or forces; or choosing the word person or God rather than the word power or protoplasm.

We want a basis which cannot be undermined and from which storm and tide cannot move us. Then let us firmly adhere to the verity of an Omnipotent and *Omnipresent* Intelligence. Like many familiar facts this great truth transcends human comprehension, but it does not violate human reason. It is a foundation upon which all superstructure of phenomena may rest in stability and symmetry. It is a center toward which all facts of science and all systems of philosophy may converge and in which they may blend. It gives light upon both material and spiritual mysteries. It reveals the source of energy, purpose, method, intellect, and of matter and its developments. No other theory will afford so rational an interpretation of things visible and invisible. It elevates our physical tenements, and gives a response to the longings and an impulse to the aspirations of the soul.

Refusing to admit of even a delegated substitute for Him, we shall be prepared to accept whatever phenomena or potency may be disclosed whether natural or supernatural. While the ordinary courses of His works will be exalted as such, and

admired for their fitness, benignity, beauty, and permanence, yet it will not be inconceivable that a jar, a discord, a miracle may at some point hasten a beneficent process, illustrate the excellence of the ordinary, reveal the hand that moves it, awaken sluggish minds, and make a special call for awe, allegiance and trust. No new nor contravening power is introduced in a miracle. It is extraordinary but not extra-potential. The adoption of the theory of these statements may put aside *necessity, law, nature, and matter* from the positions they now hold as false gods standing in front and obstructing the view of the Omnipotent One. Then it will be seen that He works perpetually, and not merely at initiation—that he works directly and consistently giving definite promises by established methods, not that he has delegated and surrendered his power to a blind substitute. Under this conception whenever the gentler term of natural consequence is used, it will signify all that is expressed by Almighty fiat, and when His decrees are spoken of it will be an allusion to the effects of causes in their ordinary relations. Whether by special and abrupt construction or by evolution and growth, whatever is produced will be perceived to be the direct effect of His will. We shall be prepared to admit, if true science shall claim it, that wherever conditions arise that are favorable for organism and life, they will appear, and it may be with or without tangible seed. If it be said He causeth the grass to grow for cattle and herb for the service of man—that not a sparrow is forgotten and that even the hairs of your head are numbered—that He maketh small the drops of water—that He made the world and all things therein, and in Him we live and move and have our being, then this will be no hyperbole, but His works will be so recognized and the conviction of His presence will be so vivid that it will not seem extravagant to say He will walk and converse with those who have clean hearts and who will look and listen to Him.

ARTICLE V^A.—SOME RACE-PROBLEMS IN CHINA.

AN added respect for the aggressive enterprise of our century comes from the thought that some of its reforms have reached China. To Western minds that nation has typified absolute conservatism and lack of progress, guarded by avowed contempt for foreigners and inaccessibility to trade. We of the United States have mustered conceit to look upon our hoary-headed neighbor with feelings of mingled pity and contempt. His vast and highly-favored domains have vulgarly been called breeding-grounds for the multiplication of a repulsive, loose-moraled race of "heathen." In the popular mind China has lately been deemed worthy of notice only because likely to cause annoyance by an overflow of undesirable population, or for possible inducements for trade, or because furnishing a mart for our surplus silver. For the comparative philologist, the ethnologist, the evangelist, however, the "Flowery Kingdom" has suggested far deeper and truer questions, concerning the origin of written language, the rise of the ancient nations, the conquering power of Christianity. An exhaustive discussion of any one of these broad subjects might appropriately be made the life-work of a Napoleon for energy, a Pascal for memory, a Gibbon for acumen, a Schliemann for diligence, and, we are safe in adding, a Methusalah for age. Nothing is farther from our intention than an attempt to pronounce upon these vexed questions of scholarship. Yet it may be possible within the limits of a short article to give a brief *resumé* of recent events,—of progress, if such has been made, in China. Still more interesting should it prove to mark out the lines within which constitutional, social, and religious changes must occur if the complex machinery which governs them is set at work. The present period seems especially appropriate for the discussion of this general theme, for it has introduced to American readers several recent texts on the condition of China and a greatly enlarged reprint of the standard treatise on the "Middle Kingdom." Written by a

thorough scholar forty-three years resident in China, is not seems to us unlikely that for fullness of information, fairness of statement, and freshness of style this work will be excelled as a comprehensive synopsis of the whole subject. One may expect, rather, to see the most attractive portions of this immense territory henceforth apportioned among the specialists.

Every country has its local atmosphere, but the atmosphere of China is peculiarly dense and puzzling, with the gathered mists of centuries. All strangers recognize this, but only those who have spent years of deep study in China and come into daily contact with the natives can appreciate fully its significance. When such authorities as Mr. Williams confess that they were often puzzled to apprehend every-day matters from a purely Chinese stand-point, one begins to realize the vast differences separating their race from our own—differences extending not merely to manners and customs, but, apparently, to the very structure of the brain and texture of the heart. The thought is the less grotesque because the exact prototypes and lineal ancestors of these "men of the Middle Kingdom" were in reality inhabitants of a world differing almost radically from our modern one in aspirations, knowledge, and material resources. With this warning to ourselves in mind against surface judgments and against making the genius of our civilization an all-sufficient touchstone for antipodal affairs, we will now endeavor, for the purpose of acquiring a fund of information for future discussion, to draw a few deductions from the educational, constitutional, and religious systems of China. We speak first of the former because it has attracted deepest attention in study of the intellectual development of that country, and because upon it the two others depend as corollaries.

It is necessary to notice that the importance of educating the masses was acknowledged in China as early as five hundred years before our era. At that time none of the other leading nations, Persians, Syrians, or Jews, made the slightest pretense to a system of education. The present Chinese system, with provisions for examinations, dates from A. D. 600. Thus its great antiquity is a proof both of the reverence in which it is held and its want of elasticity, viewed from our stand-point. But we must remember the great end of education among the

Chinese has always been and still is to discipline the heart and purify the affections rather than fill the head with knowledge. The horn-books are dissertations upon the nature of man and platitudes on the value of education. Neither the study of mathematics, geography, natural history, nor the history or languages of foreign countries has any part in the native curriculum. A peculiarity of the Chinese language which accounts for some features in the literary and educational history of the people, has frequently been overlooked by foreign writers on that country.* The structure of the characters is such that there is no clue to their sound save by its pronunciation by a native. The utterances of these sounds are arbitrary and independent of any logical system or sequence, so that if a given province should perish, it has been stated, no approach to its dialect could ever after be gathered from writings or analogy by students from other portions of China. Hence no means exists by which the sound of a foreign language can be intelligently conveyed into the Chinese language so as to open up its literature to natives. Grammars and dictionaries to teach a Chinese English or Italian without oral instruction, are almost utterly impossible. All the characters are like Arabic figures and the dialects in China emulate the diversity of the numerals among European languages. Owing to this cause, then, more than any thing else, the stores of knowledge contained in foreign books are shut out, and always have been, from Chinese scholars. Again, possessed from the earliest times with books in their own language, while contiguous nations had only such writings as were borrowed from them, the idea naturally arose in China that "outside" nations produced nothing in the way of culture worth investigating. But the peculiar maxims above referred to are impregnably implanted in the boys' minds—"more deeply," says Mr. Williams, "than are ever Biblical truths and examples on graduates of Yale, Oxford, Heidelberg, or the Sorbonne."

At first thought the public examinations for the four literary degrees are a very encouraging feature of Chinese education. Certain results they do accomplish and accomplish very well,

* For this lucid and concise explanation of the intellectual isolation of China, I am indebted to Mr. Frederick Wells Williams, of the Yale College Library.—J. A. P.

by helping to make an aristocracy of culture instead of wealth or birth; by interposing a bulwark of intelligence between the government and the masses; by furnishing the government with many convenient occasions for seeming to take an interest in the welfare of the people, in honoring and entertaining successful competitors in the examinations. But the vital point must not be lost sight of, that the remarkable interest which centres in these occasions is because they are in reality desperate struggles for office. Though few of the thousands of applicants may reach the desired posts, the unsuccessful still win the influence and dignity of a privileged class. The triumph of these examinations is, therefore, on the side of stability of government rather than higher education. There is no attempt at original thinking, nor is there much pretense to wide and sound scholarship except in the examinations for the highest degrees. What the government really offers is: "Con the old rules, and we will give the best of you an opportunity of putting those rules into practice." The highest praise, then, which can fairly be bestowed on Chinese education is that it tends to peace, by giving talent a fair chance against wealth, birth, and intrigue. Later we shall consider whether these negative merits are sufficient for the well-being and safety of any modern nation, even of China.

In theory the Chinese government is patriarchal and sublime. The Emperor is the father of his people and vicegerent of Heaven, interceding for his subjects on all extraordinary occasions. But he lives in a "Forbidden Palace;" the access to him by petition is uncertain and usually ineffective; during the past two hundred years few of the plebeians have looked upon their *hwangti's*, or "august sovereign's" face; the very streets through which he passes are usually screened with mats. The five orders of nobility, however, are unentailed, and the privileges of the eight upper classes are mostly confined to harmless vanities of dress and immunity from degrading punishments. There is nothing like a congress or parliament, or any body elected to represent the people and clothed with requisite authority to discuss constitutional questions. The active force of government is lodged in the Imperial Cabinet and Council of State, whose duties are to receive edicts, present

memorials to the Emperor, to discuss topics of general interest to the nation and the army. Under the direction of these bodies, six executive boards administer details of revenue, war, etc. In short, about all the paraphernalia of modern nation-conducting are present—excepting provisions for liberty of the individual, representation, and taxation! which the English fought for in bloody wars and we maintained in our declaration of independence. Similar paradoxes are found in their judicial system. There are supreme courts and courts of error and appeal; but civil and criminal proceedings are hopelessly confused. Justice can be invoked at almost any hour of the day or night; but judges are never without instruments of torture to use on either principals or witnesses.

The surest test of the character of this, as of all other monarchic governments, is the relations which officials bear to the people. Chinese officers, especially of the lower grades, are notoriously corrupt and harsh. Jealousy between them is fermented by a regularly organized system of espionage. The only retort which the people have against a particularly brutal offender is a street pasquinade which may perchance reach the eyes of some superior. The people fear the government much, but they fear each other more. In the breasts of each one of them is implanted the ante-Christian belief that one can rise to success only as his neighbors suffer defeat. Here, too, is an excellent inference, by contrast, of what an important factor the power of combination has been in modern civilization. The surveillance of their police would not allow the Chinese people to combine except on the basis of business-guilds. Having no press they could never institute a reform in a legitimate way, by criticism of government. One prop of government is the multiplication of petty offices at the capital. No man can hold a civil office in his own province, nor marry in the district under his control, nor own land in it, nor have any near relatives holding office under him. Another prop is that an amended edition of the *Ta Tsing Liuh Li*, or General Code of Civil, Fiscal, Ritual, and Criminal laws is published every five years by the authorities and extensively sold and read by the people. As this treatise is conspicuously able, terse, clear and plausible among the similar productions of heathen nations, restless minds

have some meat to feed upon. Giving detailed reasons why general reforms are not to be expected among the Chinese people, is complimenting their mediocrity at the expense of our space. Their minds, we have seen, are formed strictly and solely in accord with the principles expounded in their classics. The essence of their Four books and Five classics is the perfection of Ancient China and the evils of deviation from the maxims of the old philosophers. Therefore ideas of change (a different thing, be it remembered, from discontent) are out of question and out of thought, not only with the masses but with the best minds of each generation.

The people may be roughly divided into three religious sects, Confucianists, Buddhists, and Taoists. Of the former, or state religion, the Emperor is High Priest, who in person directs all great sacrifices and prayers. Heaven, earth, the sun, moon, rivers, mountains, the north-pole, etc., are worshiped, and the line is not drawn at cannon, battle-flags, and various species of ghosts. The Emperor manufactures new gods as occasions require. There is no deification of vice or human sacrifice or priesthood, and the worship of the princes and nobles is mere pageantry. As the *profanum vulgus* is prohibited, under penalty of death, from sharing the devotions of the Emperor, it is tolerably patent to the "celestial" mind that if favors or atonement are to be obtained from the unseen powers, they can come only through his Majesty, the "*Kwa jin*," or "solitary man." Opinion in this country, and elsewhere, to the contrary, Confucius himself openly confessed that he knew very little about the gods, heaven, or a future state, and concentrated his energies on formulating precepts of morality and conservatism. This was the Confucius of whom the *Sacrificial Ritual* sings:

Confucius! Confucius! How great is Confucius!
Before Confucius there never was a Confucius!
Since Confucius there never has been a Confucius!
Confucius! Confucius! How great is Confucius!

The Taoistic, or Rationalistic system, is about as old as Confucianism, and to our notions fully as whimsical. The acute metaphysician who founded the system was engaged in profound speculations on immortality; but the time of his disciples is occupied mostly with the sale of quack medicines, nos-

trums and charms. Taoism is apparently countenanced, but not assisted by the State; openly ridiculed by many; secretly indulged in by more; intelligently understood by none. Built on the crumbling foundations of monasticism and asceticism, the structure can never reach wide and noble proportions; but is barely firm enough to support the worship of a whole galaxy of petty idols and gods.

Buddhism is clearer, more positive, more inspiring—the pursuit of final happiness in Nirvana by a dream-life of fellowship with the gods. Faith is useless and sacrifice for sin is unnecessary in this optimistic code, whose strength lies in its positive promises of a future life and descriptions of the gods. But there are no schools for the study of its doctrines and its ranks are recruited mostly from infants pledged by their parents in hours of affliction or despair. Like the pike, Buddhism has no objection to swallowing its food alive; and is continually digesting whole pantheons of strange gods belonging to some other religion. Many of the followers of Confucianism and of Taoism are found in its ranks; even the *literati* do not seem to be aware of the incongruities of such proceedings. In fact the only living and spontaneous principles which all classes of the Chinese people agree upon, as shown by cheerful and regular observances, are fear of evil spirits and ancestor-worship. In other words, what we call religion, or the religious sentiment, is effete, or has never been born among them.

—The limited and stilted nature of their education, the bigotry and intangible structure of their government, and the hollowness and contradictions of their so-called religions, prepare one for the train of events following on their contact with the Western nations. Never has there been in the history of the world a better opportunity for measuring moral, intellectual, and material progress in competition with Paganism and ignorance. If the last act in this great drama has not yet been played, the more should the critics study closely the characters of the chief performers, the relations they stand in to one another, and the sequence of events, before they render a final judgment. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that English and American intercourse with China, of the present century, far exceeds in combined practical results that of all the

other nations, ancient and modern. Upon the cessation of the East India Company's privileges, in 1834, England notified China that a king's officer would henceforth represent British trade. On his arrival at Canton Lord Napier was kept at arm's length, simply because the Emperor of China still regarded himself as the mighty sovereign of the earth, before whom the representatives of all other rulers should do humble homage in person. Napier blustered; trade was temporarily disarranged; but what made war was the opium trade. The Chinese government was memorialized to legalize it, but on finding the good sense of the nation opposed, forbade it and made vigorous efforts to suppress smuggling. Large quantities of the drug were destroyed; England had a lucrative trade at stake and cried out for indemnities to her merchants and reparation for violations of international law. International law! from a nation of moon-worshippers, ignorant of the history, language, and very likely of the position of every nation in Christendom.

The Emperor gave orders to his generals to "destroy and wipe clean away, to exterminate and root out the rebellious Barbarians." The war proved to be a play affair for the English. Forts which should have been impregnable fell without loss of life to the invaders. The Chinese soldiers were utterly confused, routed and slaughtered even when they outnumbered their adversaries forty to one. The English soldiers emulated one another in bagging great quantities of this easy game. After the fall of Amoy, Tinghai, Changhai, and Ningpo, the Emperor's proclamations became as declamatory as those of Napoleon to his army in Italy. His heathen majesty further resorted to the orthodox old English custom, of Robert Walpole's time, of raising funds by sale of offices and titles of nobility. But the great treaty of Nanking proclaimed to the world that China was incapable of making a decent show of armed resistance. England got her money indemnity, together with the island of Hongkong, and the opening of five important ports for residence and trade. The United States and France sent ministers extraordinary to the court of Peking to obtain corresponding political and commercial concessions. Representatives from Prussia, Spain, Belgium and other coun-

tries were also witnesses of this solemn confession of the equality of the nations for purposes of trade. But the second English war with China, begun in 1856, showed that the new state of affairs did not set well on the Chinese stomach and could not be digested by it unless seasoned by a further resort to arms. Taking advantage of indignities committed by Chinese sailors on the national flag, Great Britain resolved to have more "international rights," in the form of a better enforcement of the trade regulations of the treaty of Nanking, and what was before unaccountably omitted from that treaty, viz: the residence of a British minister at Peking. The United States, Russia, and France were invited to coöperate with England in bringing China to her senses and the latter ally added troops to indorse her moral suasion. Canton was bombarded and taken easily; but subsequently the mire of oriental diplomacy proved bottomless. Lord Elgin remarked of the final negotiations at Tientsin, 1858, "The Chinese yielded nothing to reason and everything to fear, and were at the same time profoundly ignorant of the subject under discussion and of their own interests." In the words of a British officer, "Two powers had China by the throat while the other two stood by and egged them on so that all could share the spoil." No wonder that England took her glut of satisfaction—she has always been a harsh and grasping taskmaster with weaker nations.

China was made to establish the principles of ex-territoriality, to restrict the importation of implements of war, and to legalize the opium trade! It was evident, however, that years must elapse before the Chinese officials could be educated up to the point of believing that these changes were binding on them personally. Before minor points were ratified the British fleet were hindered in their attempt to reach Peking. This last and stupendous folly on the part of "the Son of heaven" showed conclusively how foolish was the attempt to deal with the Chinese government as a responsible organization, capable of adjusting itself to circumstances. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros returned to review the slaughter of the native troops, and the allies had another long field-day for plunder. After the possession of Peking, the sacking of the summer palace, and the

flight of the emperor, some one was found with requisite courage and authority to guarantee more indemnities, more trade privileges and new territories to England and France. Their demands were certainly not extravagant, as all China would have been theirs for the asking. This was what the rulers had expected would surely be the result of the war. The Chinese ministers had proved themselves weak, ignorant, obstinate, and helpless. They were as clay in the hands of the potter. They had swallowed this huge purgative pill of recognition of other nations in entire ignorance of its contents, only because it was rammed down their throats at point of bayonet. Henceforth the burden of proof of the wisdom or justice of meddling with China was to be thrown on the victors. It was evident that true and lasting reforms could not be counted on from the government and that regeneration must come, if it ever came, through the people themselves, by the long and difficult process of absorption of the culture, religious, commercial, scientific, and industrial instincts of the *fan-kwai*, or "foreign-devils."

The treaty of Nanking had left the imperial government confused and humbled. The treasury was impoverished and the soldiery was ill-paid. Taxes were heavy. Peaceful citizens nervously feared for their lives in the encroachments of the strangers. The braves called out to fight the English had not disbanded. Hate against the Manchu rule was intensified and crystallized. The time was ripe for a lawless uprising, the only opposition possible in China. It came, in the terrible Taiping rebellion, which for thirteen years ravaged the length and breadth of the land, destroying, blasting, and emphasizing to the stupidest subjects, the pitiful incompetency of their national government. At first the movement took on a religious guise. An enthusiast and prophet claiming divine authority to rule China gathered a few disciples about him; the crowd grew; government officials were first evaded, then defied; finally a camp was made and a regular military organization was effected. All semblance of religious fervor and unity had faded out, and as has been the case with some other parties known to history, the forces were kept together mainly by an appetite for the prospective spoils. Hung Siu-tsuen, the leader, was formally proclaimed by his army to be Emperor of China,

and a campaign was begun against Peking. The rebel army was braver and better disciplined than the regular forces. In despair the true emperor finally called upon English and American officers to quell the dreadful anarchy for which their nations were partly responsible. Meantime England had "hit off the happy medium" of fighting the Peking government just hard enough for success, but kindly leaving the emperor's forces as much leisure as possible to cope with the Taipings. If the latter were successful, that precious jewel, British trade, would have been temporarily endangered, for there would have been no properly constituted authorities to hold responsible for treaty rights at cost of the indemnities of international law. A criticism has been made that if the Taipings had originally announced their intention, if successful, of making the literary examinations more practical, they might have won a moral victory, and attracted a sufficient number of the liberals of all classes to place them in power. There are no "liberals" in China; the word "liberty" is unknown to the language. A significant fact is that during all these years of rebellion and, at first, of success on the part of the Taipings, no cases are reported of desertion of government officials. We have already indicated at some length our reasons for believing that no such bloodless and constitutional reforms are at present possible in the Chinese government.

In exchange for the pyramids of dead, acres of ruined cities, and miles of wasted agriculture resulting from the Taiping rebellion absolutely nothing had been gained, either politically or religiously. The Christianity in the name of which the rebellion had been begun was of the most pseudo and sacrilegious character. The chiefs of the new sect were ignorant of the Bible; in their fanaticism they began by destroying the idols of the other religions; many of them ended in the grossest sensuality, unfitted to lead their mob of plunderers. Legitimate efforts to spread the Gospel of Christ in China date back to the seventh century; Roman Catholic missions were established there in the thirteenth century. Their story is one of mild opposition on the part of the government and passivity on the part of the people. Dominicans, Franciscans, and Jesuits all sought to ingratiate themselves by courtesy, presents, and

scientific attainments. Preaching was problematical on account of the difficulties of the language. The Christianity they strove to inculcate was debased by many concessions to heathen superstitions. Of course there were internal jealousies and bickerings among the sects, and during the first part of the last century all were ordered out of the country. There were persecutions and martyrs' deaths, too, in this far away land. From the fair total of reported converts must be deducted the non-adhering members of families one of whose representatives performed the outward rites of the church. Natural increase came into play and swelled the number of those accounted under the influence of the priests. But the significant fact is that no progress has been made unless the European task-masters were present to lead their pupils by the hands. During the hundreds of years that Catholicism has had a footing in China, no native priests have arisen competent to influence and direct the future of the Church in that country. More than this, the pompous ceremonies of Rome have been confounded with the relic-worship, masses, bell-ringing, candle, and incense-burning of one or all of the native religions, to the great confusion of true Christianity. Native Christians are frequently mistaken for members of secret political societies; they are reviled for their neglect of ancestor-worship; and scorned for allowing women to attend religious assemblies. In reply to the question, "What salutary effect has this large body of Christians wrought in the vast population of China during the past 300 years?" Mr. Williams has returned the disheartening answer: "None, absolutely none."

The treaty of Nanking opened a wide field for Protestant missionary work. Mission schools and hospitals were established; great efforts were made to lay a corner stone of English education; the country was deluged with tons of sacred and profane literature in the hope that by some mysterious process the ideas would penetrate the benighted minds. The results have been comparatively small, though they are not entirely disheartening for eventual success. By the concessions of toleration and access to the remote parts of the country obtained at the treaty of Tientsin, nearly all of the civilized nations of the earth are honorably pledged to prosecute their missionary labors

in China zealously and in concert. But with all respect and admiration for the aspirations and the zeal of this noble body of philanthropists, any fair-minded critic must, we think, admit that the great battle-field of their labors is before, not behind them; that many of the most important and difficult phases of conversion have not been touched; that unless the skirmish lines are soon reinforced there is danger that this advance guard will have to retreat over the ground so bravely won. The lines of Wordsworth are curiously appropriate to the state of China up to this point:

“ Who ponders national events shall find
An awful balancing of loss and gain,
Joy based on sorrow ; good with ill combined
And proud deliverance issuing out of pain
And direful throes ; as if the All Ruling Mind
With whose perfection it consists to ordain
Volcanic burst, earthquake, and hurricane
Dealt in like sort with feeble human kind
By laws immutable.”

From present appearances Christianity in China is, we think, far more likely to be reinforced or preceded by the advances of commerce and science, than to lead in the regeneration of that country. Christianity did not affect the treaty of Nanking; that treaty made the extension of Christianity possible. For hundreds of years men had been *talking* to these heathen about the salvation of their souls; but when the opium trade was in danger no time was lost in *fighting* for the preservation of Western commerce. If anyone puts a more charitable construction on England's wars with China, he is respectfully referred to the Parliamentary reports of that time. In the speeches of the leaders we find very little about religion, moral progress, etc., and much about the national budget. No wonder that the untutored mind should place English commerce above English religion in practical importance. As a nation we ourselves, by nullification of the immigration treaty of 1868, have shown them that smooth words sometimes mean one thing and harsh actions another and less honorable one. This breach of faith would be, perhaps, less flagrant if we were really in the slightest danger of being flooded by an increasing Chinese immigration. The contrary has repeatedly and conclusively been proved to be the fact—to all but the soft-headed members of Congress.

If our analysis of their education, government, and religions has been logical, the extreme literalness, conservatism, and slowness of the Chinese mind has been proved. Whether it can ever be really reformed is a serious question, whose complex answer can be given *à priori* only by those who, like Buckle, have made a thorough study of race-differences and the effect of geographical position on history. But arguing from the past, very obviously no complete or lasting change can be expected in the mental condition of China, unless the best minds of all classes of society are subjected to some extraordinary and constant friction. That friction Western trade and science can supply. The fine ports, the splendid rivers, the fertile territories, the art ideas, the industrial habits of the people, all invite our capital, railroads, steamboats and telegraphs, etc., as soon as the demonstration has been made beyond peradventure that capital will not be disturbed. Two of the Northern districts alone are said to contain thousands of square miles of coal deposits. Notwithstanding the deceit of the Chinese people in private life, they usually have fulfilled their business contracts honorably and promptly. They have remarkable imitative ability, and a hereditary culture which may some day prove widely useful.

A hundred other problems remain to be solved in the presence of these ancients of the earth, every one of which will tend to make them lean more heavily upon the arms which are able and should help to support them until they can walk in the new path by themselves. Of science they know next to nothing. Of medicine they are profoundly ignorant. Their defiance of sanitary laws is shocking in the highest degree. Here are object-lessons which can be taught before their eyes; which they can learn first in a mechanical way; the solution of which will add to their individual comfort; and for permission to exercise these functions foreigners need not apply to the government. Mountains of superstition, conceit, and prejudice remain to be removed. The stable is Augean, for new and puzzling antagonisms against change arise with every real advance in China. There has lately been some ground for belief that the Chinese government was becoming liberalized enough to assist from its being willing to allow its difficulties with

Japan and Russia to be settled by international arbitration and the payment of monetary indemnities. It should be remembered that, contrary to the history of Europe, peace has been the normal state of China. During the past century never once have her three hundred millions borne their standard into foreign soil, Burmah, Siam, or Corea, though the control of new colonies would probably have been an easy matter. The establishment of a commission to superintend the education of boys in this country was likewise a good sign; but the unfavorable criticisms of one illiberal inspector insured their prompt recall.

The failure of the Taiping rebellion, though desperately persisted in when the central government was weakened by powerful foreign adversaries, has shown how hazardous would be reliance on a change of dynasties brought about by fraternal warfare. There remains the alternative that China will be reconquered by some European power; ever since she has equipped and reorganized her army according to European methods, the war-clouds have seemed to lie low over that portion of Asia, as if China longed once more to humble the "foreign-devils." With any first-class power, such as France or Russia, the result can scarcely be doubtful. As Colonel Peter Gordon, the leader of the "ever-victorious" government force in the Taiping Rebellion, lately told the Chinese government, "Potentially you are perhaps invincible, but the outcome of a premature war will show you to be vulnerable at a thousand points." No intelligent nation would be eager to repeat England's experiment with India. The management of China would prove to be that of a stupendous white elephant. The contingency that China might peacefully split into two or three separate empires is not worth considering at present.

Obviously, then, we have seen the re-modeling of China by peaceful means must be a painfully slow and uncertain process. External commerce has proved to be the only quickening wedge in splitting off the-old shell of conceit and ignorance, and two obstinately contested and bloody wars were necessary to drive that wedge home. Whether new wars would prove equally effective in demonstrating the character and inaugurating the reforms of our civilization is extremely doubtful. Like a

lofty and difficult buttress the Chinese language repels all transient invaders. Behind that wall the keen eyes of busy capitalists have detected fresh fields of wealth, and the hearts of eager evangelists throb with the thought that the largest congregation of the human species speaking one language are living there in unspeakable idolatry, ignorance, and vice. We are accustomed to think of China as one of the gardens of man's childhood; but is it not likely to prove also the great vantage-ground of the future? In all probability the hand-to-hand conflict will not come in our day or in our children's. But one hundred, two hundred, three hundred or more years hence, when California and Australia teem with population, great race-problems will surely have been solved on Chinese soil, and our civilization and our religion will have been tested, to their higher glory or their deeper shame, by the sternest yet truest of all earthly judges, Time.

ARTICLE VI.—THE IDEAL IN LITERATURE.

A REVIEW OF THE "ENGLISH NOVEL" BY SIDNEY LANIER.

The English Novel and the Principles of its Development. By
SIDNEY LANIER. Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1883.

"You observe," says the late Sidney Lanier speaking of Jane Eyre and Charlotte Brontë, "you observe that one of these figures is just as real to us as the other; and I have lost all sense of difference between actual and literary existence."

That this is true explains many of the defects in Mr Lanier's almost perfect lectures; he fails in subtle differentiations.

Because he thus fails, he confuses the moral and the didactic; he shudders at the sight of truth from the fear of its mercilessness; he prefers the mystical to the actual. But that this is true also explains a part of the gracious charm of his writing and leaves the reader for the moment in complete sympathy with his attitude. Indeed, in admiration for the man one forgets his work. The book attracts; the man fascinates. He hated the unlovely, he craved the beautiful. Indeed his own spiritual aspirations limit him, and, because he reaches out toward the Infinite Good, and also takes full delight only in that which is in itself lovely, he leaps to the conclusion that Beauty and Truth are identical. "For indeed," says he, "we may say that he who has not yet perceived how artistic beauty and moral beauty are convergent lines which run back into a common ideal origin, and who therefore is not afire with moral beauty just as with artistic beauty—that he in short, who has not come to that stage of quiet and eternal frenzy in which the beauty of holiness and the holiness of beauty mean one thing, burn as one fire, shine as one light, within him—he is not yet the great artist. Here it is most instructive to note how fine and beautiful souls of time appear after awhile to lose all sense of distinction between these terms Beauty, Truth, Love, Wisdom, Goodness, and the like." This is a rarely beautiful passage. But it is not the voice of God. "Be not deceived, God is not mocked." "God moves in a mysterious

way." "Clouds and darkness are round about His throne." There is a difference, and even the finite may grasp it, between Truth and Beauty. This is not the voice even of a strong soul. In a much larger sense is it true that what we call beautiful and what we call unlovely are parts alike of the infinite whole, and only appear as they thus do to us because of the standpoint from which we view them, or because refracted by the medial atmosphere of desire or of aversion through which we view them. And yet, inadequate as we feel these beautiful things he says to be, we instinctively like Mr. Sidney Lanier better for having said them, we instinctively wish they were the whole truth. So prone are we, poor faltering human souls, to sympathize with weakness.

If, then, we read these lectures soothed in the gratification of our own desires, we read them with intensest delight. The very desultoriness is a charm. The exquisite sense of appreciation of fitness allures us. We are flattered with the thought that we also could have discovered these beautiful things. We dwell in the land of Beulah—till we stop to think. "But," says one of our later writers, "To appreciate is to analyze, to analyze is to fail in belief; to fail in belief is to fail in love." Even, however, with this risk before us we will look for a moment at some of the simpler problems involved in this study of the relations of Art and Life, and we will try to avoid the two most prominent defects in the work before us. First its lack of persistent virility, which leads to contentment with confusion and indistinctness of thought—and second the flip-pant seriousness—for I know no better characterization—of the style.

The questions are: is there a tendency in Literature toward the growth of the Personal or toward the predominating influence of the Principle. Can Truth be unlovely? Shall Art have a moral purpose? What is the proper function of the immoral? The questions appear to lie at the threshold of the inquiry. But back of all is the greater question which is as old as history and as new as yesterday,—the conflict of the actual with the Ideal. Is it true that the unseen or dimly seen verity inspires consciously or unconsciously the real artist, and that he may work on unmindful of the immediate result to his audience,

provided only he be not unmindful of the heavenly vision? Or shall he be filled with sense of his mission to the immediate and the present listener, and with moral purpose dominant shall he sort out such truths as are elevating, as are inspiring, and conclude that the others are an inferior sort of truths unworthy of attention? In other words must he consider the actual world about him, its cravings, its helplessnesses, its wearinesses, and must he adapt his utterance to its sense of beauty, its sense of form, its sense of rightness if you will? Or may he be led on of the kindly light picturing the actual without fear and without trembling, but picturing it suffused, so far as it seems to him to be suffused, with the ideal, and be utterly regardless of the immediate result.

Let us lead up to the questions through a few generalizations.

Literature is the language painting of events, or of emotions, or of principles. Its subject determines its character as the narrative, or the novel, or the sermon, but its atmosphere rather than its form determines its classification, as into prose or poetry. And here we turn back again to Mr. Lanier. He considers forms as transitory, but he apotheosizes form. "The relation," says he, "of prose to verse is not the relation of the formless to the formal; it is the relation of more forms to fewer forms." And yet we need go no further than to his own quotations to prove that neither form nor forms makes poetry to him distinct from prose. Whatever the form, if it exhale the subtle quality which by instinct, or reason, or education, we have learned to cognize as the poetic content, it is poetry to him, and it is poetry to us. If it have it not, it is prose.

For example,—and a familiar one—here are some lines from one of the Ingoldsby Legends.

"The Lady Jane was tall and slim,
The Lady Jane was fair.
And Sir Thomas, her lord, was stout of limb,
But his cough was short, and his eyes were dim,
And he wore green specs, with a tortoise shell rim,
And his hat was remarkably broad in the brim,
And she was uncommonly fond of him,
And they were a loving pair."

Now these are faultless verses. They are rythmic, they are electric. We sing to them, dance to them. But to most of us

they are simply musical, metrical, narrative prose. Compare them with this from the "New Day" by Richard Watson Gilder.

"There was a field green and fragrant with grass and flowers, and flooded with light from the sun, and the air of it throbbed with the songs of birds.

"It was yet morning when a great darkness came and fire followed lightning over the face of it, and the singing birds fell dead upon the blackened grass. The thunder and the flame passed, but it was still dark—till a ray of light touched the field's edge and grew little by little. Then one who listened heard—not the song of birds again, but the flutter of broken wings."

This is neither metrical nor conventional in form, but it is pure poetry. Examples could be multiplied. Consider the Psalms of David; consider the book of Job. You cannot translate them into the unpoetical. The essence of the poetical is in its atmosphere, its inner content, and not in its form or forms.

In like manner, in any work of value the least potent quality is commonly its visible influence. The enduring is not that which appears upon the surface. Mr. Lanier appears always to preach from the visible. He shrinks, with a timidity immensely entertaining, from the coarseness of Fielding, Smollett, and Sterne. He tells with his own quaint grace of manner and not without a certain limited truthfulness; "I protest that I can read none of these books without feeling as if my soul had been in the rain, draggled, muddy, miserable; in other words they play upon life as upon a violin without a bridge, in the deliberate endeavor to get the most depressing tones possible from the instrument."

Now what gives this shuddering to Mr. Lanier. He thinks it is the moral degradation. He says of Smollett's work, "It professed to show man exactly as he is and the final result was such a portrayal as must make any man sit down before the picture in a miserable deep of contempt for himself and his fellows." But how comes it that he says of George Eliot, for whom,—and with reason,—he has no words insistant enough to voice his admiration. "George Eliot's book is so sharp a

sermon that it has made the whole English contemporary society uncomfortable. That the state of society in which such a piece of corruption as Grandcourt should be not only the leader but the crazing fascination and ideal of the most delicate and fastidious young woman in that society; that a state of society should exist in which pure young girls should be found manœuvring for this Grandcourt infamy, plotting to be Grandcourt's wife instead of flying from him in horror." Now why does the showing by Smollett make Mr. Lanier shudder, and the showing by George Eliot make Mr. Lanier admire the artist and recognize a moral intent? Simply because Mr. Lanier's standard is a standard of the senses. Smollett and Sterne present the physically unlovely, George Eliot drapes and softens with cultured feminine instinct. And because while the picture reads its lesson it is less repulsive. it seems to the surface observer a nobler work. But—and here is the point—in respect of the older novelists, the world does not agree with Mr. Lanier. He admits it, "As I have said," he says, "these four writers,"—Sterne, Fielding, Richardson, Smollett,—“still maintain their position as the classic novelists and their moral influence is still extolled." Now why? Simply,—and this is the link in the chain of thought,—that the surface impression from a book does not give its real content. The unconscious force within it far outweighs its immediate and outward influence. And with respect to the strong old writers of a century ago, those of us who as boys loved the vigor, and the manliness, and the tenderness of Uncle Toby do not need to be told why the world refuses to forget him.

Still further, in personal influence, the effective force is the inner light. Not long ago an educator of age and experience said to me that the longer he taught the less did he try to exert conscious personal influence. "For," said he, "the potent factor in any man is his unconscious influence and if after the spell of the personal presence is past,—given the perspective of distance,—the unconscious influence should contradict the intended,"—the what Mr. Lanier might call the moral element,—“the distrust will grow, and the last state of that boy will be worse than the first." That is, the admixture of the human in

the exertion of the conscious personal leading was inevitable and dangerous. He would rather point toward the light and efface his own personality.

Now then: if in the judgment of the world as to classification of literary works; if in the judgment of the world as to the moral potency of classical works; if in the judgment of the world as to personal influence, the unconscious is the determining factor, may we not find here an answer to the question before us? Is not the presence of the ideal the test of immortal literary work? Is it not true also that the extent with which the eternal and unseen verity is interwoven with the actual as depicted rather than the intent of the human writer, determines the moral content of the work? Is it not true that if the moral oxygen vivifies it, the work is immortal?

But the moral is not always the didactic and the writer need not be a preacher. In fact, commonly in just such measure as the human preacher intrudes, by just so much is the divine in art clouded. If it does so intrude, the effect is apt to be that we characterize the work as good or bad but straightway forget all about its moral purport.

And indeed, if in the theory Mr. Lanier appears to controvert these positions, in the discussion of the theory as applied to the example he supports them. For instance take his fine analysis of the scientifico-moral attitude of M. Zola. You should read the whole argument. It is so complete and exhaustive that in alluding to it one fears lest he may do it less than justice. Yet it is not unfair to say that as you read it the conviction grows upon you, as Mr. Lanier meant it should grow upon you, that M. Zola's vision is bounded by the human, that the absence of the ideal is its fatal defect, and that it is not only with epigrammatic incisiveness but also with simple truthfulness that Mr. Lanier pronounces this crushing verdict on M. Zola: "The hand is the hand of science; but the voice is the voice of a beast."

Or again we find the same to be true in the equally full, very much needed, and almost uncriticisable, discussion of the physical in Whitman. The "Whitman School," to use his term, certainly have moral purpose enough. But they certainly also are not strongly interpenetrated with the ideal, and we do not

feel they are unjustly treated when Mr. Lanier says of their "movement" that "its whole momentum is derived from the physically large which ceased to astonish the world ages ago in comparison with spiritual greatness."

But it is dangerous to reopen this book even to verify a quotation. No sooner does one do this than its charm narcotizes and its striving stimulates and one settles into an attitude of dreamy aspiration. The perfection of the utterance is, too, a perpetual delight. Consider how completely in these few words he combats one phase of modern vagaries.

"Listen to Walt Whitman's reverie, as he looks at some cattle :

' I think I could turn and live with
Animals, they are so placid and self contained
I stand and look at them long and long ;
Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented
With the mania of owning things,
Not one is respectable or industrious over the whole earth.'

The Whitman method of reaching naiveté is here so queerly illustrated that it seems worth while to stop a moment to point it out. Upon the least reflection one must see that animals here must mean cows and well-fed cows; for they are about the only animals in the world to whom these words will apply; 'For,' says Whitman, 'not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things.' But suppose he were taking one of his favorite night strolls in the woods of Bengal rather than of New Jersey, is it not more than probable that the first animal he met would be some wicked tiger, not only dissatisfied, but perfectly demented with the mania of owning Whitman, the only kind of property a tiger knows."

After this, what more is to be said? This particular position of Whitman is not only overthrown, but is annihilated.

Or consider how mercilessly true is this of *Clarissa Harlowe*. "In 1748 appears Richardson's *Clarissa Harlowe* in eight volumes which from your present lecturer's point of view is quite sufficiently described as a patient analysis of the most intolerable crime in all fiction, watered with an amount of tears and sensibility as much greater than that in *Pamela* as the cube of eight volumes is greater than the cube of four volumes."

Yet Mr. Lanier is never unjust. He is always candid in

intent. He loves to praise rather than to blame. And the impulse of his reader is to praise. How true is this of Walter Scott's novels. "They are the most hale and strengthening waters in which the young soul ever bathed. They discuss no moral problems, they place us in no relation toward our fellows that can be called moral at all, they belong to that part of us which is youthful, undebating, wholly unmoral,—though not immoral,—they are simply always young, always healthy, always miraculous."

What a splendid description in one sentence of George Eliot's work. She "shows man what he may be in terms of what he is." How perfect this sketch of the typical women: "Intense and hungry spirits, first wasting that intensity and hunger upon that which is unworthy, often from pure ignorance of anything worthier, then finding where is worthy and thereafter loving larger loves, and living larger lives."

We leave this book with regret. Its influence is at once large and softening. We remember the personality with tenderness, "sorrowing most of all that we shall see his face no more."

ARTICLE VII.—THE THEISM OF JESUS.

CONCERNING spirit, Jesus taught that it is an essential element in the complex being of man and is clearly distinguished from the matter upon which it may act or within which it may abide. The flesh is one thing, the spirit another: the two are continually contrasted. Spirit is not produced by the body, it may exist apart from it and therefore cannot be dependent upon it for existence. When Jesus would designate spirit as incarnate, acting upon the body and in turn influenced by it, he calls it the soul. The soul of man is his spirit animating the body, energizing the functions of its different organs, regulating its appetites and controlling its desires; and through the body acting upon the world of matter and spirit about him and in return receiving impressions. The attributes of spirit are knowledge, feeling, will, conscience, personality and power. Spirit knowing, Jesus calls mind; spirit feeling, is the heart; spirit choosing, is the will; spirit discerning right and wrong and approving the right while it condemns the wrong, is conscience; spirit conscious that it knows, feels, wills and discerns right and wrong, and conscious that itself thus acting is distinct from other spirit and from matter, is a person; while power is that preëminent attribute of spirit inherent in all knowledge, feeling, choosing, conscience and personality which originates action and is manifested and measured by the results produced. Christ taught, therefore, that spirit is not a mere abstraction, but a positive reality known by all men. Spirit cannot be seen with the natural eye, nor be grasped with the hand of flesh, nor be heard with the mortal ear: because eye, hand, ear are but matter which however highly organized can neither see, feel nor hear: these all are but instruments of spirit.

Man knows his own spirit and therefore only does he know his body, the material universe, the spirits of other men, the spirit of God. Christ's doctrine of the existence and spiritual nature of God is made by its author fundamental not only to all religion, but to morality as well. He was not content,

therefore, with merely asserting, God is a spirit, but sought to bring men to the profound conviction and vivid realization of the divine being.

He sought this end by the use of his own testimony, which was so remarkable that of itself it was sufficient for all who could appreciate it; for never disclosing the shadow of a doubt he speaks positively with the authority and convincing manner of an eye-witness testifying out of his own personal and accurate knowledge. His testimony was confirmed both by his character and his works, since these were so manifestly good that all who knew him felt instinctively that such an one as he could neither deceive others nor be himself deceived.

He appealed to the Scriptures. Apart from all theories of its divine origin and inspiration the Old Testament is a fact: it is history, a record of human thought and deeds setting forth in vivid narration and profound exposition the traits of human nature, a reliable account of man during many centuries of intense action. Christ wisely appealed to this accepted authority to confirm his own testimony to the existence of God: for the book shows that belief in the existence of God is as old as the world and is universally present in the minds of men, shaping the destiny not only of countless individuals but also of nations and races.

Jesus showed men their belief in God by turning their minds to the contemplation of the natural world. He led his hearers to form the idea of the heavens and the earth together with all that they contain, as one whole, united into the system we call the universe, and to observe within it the manifest signs of adaptation and design; so that of their own accord they asked, "Whence came this?" They asked this question, because men intuitively believe that every effect and event must have an adequate cause and that adaptation involves a designing cause. When, therefore, Jesus taught that the universe was created, and that it was the creation of an almighty, self-existent spirit, the designer, originator, and preserver of all things, they were at once convinced that his answer was true. And the more they listened to his eloquent exposition of the book of nature, and from his point of view looked upon the heavens through the clear atmosphere of Olivet and the Galilean hills and snow-

crowned Hermon, the more did they realize that God is; and with the Psalmist exclaim, "The heavens declare the glory of God!" The more they followed him along Jordan and across stormy Tiberias and into the solitudes of the desert, listening all the while to his discourses upon the reeds of the jungle, the fish of the sea, the stones of the wilderness, the more did they realize the truth so forcibly announced afterward by Paul that the eternal power and attributes of God are clearly seen, being understood by means of the things that are made. The more they attended while he spoke about pearls of ocean, fig-trees by the wayside, the rushing floods of rivers, the established rocks of the earth, the wheat and tares and other seeds growing mysteriously, and from time to time of innumerable objects from the whole realm of nature so admirably adapted and designed to illustrate and enforce spiritual truth as well as to please the curiosity and satisfy the bodily wants of men, the more fixed became their conviction and the more vivid the realization of the axiom of all religion and of all science, God exists.

Christ's appeal to human consciousness led men to the assured belief in the existence of God. The words of Jesus imply that the belief in an almighty power that killeth the body and punishes the wicked is a part of human nature and lies at the foundation of the mythology of the pagan, the superstition of the savage, and the ethical systems of the philosopher. Conscience is a fact involving the belief in an almighty person that knows the sins of men and punishes them. Conscience thus enables men to know God as really and as vividly as natural vision enables one to know the tree upon which he is gazing. But to such as enjoy the approbation of conscience there comes a personal consciousness and adequate knowledge of God that is in exact proportion to their purity of heart. Concerning these Jesus declared that they know the only true God; that this God dwells in their souls so as to be in constant intercourse with their spirits; that such are the children of God knowing him as their Father and finding in him present joy and abiding life.

Jesus convinced men that his doctrine of God was true by directing their attention to the magnificent system of religion and morality which he built upon it. He established Chris-

tianity as a fact in the world, grounding it upon the one underlying principle, God is, out of which he made all doctrine and practice to come. The stability of the fabric proves the foundation. If the stream be sweet, the source cannot be bitter. If the fruit be good, the tree cannot be corrupt.

It would give a false impression to say that Jesus proved the existence of God. He was not accustomed to argue with men. He was no sophist or dialectician, manipulating premises and conclusions. He was a seer, revealing God to men by making a powerful appeal to his own testimony, to the authority of the Scriptures, to the book of nature, to the voice of conscience, and to the kingdom of heaven established on earth. He simply removed the veil, opened blind eyes, and said: Behold! The truth spiritually discerned needed no proof. He began with the spirit of man, and by clarifying that stimulated the spiritual man so that he might gain access to the right point of view and from its exalted position behold the truth in its own light and glorious reality.

This spiritualism of Jesus absorbed not only as doctrine, but especially as life is the solution of the mysterious questions that have perplexed humanity. When he spoke to the woman of Samaria there was something more than motion of lips and impact of moving atmosphere upon the ear. The soul of Jesus communed with that of his disciple: there was contact of spirit with spirit. The thoughts of Jesus were communicated to the mind of the woman; the powerful action of his conscience awakened her conscience to the sympathetic discernment of good and condemnation of wrong; his intense emotion aroused the heart of her whose feelings had become hardened by sin; his steadfast will influenced her will to submit to his powerful persuasion. With conscience at white heat, her mind brilliant with the flashing thoughts of truth, her heart all aglow with thrilling emotions and her will by its submission to righteousness endowed with a full baptism of power, the personality of the woman was so manifest to herself and the consciousness of the reality of her own spirit was so vivid and her knowledge of the presence of a spiritual being in human form before her of transcendent power and glory was so clear, that she was enabled intuitively to grasp in its fullness the profound

saying, "God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth."

Having thus convinced men that there is a God, Jesus tells who and what he is. God is a spirit. He is *spirit*. Spirit is the essence of his being in which all his attributes inhere. God is mind, feeling, will, conscience, power inherent in one spiritual person, the infinite spirit. He is self-existent, having life in himself. He is eternal, existing now and before the world and through the unending future. He is omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of all things. God worketh hitherto even up to and into the present, feeding the birds, clothing the grass, numbering the hairs of our head, hearing and answering prayer. Instead of being indifferent to men he is their Father. The fatherhood of God is one of the most prominent elements in Christ's conception of deity. God is our Father who is not only in heaven, but on earth in intimate union with the souls of individual men. The Father dwelleth with men. He is a Father even to prodigals, ready to welcome them to his presence. But God is a holy Father. Instead of approving sin he hates it with a perfect hatred. He will not allow the sinner to come before him in peace. Only the pure in heart can see God. He is a righteous Father, showing no partiality to any of his children; but rewards and punishes according to deeds. He is the God of truth. They that worship him must worship in spirit and in truth. They that serve him must serve him only and must glorify him with good works. He will have mercy and not sacrifice. The worship which he demands is that they should love him—a worship designed to develop all the powers and faculties of man's being to the utmost and to promote the highest welfare of the race. There is no provision for polytheism, or formal rites, or religion divorced from morality that it may be wedded to vice. Yet he is merciful as well as just and holy. He punishes the incorrigible with a righteous judgment; nevertheless he loves the world in spite of its wickedness and has provided a way whereby he may forgive men their trespasses. He is not simply the God of Abram, Isaac, and Jacob; nor of Israel only; but is the God of all mankind and dispenses to all his blessings on the same conditions. He

is a God not of the dead, but of the living, giving immortality to all men, which is to them eternal life or eternal death as they choose to make it.

Such was Christ's conception of God. It proves its own truthfulness. It is a thought which needs only to be received into the mind of any truth-loving soul to be at once recognized as true. It surpasses any and every human idea of God. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, David and the prophets knew something of God, but they knew him only in part. Now and then they caught glimpses of him as one sees a distant mountain when for a moment the haze is blown away and the clouds lift. Personally theirs was an inadequate knowledge of God, however much in advance of the popular idea, because it was a conception colored and shaped by their own imperfect life and experience. Nowhere in the Old Testament can we find such a glorious portrayal of the being and character of God as Jesus has given us. Nowhere in Homer, in Plato, in Cicero, in the Vedas, in the whole realm of classic literature is there to be found a conception of God comparable with Christ's revelation of deity. Has modern life with its keen-eyed science evolved a God that shall set aside the theism of Jesus? Who is this God of to-day whom they would have us accept in the place of our Father whom Christ has taught us to love? The God of these philosophers is one of human revelation, if not of human invention; for the fundamental principle of their science is the rejection of everything supernatural. Their God is the unknowable. He may exist or he may not. If he be the Creator of the world, he has left it to run itself without any of his personal supervision. He is no prayer-hearing God. Breath spent in prayer is wasted in self-delusion. Those who worship him cannot worship him in spirit, for there is no spirit. All things are material. What is called spirit is only a function of the body or a mode of motion. There can be no such thing as sin: for all things are fixed by unchanging law. Murder, lying, sensuality are the incidental results of climate and the development of human nature, unfortunate indeed, but to be expected in the nature of things, to be tabulated as statistics and to be compensated for by other adjustments. The individual has little worth compared with

the sum total of all things and has no assured hope of immortality.

In spite of this latest result of the effort to produce a conception of deity that shall set aside the Fatherhood of God as revealed by Jesus, it is still true that Christ's portrayal of the divine being and character is indisputably the very best the world has ever seen. That portrayal was eminently his. A few of its elements had been perceived by different sages before his day, but no one had combined them all into one harmonious and perfect character. Much less could any one else have transfused this conception into the spiritual life of mankind so as to make it the organific force that has for eighteen hundred years been developing in church, society, and state the most stable and yet progressive results of true thought and noble action. Christ's portrayal of God involves no error and lacks nothing. Whence did Jesus get his idea of God? Was it the shrewd invention of an impostor? the dream of a fanatic? the fantasy of an insane person? No. This matchless portrayal of the character of God is itself a proof of its truth.

It is one thing to talk about God and prove his existence by argument; to say with the head, there is a God; but it is a far different thing to feel in one's soul the profound conviction and vivid realization of the sublime truth, God is. It is the most exalted experience of which our being is capable, the joy of the Christian's life. He loves the earth, because as he walks along by its river courses and rambles through its solitudes, and climbs its mountain peaks, and lifts up his head above the clouds, and gazes up into the heavens at night resplendent with flashing stars and silent planets, his breath comes and goes as through these glorious works of creation the being of God manifests himself to the soul. He loves the Bible, because as he reads it from Genesis to Revelation, with Jacob as he wrestles with the angel for the knowledge of God's name; with Moses at the burning bush realizing the presence of the great I Am; with Elijah in Horeb, discerning the character of God in the still small voice; with the disciples on the Mount of Transfiguration stunned by the voice of God; with Jesus as he manifests in his embodiment of truth the image of the divine being, he sympathizes in heart and mind and is led to realize

more and more that God is, and that man may be filled with the knowledge of his glory. He loves to study the philosophy of the soul, because the more he knows of the faculties of the intellect, of the variety and force of the emotions, of the mystery and power of the will, of the nature and laws of conscience, not only in themselves but also as manifested in the experience and deeds of the individual and the race, the more is he thrilled with the conviction and realization of the existence and glory of him who created man and endowed him with such enduring worth. He loves Christianity, because all of its teachings declare the being and power and goodness of God; its religion binds his soul in intimate union with God; its morality regulating his relations with his fellow men has for its one underlying principle and motive obligation to and love for God; its church is the temple of God filled with his abiding presence; its services of prayer and praise and contemplation of the truth are worship, by means of which his soul is lifted up into the knowledge of God and participation in his enduring joy. He loves Christ, because his name is Immanuel—God with us; his testimony reveals God; he is himself the brightness of God's glory. The natural world, the Bible, human nature, and the Church, reveal God with great power; but no one nor all of these can make God known to the soul with such vividness as does the Lord Jesus. The more one knows of Christ, the more he knows of God. The more he imitates Jesus and drinks of his spirit, the more glorious to the soul is the manifest presence of the one perfect being; the more adequate is the comprehension and the more intense is the realization of that profound truth stated in the monosyllables, God is.

ARTICLE VIII.—ANARCHIC SOCIALISM.

“Until Kings are Philosophers or Philosophers Kings cities will never cease from ill.”—*Jewett's Plato*.

SOCIALISM is widespread and powerful to-day throughout Europe. In France it is at home. In Germany it has political status. In Italy many adherents. Spain with its society of *El mano nera* (the black hand), is honeycombed with it. Russia, on the eve of revolution, has its cities and villages permeated with it, and Ireland finds the means of its agitation in the themes of Socialism. It is a product of our modern civilization; a part of the unrest and ferment of the time; though similar movements are not unknown to history—for example the Agrarian difficulties in Rome—yet not one has had so intelligent leaders, nor so thoughtful a philosophy upon which to base its fundamental principles. It is weak just in proportion as government becomes popular and representative in its character; strongest where monarchy is most absolute. Its origin is easily traced to two working causes: Despotism and Idealism; the one the initial cause, the other the motive power which keeps the agitation in progress. It is easily seen that a people under the iron rule of a monarch, or under the no less iron rule of a corporation soulless, grinding the face of the poor, must seek for changed conditions, and better. That is Socialism reduced to its simplest statement. It is born of despotism. It is the cry of the oppressed—the social “*de profundis*.” When we consider how the individual in many parts of Europe is trammelled, not to say under complete subjugation, it is no wonder that in these days of generally diffused intelligence such a widespread movement as this should take place. If there were no such movement, it would be a remarkable phenomenon. Take the youth of to-day, well educated and of the artizan class, having read of free institutions. What does he find himself confronted with in Europe—in many lands? A monarch at whose beck he gives up his best years to military service; for whom he is called upon to lay down even his life;

an aristocracy, a privileged class with vested rights, to whose ranks he may never hope to gain admittance; an ecclesiastical organization for whose support he is taxed, though of another faith; a corporation in whose service he is employed which reduced his wages to a small amount and from whose clutches he cannot escape except he starve; and alas! there is no land for him to till as a freeman. And now he is no longer an ignorant peasant; the printing press has emancipated him; his eyes look out on all the world. Now there comes to him with the consciousness of wrong, the hope of redress, of betterment, of liberty. He sees a vision of a new order of things. From the earth, which the people shall hold as their own, shall arise newer and fairer cities with their columns and arches, their heaven-pointing spires. Having no wars there will be no need of walls. Poverty will be done away, and with poverty crime and its great result. No one can imagine this earthly Paradise, for how can any one tell just how the race will develop under these new social and economic conditions. It is a vision of the future; a golden age. Of this the poets have sung, the dreamers have dreamed. For this the good and wise in all ages have wrought. But now the successful experiments of popular government have made it not only possible, but feasible. Based on a careful study of economic laws and individual rights, having the advantage of profiting by many previous mistakes, it cannot fail. The time is ripe. For what indeed can a man strive that is worthier, nay, holier, than this new order of things which will enrich the poor and not impoverish the rich; which will humble the proud and cheer the humble; which will give to each and every one the opportunity and the privilege of living unfettered by any restrictions except self-imposed—neither of government, society, or commerce—and so to live his life in the full and perfect development of all his faculties. So arbitrary power, old customs, vested rights in Church and State, push this movement in the minds of men to the front, while the hope, which has ever something of green in the human heart, beckons it on.

In no two countries of Europe has Socialism the same manifestation. It takes its form from its environment. To understand it, however, two great phases must be considered—the

two hemispheres of the world of its existence. These two phases are the Economic and the (to coin a word) Archic or Legislative; the first or Economic the greater. Its professed object is the more equable distribution of the results of labor—a fair chance for humanity. Economical reform is then its vital principle: the adjustment of social conditions with reference to wealth. Establish, it is said, economic laws; restrict undue class privilege, extortion, usury, monopoly, corporations as you would other evils which infest the State and war against the greatest good of the greatest number; make it impossible for the few to be very rich by taking away the opportunity for large accumulation, and the goal is reached. This implies a philosophy of political economy. Concerning the truth of the socialistic philosophy, the great question of its right to live, the battle wages. This region of thought, the economic, any student realizes, is thick with strife. One looks down upon it as upon a plain where a battle is raging. He sees the contending armies march and countermarch; here a flank movement, now a sudden ambushade; now the main body is broken; anon the line comes marching on in full front. Conflicting theories of wealth, value, labor, property, taxation, lead one into labyrinths of opposing forces. Socialism does not fear. It can verify its own economic science. It bases its right to live and grow and become, in its great consummation, the new order of life for the world in what it claims are irrefutable economic principles. The archic or legislative phase of the movement, concerns the practical carrying out of its reforms and the status of its condition in the future. Here it is divided into two camps diametrically opposed to each other, the archic and anarchic schools. The two great leaders of these opposing forces are the German Carl Marx and the Frenchman Proudhon. The German would have a strong government controlling and checking, managing the social sphere as if a machine of complicated working. The Frenchman would have almost no government: it is a useless appendage, a nest of abuses; under pretence of protecting rights it robs of privilege. The world will never be happier or better until absolute individual liberty is secured. Mutuality, agreement to do or not to do with one's fellows, is the only way in which anything like a government is recognized.

The Anarchic school seemingly has more of reason with it. If you institute a strong government, what is to prevent abuses? Do you not repeat the mistakes of history? It accepts Mill's treatise on liberty as representing its views,—in the main. It would seem that with an entire new régime any authoritative interference would militate against the success of its proposed social condition. This Anarchic school holds to individual sovereignty as its watchword. To-day Socialism has its two parties—the *Anarchists* and the *Collectivists*—the latter a new designation of the German school. It differs from the Anarchic school in that it presents a more definite programme. It is constructive. The School of Proudhon, notably the *Nihilistic* Anarchists of to-day, object to any formulas of upbuilding as weakening the movement and causing division. Let us destroy, say they: One thing at a time. There will be time enough to construct, after destruction has done its perfect work. Collectivism has two wings: the *Revolutionary*, which would gain its end by popular uprising, and the *Evolutionary*; the latter recognizing the idea of Evolution as applicable to Social Reform as to all things else.

Having now considered the various schools of Socialism, we ask what are its ethical principles or tenets? More than ever before in the world's history does mankind demand of any new movement a declaration of its fundamental ethical bases. Socialism does not refuse the challenge. Primarily it affirms that no real progress, no complete civilization can come unless justice be the rule of the State—"Justice," says Proudhon "the general, primitive, categorical law of all society." The movement is therefore protestant against existing social institutions appealing to the sense of right in man, and the rightful adjustment of relations between man and man, which is justice. These relations, everyone admits, are many of them ill-adjusted; concerning this there is no question. Again, equality is sought, equality before the laws, equality as the outcome of proper economic observances. To obtain justice, equality is necessary—equality of right and privilege. This cardinal principle every American accepts as far as the State is concerned; it is the initial principle of our institutions. When a like equality is asked in the economic world, an equivalence

of advantage and opportunity for every child that is born, there is a shrinking from the possible consequences of such a subversion of the existing order.

In the new society one other principle is taken for granted as binding on the individual—in fact its presence is the beating heart of the new régime; the Christians would call it brotherly love; the Positivists and Socialists, Altruism. This altruism is the essential oil of the new machinery; without its magic property the new order of things never can be; without its presence this new social fabric would topple and fall. And yet, strange to say, in all systems of Socialism, the effort to promote the golden unselfishness is neglected. Here the whole movement is weak.

In hope the world is ever young. Here is an attempt to reconstruct society—to establish justice securely, not on her throne; that would savor of monarchy, but in the market place—a serious attempt. Here is an effort to abolish all fictitious privileges of custom, or of caste, or of legal sanction; to start all men equally in the race of life from one common baseline—a genuine effort. The appeal is made to the generosity of human nature for a common good to yield a special privilege; once successful it is thought a selfish interest would secure a stable foundation. The new order of things will be its own best argument. Are these men dreamers? Are they misguided? Is this movement which has had many precursors on a small scale during this century, merely the unrest of the age, which like troubled waves of the bay, will subside when the great tide of the world's progress comes rolling in upon it?

It has been said that Socialism is influenced by two causes: Despotism, which thrust it into life, and Idealism, which supplies its sustenance through a belief in its "far off divine event"—its millenium. It has the courage of its future. Two grievances also rankle in the bosoms of its adherents. The first the world-old one of poverty with its resultant misery; the second, economic injustice, the mother of poverty. As to the first, the dire results of poverty in our modern civilization, it must be granted by all thoughtful men, that here is abundant misery, and abundant is the need of wisest thinking by the students of social science, and moreover the greatest wisdom of practical statesmanship.

This fact of poverty and its evils is patent to every one. How far it is due to individual culpability, is not considered here. That can be reduced by Socialism or economic reform, the new movement justifies its existence. The second grievance is that of economic injustice. This is the real issue in the debate. The field of political economy is the battle field in which the Socialists are willing to abide the issue.

The master spirit in the radical Socialism of the day is the Frenchman, Pierre Joseph Proudhon. No one can understand the rationale of this attempt to reconstruct society without having observed the earnestness, the intensity of this man who gave his life to the spread of its doctrines. It is necessary to understand his theories to account for the growth and the courage of the movement. To us he seems a fiery Frenchman with a sublime assurance begotten of an intense conviction. "He has been called a German-Frenchman," says Engländer; "he writes with a deep-thinking German intellect and a French power of execution. There is something of the Puritan element in his development. One sees in him the sword and the Bible, while ever and anon, the upstart, the self-educated man, is present." The Anarchism of the day is the phase of Socialism, which (the Socialistic theories of Proudhon, demanding a *politico-economic* revolution), was of necessity to be looked for. It is interesting to note the growth of a theory in the mind of a man; we understand it better when we know its origin. Says Proudhon, "My real masters, those who have caused fertile ideas to spring up in my mind, are three in number: first, the Bible; next, Adam Smith; and last, Hegel." It is the Hegelian Philosophy which permeates the thinking of the more intellectual Socialists. This is true of the German and French schools. Hegel with his thesis and antithesis—with his law and his antinomy—ever-recurring contradictions in the world, and the truth on the next higher plane, with its synthesis, to be sought. It is found in Socialism, the superior synthesis reconciling the thesis and antithesis. It will be seen therefore that this movement is not merely on the surface, but that the large ideas of a strong philosophy sway the minds of its thoughtful leaders.

Property, says Proudhon, is the exploitation of the weak or the laboring classes by the strong or the capitalists. Community or Communism, the reverse, is the exploitation of the strong by the weak—the laboring classes dictating to the capitalists. Here we have the Thesis and the Antithesis. *Possession* is the Synthesis: each man holding and controlling his labor product. The same Hegelian idea is seen again, expecting that through this Thesis and Antithesis will result the high social condition called Liberty—or a condition of complete non-interference by capital or government with individual right. This, however, does not seem to be clearly demonstrated. This coming society known as Mutualism lays too heavy a burden on the benevolence of the average individual or community.

Proudhon was a very voluminous writer, but his book entitled “What is Property? an Inquiry into Right and Government,” gives the gist of his theories. His startling definition that property is robbery, “*La propriété c’est le vol*,” has been the battle cry of his followers—misconceived by them, as it has been by many anti-socialists. He makes a very neat distinction in his definition of property, using the word out of its ordinary and accepted meaning—as he does also the word anarchy. Property as right of possession, he allows; property as right of increase through rent, interest, taxes, he unqualifiedly condemns.

Listen to him: “Suppress property while maintaining possession, and by the simple modification of this principle, you will revolutionize law, government, economy, and institutions; you will drive evil from the face of the earth.” With what ardor and confidence he speaks: “May I in this momentous struggle carry into all hearts the light with which I am filled?” Again: “Wherever this work is read and discussed there will be deposited the germ of death to property.”

It is the vexed question of capital and labor on which the truth of this paradoxical statement that property is robbery hinges. Who is robbed except the laborer? How is he robbed? Briefly, through the tyranny of capital; the accumulation through interest. Without interest, rent, and profit, capital cannot increase except as it were through day’s wages, in a

very limited way. Overthrow right of increase thus, you would introduce into the world an equality of condition, and corresponding happiness and freedom from crime. The middle class overflowing either way would absorb the very rich and the very poor. Why, it is asked with great earnestness, should you give to inanimate money the magic power of increasing, when it lies idle in your strong box? It does not work. It is not entitled to any increase of right. "Property engenders despotism; the government of caprice; the reign of libidinous pleasure."* It is said the non-producer produces; this is an anomaly. The capitalist works not and yet he receives wages. Who pays him? the laborer. Certainly; there is no one else. He therefore robs the laborer, giving him no equivalent for his labor. Destroy interest in every way, shape, and manner, and you establish justice thereby, and equality, and happiness. Here is a definite issue: Is the right of interest granted to property unjust? Proudhon proves that it is unjust to his satisfaction in a chapter entitled: "Property is impossible." It is hardly necessary to say that he has the political economists of the day against him. Reduced to its simplest terms the question is: Has any man a right to loan anything and receive for the loan a payment by the borrower? Admitting this the question is solved. Concerning this simple right it would seem that there could be no question. It would be a matter of no moment were it not that the spirit of Socialism, a spirit of disaffection with existing institutions, bases its opposition on the alleged injustice of the right of one man to receive interest from another for money which he has loaned. The argument finds its justification mainly in the abuse of this right, showing the evil effects of usury, the tyranny of capital, the power of corporations. Yet to argue from the abuse of a right to the non-existence of it, is absurd.

The justice of interest lies in two considerations: a negative one, the individual right of abstinence from use; and also a positive, the individual right for payment for service rendered. In this twofold relation lies the justice of interest. The right of abstinence from use is a main right of property, second only to right of possession. This abstinence is entitled to recom-

* Pr., p. 279.

pense, as in rent when property is used, or in interest when money is loaned and there is an additional risk of loss.

Property or money: convertible terms, is merely stored production. It has potential power—call it magic, if you will, to purchase, to create, for an individual. Looked at in one way interest is a kind of wage paid by the borrower to the lender. Through the lender's capital the machine and the workman are brought into activity by the borrower. The amount of money loaned is, for the time being, equivalent to the machine and workman—they are convertible terms—the interest is a part of the product earned; for the lender's money is an efficient factor with the machine and the workman, in the total product, and therefore justly paid. Interest is also payment for service rendered. The objection is made: if the workman labors he is entitled to all he earns, his full product. If he pays interest he must take it from his product. This he is obliged to give to the capitalist; so he is virtually robbed. The capitalist, it is true takes it, but rightfully, for the capital for which interest is paid is the overplus of energy, beyond that which the laborer alone represents, with his machine; it works with him and he is entitled to his product less the efficiency of capital entering into and being a component part of the combined labor; that subtracted from the total product is the interest which the capitalist receives. It is a difficult question to explain, running back as it does to the ultimate and original questions of land and its distribution and the unearned increment. Perhaps, in a word, the justice is best placed in the sovereignty of the individual privilege to do what he will with his own, from the economic standpoint.

From the standpoint then of Political Economy as a matter of simple right, the objection to interest is seemingly ill-founded.

But there is another phase of the question lying alongside of this, concerning which the way is not quite so clear. It is this: whether the world would not be better off if all right of increase pertaining to property were forever done away with? Soon, then, amassing of wealth would be impossible, tyranny of corporations, vices of luxury, and idleness. This is the Socialistic claim, which they assert is rapidly growing and winning favor in the minds of men.

In answer to this it may be said in general, the world would be better off if general benevolence prevailed, and if men unselfishly abandoned the right of accumulating vast sums of money, and using it to the detriment of others; the right thus to accumulate being an individual right, inalienable. To promote general benevolence, unselfish individuality, would seem to be the first and necessary step in the Socialistic programme, but of this we hear but little.

Let us endeavor to see what would be the condition of affairs were the Socialistic paradise to be established, yet it is dangerous to prophesy. Mutual societies, like so many circles: these would be various; like seeking like. Professions, trades, occupations; in each of these individuals of superior ability acknowledged leaders. A senate to arrange difficulties between these circles. In corporations made up of employer, and workmen, superintendents. Interest and rent and profit being abolished—a supposed uniformity of comfort and expense, the vices of the rich being removed from the body politic. The evils of competition disappearing. Leisure for individual improvement would be possible. In order to facilitate business, a bank to be established to loan money in peculiar conditions, at a rate sufficient only to cover expenses. This is the future society of the radical Socialists of the Proudhon school. It may be mentioned also that every one being well fed, housed, clothed, educated, crimes against society would disappear. It is not wholly Utopian, as one might think. Practically in New England there has been a condition of affairs not unlike this. Each man with land; each man with a voice in government; a few selectmen; farms worked on shares; the church mutual societies; equally diffused comforts, and crime reduced to a minimum.

It must be remembered that Communism is a grosser form of Socialism, for which many of the Socialists of the day have ridicule and bitter words.

The difficulties in the way of this reform are apparent. Competition between mutual societies; the combination of these societies to control others; the difficulty of obtaining best men to superintend. As in political life, says Mr. Mill, "they will hold back from managerial responsibility." That

seems natural for they have little to gain and must stand much adverse criticism. Also, "as far as the motives to exertion are concerned in the general body, Communism has no advantages which may not be reached under private property." The Malthusian doctrine whose terrors have incited so much of persistence in social changes will not come to be a terror here, for no prudential reasons will limit the number of children, if all are moderately sure of support by the body politic. The incentives to production are much lowered. The spur to invention is removed. Many of these difficulties might be avoided by the nationalization of the land, and yet such a measure involves a strong central government and its possible tyrannies.

It has been remarked that Mr. Spencer's theorem that a movement from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous characterizes all progress, is fatal to the success of Socialism.

Considering this movement in our modern civilization, the unwonted direction of its efforts coming as it does mainly from the aggrieved classes should be noticed. It aims to construct the foundations of society *de novo*. Its objects are worthy and radical enough to satisfy the most exacting. It also runs in parallel lines with the hope of the age that the reign of universal peace and brotherhood may come. There may be furthermore said in its favor that the certain modification of social conditions in the near future as civilization and intelligence become wide spread, may contribute to make some of its problems less difficult. The advance in practical invention is already doing marvelous work in the changing of social conditions. Note the efforts in coöperation which is an indication of the need of social reform and a means of averting its perils.

Looking at the movement with reference to the various theories brought forward in its behalf while yet it is in doubt whether Political Economy is a science or an art or both, it is not uncommon to hear that the science of Political Economy is *independent* of ethical considerations. It is a science, its laws are uniform like the laws of nature, they can be calculated. Malthus has an arithmetic of despair and Proudhon an arithmetic of destruction. Morals are relegated to another sphere. This idea pervading the social philosophy is decidedly erroneous, for as long as men are as they are to-day, self-

interest, benevolence, fraudulent competition will inevitably enter into and modify economic laws and social conditions. This idea is allied to the materialistic philosophy of the day, ignoring the transcendent force of the will as a factor in progress, and assuming too much for induction through material facts and forces.

On the other hand it is claimed also that Ethical progress is *dependent* on Economic reform, a complete shifting of ground. It seems wholly erroneous to suppose that ethical reforms, radical in their nature, are to be run through economic influences. Although there is a modifying effect, this idea is a renewal of the natural order of things—subjecting the immaterial mind to the material force—as a stronger power. The world is not quite ready to believe this. It is seen, moreover, that with the fullest carrying out of economic conditions, consequences of wealth and its accompaniment of luxury and crime ensue.

There seems to be one fallacy running through all the Socialistic arguments, that of expecting more virtue in society as a whole than in the individuals composing it. A great difficulty looms up before these earnest men, that is, in adjusting the claims of a complete individual sovereignty with the requirements of social benevolence. The philosophers agreeing as yet, that man is a very selfish animal, the absence of any strong religious element in Socialism cannot fail to be noticed. Obtaining its conception as it undoubtedly does from Christianity with its teaching of brotherly love, it yet fails to make use of the chief regenerating power in human society. It is partly a revolt against forms of Christianity, overgrown with political and traditional beliefs. Says the author of *Underground Russia*: "Among people in Russia with any education at all, a man who is not a materialist, a thorough materialist, would really be a curiosity,"*—and further, the Nihilist (who is an Anarchic Socialist), seeks his own happiness at whatever cost. His ideal is a reasonable realistic life. "The Revolutionist (the Socialist in action), seeks the happiness of others at whatever cost, sacrificing for it his own. His ideal is a life full of suffering and a martyr's death."

* *Underground Russia*, p. 7.

De Laveleye, the Belgian Economist, characterizes this movement as the European terror; "it may be compared to an incandescent lava which from time to time bursts through the stratum which hides it from view." With the claims of the Collective Socialists in France, almost any one can sympathize. They are substantially as follows, as quoted by Laveleye: One day of rest weekly; eight hours' work; children under 14 years not to be employed in factories; a legal *minimum* of wages to be fixed every year, according to the local price of provisions (a difficult matter to arrange); State schools; equal wages for the two sexes; society to provide for old people and invalids; the masters to be held responsible for all accidents abolition of indirect taxation, to be replaced by a progressive tax on all incomes which exceed 3,000 francs, \$600.00; suppression of all indirect succession and of all direct succession, exceeding 20,000 francs, \$4,000.00; reconstitution of communal property; unemployed funds to be used in building houses for workmen, to be let to them without profit to the Commune. Many of these claims are acknowledged by us as fair, and are in happy working here. Others await the crucial test of experiment.

The radical efforts of the Anarchic Socialists, the Nihilists of Russia, with their policy of dynamite and destruction, win but little encouragement from thoughtful people, while at the same time they are not insensible to the oppressions under which they groan.

The new cry of Nationalization of the Land is a part of the Socialistic programme. An indication of the rapidly growing interest in Socialism is the fact, unprecedented with reference to a work on such a subject, that Henry George's "Progress and Poverty" has been sold in England to the number of 50,000 copies in the last year. In the United States there are 200,000 members of labor organizations who are more or less familiar with the doctrines of Socialism.

It is the coming question which it is necessary that every thoughtful Christian man should earnestly consider. To Christianity the Socialist does not look. It is outgrown—belonging to the childhood of the race. To the religious

element it appeals not at all. To united efforts of good men to crush out vice and crime, it lends no helping hand. These methods of promoting human welfare are out of date. The world has gone beyond them. It becomes, then, the duty of Christendom to educate more strongly in the doctrines of brotherly love; to make of this vast movement an ally, not an enemy. It is young and strong. No better indication of this can we find than the fact that the Vatican endeavors to crush it. It will be a sorry day for the Christian church when it finds itself out of sympathy with the common people who heard the Master gladly, and a sorrier day for the world. Says Socialism, proudly, The world progresses. Yes. Will the church welcome progress? Yes. But science makes rapid strides. Yes, that we know. It builds its universities along side the churches. Yes, true indeed, but Christianity is the very beating heart of progress; it welcomes all advance, it does not lament, it rejoices, even though the steam tug plows the waters of the sacred Lake of Tiberias.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE GROUNDS OF THEISTIC AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF.*—The very name of the author of this volume is a warrant that it will possess certain characteristic excellences in a noteworthy degree. There is no need, then, to repeat the precise words of praise and welcome with which the majority of the reviewers have come to greet each new work from the pen of Professor Fisher. It may be taken for granted that this book, like its predecessors from the same source, will be candid in spirit, comprehensive and accurate in learning,—but without pedantry,—and clear, concise, and elegant in style. We confine ourselves, therefore, to indicating very briefly some of the particular wants which it is designed to meet, and also some of the particular claims which it, therefore, makes upon the attention of the readers whom it addresses.

This latest book of Professor Fisher is, more than any previous book by the same author, designedly and avowedly apologetic. It is true that a considerable part of all the work so well done by the same hand, has carried upon it the stamp of so-called apologetica. But *this* book is from beginning to end, in its entire plan and in the details of its execution, a “Defense,” an “Apology” (see p. vii.), a plea for the rational and validly historical nature of Christianity. Its value and excellence will depend, then, in the first place, upon the answer which is given to the question, Whether there is a real want for works apologetic of Christianity, and whether it is a helpful and dignified employment of the resources of Christian scholarship to produce such works; and, in the second place, upon the answer to the question, Whether this particular book—its design being assumed to be worthy—worthily meets the above-mentioned want. In other words: Is it a fit task for broad and fair Christian scholarship to undertake the direct and intentional defence of Christianity? and, Is the book of Professor Fisher successful in accomplishing its intended task?

It is scarcely necessary to argue the question whether there is in these days a real want for an avowedly apologetic treatment of

* *The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief.* By GEORGE P. FISHER, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883. 1 vol. 8vo. Price \$2.50.

the facts and truths of Christianity. This want not only continues to exist, as it has existed in all ages of the Church, but it is now in some respects peculiarly strong and self-conscious. Those who sneer at the so-called "Evidences" of Christianity do not always stop to think that the reproduction and improvement of such evidences is a necessary factor in the growth of the human mind under the influences of that system of rational and historical truths which we call Christian. As long as Christianity is vital, there will be defences, if there are attacks; in case those who do not like such defences wish to have them cease, they should first of all try the method of suppressing the defences by suppressing the attacks. It is *at least* as worthy work for men of the best gifts and the highest attainments to defend the belief in God and in the verities of historical Christianity as to attack it. Nothing can be more undignified, or more suggestive of weakness, than to cultivate attacks on facts and truths esteemed Christian, and then to raise a hue and cry about "Apologists" and "Apologetics," when such attacks begin to call out the appropriate defences. As much of broad and fair research, as much of freedom from prejudice, may belong to the defence as to the attack of historical Christianity. It is enough that both opponent and apologist should stand upon the same level of obligation to be thorough, prudent, candid, and conclusive.

In truth, we do not believe that the aversion to apologetical writings, as such, is serious, or that it extends to any considerable class of authors or readers. It is true, as Professor Fisher says in his Preface (p. vij.), that "it has become the fashion of a class of writers to decry all works having for their aim to vindicate the truth of Christianity." But of this class, which as a whole is by no means numerous, only a portion object to apologetics as such; or, if their objection goes so far, it is to be regarded as not well considered, and scarcely serious. Another portion of the same class are inclined to decry all apologetic works on account of the character which many such works have hitherto borne; they have too often been lacking in breadth, in cordial sympathy with all truth, and in a fair and judicial temper. But this very fact increases the real need of apologetic works which shall be the opposite of all this,—of works which shall be comprehensive, candid, and sympathetic with all sound thought and generous scholarship. Such a comprehensive, candid, sympathetic work is this one of Professor Fisher. For, although its cast is throughout

apologetic, it is never open to any just suspicion, even from those who do not accept its conclusions, of concealing or perverting facts and considerations which properly belong to the other side. The objections, then, which are usually urged against books on the evidences of Christianity, make the work of Professor Fisher all the more welcome, because the more needed and the more timely.

There has been for some years a comparative dearth of books which aim to go over the entire ground, in a summary way, of the evidences for our theistic and Christian beliefs. The fact has been inevitable; it has been due to the very nature of the progress made in modern times with respect to philosophical, critical, and historical researches. It has been felt that the field opened to view is too vast and varied for any one survey. In the last analysis, of course, Christianity is, *itself*, its own comprehensive and satisfactory evidence. In other words, that system of facts and truths which we call Christian proves itself by its ability to fit itself into, and satisfactorily to fill, all the right demands of human reason, of human history, and of the practical human life in respect to moral and religious conduct. To give, then, a complete survey of the evidences of Christianity involves no less a task than that of showing *how* its system of facts and truths stands related to reason, to history, and to the so-called practical life. But even among the adherents of Christianity, there has arisen, in consequence of these extended and varied researches, considerable difference of view as to the precise nature of this relation. And, of course, beyond the limits of the avowed adherents, a still greater difference of view exists; this latter difference reaches outwards and downwards as far as those who declare that so-called Christianity is irrational, unhistorical, and unfit to control and satisfy the demands of the practical life. The "Apolo-
gist" in these days, therefore, needs as never before a large equipment of resources, and a rare delicacy and good judgment. He must be a philosopher, a critic, a historian, and also a *man* acquainted with what is in other men. The statement just made is no exaggeration: let it only be put to the test of experience. How, indeed, shall one who knows nothing of philosophy defend Christianity before those who attack it intelligently on philosophical grounds? How shall one who has no notion even of what a "higher criticism" is, and does, make answer to the trained crit-

ics, when, for example, they display their evidences that the Fourth Gospel is neither genuine nor authentic?

But the greatness of the difficulties, to which allusion has just been made, only enhances, the value of any work which can, partially or wholly, overcome them. It is for this reason that we are inclined to give to the last work of Professor Fisher a peculiarly cordial welcome. It would be difficult to find any one else in this country who so well as he combines the gifts of philosopher, critic, historian, and practical man, with a rare skill in making the fruits of such gifts intelligible and palatable for educated people generally.

Our answer to the question, whether this book meets the want of a compendious and trustworthy survey of the evidences of Christianity, in a worthy and interesting way, has already been indicated. It meets this particular want as no other book has yet done. We specify a few instances in confirmation of this general conclusion.

All the so-called evidences of Christianity may be—not very precisely to be sure—divided into those three classes, the nature of which was indicated above. Is Christianity rational, in the highest sense of the word “rational?” Is it historical,—comprehensively and validly historical in respect to its beginnings, as the biblical writings and the faith of the Church represent it to be? And, finally, does it satisfy the conscience and heart; and does it serve to build up a good and true life in respect to morals and religion? The apologist must answer these three questions affirmatively.

There are, then, three classes of evidence which we may venture to call the philosophical, the historical, and the practical. Professor Fisher treats each one of these three classes, although without suggesting the division, and treats them in substantially the same order in which they have just been named. The first four chapters of the book deal with the first of these classes. Of course, and from the very nature of the design formed by the author, the grounds of theism, as distinguished from the grounds of historical Christianity, are gone over in a more summary way. But in the first four chapters, the personality of God and of man, the arguments for the being of God, with a criticism of certain materialistic and agnostic theories, and the nature and function of miracles in a scheme of divine self-revelation, are all discussed. The number of points touched, and very briefly but forcefully presented, is

surprisingly large, considering the limitations of space to which the author subjects himself. This excellence is especially notable in the short chapter of only seventeen pages (pp. 103–120) on miracles. Here the most important elements of a correct view of the subject, whether as against the extremes of supernaturalism or the denial of naturalism, are at least suggested for the further consideration of the reader.

The chapters (V.–XII. and XVII.) which treat of more specifically historical and critical defences of Christianity are even better examples of how much on the subject can be indicated in the briefest possible space. Chapter VI., which considers the “Proof of the miracles of Christ independently of special inquiry into the authorship of the Gospels,” is masterly in this regard. About everything which can be suggested or said in the line of such proof, is here, at least for a brief mention, brought to our consideration; the order and proportion are also admirable. Chapter X., on the “Miracles of the Gospel in contrast with heathen and ecclesiastical miracles” is also a much needed piece of work admirably done. It is indefinitely more considerate and trustworthy in its picture of the real state of the case than is the pretentious but unsatisfactory discussion of the subject in “Supernatural Religion.” And yet, Professor Fisher’s work is avowedly apologetic, while that of the author of “Supernatural Religion” is,—to say the best, *not* apologetic.

The evidences of Christianity, so far as they consist in its ability to satisfy and guide the demands of the practical, moral, and religious life, are considered in the chapters from the thirteenth onward,—with the partial exception of the eighteenth, which treats of the “Canon of the New Testament in its relation to the Christian Faith.”

In this connection we wish to call attention to a conspicuous example of the rather unusual candor which fitly leads the author of this book, even in an apologetic work, to bring forward considerations which are not thought by some to have an apologetic value. We refer to his treatment of the disputed books of the New Testament (the so-called Antilegomena), and of the undoubted fact that other books than the canonical were considered as inspired by the early Church,—some such being in certain places, at times, read in the public services of the early Christians. A goodly number of the facts bearing upon this subject will be found by the reader as they are stated and discussed on pages

428-444. It is both suggestive and amusing to notice that a few of Professor Fisher's critics are at a loss to know what he can mean by alluding to so many facts, disagreeable to these critics, which they are pleased to speak of as "unnecessary concessions," or as "going further than they should themselves be inclined to do." Plainly—and most fortunately—the mind of the author does not work after the pattern of certain editors of religious newspapers who have their own orthodoxy to vindicate in every review of a theological book which they set themselves to write. With Professor Fisher, apologetics is not now, and never has been, in any sense a synonym for concealment, twisting of facts, or slipping through the gaps in the argument of an opponent. And we are heartily glad that this is so. For this book could not be the admirable compend of apologetic considerations which it really is, if the mind of its author were accustomed to consider plain historical truths in the light of "admissions" and "concessions."

In brief: this book deserves, and will receive, a warm welcome, high commendation, and a large sale. It is quite the thing for the intelligent layman to read, and to place in the hands of his family for their reading. It is also much better than anything else obtainable for use as a text-book in the Evidences of Christianity. It is, furthermore, an admirable volume for the Sunday School and parish library. And in commending it thus highly for a wide sale, and for popular reading, we do not intend to detract in the least from our high estimate of the breadth and depth of its thinking, the fullness and accuracy of its scholarship.

PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY.*—This volume contains eight lectures on the following subjects: Religion and Intelligence; The Philosophic Theory of Knowledge; The Absolute Object of Intelligence, or the Philosophic Theory of Reality; The Biblical Theory of Knowledge; Biblical Ontology—The Absolute; Biblical Ontology—The World; Biblical Ontology—Man; Comparative Philosophic Content of Christianity.

* *Philosophy and Christianity.* A Series of Lectures delivered in New York in 1883, on the Ely Foundation of the Union Theological Seminary. By GEORGE S. MORRIS, Ph.D., Professor of Ethics, History of Philosophy and Logic in the University of Michigan, and Lecturer on Ethics and the History of Philosophy in the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway, 1883. xiv. and 315 pages. Price \$1.75.

Perhaps the most complete characterization of this book in a single line is to say that it is an attempt to infuse into our accepted evangelical theology the truths suggested by the philosophy of Hegel; although no such intention is avowed. Christianity is comprehensive of all spiritual truth. As the one absolute and universal religion, it must be able to take up all spiritual truth and to accord with all spiritual reality. The profound philosophy of Hegel suggests truths, aspects of reality and lines of thought by which our accepted theology may be broadened, deepened, and enriched, and the *rationale* be to some extent found of doctrines received on the authority of revelation; I say *suggests*, for Hegel himself, beclouded in his dialectics and his *a priori* methods, can scarcely be said to have grasped and clearly enunciated the theistic and Christian truths which his philosophy approximates and points to, but never reaches and clearly declares. It is legitimate for Christian theists to seek whatever truth is suggested by it, and use the same to enrich and support the Christian faith. Among those who have attempted to do this are Dr. Caird in his *Philosophy of Religion*, Mr. Mulford in his strangely named book, *the Republic of God*, Dr. Dorner in his *System of Christian Doctrine*, and now Professor Morris. It must be said, however, of them all that, whatever of value they bring to Christian theology, they bring it encompassed with the obscurity and the tenuous speculation characteristic of the Hegelian philosophy, and with forms of expression which easily lead to idealistic Pantheism and to the mistaking of logical notions and processes for concrete beings and their activities and relations. We think Professor Morris has succeeded better than any one of the others. He is a vigorous thinker and learned in philosophy. No one sufficiently informed to read his lectures intelligently can fail to find in them much that is suggestive and quickening to thought, and the presentation of sides of truth and views of the true position of Christian theology in its relation to skepticism and unbelief, which deserve earnest consideration.

ORTHODOXY AND HERESY.*—These lectures were delivered ten years ago by Mr. Hall, now pastor of the First Parish in Cambridge, before the congregation of which he was then pastor in the Second Parish of Worcester, Mass. They were afterward

* *Ten Lectures on Orthodoxy and Heresy in the Christian Church.* By EDWARD H. HALL. Boston: American Unitarian Association. 1883. 238 pages.

privately printed for their use. In compliance with the earnest request of leading Unitarian ministers, the American Unitarian Association has obtained the author's consent to their publication. The lectures are on the following subjects: Paul and the Apostles; Views of the early Church respecting Christ; Arianism and the Council of Nicæa; Controversy concerning the two natures; The Pelagian Controversy; The Catholic Church; The Lutheran Heresy; Other Trinitarian Heresies; Unitarian Heresies; Religion and Dogma. The author's point of view corresponds in the main with that of the Tübingen School. The conclusion reached is "that dogma is no essential part of religion. It means, not that this doctrine or that is false, but that doctrine as such carries no final authority for the soul. It means that Christianity is really, what it seemed 2,000 years ago, not a verbal system, but a religion; and that if it be a true religion, it must necessarily lead us constantly into new and nobler beliefs." If this conclusion is correct, the doctrines that there is a God and that God is a Spirit are not essential to religion and carry no final authority for the soul.

JANET'S THEORY OF MORALS.*—This work has been translated by Miss Mary Chapman under the supervision of President Porter of Yale College, and is published by arrangement with and under the authority of the author. In 1869 M. Janet published "The Elements of Morals," presenting the results of the science in a practical way and designed to be accessible to all minds, especially to the young. The present volume is a new work, discussing the theory of morals and containing only a few pages in common with the other.

The fundamental principle of the theory is that *moral* good presupposes *natural* good. But natural goods are not to be estimated according to the pleasure which they give, but according to their intrinsic character, which he calls *excellence*, and which is independent of our feeling. The most excellent thing in man is the excellence of his soul, of his personality, that is, of his reasonable will; but not merely of the personality in itself, but in its fraternity with other men, and its devotion to such goods as the true, the beautiful, and the holy. The good of a man there-

* *The Theory of Morals.* By PAUL JANET, member of the Institute, author of "Final Causes," etc. Translated from the latest French edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883. x. and 490 pages.

fore consists in his perfection and the happiness incident thereto. This implies a law by which all pleasures and their sources may be estimated and which imposes obligation to seek the true good which is perfection. Virtue is a person's character conformed to the law and realizing, or intended to realize, the perfection which is the true good. The work is divided into three books, which treat in succession the three subjects just named: The Good; Duty or Law; and Virtue. Merit and Demerit he defines as not representing the relation of the moral agent to reward or punishment, but as expressing the increase or diminution of the internal worth of the moral agent by the action of his will—the increase of worth being attested by the agent's moral satisfaction and the esteem of men, its diminution by the contrary. Well-being or beatitude is not the reward of virtue, it is virtue itself. "The future life should not be considered as a recompense, but as the peaceable enjoyment of the only thing which has any worth—perfection."

It is the design of the author to give real content to the ethics of Kant, which recognizes only the formal principle of the law, without losing its grand truth in the recognition of imperative law; and, on the other hand, by recognizing the law by which we estimate the value or worth of enjoyment and its sources, to elevate into a rational and spiritual ethics the gross utilitarianism of Bentham without losing its recognition of happiness as an element in the good. He has succeeded in doing this. We think, however, he would have presented the result with more power, and would have escaped a considerable number of the difficulties which he recognizes and tries to remove, if, instead of beginning with natural good, he had begun with the Absolute Reason, the Eternal Spirit, that is the ultimate ground of the universe, and in whom all truths, laws, ideals of perfection, and all norms or standards of good are eternal and archetypal, and of whom man, as endowed with Reason and free-will, is the image. These archetypal truths, laws, ideals, and good are thus the constitution of the universe and make sure that the good of man must be in the perfection of his being, its harmony with the constitution of things which are his environment, and the happiness involved therein. Starting as he does with natural good, he finds a difficulty in accepting the fundamental ethical fact that personal beings are always and in themselves *ends* or objects of service, and may never rightly be *used* as means to good. Hence he

speaks of virtue as "the love of good or the love of order." But Christ presents as the object of love required in the law, not order, nor good, nor truth, nor right, nor duty, nor any abstraction, but personal beings; thou shalt love *God* and thy *neighbor*.

The work is well worth translating. It is rich in historical notices of the course of ethical thought; it is suggestive and stimulating to thought; it is written in a lively and attractive style; and, whatever may be the criticism of the order and method of his development of the subject, the result which he reaches and the tone of the discussion are morally healthy and bracing.

CERTITUDE, PROVIDENCE, AND PRAYER.*—This is the title of the fourth number of Dr. McCosh's Philosophical Series, already widely and favorably known. It treats in successive sections the following topics: "Realism and Certainty; Evolution and Certitude; Evolution and Morality; Providence; Prayer; What is our World?" He states clearly the doctrines as to Certitude, Providence, and Prayer, and answers recent objections against God's Providence and his answer to prayer, founded on the law of Continuity or the Uniformity of Nature, as now understood in the light of Evolution. His treatment of the subject is clear and incisive, and sustains the reputation of its distinguished author.

He relates in a note the following interesting incident: "Some years ago I had a call at my house in Ireland by a young nobleman with whom I was at that time intimate, and who has since risen to eminence as a statesman (I mean Earl Dufferin), who introduced to me his friend Lord Ashburton. The nobleman introduced took me aside and said: 'You know that I have lately lost my dear wife, who was a great friend of Mr. Carlyle's, and I have applied to Mr. Carlyle to tell me what I should do to have peace, and make me what I should be. On my making this request he simply bade me read Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*. I did so, and did not find anything there fitted to improve me. I went back to Mr. Carlyle and asked him what precise lesson he meant me to gather from the book, and he said: Read *Wilhelm Meister* a second time. I have done so earnestly, but I

* *Philosophical Series—No. IV.: Certitude, Providence, and Prayer.* By JAMES MCCOSH, D.D., LL.D., D.L., President of Princeton College, author of "Method of Divine Government," "Intuitions," "Laws of Discursive Thought," "Emotions," etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883. 46 pages. Price 50 cents.

confess I am utterly unable to find anything there to meet my anxiety, and I wish you, if you can, to explain what Mr. Carlyle could mean.' I told him that I was not the man to explain Carlyle's meaning, if indeed he had any definite meaning, I told him plainly that neither Goethe nor Carlyle, though men of eminent literary genius, could supply the balm which his spirit needed; and I remarked that Goethe's work contained not a little that was sensual. I did my best to point to a better way, and to the deliverance promised and secured in the gospel. I do not know the issue, but I got an eager listener."

THE PARABLES OF CHRIST.*—The author divides the parables into three divisions: Theoretic Parables, uttered as a teacher for the instruction of his disciples; The Parables of Grace, uttered as a preacher of the glad tidings of redemption to the people; and the Parables of Judgment, of which those of the wicked husbandmen and the ten virgins are examples. Thirty-three parables are examined and eight "parable-germs;" of the latter the new patch on the old garment and the wise and foolish builders are examples. The treatment is not exegetical in form, but is a genial and practical exposition of the didactic significance of these beautiful sayings of our Lord. The exposition, however, is scholarly and critical, and is careful to present the exact meaning of our Lord. The author does not draw from the patristic interpretations so richly as Trench has done; but he avails himself of the results of the most recent scholarship and notices the current skeptical criticism. There is no work on the Parables better fitted for the use both of the clergy and the laity at the present time.

BIBLICAL STUDY.†—The author has published in reviews and other periodicals articles on some of the topics treated in this volume. These he has freely used in treating of the same subjects in this volume. But the whole matter has been worked over anew,

* *The Parabolic Teaching of Christ: A Systematic and Critical Study of the Parables of our Lord.* By ALEXANDER BALMAIN BRUCE, D.D., Professor of Apologetics and New Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 714 Broadway. 1883. xii. and 515 pages.

† *Biblical Study: Its Principles, Methods, and History; together with a Catalogue of Books of Reference.* By CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS, D.D., Davenport Professor of Hebrew and the cognate languages in the Union Theological Seminary, New York City. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883. xv. and 506 pages. Price \$2.50.

additional subjects have been examined, and the whole is here presented in systematic form. The work thus gives a concise but full and systematic treatment of the different departments of Biblical study. Under each topic we have brief notices of the history of Jewish and Christian thought in that department of Biblical study, and an exposition of the principles and methods which in the progress of thought must now be accepted as true and applicable. The work is thus an introduction to Biblical study. For this purpose it is of great value alike to professional students and to intelligent laymen who are beginning the thorough study of the Bible.

The topics discussed are the following: Advantages of Biblical Study; Exegetical Theology; The Languages of the Bible; Criticism; The Canon; The Text; The Higher Criticism; Literary Study of the Bible; Hebrew Poetry; The Interpretation of Scripture; Biblical Theology; The Bible a Means of Grace. Appended are a catalogue of books of reference for biblical study, filling sixty pages, an index of texts, an index of topics, and an index of books and authors.

PREACHING TO SPIRITS IN PRISON.*—The aim of the author is to ascertain the true meaning of Christ's preaching to the Spirits in prison and of the preaching of the gospel to the dead, spoken of in the texts from the first epistle of Peter, cited on the title page. His explanation is, in general, that Hades and Sheol denoted the abode of the Spirits of the dead; that it was separated into two parts, the inferior paradise, so called to distinguish it from heaven, which is also called Paradise, and Gehenna, or the Pit; that the servants of God under the Old Testament dispensation were not received at death to heaven, but went to the inferior Paradise, while the wicked went to Gehenna; that since Christ's resurrection, believers in Him are received at death immediately to heaven, that Christ between his death and resurrection went to the inferior paradise and proclaimed the consummation of his work of atonement to the saints of the old dispensation who had been dwelling in that intermediate abode, and at his ascension

* *Christ preaching to Spirits in Prison*: or Christ's preaching to the dead explained by the change from the inferior to the celestial Paradise. I. Pet. iii. 19, 20, and iv. 6. By WILLIAM DELOSS LOVE, South Hadley, Mass. Boston: Published for the author by Congregational Sunday School and Publishing Society, Congregational House, Beacon Street. 1883. 167 pages.

took them all with him to heaven ; that those who were once disobedient in Noah's day were persons who repented before the flood destroyed them and therefore were received into the inferior paradise, and were among those to whom Christ there preached.

The work is the result of patient and faithful study, and probably presents as strong an argument for the positions taken as can be made.

DR. WM. M. TAYLOR'S SERMONS.*—A modern poet complains, that

“ The Word of Life, is well nigh preached to death.”

And before he ends his strain he describes the preaching that seems desirable

“ We want the Book
Translated into life, not the mere look
Of Life embalmed and shrouded in the Book.”

If the poet is still in search of such preaching, here are some good sermons for him. He may miss the “inbreathed spirit” of the preacher's utterance in the volume ; but here are some admirable maps of thought, by one who handles the “ Word of Life” according to the poet's mind.

We are glad to meet, in this permanent form, a few discourses, the fame of which “we have heard with our ears,” notably the sermon on “Christ before Pilate: Pilate before Christ,” and the one on “What is the Chaff to the Wheat?” The excellent address upon the “Inductive Study of the Scriptures,” delivered to the theological students at Yale, Princeton, and Rochester, is also deserving of the place it holds in this handsome volume.

Issued as the book is,—at the request of its publishers, and because of the bearing of the sermons upon “topics of great present importance ; and because of many testimonies to their helpfulness,”—we give it great praise in saying that its readers are likely to find its contents justifying its preface. The Sermons are what they profess to be, “helpful,”—they are neither startling nor learned, neither novel nor critical, not even *theological*, nor are they meant to be ;—they are what all sermons ought to be, good for food, sermons to be desired because they make men wise unto salvation.

* *Contrary Winds and Other Sermons.* By WM. M. TAYLOR, D.D., LL.D., Pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Sons. 714 Broadway. 1883.

LAND AND ITS RENT.*—This little book contains the substance of four lectures delivered in Harvard University in May, 1883.

President Walker's views in regard to rent are fully developed in his large work on that subject, and while the present volume contains an exposition of his theory, which is that of Ricardo, its object seems principally to be to criticise the arguments of Bastiat and Leroy, Beaulieu, John Stuart Mill, and Henry George, and to reply to Mr. Henry C. Carey. The discussion is conducted with great directness and vigor. If the reader is not convinced it will not be because the author is not entirely sure of the correctness of his positions.

UHLHORN'S CHARITY IN THE ANCIENT CHURCH.†—The author of this interesting volume is well known to English and American readers by his work, especially, on the Early Conflict of Christianity and Heathenism. In the present book, he sets forth an attractive characteristic of the primitive and early churches,—their liberality in dispensing charity. At the present time, when the topic engages a somewhat general interest, and when votaries of economic science seem disposed to push their theories to a dangerous extreme, a historical discussion of this nature is quite timely. Independently of this consideration, the theme, handled as it is by a Christian scholar who is qualified for the task, is fraught with interest. One point to be observed is that charity among the early Christians was much more judicious than in the mediæval age.

PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS.‡—Generally speaking, persons of taste and culture prefer to make their own selections. If passages are to be culled from great writers, one is disposed to pick the fruit for himself. We want to see not only a part of what an author says on an important topic, but all that he says. The context is often of the highest consequence. Plato, however, is so voluminous a writer, the number of readers who will not take

* *Land and its Rent.* By FRANCIS A. WALKER, Ph.D., LL.D. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1883.

† *Christian Charity in the Ancient Church.* By Dr. GERHARD UHLHORN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

‡ *Plato's Best Thoughts* compiled from Professor Jowett's Translation of the Dialogues of Plato. By Rev. C. H. A. BULKLEY, D.D., Professor in Howard University. New edition. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

up Jowett, much less the original Greek, is so large, the value and suggestiveness of his thoughts are so peculiar, the alphabetical arrangement adopted by Dr. Bulkley, in the arrangement of his excerpts, is so convenient, and the book as a whole, which he has prepared, is so engaging, that we cordially commend it to those who have not time for a larger endeavor, or wish to taste of the viands before they sit down to the meal.

DR. SCHAFF'S CHURCH HISTORY, VOL. II.*—Dr. Schaff has submitted to the labor of thoroughly revising—in fact, re-composing—the portion of his Church History, which covers the period from A. D. 100 to the Council of Nicea,—he having previously re-written his history of the Apostolic Age. This new volume gives fresh proof of the learning, the candor and the indefatigable industry of this veteran scholar. One very valuable feature of the book, as of its precursor, is the full guide to the literature which is furnished under the proper heads. It is to be hoped that Dr. Schaff may have the strength, and the leisure from other employments, which shall enable him to carry his important undertaking to a completion.

THE MAGAZINE OF ART commences a new volume with the December number. It contains an original etching by R. W. Macbeth of "Lady Bountiful." "North Tuscan Notes," by Vernon Lee, with eight engravings. "The Poachers Surprised," from the picture, by Hugo Kauffman. Madrazo, the Spanish painter, by David Hannay, with two engravings. Sketches in Egypt, with six engravings. "Venetian Glass," by Madeleine A. Wallace Dunlop, with three engravings. "On the Ebb," from the pictures, by Mesdag. "A Note on Realism," by Robert Louis Stevenson. Some portraits of Martin Luther, by Richard Heath, with seven engravings. "Pens and Pencils; Hazlett & Northcote," by J. Ashcroft Noble. The Constantine Ionides Collection, from David to Millet, by Cosmo Monkhouse, with six engravings. American art notes. The chronicle of art. Yearly subscription, \$3.50. Single number, 35 cents. Cassell & Company, limited, 739 and 741 Broadway, New York.

* *History of the Christian Church.* By PHILIP SCHAFF. New ed., thoroughly revised and enlarged. Vol. II. Ante-Nicene Christianity, A. D. 190-325. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

The "CALENDAR OF AMERICAN HISTORY"* compiled by Miss Lyman is something more than a bare list of important events which have occurred on the different days of the year. Miss Lyman has aimed to give, in connection with each event which is mentioned, a brief account of the circumstances which attended it. Many of these accounts are quite noticeable for the clear and succinct way in which what is most important is stated. Often they are very happily illustrated by quotations from the poems of our best American authors. The range of subjects is large. They include events which occurred in our colonial history, in the revolutionary period, and in the civil war. A place has been found for a large number of the political questions which have at different times agitated the country. Descriptions are given of the leading religious denominations, of the most valuable inventions, of the most popular authors. We feel confident that as the sheets are torn off during the coming year, the conversation at thousands of breakfast tables will be directed to the most important topics in our national history, and the interest of many a person will be awakened afresh in what were not very long ago living questions, while many a youth will be led to seek further information in the standard histories.

THE ART AMATEUR for December, the first number of the new volume, contains working designs for a teapot (Japanesque decoration), a dessert plate (wild geranium), a hand screen (shepherdess), embroidery (a fan, Christmas-card box, doilies and mitres), repoussé work (cockatoos and dolphins), wood-carving and jewelry; two beautiful designs of children, with minute directions for painting in oils and mineral colors; an illustrated report of the Feuardent-Cesnola trial; a biography of Charles Sprague Pearce, with numerous original drawings; an illustrated notice of the Huntington gift to the Metropolitan Museum: reviews of the National and Pennsylvania Academy exhibitions, the Sketch Exhibition, and the National Exposition at Paris; dramatic and musical feuilletons; some fine illustrations of Derby porcelain; practical articles on decoration, needlework and china-painting; correspondence, literary and editorial notes. Price 35 cents; \$4 per annum. Montague Marks, Publisher, 23 Union Square, New York.

* *Miss Delia Lyman's Calendar of American History.* G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York.

The December (Christmas) **MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN HISTORY** contains four historical Essays on Christmas and its observances in various parts of early America and among different nationalities. John Esten Cooke contributes the leading article on "Christmas Time in Old Virginia," illustrated with portraits of the Pages, Carys, Pendletons and Nelsons of the "Old Dominion," with pictures of ancient churches and historic houses; Norman McF. Walter, of New Orleans, follows with a charmingly picturesque description of "The Holidays in Early Louisiana,"—among the Creoles; John Reade, F.R.S.C., of Montreal, describes "Christmas-Tide in Canada," among the earliest French settlers; and Mrs. Lamb, Editor of the Magazine, writes of the "Christmas Season in Dutch New York." Publication office, 30 Lafayette Place, New York City.

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Prospectus for 1884.

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MAR. 1 1884

THE

NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CLXXIX.

MARCH, 1884.

ARTICLE I.—SCIENTIFIC ETHICS.

SYMPATHY for those who are vexed with the consciousness of possessing a sound mind, and are laboring under some of the disabilities which it imposes, as well as for those who are oppressed generally with a sense of the inability of human nature to regulate itself, has inclined us to view with favor any safe method that may be devised, promising a mitigation of their distresses.

It has long been a subject of complaint among those whose peculiarities of disposition and modes of life have brought them into disagreeable acquaintance with civil enactments, and caused them to experience the unpleasant consequences of an imperfect understanding with their fellows, that society was in the habit of dealing too harshly with their indiscretions, and that their proper measure of happiness was thus unwarrantably abridged. And it must be admitted that this implied censure upon our course of treatment of this class is not without foundation. It is on this account that many are now passing their time in unwilling retirement, withdrawn from the good light and air of heaven; while others are filled with unpleasing reflections, looking to the same result in the near future; and

a still greater number are painfully deterred from undertaking the accomplishment of long cherished plans lest a like privation should overtake them also.

This condition of affairs is without doubt a misfortune to some; and such wrongs should be amended. They are a vexation to the race. Every one feels it. We are losing the benefit of the best efforts of many of our citizens. Our race is on a decline, and we must be relieved. Some remedy must be found, so that any just cause for such complaints may be removed; and it should be so fixed that every individual, without distinction of class or of persons, may feel at liberty to give the fullest play to whatever instincts, faculties, or desires nature has thrust upon him, without feeling hampered or intimidated by any arbitrary exactions which government or society may have undertaken to prescribe.

It must be apparent, at a glance, that the greatest liberty to the greatest number of individuals affords the surest guaranty for the proper development of each, and the consequent advancement of the race, as a whole. Progress is the law of the Universe. Whatever opposes this must get out of the way. Hence it is that, until these discouragements complained of shall have been removed, and all invidious distinctions between the qualities of actions, which have been created by unnatural and senseless edicts which serve to promote the mischief shall have been done away, it can not be expected that each member of the race will step forward with conscious freedom and take his proper place and rank in the order to which he belongs. This is what we most need. The race will then advance.

It is therefore with no small degree of satisfaction, that we have to contemplate the advent of a *new system of Ethics*, which promises all that the case demands. It has its foundations in the principles of genuine Science, which never falters nor leads astray. The system therefore has the merit of permanence and stability. It treats with due consideration all lapses from the old established lines of conduct, fitly characterized as "abnormal actions." It takes proper cognizance of the rights of the refractory, and regards with befitting reverence all those demonstrations of an impetuous nature which are conspicuous in the orders from which men are proud to have descended. It

brings peace, and quiets all alarms lest ventures should miscarry. It lifts up the fallen; comforts the stricken; says to the bound, "go free," and gives to all alike the promise of a speedy and complete deliverance from those inconveniences which have been wont to follow even the less grievous infractions of right. It thus engages to restore the long-lost equilibrium of society. To this we look to give freedom and redemption to the race.

Accordingly, after due and proper examination of the system, and becoming fully persuaded of its leading merits—in order that no delay might be suffered in bringing it into practice, and so commending it to the esteem and confidence of others—it seemed to me the fitting thing to first test its excellences by actual experiment; which I proceeded to do. A few instances will serve to show the simplicity and vigor of the system, and how readily and cheerfully it adapts itself to the varied relations and experiences of every day life.

Let me see; I guess it was yesterday, I killed my mother-in-law. No matter about the circumstances. They were not peculiar. We had a bit of discussion, with the result stated. It was a case of *Natural Selection*, a *Struggle for Existence*, and the *Survival of the Fittest*, all aptly demonstrated in good shape. Nature prevailed. "Moral principles must conform to physical necessities." Yet when I administered the second blow, to finish up the job, she gave me such a look that it did seem as if I felt a twinge of pity at the method of so untimely a taking-off. But it was only for a moment, until I could adjust the system which was then fresh and new to me. I found that it worked all right. It was the triumph of science, and I was content.

I can see that there may be just enough room, right here, for suspecting that, in this particular instance, it might be hard to justify the act; and some explanation might be needed to make it altogether clear and satisfactory. Perhaps it may be so. But it is no fault of the system. It needs only to be rightly understood. The system is sound and will vindicate itself. It is the application that has not yet become familiar. How did I do it? Let us consider the matter briefly. The teachings of science are our guide, and we can not be mistaken.

Shall it be contended for a moment, that a Law of Nature as universal as the law of gravitation, inexorable as fate—a law so indispensable to the genesis and development of every *other* species of organized matter that has ever existed; a law which lies at the basis of all progress—that this law of Natural Selection shall be deemed to have expended its force, halted, and gone into retirement at the very point in the scale of progress in *human* affairs when it must be conceded that its beneficial influences are most needed? Where shall we look to find the warrant for this? Who says so? What has arrested the operation of such a law? What reason for it? *Cessante ratione, cessat lex*. What reasons availing before have ceased to prevail? This is not science. Science unfolds no such reason. Has nature any other law that acts thus? What has become of the Persistence of Force? When will gravitation cease? No such pretension is allowed for an instant. Nature's laws do not expire in this way. They are blind, indiscriminating, inflexible, eternal. So science says; and who shall gainsay it?

The truth may as well be admitted and have its full effect. This law has not ceased. There is no such thing. It still holds sway. There are altogether too many of the race now living here and there and all around, to allow of that steady advancement and onward progress toward perfection in the development of the species which the laws of nature governing such cases clearly intended. We are making no progress. Something is wrong. The due course of Nature is interfered with, and has been turned awry. We can see distinctly how the thing is. We are overstocked; and a beginning must be made somewhere in the process of thinning out. And it is not difficult to know where to commence the treatment. Numbers are found in every direction unfit to live; of no possible use to themselves or anybody else; precious for no purpose; a burden to the earth and those who rightfully inhabit it; better off without life than with it. Many are standing in the way of others and impeding their progress, and have no business there. These ought to be promptly disposed of and give place to their betters. Nor is there any good reason, in the nature of things, why an ill-founded though time-honored prejudice against the taking of human life should be suffered

to stand in the way of progress. Is not this worth more than all else? Why should human life be thought any better or be deemed more sacred than any other? Let this great and beneficent law of Nature come into full play and perform its work manfully, as it should, and we shall soon discover what the Survival of the Fittest will accomplish for the race. And let the selection be *natural*, so that science be not balked. Nature will point the way. This will be a great happiness.

Here is another occasion, in the line of conduct, to show the system. This morning I withheld my car-fare from the conductor as he passed me unwittingly. A nickel, only. Under ordinary circumstances, without the sustaining power of the new system, I should have reckoned it a mean advantage and cursed myself. This saved me. No struggle at all. It was a plain case of *Egoism versus Altruism*. The greatest happiness principle was again duly demonstrated, and comfort flowed in.

Still another case. A while ago a man addressed me in terms more abrupt than polite, and informed me, in substance, that I had exalted my imagination above the fact, in some statement made respecting himself, and enforced his remark with an ungraceful and provokingly emphatic gesture. I scorned the imputation and thought I felt doubly hurt, for the moment, especially at the displeasing reflection upon my veracity. But in this I was mistaken; for an instant's recurrence to the new system restored the mental equilibrium. Magnanimity took the place of hate as soon as I recognized in the offensive act a case of *Altruism versus Egoism*—another "*adjustment of acts to ends*;" and the recovered sensation was as placid as would have been that of my remote cousin, the clam, under like circumstances.

Numerous other instances might be cited of like happy result, both from personal experience and observation, in token of the superior excellence of the system now advocated. But let these suffice. They are a fair sample of the whole. There are no exceptions. It works well. The outlook is in every way encouraging. There is nothing like science to sustain the spirit of a man under the pressure of the most adverse circumstances. Great are the consolations of science. This must be

what the great Webster had in view, when he declared that, amidst some of the perplexities that assailed him, he "used philosophy," and was comforted. It will be perceived also that the method now proposed commends itself both on the ground of economy and the opportunity afforded for the ready and cheap administration of justice.

Should it be suggested, at this point, that there is discernible in the system a lack of the usual incentives to the exercise of a virtuous disposition, never mind that. Let us not become involved in any collateral or immaterial issues. They serve to becloud the judgment and distract the attention from the main subject in hand. Virtue? what is that? We are dealing with science; and what has science to do with virtue? If virtue can not take care of itself, and must always be asking favors of science, it must be a poor and ill-conditioned parasite; and the sooner they part company the better for both. Besides if virtue stands in the way of progress, so that it impedes the advancement of science and checks the development of the race—for that is what we are after—then its tendency is clearly mischievous, and it must seek for itself other affiliations. So, let us proceed.

In entering upon an elucidation of the system now proposed, it may be well to observe, at the outset, that, in taking an account of conduct in all spheres of action, each actor must be regarded as having discharged aright all those duties and obligations required of him whenever his acts come up fully and squarely to the standard of capability for which his nature and faculties have fitted him. So, limiting the case to the species to which some of us belong, if man, in whatever capacity he may be placed, shall there prove true to his nature and his origin, and his conduct shall also correspond to the same rule, this is the utmost that can be demanded. This is sometimes found to be an incentive to high and noble deeds, and at other times quite the reverse; according as each may estimate himself. Whoever, therefore, obtains a proper understanding of himself, his origin, his nature, and his faculties, to such a degree as to assure himself what sort of a thing or creature he is, is capable of being, is fitted for, and what he wants, and how to get it, this is all he needs. He is quite ready for action, and may

as well proceed at once to occupy himself with whatever comes to hand.

Now, since our present dealing is with science strictly, it will be important to start where we know our ground and take nothing upon trust, in order to make sure headway. Let a few *First Principles* then be stated.

First. That no thing had any beginning.

Second. That every thing came from something else.

Third. That whatever is not known has no existence.

Fourth. That no one can tell what is not known.

Fifth. That every one is at liberty to act upon what he knows.

Let these things be granted. In the next place, since most are pretty well agreed that man, such as he is, has his fixed plan for action so long as he requires any wherein to conduct himself at all upon the spot called Earth, it has been deemed of prime importance to science to determine how he got here. For, if he was not here, he would be of no consequence to us; and unless he came here in the proper way and in a manner approved by science, then he has no business to be here and may be treated accordingly. It is in the solution of this great problem that science displays her powers. Let us understand fully how this is: but it will carry us back a little.

Heretofore then, and at a time antedating any chronology of which we have any certain knowledge, a quantity of matter suitable for the purpose became generated and lodged somewhere in space, sufficient to form the Planet which we now, with some other creatures, inhabit. Where this matter came from; how it got there at first; what kind of stuff it was before it came; how it was changed, if it all; why it came away, and didn't stay where it was before; what started it; how it happened to stop here and not go any further; how there was just so much of it; and how it tumbled itself into this precise shape, and commenced whirling, as it does, in such a way that it never went nor goes any faster or slower—these are a few of the questions that the curious might raise respecting the orb. But since their solution is foreign to our present purpose and some of the scientists have not yet so fully completed their investigations into these matters as to be agreed about them, for lack

of the required *data* we commit ourselves to no positive theory concerning them. It is true that, in the course of our researches, we have learned that certain simple elements do abound and become manifest in matter when called for. But science declines to tell us which of these simple elements existed *first*; or whence it was derived; or whether it was derived at all; and if so, how, when there was no other element; or whether, if it was simple oxygen or hydrogen, or something else to begin with, then which produced the other afterwards or was generated by it, and how it was so done in any manner now known. But these things being disposed of, the result arrived at is known as the "Eternity of Matter." We have now gained the planet, and that is so much; and it is a good thing to start with and to be sure of. If it didn't come in this way, then we don't know how it did come.

Yet dead matter, of itself, is useless for any purpose without something else to use it, since such matter can not use itself. So far as we know it is content to remain unused. *Inertia* is one of its chief and inseparable properties. Hence, in order to introduce some sort of life and *activity* into the universe and provide something for the law of progress to act upon, it happened, further, that some of the atoms composing this matter became in time uneasy, restless, discontented with their low condition, as was natural, and shifted about and strained themselves to such a degree as to commence stirring on their own account, and took upon themselves a kind of self-operating energy known as the "*principle of life*;" or somehow this principle of life, straying around loose, casually encountered, came in contact with, caught hold of, and entered into these atoms. As to which first found the other, we can't exactly tell; but they both met and formed an attachment which proved to be permanent. In this way the atoms thus affected became active, or possessed of powers for action independent of the other atoms which remained passive and inert without catching the infection.

It is also to be observed that the atoms thus vivified invariably first suffered some peculiar change in their constitution and texture—becoming to some extent relaxed, as well as aggregated into definite form or shape, for the most part less

dense and more elastic in substance, about the same as a compromise between a gas and a mineral—a fitting receptacle for this newly found principle of life to enter. How this came about we don't know now. It looks very much as if life must have had something to do with them beforehand. But the result is known as "organic matter," and is sometimes *vegetable* and at other times *animal*—as the same may suit the taste and disposition of the particles concerned. But our present concern is chiefly with those of the animal kind.

Now what this "principle of life" is; what is its essence, if it has any; whence it came, and what for; how and where it originated; what called it into existence, if any thing; and if not, how it came uncalled; how it knew it was wanted; what its condition and business were before it found any thing that wanted it; why it don't stick by when it has taken the pains to come, but makes off so abruptly; where it goes when it quits; why so particular in its selection of forms for its tenements while it puts up with them; and why a stone may not creep just as well as a caterpillar; these and other like inquiries that may occur in this connection, it must be admitted that science has not yet quite fully determined, so far as we can find out. But science is busily occupied in looking up these matters. Experiments thus far among the elements, with battery, microscope, speculum, crucible and retort, have been quite unsatisfactory in revealing all that is desired; and some new device of more thorough and searching power is now in prospect from which great hopes are entertained. But for the present, while waiting for fuller developments, the theory of "spontaneous generation" is commended to our notice by some, as affording a short-cut for escape from most of the difficulties attending the production of life.

This theory makes life an inherent factor or principle in all matter, living or dead, organic and inorganic alike; that it is universal and insuppressible, like light or air; that every thing is instinct with life in some form, active or dormant, watching its chance and ready to burst forth at any time and under all conditions upon the least provocation, and defying the most persistent efforts to destroy it; ever on the look-out to seize hold of and enter into something upon the slightest opportunity.

The only trouble is to find it. We are partial to this theory on many accounts. It is so simple, easy and natural. It requires so little explanation as to how and why life comes, and where it comes from. It takes care of itself. There is no mystery about it. For if life will come, whether or no, and there is no such thing as preventing it, that would seem to be an end of the matter. No reason is seen why a stone may not get up and crawl off at any time without asking any permission. Yet if life is any where or every where, and still can not be found, it is difficult to see how it can be made available for present purposes; and it would seem to be about the same in the result as if it was not there. But perhaps not. Still it puzzles us to know how the thing, life, gets in any where in the first place; and having got in, why it doesn't stay; why so evanescent in its nature, when so eager at first to come; why it flickers away without any warning, leaving no means for tracing it and giving no reason why it goes. Why should life quit a creature when its head comes off? Why should it go? It is very queer that science should not tell us how this is.

There is another theory of the origin of life on the planet and of the way it first made its appearance which has its advocates among men of science, and which, in proportion as it is more purely scientific, may be less intelligible. Yet perhaps it may be explained. Let us try.

It is known that there are certain forces and agents continually at work in nature, producing whatever results they may; some of them known as attraction of sundry kinds, such as attraction of gravitation, of cohesion, capillary, magnetic, and galvanic; also chemical and electrical affinity, etc., quite harmless in themselves, and some of them of so subtle and obscure a nature that it took a great while to find them out. Where these forces came from, what produced or set them at work, or the occasion for them, when there was nothing for them to do, we can't tell. But being forces of nature, of more or less energy, and agents operating at will or at random, once being set at work and presided over by some other and greater persistent force, which nobody has ever been able to discover, and all acting upon the matter lying in their way without let or

hindrance, sometimes in concert and sometimes in antagonism, just as it happened, without any definite purpose other than to stir up a tumult generally, among other freaks they managed and contrived, in some unknown and undefined manner, to draw together, sift out, distribute, rearrange, and permanently fix, in some way, such atoms of the matter operated on as were needed for the occasion, and thus constructed out of them, in spite of their resistance, one single infinitesimal specimen organism fitted for the purpose, and infused into it without further ceremony their own entire concentrated essence, which proved to be this *principle of life*. No one pretends to know precisely, to a demonstration, how the thing was done or when the catastrophe occurred. But it was when nature got all ready for it. Yet as there can be little doubt that this prodigious and formidable array of forces might be capable of effecting almost any thing required, why should they not produce the result proposed, in the absence of any other method of accounting for so remarkable a phenomenon as the production of a living creature? Sure enough! why not?

This theory may be thought at first to be involved in some obscurity; but it is so closely allied to that of spontaneous generation, that it will be readily recognized as having originated from science only, and is therefore entitled to the same high consideration as the other. Of the two, however, we think we prefer the latter. It comports better with our ideas of the majesty of the forces of nature for which we entertain a profound respect.

Of course it will be seen that it is quite immaterial which of these theories is allowed to prevail, or obtain the preference among men of science. They are equally good provided they serve the purpose. Each of them is attended with some difficulties at the outset. But in either case, we *have the animal* to begin with. We have now got the animal; and that is a great point gained. The bit of organic matter, however derived, united to the principle of life, wherever found, makes an animal of some kind; and no matter of what kind, whether great or small, long or short, crooked or straight, hard or soft, rough or smooth, we shall presently discover that, with this for a start, we have the making of any thing else that may be

called for in that line. Therefore despise him not. Just let him once make a beginning and grow, and exercise himself, become ambitious and venturesome, and get ready for doing and producing something, and let the law of progress lay hold of him and we shall see what he will soon turn out.

. Adherents of the *force* theory are pretty well united in the opinion that this beginning process has never been repeated, so far as at present ascertained, since it would naturally tend to introduce confusion into the animal kingdom. Yet it is by no means clear why nature should have restricted herself to this one single effort, when all these forces of hers are ready at hand to do her bidding whenever she gives the word, and have nothing else to do; and it is so easy to try it over every day without getting tired. Besides they might do better the next time. We confess ourselves not well satisfied upon this point. We should like to have a more substantial reason for stopping this generating process at the start. We see no cause for concluding that the powers of nature were thus exhausted; and are more than half inclined to think that this kind of business may be still going on somewhere, if we could only find it out. But perhaps not.

In case the inquiry should arise, what this first favored animal was—this grandfather of all flesh; it must be admitted that naturalists and men of science who have given the subject their best attention, have not been thus far in perfect accord here. The specimen was not preserved. The more modest and conservative in their opinions incline to the belief that it was the *monad* or *moner*; a single diminutive cell, just enough to say "life;" most simple in its structure, with nothing to spare; an animal out of all proportion to one presumed to be of such towering aspirations as a creature holding within itself the promise and potency of all the terrestrial life of the ages. This species of animal has now gone into retirement and is seldom seen. On some accounts, if we had been consulted in the matter, from what we now know, we should have been disposed to give the preference, for the purpose of making a fair and respectable beginning, to the *frog* animal, both on account of his generally dignified aspect and gentlemanly demeanor, and for the greater convenience of animal-evolving in both

directions at the same time, down as well as up, and backwards as well as forwards. And since this is still an open question, perhaps it may have been so. We really do not know how it was; but the current opinion is against us. No one was at hand to take observations when the thing first wakened up. He left no prints in the sand or rock that have come down to us; and one conjecture is as good as another; so *monad* let it be, to avoid all dissension.

But we can not withhold the expression of our own opinion, that this *monad* can hardly be accounted a very brave beginning on the part of nature, in setting out in the life-business. When she had so much capital and raw material on hand to commence with, and no other use for it; it certainly wears a mean look, as if she might have felt ashamed of her work, to turn out something for a sample that made no show at all and that nobody could see if he tried. This is not up to our ideas of the bountifulness and generosity of nature. We are not to be told that it was any harder work for her to make a *frog* than a *flea*; and the article when completed is surely more useful as well as attractive. Besides the latter is much the finer and more elaborate workmanship of the two, especially in the locomotive apparatus and the method provided for taking its sustenance.

But this little *monad*, such as it was, displayed some shining qualities. It proved to be industrious and enterprising, and seeing the world before it, took in the situation, made the best use of his time, improved his opportunities, encouraged himself to grow and expand, and gained a livelihood; and as time went on and a sense of loneliness oppressed him, as leisure afforded the chance, the creature gave itself to the business of reproduction—a process invented by itself which need not be here explained, but the importance and effect of which will presently come into view. So it soon became the head of a numerous family and made its mark in the line of progress.

But in the course of events, when this old pioneer had become worn out with long usage and was not farther serviceable to himself or others—for such is one of the strange conditions of all life—unable to find any remaining comfort or employment, it severed itself from the principle of life, went

into decay and was visible no longer. No more of that monad. Yet why the creature should have been suffered to decay, we cannot tell. It would seem as if the same combined forces of Nature which called it into being, having never been withdrawn, under the persistence of force and the law of progress would have borne it on and on, with themselves, from age to age, and never have suffered it to droop, or dwindle, or expire. How should it decay? Whither can the sustaining power of these forces have fled? and why thus have abandoned the work of their own creation? Can it be that there is any element of exhaustion or decay in these forces themselves? If not then are they not subject to some other and further influences outside of themselves? No; none that science has yet revealed to us.

But life did not stop here. It kept right on. The successors of this *monad* also took up the business and made the most of it. The general suspicion is that they, like their illustrious progenitor, had proclivities for the water; that there they swam, and wiggled and wriggled, and did their best; for the laws of progress and the persistence of force were upon them. They copied with fortitude the example of their little predecessor. They likewise forgot not the business of reproduction, but gave it special attention under increasingly favorable auspices and multiplied exceedingly, insomuch that, in process of time, the entire sea began to swarm with life and became too small for the accommodation of its occupants, so that some were crowded out and forced to take their chances upon the land.

Meanwhile some changes were going on preparatory for land-life. Nature never made two things alike. This would not answer; for then they would never quarrel. And science assures us that discord is one of Nature's highest laws. There can be no true progress without it. All the harmony we have is the resultant of opposing forces. Life is activity coupled with a will.

Here comes in the Struggle for Existence; only the struggling is chiefly on the part of those whose existence is soonest to be cut short, so that it serves them no good purpose, and they had done better not to struggle, only as the law of Nature

says they must. Hence very soon after monads began to be plenty, some swam faster than others and found more to eat; and it sometimes produced an effect upon their systems and their disposition; and conflicts arose, and some went in for conquest, and the weaker went under in the struggle. Although a battle between *monads* is not the most terrible thing for us to contemplate, since no one of them in the sanguinary strife could manage to absorb more than two or three other individualities of his own size at once; yet it was no small affair for them, and the effort was always stimulating. And in proportion as each swimmer and eater continued to enlarge his sphere of usefulness and prey upon the weaker, he grew more robust, increased his own chances for longevity and attained a degree of independence that was enviable among his tribe. And so it was, that each mightiest swimmer and eater claimed the preëminence in his own right; and Nature said "Yes," and selected him, like a fond mother, for the best kind of a *monad* and the fittest survivor of all the monads; and he kept on swimming, kept up the struggling, continued the devouring, waxed heartier and mightier, and overslaughed all that came in his way, as he should, until somehow, finally, this same fittest survivor also himself took his last swim and his last catch, came to a short stop, gave up the struggling, quit the devouring, and in some unknown way vanished like all the rest and left a clear field to his successors. Strange that he too should go! No need of it. Why didn't he stay? We can't tell.

But this was not all. This fittest survivor, by virtue of his outshining all the rest, cherished aspirations after something higher and nobler than to be a monad. This also was natural. Such is life. The law of progress has its uses, and something must be done. Nature was no disinterested spectator of the struggle, but looked wisely on and understood the proper thing to do. Whenever therefore, as the mark of some desperate encounter, or accident, or otherwise, some scar or excrescence announced itself, the opportunity was improved by special selection, to perpetuate the same and turn it to account. And so the mightiest *monad* was enabled to transmit these badges of renown and acquired personal adjuncts, by genera-

tion, to some remote successor down in some distant age, who thus became elevated into a new and grander creature and shot forth into the seas in full equipment as a *wiggler*. In like manner, again, in the lapse of time, when everything was ready, some fittest surviving wiggler, through like interminable struggles and conflicts and appropriate demonstrations, with corresponding marks of distinction and newly acquired adjuncts, was in turn advanced to the statelier *tadpole*. And this elevating process having once become a habit of nature, there was no such thing as stopping it; but on it went with increasing momentum, until our favorite, the *frog*, leaped forth and trod the earth alone, the earliest known land proprietor of this little universe. From this point the advance was rapid and onward, until the frog's progeny emerged into the *hippopotamus*, which tramps the reeds and rushes and flounders in the mire. Such is the operation of the law of Natural Selection and the Survival of the Fittest.

The wisdom of nature apparent throughout all the succeeding changes in the process of elevation challenges our admiration. Amidst all the turmoil and confusion incident to the necessary strifes and strugglings, no mistakes anywhere occurred. Special pains were taken to see that the changes were in the right direction. Instances were rare in which the head and tail changed places, or the internal fixings were promoted to the surface for purposes of display. Whenever an extension or enlargement became manifest, it had a definite office assigned it to perform before it was ready for action; each feature taking on rare qualities, such as the predecessors of the new creature never dreamed of, all crowned with appropriate selections of place for their attachment and comely proportions in the animal structure.

Neither was any intemperate haste exhibited in carrying on the process; but matters were conducted with due deliberation, looking prudently to the end proposed. Indeed so far was it from this, that age after age crept by and no perceptible change came on. The monads peopled the seas until there was no room for more, before the struggle and the conflict had waxed strong enough for the earliest onward movement to begin to transpire. And the same also with the next; and so on, down,

down, through all the unrecorded epochs, until the final stage of accomplishment was reached by an interminable succession of the most infinitely minute and imperceptible gradations, running through countless periods of time, to bring these matters around as they should be. In fact, this is found to be a fundamental law of Nature which suffers no transgression, and to be kept constantly in view for the perfect understanding of her work, that "*Nature makes no leap;*" or, as science puts it, *Natura non facit saltum*. She makes no *sudden* change, to show how the thing is done, or whether it is done at all and does not do itself. She is very particular and will have none of that. Hence these imperceptible gradations, ever silent and always in the same direction.

If the inquiry should arise, how many imperceptibles it takes to make a perceptible; we can not answer that. It requires a good many. That belongs to another branch of science. It don't trouble us any here. Please to consult the calculus. It may be pretended that these "interminable ages," which are wont to play so prominent a part in this system of animal elevation, in fact cut no figure at all, for the reason that *time* is no active agent or participator in the production of any thing, any more than *space*; that he is known to be simply a lazy fellow, that lags along and looks on to see something else do the work, if it can; and if he does any thing, always pulls the other way, and tears down what he can; and that this is his regular business, if he has any. Well, what of that? This might perhaps be the case now; but who can tell how it was when those things occurred? That was some time ago, and it may have been different then. At any rate, we can not afford to unsettle the conclusions of science now, especially upon any such ground as this. Nature's work-shop was pretty busy in those days; and time, though feeble enough in itself, may then have been the essence of all progress.

Some of the processes in this course of animal-creating claim special notice. Overlooking many of the intermediate outcomes of the *monad* which have already attained some distinction in the line of development, attention is drawn to an inquiry after the method of introducing a back-bone into a wiggler that never had one, never saw one, and never knew

that he wanted one. How did it come about? Let Natural Selection and the Survival of the Fittest, that irrevocable law that presides over the development of all organic matter, determine this question. The solution is easy. The selected wiggler did too much wiggling, and through several successive ages and generations gradually grew weary; and the swimming muscles gradually became more and more rigid until they finally broke up into sections, each preserving its original connection with his fellow, to keep up the continuance, so that no mishaps should occur, until the column was complete, and then all the attachments naturally came in and took up their positions. Hence, the back-bone.

A serious question has arisen here also: how it was, since this vertebral column is observed to have shifted its place from that of either of these lateral swimming muscles out of which it was obviously constructed, that this should have become displaced in the process; and why there should not be two back-bones instead of only one, as would naturally be expected, with their proper location in the animal structure conveniently down the sides. Yet this is readily explained. Nature always vindicates herself from such presumptuous aspersions. She does nothing in vain. Why should she have provided two of these columns when one has been found to serve every purpose? and even this has often proved upon trial to be greatly in the way. As to the place assigned it in the transformation, it was clearly a case of compromise; for the two met half-way, thus settling their differences and pooling their issues.

But without going minutely into all the branches of the mechanism of animal-building, it will be convenient, after once starting the thoughtful on the track, to refer the curious in such matters to more extended treatises on this part of the subject, where the whole matter will be found fully and freely set forth and the different stages of elevation thoroughly expounded in such manner as to show exactly how the thing was done. It is replete with interest, and opens a wide field for the play of the imagination. It must be kept in mind, however, that this entire business was conducted upon the best approved principles of legitimate science, and all in the most perfect har-

mony with the law of Natural Selection, from the earliest appearance of the microscopic cell of the first *monad* to the *megatherium*, long since departed. No artificial aid; no splicing allowed; no inoculation; no monstrosities of any kind, which are nature's special abhorrence; but simply by an interminable succession of these insensible gradations with which Nature always pursues her handiwork. It was the sport of ages.

Yet it was a part of the process that the requirements of each animal should be to some extent consulted. Whenever in the condition or surroundings of the creature, at any stage in the line of progress, it chanced to fancy or require some alteration of the present anatomy, whether by addition, subtraction, or both, in different sections of the structure, it had only to make it known and it was gradually done. When some took exception to the ponderousness and inflexibility of the fishy tail, as ill adapted to land use, time gave the word and the item gradually shrank to the desired dimensions and became a switch. Some gradually doffed their scales and assumed instead the sleek and artistic coating of the zebra, the wool of the sheep, the down of the duck, or the shell of the mollusk, while others dispensed with any covering at all. Some gradually dropped their fins, and out darted legs, finished off with appropriate claws or hoofs, whole or split, according as they desired. Some fishes became warblers, and stipulated for wings as well as legs and took to another element, floating off into the air; while others gradually discarded alike fins, legs, and wings, content to wriggle ahead like the snake, without retaining a single protuberance to swear by. Each gradually did as the notion took him. And thus it came about that, after so many loppings and sloughings off and sproutings out, it finally came to require the efforts of a regular genius in the field of science, assisted by a well-trained imagination, in connection with the burrowings of embryology, to duly explore the surface and internal recesses of a given animal, and trace properly his path of progress from the little original.

It may be suggested, at this point, that there are certain peculiarities of structure, nature, constitution, and habit, observ-

able in some of the species, that may not tally well with this arrangement but tend to unsettle the theory. Yes; science has looked into this likewise and pronounced it all right and regular, straight and sound. Any seeming or casual wabblings of this kind are directly attributable to the environments of the creature and must always be taken into the account, as a part of nature's work. For instance in the case of the *pole-cat*, with the pungent odor that it carries and flings about so generously on occasions—it would be proper to consider where the animal or its remote ancestor may have wandered, at some time, and what she may have found there, or passed through. This is very important. We dare not assert but that she may have discovered something rank enough to perfume her nature and that of her descendants for all time. Probably this is so. The *musk* animal also and the *civet*; frequent exposure to malarial and other pernicious influences had a like effect upon them which they never recovered from. As for the *torpedo*, that fish once met with an accident which so shocked her system that she never got over it, but transmitted the shocking power to her progeny. This couldn't be helped. The *lobster* and *crab* are specimens that became tired of going ahead all the time and concluded in some of their antics, to reverse the action, and liked the change so well as to continue the habit ever after. This also was natural. The *wasp* and *scorpion* are instances of the shifting of the deadly fang of the viper from head to tail, for more effective service; another natural process. While the *camel* was being gradually worked up, and yet in an unfinished state, she fell into the habit of taking too much drink and couldn't break off; hence an extra receptacle had to be provided for transporting it. The *fire-fly* and *glow-worm* are cases of swallowing an extra amount of electricity which passes off in small discharges. And so on throughout all the different species. All are cases of Natural Selection modified by environments. It is all right and straight work. Nature makes no mistakes nor blunders in her performances.

Thus on the races came; peacock, centipede and torpedo, bat, scorpion and giraffe, mole, monkey and man, all trooping up to view, their species most complete, with no ragged or unfinished parts to show; each to take his place in the

endless caravan. Such, in accordance with the later and more advanced thought of the times, is the Natural History of Creation.

And thus it came to pass that, as the ages swept by, under the influence of the gradual self-unfolding, expanding, contracting, lengthening, and reshortening of the forms of organic matter united with the principle of life, continued through all the lines of differentiation in morphological development, there stalked forth into the sunlight on one bright morning of being, as the loftiest production of the agitation of all terrestrial matter and the sublimest exhibition of the mastery of all the contending forces of nature, the creature, *Man*. 'Tis thus he stands, as the pinnacle of nature's architecture, until, under the inevitable law of progress, another and better shall displace him.

Men of science have been profuse in their eulogiums upon this work of creation, and vied with one another in extolling the order to which they themselves belong. Such partiality is natural. This animal is claimed to surpass, in the make-up of his anatomical furniture, his outer and inner physical paraphernalia, the beauty and symmetry of his proportions, and perfect adaptation to his environments, all the orders that have preceded him upon the sphere; as if, in this being, nature had reached her goal.

But hold! Many are the mistakes begotten of excessive confidence. Let us not be too hasty. We are dealing with science; and a due regard for that which lies at the basis of all science compels us to record the fact that, after this all-sufficient and much-lauded animal had been permitted to hold the precedence over all other known frame-works of flesh and bones since the dawn of being on the earliest *monad*, it was reserved for an eminent physiologist in a modern university to discover and declare that, if his optician were to send him such an instrument as the human eye, he would return it for alterations. As usually happens, when one imperfection is pointed out, others are speedily discovered; so here, still more glaring defects have been indicated in another section of the human anatomy.

Attention has been called to the fact, that the creature has *no tail*; and investigation shows, moreover, that, without any controversy he is entitled to have one. Ever since the occurrence of that most eccentric and transcendental freak of nature which is supposed to have first overtaken the much-revered ape—from which, we are proud to say, that our lineage is direct and unmistakable—whereby the elevation from quadruped to biped was rendered possible, thus fulfilling Plato's definition, more apparent than ever before has been the wisdom and benevolence of that bountiful provision which was current through all the antecedent races, in supplying and maintaining that comely appendage which gives such a graceful finish to a part otherwise so abrupt, barren and uninteresting. It is true that Lord Monboddó insisted that man's first step toward civilization was getting rid of his tail. But it is equally clear to us that Monboddó didn't know. He was an eccentric genius, lived in other times, and failed to appreciate fully the necessities of the case or the benefits to be enjoyed. Coming to think of it, every one knows that this omission is an egregious blunder; that it is quite impossible for creatures to turn from the habits and tendencies which they have inherited, so suddenly. The ape has the article in all its magnificence; then why not, his boy? What reason for this degeneracy? Nothing stands between. *Natura non facit saltum*. Where, when, and wherefore, we beg to be informed, was this felony committed? The extension is needed no more for ornament than for use. Where without this, we should like to know, is the steering apparatus? To the absence of this caudal attachment is to be attributed the unsteady and erratic course of so many who decline from the paths of rectitude. The article must be found somewhere and restored, in some shape, so that the race may advance in the line of progress. No wonder that those who are thoroughly alive to its importance should have explored with such enthusiasm the bowels of the earth and circumnavigated the globe, in the interest of science, scouring all seas and diving into all dens and sunless caverns, in quest of this lost appendage. There can be no true progress of the race without it. Just one more joint to piece out and finish off the sightless stub that now terminates the vertebral column, with a

corresponding muscle to give it motion, in any direction, rotary or oscillating; with what rapture would such discovery be hailed as the long-sought *missing link*, a consummation after which the disconsolate scientist has hunted and sighed in vain! But no tail has yet turned up. Borneo and Kaffir land did each promise, for a season, to render up the appointed article; and hopes and eyes were turned thither, in trembling expectation for relief. But, tail, there is none; and the wagging muscle gone, too! Nor yet is the conjecture well-founded, that these pieces have only been dropped temporarily, with an implied understanding, as in some other cases, that they should hereafter be restored in some more highly evolved creature, in the dawn of some future morning. Even this hope must be abandoned. Justice to the subject requires the allusion to be made; but wise men having the matter in charge assure us that there is nothing in this idea, and that the only chance now left lies in the grafting process which they are prepared to undertake. True, it is not without some sort of scientific pride that we turn from this dismal conclusion to the cheerful announcement that, at some time during the period of gestation, this identical rudimentary terminal does in fact take form and become movable in the embryo, but it refuses to hold on long enough to be produced. This is altogether too bad. Sorry for science! pity for the member! to be thus fore-shortened, when so willing and so nearly ready to manifest itself. "So near, and yet so far!" But this only serves to aggravate the case. For nature to thus miscarry impairs all confidence in the rectitude of her intentions. What can have become of the little incipient? Science asks in vain, why did it sprout at all? and why should it shrink away? But that settles it. No more tail for the human. *Natura non facit saltum.*

It also appears that this man-creature holds his preëminence subject to sundry other disadvantages of peril and mischance, unlike precedent orders, for the most part growing out of his habits and disposition, such as combine to interfere with his animal enjoyment and mar the pleasures of his life. Setting out as the most helpless and dependent, he becomes the most cruel, vindictive, and malignant. He hunts his fellow and his

fellow hunts him in turn. He seeks for blood when he has no use for it. A multitude of distempers torment him, as if his body was intended for a magazine of pain ; and a greater internal agony at times afflicts him, when he has no pain, so that his features become distorted beyond recognition. He weeps and sighs and laughs, and blushes and turns pale. Sometimes a trifling sound uttered, or a change of attitude or look in the presence of another, is the signal for collisions which endanger and destroy life. A sense of impending evil drives him when no evil is near. Strange forebodings visit him ; and often, sick and weary of life, he cuts it short and follows the original *monad* away into non-existence.

Strange creature, this, to be thus affected without cause ! Queer, that he should have inherited these peculiarities from his ancestor who had none of them ! Whence came they all ? *Natura non facit saltum.*

But let us not suffer any of these paltry objections, which in the interest of science may not be passed over without mention, to obscure our view of the *great fact* of the true origin of the race to which we belong. Here we repose. There is nothing like science to bring comfort and rest ; to leave the unreal and visionary and take firm footing on substantial ground.

Lest the inquiry should be raised, at this point, how these varied peculiarities of the man-animal, so far as they are brought to view, are to be accounted for, as if they were about to be slurred over ; to what environments of soil, climate, objects of nature or condition, they are to be attributed ; we shall take no pains to conceal our purpose to dodge this question altogether. It is none of our concern. We must adhere to science. We have no presumptions to entertain. We propose simply to take the animal as we find him, the creature that he is, just as we would any other ; and having observed his habits and his disposition, his wants and ways, without inquiring how he happened to come by them, treat him accordingly with fairness and with justice.

Then such as he is, and is shown by his origin to be, " being so fathered," what ought to be expected and demanded of him in the line of *conduct* and of action. Actions of such a

character that they pass without the special notice or censure of others would seem to need no rule or guide by which to judge them, and may be disregarded. They take care of themselves or concern chiefly the actor alone. It is only when interference with the wants, wishes, liberties or rights of others gives them a different character, that they become proper subjects for inquiry or the treatment of the actor assumes any importance.

One man steals, takes or withholds what belongs to you, or to another than himself, and what you claim he has no right to. Another lays violent hands upon his fellow and puts an end to his life. Another lies in wait for a defenseless woman and makes her the victim of his lust. Still another slanders his neighbor and inflicts untold misery by a vicious lie. All these and other similar acts, you are wont to say, demand punishment for the offender. Why? What is the matter? What has he done to justify it? and what good end is to be served by all the trouble and outlay needed to bring him to justice—as you term it—and apply the penalty? Shall he be punished because the statute says so? That is no reason or a very trivial one. Science goes behind the statute and demands the reason why. Is it because you say, or think, or feel, that such conduct tends to social disorder and must therefore be suppressed, and everybody else unites in the same judgment? Just wait a minute and let us see; for we may all be wrong, and there may be some mistake about this, and it may not be so bad after all. Neither must he be punished, to repair the evil done; for that is impossible. Nor to reform the culprit; for it is not worth it and no such result is assured. Nor even to deter others from like offences; for few or none will be thus affected by it. And none of these reasons has any foundation in science, which we have accepted for our guide. It makes the creature trouble, interrupts his enjoyment, stands in the way of his development, discourages his best efforts, and casts a cloud over his life; prevents the proper fulfillment of those duties for which he is fitted, stunts the growth of those powers and faculties which he has inherited and impairs his usefulness as a member of the race. What wonder that, exposed to all these disadvan-

tages, the progress and advancement of the species should be retarded?

This punishing business is, in fact, all wrong. It is the wanton and gratuitous infliction of suffering without cause and without any adequate gain. Let science speak! She understands the case; and upon the basis of sound reason she declares that we have no liberty to judge or deal with this offending creature by any severer rule than his nature warrants, or the terms of our philosophy applicable to his case prescribe. This is the limit. Your ox gores his mate or his driver, so that he loses his life; will you hang or otherwise kill this offender? Your dog runs off with your dinner, or is out in the field and practices a deception by which you lose your game: will you shoot or imprison the dog?

But you tell me that the man-murderer or thief *knows better*. Does he? What does that mean? If by this is intended that he knows something better than the gratification of the wants and inclinations of his nature, that is something new. What is it? and how did he find it out? This is what we wish to learn in the first place. The monkey didn't tell him. So far as we have been able to discover, that individual has said nothing on the subject, nor any of his ancestors. Then he never learned it in any proper scientific way. It is only imaginary. The fact is, that the creature is, and knows, just what, and so much as, he has inherited, and has come to him by those unerring laws of the Universe which gave him being and fixed his place and sphere of action; and no other, and no more. To these he must be held submissive. By these he must be tried and judged; and to these will we adhere. If you insist upon finding something else, some foreign ingredient, lodged in his nature, simply to furnish you an opportunity to lay the foundation for making further and extortionate demands of him, no such presumption can be allowed. It is not there. No way has been provided for it to get there. There is no source discovered from which it could have come. Where is the article kept? and how is it obtained? The noble animal is not to be thus abused by being charged with any fancied infusion from supernatural agencies, in order that you may thrust upon him any such faculty as a sense of accountability for his con-

duct. It is purely visionary. Science knows nothing of it. *Natura non facit saltum.*

It must be admitted that this pretended knowledge of good and evil which is injected into the present favorite system of dealing with this much-exalted and highly-evolved being, and so punishing him from time to time for obeying and following out his propensities, is without warrant and out of the course of nature. Whenever he happens to want what somebody else has, and takes it for his own happiness and delectation; or when he sees fit to put somebody else out of the way so as to have freer scope for action; or when he seeks to gratify his passions at the expense and against the will of the weaker; this is his mission. It is his privilege. Hands off! Let him alone! The fittest survives, as the sequel shows. Let us not violate kind nature's laws. Just let the man have a fair chance and a good time. Give him an even show with the other mammals. He knows best what he wants and the best way to get it. Don't interfere with his prerogatives. You can't change his nature. Science forbids that. These things he will do, and must, because he can, and wants to, and you can't help it. Then let him have comfort and satisfaction in them, like the rest of his brother animals. It is a pity that he should not fare as well as they. Let him stand on a level with the horse, the dog, and the monkey, and all those glorious and happy tribes and races of the earth that have preceded him, have acted their several parts in peace and gone to their rest without being missed or mourned by their successors. Don't single him out and embitter his brief existence by imposing conditions of conduct which he can never fulfill. Why more than all others should he be thus molested?

It is a mistake to suppose that I am forbidden, by nature's laws, to take the life of a member of the race to which I happen to belong, if I choose to do so, any more than is the porpoise or the playful panther. Still harder is it to show that, by nature's laws, a man may not appropriate his neighbor's goods or indulge and gratify his appetite whenever and wherever he chooses to find the means. Who can judge so well as he of the demands or necessities of his case? Why may I not kill

you in perfect good feeling, or supply my wants from your abundance, and no ado be made over the simple transaction? At what point in the scale of animal life were these natural rights arrested? and how? It will be difficult to demonstrate either to my satisfaction or your own, *upon principles of science*, that any prohibition of these acts has any just foundation. Upon what basis will you set out? Where and how will you draw the line of distinction? Why is human life any more valuable or sacred than any other life? The marvel is, that so much respect should be paid to human laws, when they so plainly contravene the laws of nature and rest upon so slight foundation.

Neither shall we arrive at any different result if we take *reason* for our guide. You will probably reiterate the assertion, that I know better. This I have denied, and now repeat it. But grant it, and suppose that I do; how does that help the case? What has that to do with it? Unless reason assures me that such knowledge proceeds from a source that renders it imperative; so that I as well as you and every other one of my kind am bound by it with the same force as by any of nature's laws; so that in fact it overrules and controls them; this knowledge avails nothing to the purpose. And that is something that reason or science can not show. Reason alone teaches no right and wrong. If man is but a talking horse or a reasoning monkey, he is entitled to be treated as such, and you can make nothing more out of him.

Perhaps you will point me to the consequences resulting to yourself and others, involving irreparable loss, untold evil, general and wide-spread misery and disaster to the race, if these acts are suffered, and claim to have found here the warrant for their suppression. But this is the very thing that you are required to prove. I deny this also, that the evils charged as resulting are evils at all; or that they in any degree outweigh the benefits sought and likely to accrue. Who is to be the judge of these matters? Where is he? and what right has he to judge? I accept no judge but myself, and am not bound to. Evils do not become such simply by being so called. What may be an evil for you may be an excellent thing for me. And if these acts complained of are admitted to be evils in fact;

then I answer that they are only such as nature directs and has provided for; and that is the end of it. You still make no headway. You only claim an advantage by way of protection to yourself and exemption from harm to which you are not entitled, without any adequate or corresponding benefit to me or to the race.

It is a very cheap and easy matter to insist that such and such a thing or act is *wrong*, without stopping to determine why it is so or what is meant by it. No particular act or single instance of human conduct has of itself, *ex necessitate rei*, any moral character or quality whatever. Nor can it be shown, by any process of reasoning alone, that any such act done or suffered has any such quality, any more than if the same had proceeded from a horse or dog.

Reason starts with certain truths and propositions that are known and recognized, and accepts nothing that is not admitted or self-evident, unless having first established it by proof. With what such premises shall we set out here? Right and wrong do not grow out of the ground. They are not inscribed on the works of nature anywhere. The forces of nature tell us nothing of them. The winds do not whisper them into our ears. The lights in the firmament inculcate no such lessons. Nature nowhere teaches any "must" or "must not." On the contrary, nature says you may do any thing you may choose, provided only that you accept the consequences. Some men might shudder at first, at the thought that their lives and property were at the mercy of such a principle as this, for the basis of human conduct; but it is because they are not accustomed to it.

Right and wrong are terms employed to denote the respective qualities of the acts of a free and intelligent actor capable of understanding to what they relate; and that relation is to some principle outside of themselves which neither nature, science, nor reason discloses to us. They are not definable in any terms known to reason or natural science; nor can they be established by any inferences or conclusions drawn from those sources. They are vain and impotent for this purpose. There is nothing for them to catch hold of; nothing by which they can climb; nothing whereby any measurement may be taken

of their force or obligation. As well attempt to measure a chain of lightning, or the force of a can of dynamite, by the quart. It won't apply.

Until you can point me to some authority or power which I recognize as rightfully competent to say to me, "*thou shalt*" and "*thou shalt not*," and which has the means to detect and call me to account and punish me for violating such command every time, whether any other creature knows of it or not, I acknowledge no other master than myself, no rule to guide me but my own wants and inclinations; and them I will obey, for they are nature's laws and there is nothing higher than they. Neither reason nor science brings to view any such authority; and I am therefore at liberty to kill, rob, burn, and lie, at pleasure, subject only to the risk of such inconveniences to myself as others may chance to visit upon me in case of detection.

Do the inquiries then arise, how and whence comes the knowledge of right and wrong, and the force of obligation, if any, which it brings? Many have asked the same questions all along and every day. We profess no greater wisdom than reason and science reveal to us; and they pronounce these things fictions. So let us move on and let these have their sway. Society can get along quite well without troubling itself with these matters. It is only a menagerie on a large scale or a sort of zoological garden without the cages.

Then if any one sees proper to club his mother-in-law, let him only fortify himself with the reflection that the tiger or the hyena would have done the same under much lighter provocation, and with no abject fear of being called to account for the little diversion. It is nature's work, and the fittest survives. The race will be struggling up. If another will be mean and parsimonious, let him consider himself the highly evolved expansion of some molecule of past ages, which helped to finish out a flea; and let him draw courage and comfort from the thought, claim his origin and exercise his privilege. Or if it be the chosen prerogative of another, to lie, steal, plagiarize, or play the debauchee, let him sustain himself by selecting for his grand prototype, the frog, the civet, the opossum, the serpent, or the fox, and content himself with the reflection that he is of the same nature and the same kind of stuff as they, and enjoy

the consolation which it brings. It will help to sustain him in those seasons of despondency which, for some unknown cause, occasionally afflict him. Whatever he may be or do, it matters not. Let him suffer no distress and borrow no trouble on this account, nor be unduly exalted with any sense of pride or self-sufficiency. There is neither bad nor good. It is all the same. These distinctions are the result of an imperfect education; and like other non-essentials, will soon vanish under proper training and an enlarged experience. Science will uphold and protect the man and vindicate nature's laws. Only let him be true to his origin, steadfast in the way of progress and vigilant in keeping alive the memory of that long line of august ancestry through which he has attained his present eminence, and preserve it without taint. Let him copy with reasonable diligence those noble traits and qualities which enabled their original possessors to reach their respective stations in the line of development, through the intervening links that have peopled this goodly planet, and prove himself worthy of such illustrious parentage. Nature will accomplish all the rest, true to herself and those unvarying laws which uphold and guide the universe. The race will thus advance in beauty and in strength under the benign influences of these coöperating harmonies, and the goal of human happiness will at length be reached.

The new system of Ethics we applaud without reserve, as worthy of its origin, admirable in its conception, sound in principle, practical in its operation and well fitted to meet the wants and special needs of a large and constantly increasing class in society hitherto much neglected.

The system may, and doubtless will, encounter no little opposition; and some time may elapse before it can be brought fully into practice. We can readily foresee difficulties and obstacles all around. It is the case with all new systems, however perfect in themselves and meritorious they may be, which affect the public interests. Men must be allowed time in which to conquer their prejudices. There is the well-known conservative element that brooks no innovation; and its adoption must be general in order to give it full effect and render its action harmonious. A partial trial will only benefit individuals,

and the public will be little better off, and perhaps not so well, to begin with. Morals will resist it, always jealous of the advance and encroachments of science. Governments will contend against it, because it forecasts their doom in the abolishment of place, patronage, perquisites, and power. So that, with so formidable an array against us, we may be compelled to wait long to witness the full tide of its accomplishment. But let us be patient. We can afford to be. Science will in due time assert herself and claim her own. She always has. Long live Science!

ARTICLE II.—DARWINISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

From the German of William Bender. By EDWARD G. BOURNE.

DUBOIS REYMOND, the standing secretary of the Academy of Science in Berlin, at the usual meeting in memory of the noted dead of the past year, gave expression, somewhat exuberantly perhaps, to the thought that Darwin had rendered the same service in the interpretation of organic nature that Copernicus was celebrated for rendering in the interpretation of our planetary system.

The comparison of Darwin to Copernicus reminds me at the outset that the Christian faith, or what is commonly so called, is not involved in a conflict with natural science for the first time. This conflict is as old as the emancipation of science from the authority of the Church. When science, toward the end of the 17th century, began to attribute to mental and physical disturbances certain diseases which hitherto had been explained as coming from the influence of the Devil and evil spirits, theologians, lawyers and physicians vied with each other in shouting that Christianity was in danger, the Bible was disregarded, and the devil deprived of his just claims.

But Science has advanced and taken under its powerful protection those unfortunates who used to be racked and burned for alleged possession by the devil.

If theologians have ventured to take delight in the interesting chapter on devils and demons, thenceforward only to be found in the less prominent parts of their dogmatics, the Christian faith has thereby suffered no loss. We have become accustomed also to esteem the Bible stories of the devil and demons as belonging to the notions of the distant past, but he would be a strange man who should wish to maintain that our belief in God and his Providence had lost its old power because we no longer earnestly believe in the devil and his fellows.

The alleged struggle between Faith and Science had at that time appeared only under the form of a struggle between two

theories of medicine: one, obsolete and theological; the other new, rising into favor, and scientific.

Advancing science rendered faith a great service in setting it free from the former and its evil spirits. Much the same state of affairs existed in another quarrel of those times. If we venture to believe the theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries the Christian faith was threatened by no greater danger than the rise of the Copernican system. To-day that system is taught in the schools. But on its first appearance it seemed to be nothing less than an outrage on the soul of the Christian faith.

Not only was Galileo persecuted on account of the Copernican heresy by those who claimed infallibility, but Kepler, also, had to be warned by the Protestant consistory at Stuttgart "not to throw Christ's kingdom into confusion with his silly fancies."

Well into the 18th century the theologians resisted all acknowledgments of the Copernican theory as the most dangerous error. If we will go back in thought to that age we shall be able in a measure to understand the matter. The earth till that time was considered the solid center of the universe. Above, the vault of heaven was outstretched; and far down in the bosom of the earth was supposed to be the place of the miserable who were damned. In that solid vault of heaven rose the throne of God from which Christ came down to redeem men from the wrath of God through the shedding of his blood. And thither he returned in the body, borne up by the clouds, to prepare a place for his followers in the upper world of the blessed. Now came the Copernican theory to teach us to recognize in the earth but an atom of the whole universe; to break through the solid vault of heaven where were enthroned God and the blessed, and to spread open to view the immensity and infinitude of the universe. Where was now that heavenly place, the throne of God from which Christ descended and to which again he ascended? Where were the mansions of the blessed for which all Christendom had been hoping? All had been swallowed up in that infinite space where for æons the constellations had revolved, full of inspiring majesty, indeed, but cold and dumb before the question of the human soul

anxious for its salvation, when the home of the blessed was forever snatched from its eyes. Indeed, he who knows how religious faith always adjusts itself to a world, appealing to ideas of sense, understands how it must have felt shaken to its very foundations as it saw these fundamental notions explained away as illusions. Yet what was the result of this struggle between Faith and Science which lasted through two centuries? I might express it in this way: the old theological cosmology had lost and Christian faith had gained by it. The notion that the earth is the center of the universe, that the heavens are a solid place above us, and hell a no less fixed place beneath us—in short all those views of nature which the Bible shared with antiquity are irreparably gone. We know that we know nothing of the heavenly world in which we believe. We know that all our ideas of heaven and hell, of being lost and being saved, of resurrection and going to heaven, are only symbols which we use to designate something our thought cannot grasp. The theological attempts to evolve a topography of heaven as a physiology of our heavenly bodies can never be renewed.

But though the Copernican theory has made a more powerful attack on the old ideal world of the theologians than the later philosophical criticism, yet it has not been able to destroy the religious belief in immortality, in salvation, and in judgment. On the contrary it has transferred this belief from the realm of sense to the realm of spirit by showing that it can only be based upon the ideal data furnished by the history of civilization and upon the eternal postulates of human feeling.

The alleged struggle between Science and Faith at that time developed into a struggle between the obsolete theological and the new scientific cosmology. If we wish to understand the quarrel historically, we must be careful to remember that in the middle ages theology was the universal science, which would derive from the Bible not only the laws of moral and religious living but also the laws of physics, medicine, astrology, psychology, etc. Thus it came to pass that the Bible was treated as revealed evidence on all subjects and that the principles of natural science, medicine, psychology, were presented to the world as religious truths to be received on faith.

Therefore the history of the development of science since the Reformation has assumed the shape of a history of the emancipation of science from theology; while theology itself, when its claims to the character of the universal science had been disputed on all sides, was forced to set limits to its ambition and to retire into its own peculiar field—the moral and religious side of life. But even to-day, the theology of Rome maintains in all its fullness the right to bear sway in the whole realm of knowledge with its infallible Bible. The Protestant theologians, too, occasionally assert it in a modest way.

Now I will return to my subject. Is the question which is involved in this strife between Darwinism and Christianity after all only a conflict between natural science and theology and not between science and faith? Or, to express myself a little more clearly, have we not here also, as was the case with the Copernican theory, a conflict between old theological nature and modern exact science? Or have we really this time a conflict between the Christian faith and advancing science? In answering this question we must clearly distinguish between the doctrine of the descent of man, properly speaking, and dogmatic Darwinism which has been inclined to work this doctrine in the interests of materialism. This doctrine of the descent of man is undoubtedly opposed to certain traditional views of theological anthropology, but not at all with any of the vital interests of the Christian religion.

This is the first thing we have to show. But where this doctrine is enrolled in the service of materialism, we find assuredly an irreconcilable opposition between Christianity and dogmatizing material science, which in deriving dogmas from its hypotheses, gets out of its proper sphere just as much as theology did when from its religious beliefs it derived theories of anthropology. This is the second point.

We cannot too strongly insist on the weakness of our comparison between the theories of Copernicus and Darwin. The Copernican theory is proved scientific truth, while Darwinism, in the first place, is neither more nor less than scientific hypothesis. What it asserts is well known. According to conjecture the different species in organic nature,—since they are the first subject of discussion,—have not always existed side by

side without variation, nor did plants, animals, and man come in their perfection, from the Creator's hand, as plants, animals, and man. According to conjecture, the organism, in the course of infinite periods of time, developed into well-defined species, and in the following manner. Under favorable external conditions the lower species passed into higher, plants were transformed into animals, from which, mankind. As was said, this doctrine of transmutation, of the variation of species, of the development of the higher species from the lower, is, in the first place, still an hypothesis.

But it is an earnest, scientific hypothesis which, as a principle fruitful in discoveries, will in any case long have a ruling influence in natural science.

The hypothesis, too, is so ingenious and, superficially regarded, so luminous, that we cannot be surprised that, even before scientific proof has been brought forward, it has met with extraordinary recognition and circulation far beyond the ranks of professional men. Further, the probability of the hypothesis appears the strongest on just the point where the religious interest is set aside.

For the investigations of the last year in the history of language and civilization and in anthropology has shown, almost beyond a doubt, that our race has developed from comparatively rude beginnings.

The development of the human race has been upward, not downward. There can scarcely be any doubt on the point. If we compare the tribes, who, to-day, are said to be in the state of nature, with civilized people, not to mention idiots, we certainly can say without exaggeration that we know human beings separated from us by as great a gap as the beasts of the field are. It is at all events nothing to the purpose to treat the derivation of men from animals simply as an absurdity and to expose it to cheap mockery.

It is much more expedient, in view of the spread of the hypothesis among the lower ranks of people, earnestly to ask, in case it is sooner or later proved, what losses we must suffer in respect to our Christian faith or what correction of it we have got to undertake.

Now I maintain that the doctrine that man, during the immemorial past, was developed from one of the higher species of animals, does not put an end to our belief in his higher destiny, or in what is commonly implied in the expression "being in the image of God." This belief remains what it was before, an ideal, moral postulate of our spirit. But the doctrine of the descent of man does most surely put an end to the old theological anthropology which in junction with the Old Testament teaches that man came forth immediately from the hand of God in a state of absolute perfection only to degenerate through his own fault to the level of the animals, yes, even lower than the animals, so that a second creation was necessary to restore the image of God in him.

This latter theory, to be sure, long before the rise of evolution, had been corrected by modern theology or laid aside.

We have alluded to the idea that the belief in the moral endowment and destiny of man, leading to a likeness to God, has nothing to do with any means of outlining a history of the origin of the human race, nor can it have any paramount interest in the questions about the earliest development and growth of mankind. If we go back to the New Testament, which must be our standard in judging Christianity, we find nowhere any tendency to set up a theory of the appearance or of the descent of man, nowhere any attempt to outline a history of the origin of the race. The decisive question in the Christian religion is not about our descent but a question about our destiny. The Christian revelation teaches us that we are designed for moral perfection and a state of true happiness.

In the teaching and life of Christ the redemption offers us the means for the realization of this design, that we should have a likeness to God, or "be in his image." The New Testament looks so invariably at the ideal goal of the race that the question of its origin is hardly brought up. But where the question is touched upon, the New Testament only gives expression to the belief that man must be adapted for moral perfection, and that, as his human worth is certainly to be attained only in it, he exists or has been created by God chiefly for this ideal, moral task. Indeed, the New Testament is so thoroughly permeated with a feeling of the permanent value of this ideal

aim of life that it expresses the belief that the whole world chiefly exists for the sake of the kingdom of God, or what means the same, that it was made through Christ and with Christ in view. But at the same time, it in nowise tells how the world began, and only gives expression to the practical necessity which compels man to pass judgment on the whole world in which his human aims are to be worked out according to the standard of that which appears to him the highest aim of life.

We know nothing about the origin of the world but "we perceive by faith that it exists through the word of God." The first and great word of Christianity is not the belief in creation, but the belief in the destiny of man for a kingdom of God, in which he is to attain not only the fulfillment of the divine moral law but also the perfection of his own life.

Belief in the creation of the universe is perhaps the necessary consequence of this belief in the moral aims of human life but in no way its basis. We find nothing in the New Testament to tell us how this ideal adaptation and endowment became a part of human nature, whether it is original or acquired.

There is still less to tell us how, indeed, God made man; whether he sent him forth in his completeness, as the reflecting, intelligent, moral creature, or whether it pleased him in his wisdom to suffer man to advance from lower forms of existence through gradual processes of development. In short, the New Testament addresses itself to the irrefutable *existence* of man surpassing in intelligence and ethical character all other creatures; it does not ask how the "crown of the creation came into this existence, it gives no genealogy of our race. But if now the doctrine of man's descent should be proved, if the proof should be brought forward that man did not come from a clod of earth as the Old Testament says, but from one of the higher animal species, could it impair our belief that this same man is endowed with spiritual adaptations and capacities which raise him above the animals, which show him to be a being capable of infinite perfection, a personal intelligence, a moral person, and, at the same time, the peculiar and unique image of the highest intelligence and perfection?

I answer with a second question. If to-day the origin of our race should be disclosed; if to-day proof should be brought forward that some thousands of years ago we had reached about the rank in civilization which the Fuegians occupy, and several thousands of years further back, lived the kind of life led by the intelligent animals, should we form our judgment of man and his adaptations and destiny from the point of view of the Fuegian or of the monkey (which generally speaking would be incapable of one), or rather, as before, from the point of view of civilized people of Christian training which we have now reached. Our judgment of man cannot be according to any degree of advancement whatsoever which mark his beginning; it must be formed upon the whole history of his development.

If we, according to the standard of our present Christian culture, are obliged to find our own essence in the intelligence which rules nature, and in the ceaseless impulse toward moral perfection, which takes hold of the conditions of our natural life, we shall in like manner form our judgment of man and his position in the world according to the ideal standard, which the history of our civilization has established, and according to no other, whatever may be shown to have been our origin. We shall further keep fast hold of the belief that our destiny lies not behind us but before us; that our life tasks are to be prescribed by the moral law of our spirit, and not by the physiological laws of our development; that we are to receive the rules and laws of our life in the world, not from the problematic book of our origin, but from the clear words about our destiny offered by Christian revelation. I repeat therefore: religious faith is concerned with the question of our own human life-destiny, and we shall continue to think as Christians about our moral destiny to become like God, how much soever we may be obliged to change our view of our physiological origin.

In so far, too, as we feel inwardly compelled to place the moral interest in the rank of unconditioned rules and laws in our life, we shall believe in a moral government of the world, in which we live, and in an intelligent, moral world-cause, though we can make no declaration at all, with the help of faith which certainly is not knowledge, as to how things began and as to the methods of the divine guidance of the world.

But the deficiency of the traditional theology as well as the ground of its conflict with exact science lies in this, that instead of interpreting and establishing Faith on a sound basis it has given much more thought to the derivation from it of scientific propositions about the mode of the creation of the world and man. We have then, no longer, a struggle between faith and knowledge, but one between theological and scientific anthropology.

To be sure the objection will be made that the old theological anthropology is derived from the Old Testament if not from the New, and must be unconditionally preferred to every modern system of anthropology because the Old Testament is as much inspired as the New.

Quite the same argument was made in the 16th and 17th centuries by the advocates of the theological cosmology against the theory of Copernicus. What can be urged against it? Right here we might ask the question: what kind of an idea of divine inspiration and revelation is that which would include under them, perforce, a communication on the ways and means used by God in the creation of man? So far as I know, the character of revelation has been ascribed in the Church only to such doctrines and events as stand in some assignable connection with the salvation of man. But how in the world can it be shown that our salvation depends upon any revealed or not revealed theory of the origin and development of organic nature? Granting, however, that the Old Testament account of the creation of man came through inspiration, how much more do we know about the problem of the origin of things? We find this process of origination just as problematic with the Old Testament as without it. It has been truly said that we know nothing at all about the beginning of the world and man. We may then regard the biblical story as revealed or not. Such also must have been the opinion of the apostle Paul who, at all events, had once an opportunity to make a declaration about the history of creation, namely, in the Epistle to the Romans, where he sets forth in so impartial a way the prerogative of the Jews as compared with the Gentiles. There he declares that the Gentiles had the moral law written in their consciences, while the Jews possessed it in palpable shape in the tables of

Moses ; the Gentiles had recognized God's creative power from his works—he does not continue while the Jews possessed an inspired account of the manner of creation. If Paul had seen in the Bible history of creation what certain Jewish Christian theologians would even to-day see in it, it would have been inexcusable in him to omit that opportunity to extol the advantages of the Jews.

But disregarding the fact that, when we measure the Bible story by the standard of scientific requirements, it gives no disclosure about the origin of man, it presents us, like all the religious cosmogonies of antiquity, with a judgment of faith in rather than with an inspired scientific theory. It answers Faith's question, how the pious Israelite represented to himself the beginning of the world, rather than the scientific question how the different kinds of existing things came into being.

The fact that this faith-knowledge is arrayed in historical form does not change its character. The fact that it is in a certain degree illustrated by the naïve views of nature entertained by antiquity has just as little effect upon it. The value of this story lies not in its historical dress nor in its form as history of nature, if we may use the phrase, it lies in the notion it gives of the relatively high and pure idea of God and his relation to men, formed centuries before Christ by the pious Israelites.

But if we take the story just as it is, it tells us nothing about a condition of perfection surrounding men in the beginning, it finds the image of God like ancient philosophy in nothing else than reason through which man is to learn and to rule nature. The moral quality which Christianity has taught us to regard as the specifically human attribute appears there, though still materialistic as in all Israelitish religion.

Yet whatever may be the bearing of the Jewish cosmogony, it rests in any case on that untenable view of the universe which regards the earth as the center.

It has already, on this point, been disproved by the Copernican theory. We need not wait for the proof of the doctrine of descent. The biblical history of creation is as valuable as testimony of the ancient Jewish belief,—the belief in the intelligent, holy Creator of the world which we Christians share, as it is valueless when we apply the test to see how far it furnishes

a scientific solution, at all satisfactory, of the problem of the origin of the world and man.

I hold this position, then : theology has absolutely nothing to do with deriving cosmological or anthropological theories from religious belief. It should show how and why we come to a belief in the creation of the world, and that man is in the image of God, how and why we can retain the belief in its strength in the face of Darwinism as well as Copernicism. Thereby it will fulfill its task as a science of religion and not of nature.

We have now advanced to a stage in the discussion where our conflict is no longer to be considered as a conflict between obsolete theological and earnest scientific anthropology. If we have reproached the theologians with having derived scientific propositions from religious belief under a misconception of its peculiar nature, we must now reproach their opponents with having derived dogmas from the propositions or hypotheses of exact science under a like misconception of its proper limitations, dogmas, too, which assuredly have a direct bearing on the sphere of religion and are only too often in open antagonism with Christian faith. This has been done by the advocates of evolution. This hypothesis has been used to support and spread a belief in materialism.

To furnish instances I need only mention the names of Strauss and Hæckel. We must, therefore, make a clear distinction between the scientific hypothesis, evolution, and dogmatic Darwinism.

Christian faith can with difficulty become satisfied with that hypothesis, but with the dogmatic conclusions drawn from it, it can never be reconciled.

Now then we have no longer a conflict between science and faith, but between faith and faith, namely, between old Christian faith and materialistic faith newly arrayed with the help of the evolution doctrine.

Let us look at this a little closer. Without entering the field of natural science we may as laymen draw a distinction between the doctrine of the descent of man itself and the doctrine of natural selection. The first only says, conjecturally, that the higher species have developed out of lower forms. It

does not decide whether this development was the result of outside influences only, or whether these outside influences were only the means, under favorable conditions, of setting free latent powers, especially those of a spiritual nature.

The doctrine of natural selection, on the contrary, if I understand it correctly, recognizes in these outside conditions of development: heredity, environment, climate, time, etc., immediately the causes and the only causes of the appearance of the higher species as well as of mental life. Now nobody disputes that the development of mental life depends upon physical conditions, but that these physical conditions are the causes of the development of mental life is an hypothesis which can not yet be clearly represented in ideas, much less supported by a single example. The notion that mind has developed out of sense is almost equivalent to saying that mind is merely a function of the physical powers.

It has not been possible and probably never will be possible to show how nervous action becomes consciousness, or how a muscular movement changes into an act of the will. Certainly it is a gross self-deception to consider mind as a mere function of matter. If we begin in earnest to regard matter as the cause of logical, æsthetic, or moral and religious functions, we begin to regard as matter something which is no longer pure matter, if I may so speak. When we regard it as endowed with spiritual powers we regard it in reality as spirit, and the whole conflict between materialism and idealism turns out to be a mere question of words.

When we accept the doctrine of the descent of man, what more do we know about the essence of matter, of mind, and of the relations which subsist between these two fundamental principles which our thought must not only necessarily separate from each other but also unite together? Viewed in a scientific light this doctrine has given us nothing, absolutely nothing, which has brought us even a single step nearer the solution of that eternal riddle. Therefore the working out of this hypothesis in support of dogmatic materialism is thoroughly arbitrary and unnecessary; and further, we may judge about the grounds of belief in materialism after the rise of evolution in exactly the same way we were justified in judging of them before.

Here again now we cannot insist too strongly on the point, that, when we discuss the contradictions between materialism and Christianity, just as before, we have to do with the contradictions between two views of the world, two kinds of belief, and not at all with the contradictions of science and religion.

Materialism as a general view of the world does not come under the category of science, but under the category of religion. It has then to be measured by the standard which we, generally speaking, are able to apply to religious belief in accordance with its peculiarity. Therefore we may say that correctness and truth are to be attributed to every general view of the world according to its capacity to call forth and guarantee a true moral culture.

In the first place we have to consider its qualifications to give us a general, satisfying, theoretical interpretation of the world which shall be equally just to spiritual and to physical facts.

Every religious view of the world must base its right to life on its value as a means of culture. The capacity of a faith morally to ennoble men, to reconcile them to their condition in the world, to make them relatively happy in the best sense of the word, and to give them inward satisfaction, will always be the chief proof of its truth, if truth is the proper word. No faith at all, neither materialistic nor Christian, is theoretically capable of proof. But if we look at the practical value of these two as means of culture we can scarcely institute a comparison or raise the question of rivalry between them. What could materialism oppose to Christianity's ideals of life? Where can we find a view of the world which as a means of culture is to be compared with Christianity? We ask the question because very many of our contemporaries have become unconscious of the immense value of the ideas of Christianity as a means of culture and chiefly on account of the unhappy mixture of scholastic theology and Christian faith. Surely, too, we have not only to deal with the moral ideas of Christianity but also with its specifically religious ideas.

The belief that the guidance and government of the world is under the control of a highest Intelligence and a just Will; the religious belief that above us rules a Love aiming at our true

welfare, always ready to forgive, is certainly of just the same eminently practical meaning as the moral belief that our worth as men is not derived from the accidental circumstances, which condition birth and fortune, but only from our moral destiny. We have, however, been brought by a lazy habit into so external and mechanical a relation to these ideas on which our true living depends that moments of special illumination seem to be needed to enable us to feel and understand how they are bound up in us. The ideas and ideals which Christianity sets up are not our only subject.

The real historical guarantees of their truth which it gives is: the incomparable historical helps for their realization which it has had the disposal of, claim our attention.

We need not remain standing in the porch, we should enter the Holy of Holies of the Christian religion, if we want to exhibit its incomparable worth as a practical means of culture. Is it possible to desire to retain the moral ideal of Christianity and at the same time to hold in contempt the means which the teaching and the life of Christ furnish us, for its realization, the certainty of reconciliation with God, the moral power of his Spirit which alone deserves the name of Holy Spirit, the hope in the coming perfection of the individual as well as of the world?

Indeed, only such hints as these are necessary to make the attempt, to attribute to the materialistic belief such value as a means of culture as is possessed by Christianity, appear either ridiculous or frivolous.

But what, says some one, is the good of laying so much stress upon the value of Christianity as a means of culture if so-called scientific truth is not on its side but on the side of materialism? This prejudice is very wide-spread, but it is only a prejudice, as hinted above. But even on this point we may insist that purely theoretically considered materialism has no advantage over the Christian faith.

Suppose the Christian view of the world to be one-sided, taking the moral interests of human life as its standpoint, does not the materialistic view start from a consideration of nature in a no less one-sided manner? If the former is unable to solve the problem how the bodily world came out of spirit, the latter

is as little able to show how spirit is developed from matter, or how matter produces spirit. When looked at in a strictly scientific manner each view of the world leaves as many problems unsolved as the other. But when we test the capability of each, the materialistic as well as the Christian, to give men a satisfying explanation of their existence in the world, then, on the theoretical side the superiority of Christianity seems to be beyond question.

We should also clearly maintain that general views of the world, so-called, do not, on the whole, admit of a strict scientific form, and that we have in them always a free explanation of the total life of the world from that standpoint which regards man as the center. We men seek a satisfactory explanation of the total life of the world, with which life we have grown up, and we naturally will feel satisfied with such a judgment only of the world as does not take away from us the ideal and moral interests, which are our standards, but gives validity to its own meaning when used to explain the world.

From this point of view we may assert that, since Christianity makes the spiritual, not the physical world, its starting point, and consequently explains nature as a means of attaining the ideal aims of man, it interprets the world only by the standards of precedence things have for men.

We do not need to become ascetics, if this attitude and the judgment of the world from it are explained as the one necessary for men and therefore true.

Every one who accords to the ideal and moral interests their superior value must also recognize that from them our general view of the world should be derived.

The truth, or as I should prefer to say, the just claim of Christian idealism take root thoroughly in the moral aims which by the power of the practical force of attraction belonging to them, will be recognized to-day, by individuals as well as by society, as the standard laws of our existence as men.

If any body wanted to make proselytes for the materialistic faith with the natural consequences he would have to give up our moral culture and bring Christian society back to the stage of men in the state of nature. But who would earnestly pro-

pose such a thing. No fanatical adherent to materialistic dogmas will ever desire it.

Therefore no one should dispute our right to judge of the world, its origin and final purpose in a manner corresponding to our moral culture gained essentially through Christianity. It ought to recognize that the Christian faith is not only the necessary consequence of our stage of moral culture, but also that it is the correct interpretation of the world by the standard of that moral culture.

ARTICLE III.—WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE.

AMONG the social questions now under discussion, none is more important or more freighted with principles and issues that outreach present consequences and take hold of the very life of society, than that of Female Suffrage. The frequency and urgency with which this measure is pressed upon our legislative bodies by a certain class of reformers, encouraged by partial success in some of the newer states and territories, and the recent advocacy of it in full or limited form by some who have very largely the ear of the public, and the apparently increasing drift of public sentiment in this direction manifest in many quarters,—call for a sober and reflective revision not only of the reasons and supposed advantages of the so-called reform, but of the very serious issues and consequences involved in it. These issues are not immediate and do not lie on the surface. The question is one which cannot be solved on abstract principles, such as that so often urged, of the 'right' of women to vote; since nothing is more fallacious than the application of abstract theories to practical and political problems. The profound aphorism of Burke is specially applicable here,—that in proportion as such theories are logically true, they are practically and politically false. Nor can it be decided by its immediate advantages, supposing them to be real, such as the effect of women's vote in temperance legislation and other politico-moral questions. Such temporary good, even if secured, may be purchased at too dear a price if it bring after it evils outweighing and outlasting the evil it is supposed to remedy. Illustrations of immediate advantages purchased at the cost of great and wide-sweeping evils are not wanting in our history. The admission of slavery into our Republic for the sake of union, and its subsequent ravages, ending in the war of the Rebellion, is one signal example. The exclusion of the Bible from our public schools as a concession to Roman Catholics and infidels, resulting in the secularization of our whole system of popular education, is another fearfully omin-

ous fact, the end of which is not yet. Before committing ourselves to one more radical and irremediable error, and plunging blindly into this gulf of women's suffrage, it will be well to pause and see whither we are going, and what this new movement, or 'reform' really signifies; whether it rests on a true principle or a shallow and pleasing fallacy, and whether its results are likely to be beneficial or disastrous.

We do not propose to discuss the question exhaustively, or as thoroughly as it really demands, but simply and briefly to expose a few points that seem to us to touch the heart of the subject, and which are very commonly overlooked in its discussion.

1. And first, *this reform signifies nothing less than a radical and revolutionary change in our whole social system.*

Society as at present constituted is based upon the Family as the social unit. The State is not an aggregation of individuals, but an organism, of which the family is an integral part. This social unit is represented by the constituted head of the family,—the husband, father, or householder, to whom the care and support and interests of the family are naturally intrusted. Whatever tends to disintegrate this organic family unity is a violation of the divine constitution, and can work only mischief, whether it be enforced celibacy, easy divorce, or female suffrage. *Individualism* is the bane of our modern social life, as is but too apparent in the theories and practices respecting marriage, which is fast becoming a mere contract, with reserved individual rights, dissolvable at the will of the parties, instead of that sacred and indissoluble union which is its divine idea. It is, whether applied to marriage, the family, or the State, an essentially infidel theory whose legitimate issue is the destruction of the family, of government, and the church, as divine institutions, and the exaltation and assertion of individual 'rights' under the flag of *Each one for himself.*

The practical tendency of women's suffrage, as all must see, is to impair the unity of the family as a social organism, being itself a denial of it, and to create discord and rivalries between husband and wife, who by the divine ordinance are "no more twain but one flesh," but by this act are legally declared to be not one but *two*. Besides, such suffrage is a tacit decla-

ration that the husband and father cannot be trusted to protect the interests of wife and daughter in political as in domestic affairs, which is a sure method of relaxing his sense of responsibility and loosening the ties of family affection. Where there is true affection, the wife, if she vote at all, will vote with her husband, even against her own interest; and where there is not, the multiplying of causes of discord will not remedy but only aggravate the evil. The kind of rivalries that woman suffrage will introduce into the family is strikingly seen in an actual case reported in the papers some months ago. In one place in Wyoming it was stated that "Mr. Horatio Evans and his wife ran on opposite tickets for the same office, and Mr. Evans won." The domestic consequences of this political strife in a house thus divided against itself are not reported, but may easily be imagined. In any case, woman suffrage strikes at the root of that which should be the first end of government to protect, the sacred unity of the Family.

But, it is said, a great many women are unmarried, and own property on which they pay taxes to the government; therefore justice requires that the right of suffrage be extended to them. Passing by the question whether the payment of taxes involves a right of representation, and this a right of voting,—which, though seemingly taken for granted, is a groundless assumption,—allowing the justness of the plea, we answer, that marriage is the normal status of woman; singleness is the exception and not the rule, and political institutions should be based on broad and general and not exceptional facts. Especially should great social interests not be sacrificed to those which are special and individual. The anomaly, if it be one, is not peculiar to woman, but is inseparable from any system of law and government. All male persons under twenty-one years of age are excluded from voting, although they have as much natural 'right' to the suffrage before as after this age. And many a young man is more capable of exercising this right than multitudes who do possess and abuse it. Again, all minors having property may not legally dispose of it, but are put under guardians till they arrive at mature age; although many have as much or more business knowledge and discretion at eighteen as others at forty. But government legislates on

general principles for the general good, and not for exceptional cases.

If individual *right* is the question, what greater personal right may any one claim, than that which a woman has to her own name? Yet this name is lost or merged by marriage in that of her husband—signifying, what few in these days consider, that her person and all that appertains to it, including her political rights, if any such exist, are surrendered and merged in those of another, with whom she is morally and legally *one*. To be consistent, the female suffragists should demand that the wife retain her maiden name, coupled if need be with that of the husband, and thus declare, what the movement really signifies, that the marriage union is simply a copartnership, with “all rights reserved.” Under the accepted legal and Christian idea of marriage, all talk about the disfranchisement of women, and their degradation to the rank of children, or of idiots and criminals, is sheer nonsense, or the most transparent fallacy.

2. *The demand for woman suffrage is based upon a radically false theory of civil and political rights.*

The cry of “woman’s rights,” so shrilly and persistently sounded in our ears, needs to be weighed and analyzed more carefully than it is wont to be by those who raise and listen to it. No human being has any natural rights beyond what nature bestows, nor any political rights except what political expediency and the best interests of society prescribe. Natural rights are grounded in the nature which God has given us, and are the claims which that nature asserts in the name of God for fulfilling its true end. A right, as the word itself implies, is first of all a moral claim, implying obligation, as is seen in the highest and most sacred of all rights, those of conscience, which are rights only because it is man’s imperative duty to obey its dictates. Our boasted ‘inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ are not supreme or inalienable, since they may, each and all, be forfeited, and are in fact forfeited by and taken away from criminals and murderers, in the name of justice and for the protection of society. Not so with the really inalienable rights of conscience. Here, and here only, the individual is superior to the State, and is amenable

to God alone. Such natural rights, involving duties or obligations commensurate with them, we recognize as implanted in the nature of man. But nowhere do we find in the human constitution a right of voting bound up with his other rights; nowhere an obligation to vote, or to take an active part in civil government; although Plato and Aristotle and other philosophers long ago observed that man's nature is configured to the civil state and the condition of civil obligation.

To make the right of suffrage, or any other political right, absolute and grounded on first principles, is to fall into the error of the radical theorists and revolutionists of France, in opposition to the sound English doctrine recently affirmed by Matthew Arnold, "that all political rights are created by law, and are based on expediency and are alterable as the public advantage may require." The same sound doctrine is expressed by an American writer: "No political right is absolute and of universal application. Each has its conditions, qualifications, and limitations. It is in the concrete and not in the abstract, that rights prevail in every sound and wholesome society. They are applied where they are applicable. Government by doctrines of abstract right, of which the French Revolution set the example and bore the fruits, involves enormous danger and injustice." And yet it is upon this false and dangerous doctrine, claimed to be the foundation stone of all our institutions, that the woman suffrage movement is avowedly based. "The strength of the woman suffrage movement in the United States," says one of its leading advocates, "lies in this, that every axiom, every position claimed originally as applicable to American men, proves on reflection to be applicable to women also. If there is any principle on which all our institutions rest in the popular mind, it is the right of every adult person, not laboring under special natural disqualification, to take part in the government of the country." Such a right nowhere exists, or ever did exist, save in the brains of theorists. If this be the principle on which our institutions rest in the popular mind, it is by the same sophistry of radicalism that once made slavery to be the corner stone of the Republic, and State rights paramount over the sovereignty of the nation. The sooner the popular mind is dispossessed of such doctrines, before their

fruits are ripened into revolutions, the better for our peace and safety.

Rights, as we have said, are always correlative and commensurate with duties. A right to vote implies the duty to vote, and this carries with it in a free government the right to be elected to office, and a participation in all the duties and responsibilities of government. Indeed this is the avowed aim of the female suffragists, to open the whole sphere of politics and government to women equally with men. This is the issue fairly before us, and a graver and mightier one, or one more fraught with peril to society, to the family, and most of all to woman herself, it is impossible to conceive. And this leads us to say further,

3. *The claim for woman suffrage rests upon a radically false conception of the relations and duties of the sexes.*

If there is any law written in nature's boldest and most legible hand and stamped indelibly on the human constitution, it is that which assigns different spheres and duties to the two sexes. Woman is made to be the complement and help-mate, not the rival of man. To the man is given physical strength, executive force, mastership, leadership,—in a word, *headship* in the family, in the field, and in the State. Hence government is his prerogative by nature. To the woman is given a finer and more delicate organization, not inferior but different in kind and quality, fitting her as manifestly for private and domestic life, and its not less responsible duties. To deny or ignore this law is to deny the plainest facts, and to fly in the face of nature itself. Nature and reason, no less than Scripture, declares man to be the "head of the woman" and of the family, and for the same reason he is the proper head and ruler of the State. The fact of female sovereigns and their often successful reigns, argues nothing against this, since every one knows that the real governing power in England and other female sovereignties is behind the throne, and is male, and not female. The equality of the sexes, in the only sense in which the term can be properly used, is perfectly consistent with subordination of rank and place, as even theology teaches in the doctrine of the Trinity, where the Son is subordinate and obedient to the Father, yet one with Him in all divine attributes.

This whole movement for female suffrage, is, at least in its motive and beginning, a rebellion against the divinely ordained position and duties of woman, and an ambition for independence and the honors of a more public life; as if any greater and diviner honor could be given to woman than those which God has assigned her; as if the sanctities of home and the sacred duties of wife and mother, with all their sacrifices, were not a higher sphere and a truer glory—a glory she shares with the world's Redeemer—than the vulgar publicity of the polls and hustings, or even the Senate and the bar.

It has been argued by advocates of this reform that the social position of woman is different in this age from what it was in the preceding centuries, when woman was deemed and held subordinate to man. "It is the weakness of the stock arguments against woman suffrage," says Mr. Higginson in the *North American Review*, "that they are mainly based on the survival of a tradition after social facts are changed. 'As manners make laws, manners likewise repeal them.'" But it is not social facts or traditional manners on which our arguments are based, but natural constitution and the laws written by the Creator on the nature of the two sexes, to which human laws ought to be conformed. St. Paul, in his chapter on the subordination of woman,—upon which so much shallow sophistry and irreverent wit has been expended,—appeals in his argument chiefly to nature and the original constitution of woman, which no social facts or customs can essentially change. It is not a social, but a natural fact that woman is shorter in stature, weaker in body, lighter and less forcible and less commanding in voice and movement and all that indicates authority and mastery, than man, notwithstanding a few abnormal exceptions. It is not a tradition, but a scientific fact or law, that the average weight of the brain of woman is one-tenth less than that of man, and differs from it also in structure,—indicating not that she is mentally inferior, but that certain spheres of thought and activity are specially adapted, and certain others not adapted to her mental, no less than to her bodily organization.

It is a psychological and not a social or traditional fact, that the logical and judicial faculties are in most women subordinate and inferior in strength to the intuitive and spiritual; that feel-

ing enters more largely into her opinions and judgments than the *lumen siccum* of pure reason,—a fact which in some departments makes her a more true and acute discerner, and in others a more partial and prejudiced observer.

Now this marked difference of organization, both physical and mental, certainly indicates some difference of design and end touching the sphere and functions of the two sexes. What this difference is; which shall be the *head*, the primordial and governing force in all things pertaining to public and political life; and which shall be the *heart*, the inward and retired, but not less powerful spiritual force which animates and warms and cheers the domestic and social life; the controller of this interior world within the outer one of business and politics, like the heart in the physical system sustaining, shaping and building the body by its vital chemistry, pouring life and health through all the veins and arteries and so feeding and vitalizing the whole, the head and brain no less than the lowest members,—this surely ought not to be a question in dispute, and cannot be to any level and true-seeing mind. Indeed this question whether women shall vote, and the issues connected with it, recalls the old fable of the belly and the members. It looks to us like the question, whether the heart shall usurp the function of the head, and assert its right to be at the top instead of at the center of the body; i. e. whether it shall govern and direct the external movements of the man, or animate and vitalize, and so inwardly control, the man himself. In this view there is a look of absurdity in the claim for woman suffrage which has not escaped the notice of some who have written on the subject. Prof. Phelps speaks in bold and convincing language of “the absurdity of thrusting upon one-half of the human race a privilege which they have never asked for, and their desire for which is a thing not proved; the absurdity of imposing upon one-half of the race a duty, the gravest that organized society creates, but which they have no power to defend in an emergency; the absurdity of holding woman to military service, as she must be held if she is to stand on any fair terms of equality with man in the possession of this natural right; the absurdity of the intermingling of the gravest duties of the court room and the senate chamber with those of the

nursery—these and other like things involved in the proposed revolution and its sequences, we claim to have the look of absurdity to the average sense of mankind. Yet they are commonly treated either flippantly or passionately in the attempt at rejoinder; and once and again we are told that the revolution is right because it is right; and it must succeed because it will succeed. We ask for a reverent answer to St. Paul's reasoning, and we are informed that St. Paul was a bachelor. We ask what to do with the apostle's inspired command to wives, so marked in its distinction from his commands to husbands, and we are reminded that the apostle was a Jew. We urge the impossibility of woman's defending the ballot by force of arms; and we are answered that woman is a slave. We argue the incongruity of the duties of maternity with those of the jury-box and the bar; and we are instructed gravely that men are tyrants, usurpers, brutes. We speak of the dignity of marriage, and the sacredness of motherhood; and we are met with the discovery that woman has a mission."

4. *The reform in question is a violation of woman's truest and deepest instincts, and so is truly a "reform against nature."*

It is not implied by this there are not women who delight in publicity and who have a talent for affairs, and even for government and leadership in the State; strong-minded and masculine women, as their very presence and boldness of address declare. Such are most of the leaders in this movement, generally single women thrown out of their true sexual relation by the abnormal force and independence of their nature, and seeking to find or make a place for their uncomfortable and irrepressible energies. The very names of some of these leaders give one an inward shudder when thought of in the relation of wife. But these, happily, are exceptions to the sex and do not represent woman as God made her to be, and as most women are. Such, when left to their own womanly instincts, and not forced out of them by sophistry or ambition, disclaim all sympathy with the movement, and would not vote if they could. Not assuming to be wiser than St. Paul, or stronger than nature, they acknowledge the headship of the husband as the ordinance of God, finding in it not tyranny but strength and peace. One of the best and noblest women we ever knew,

whose clearness and strength of intellect was equaled only by her strength and purity of affection—once said, “Women like to be controlled; it is woman’s nature to be governed, and not to govern;” giving utterance to what every true woman knows in her inmost heart to be true. Said the late Prof. Maurice to a lady who was protesting against the required promise in the marriage service, to honor and obey her husband, “My dear Madam, you little know the blessedness of obedience.” It is one of the chief mischiefs of the modern woman’s rights doctrine, that it ignores and violates the deepest instincts of her nature, and calls subordination *subjection* (as in J. Stuart Mills’ book entitled “The Subjection of Women,”) obedience servility, and headship tyranny.

A most significant and hopeful sign in connection with this woman suffrage agitation, is the fact that so few women are in favor of the reform, or avail themselves of the limited suffrage allowed them in certain states and territories. A recent number of the New York *Tribune*, speaking of the reported working of woman suffrage in Wyoming Territory, says: “The most striking point in connection with woman suffrage is seen in Wyoming as well as elsewhere—the indifference of women themselves to the right. Even in school matters, in which those who do not favor a general suffrage for women would be glad to see them interest themselves, they do not seem to be active. In New York and Massachusetts, where women have a limited suffrage in school matters, the number exercising the right has been very small. In Vermont 15,000 tax-paying women have had the same rights for three years, but few have availed themselves of them. Only eight women voted in Burlington this year against sixteen the first year of the law, and a similar indisposition to take part even in school politics is reported from other quarters of the state. The advocates of woman suffrage are rejoicing over the probable approval by the Governor of Washington Territory of a woman suffrage law already passed, but Dakota, which will probably come first into the family of States, refused to put it into the proposed Constitution. The great obstacle everywhere, however, seems to be, the indifference or unwillingness of women rather than the opposition of men.”

This proves conclusively that woman's instincts, always wiser than her reasonings, are against this theoretical reform advocated by the few whose instincts have been repressed and conquered by their will.

5. Apart from all physical disqualification for the duties of government and the so-called right of suffrage—which is too obvious to dwell upon—there is one argument grounded in woman's mental and moral constitution that is unanswerable. This is what may be termed the *attraction of personality* inseparable from her nature. Woman is nothing if not a respecter of persons. All questions to her are personal questions. This propensity is so well described by Mr. Hamerton in his *Intellectual Life*, that we quote his words: "A woman," he says, "can rarely detach her mind from questions of persons to apply it to questions of fact. She does not think simply, 'Is that true of such a thing?' but she thinks, 'Does he love me, or respect me?'" This feeling in woman is far from being wholly egoistic. They refer everything to persons, but not necessarily to their own persons. Whatever you affirm as a fact, they find means of interpreting as loyalty or disloyalty to some person whom they either venerate or love, to the head of religion, or of the State, or of the family. Hence it is always dangerous to enter upon intellectual discussion of any kind with women, for you are almost certain to offend them by setting aside the sentiments of veneration, affection, love, which they have in great strength, in order to reach accuracy in matters of fact, which they neither have nor care for."

It is easy to see how this characteristic, which all must acknowledge to be true, disqualifies woman for impartial judgment of questions to be decided by the ballot, for sitting on juries, for the bench, and for almost all political action where measures and policies and not men are in question. It is no discredit to woman that this is so. It does not argue an inferior, but only a different type of mind and nature. Being formed for man, and not for the State, for clinging affection, and not for legislation or debate, persons are everything to her, and all questions and policies are of interest only in their individual and personal bearings. As Milton truly describes this difference:

“Not equal, as their sex not equal seemed :
For contemplation he and valor formed,
For softness she, and sweet attractive grace ;
He for God only, she for God in him.”

A good deal of shallow criticism has been expended on this last line, as well as on the argument of St. Paul touching the subordination of woman. But nowhere does the great poet show more clearly his deep insight into the nature of woman, and the divine philosophy of religion, than here. The attraction of personality of which we have spoken, woman's natural indifference to the abstract, the absolute, and the remote, and her craving for the personal and the concrete, together with the all-dominating sway of her affections, renders the one object of her love and reverence the natural medium of her religious adoration. This may explain, if not justify the old formula in the English marriage service—“With my body I thee worship,”—taken doubtless from the 45th psalm: “For he is thy lord and worship thou him.”

6. A last argument against woman suffrage is *its practical consequences*, or the evil results that will naturally follow such a social revolution. Only a few of these can be hinted at rather than described.

Not the least disastrous result would be the intolerable burden thrust upon women's shoulders by imposing political questions and duties in addition to those already borne. Domestic and social duties, never so onerous and distracting as now, the care and nurture of children, with the high and sacred responsibilities involved in these, are enough, and more than enough for most women in this age. To add to these the cares of public life and the turbulent excitements of politics, would be indeed to break the bruised reed. As has been well and truly said by a recent writer: “There is no country in which women enjoy such large and various liberty as with us; but it would be bold to say that American women as a whole are superior to those of other leading nations. In spite of these advantages a vast proportion of them fall immensely short of the influence and consideration that ought to belong to them. This proceeds from a variety of causes—an overstrained and nervous activity, an incessant tension of nerves, bred partly by

climate, but incomparably more by the peculiar social conditions of a country where all kinds of competition, spurred by all kinds of stimulus, keep mind and body always on the stretch. The men feel them in the struggles of active life; the women in the ambitions, anxieties and worries of a social existence where emulation prevails from the highest to the lowest. And they, as the more susceptible, and more easily deranged, suffer more than the men. . . . Worn as many of our women are by this morbid action and reaction of body and mind, it is impossible for them to reach that full womanhood than which the world has nothing more beneficent or more noble. In this condition of things what do certain women demand for the good of their sex? To add to the excitements that are wasting them, other and greater excitements, and to cares too much for their strength, other and greater cares. Because they cannot do their own work, to require them to add to it the work of men, and launch them into the turmoil where the most robust sometimes fail. It is much as if a man in a state of nervous exhaustion were told by his physician to enter at once for a foot-race or a boxing match." The result of such a cruel and intolerable burden, if imposed, would be either utter prostration and distraction, or *evasion* of one or the other class of duties. Which would be evaded would depend on the character and conscience of those compelled to choose. With the increasing disposition on the part of many women to get above domestic duties instead of seeking to rise to a proper discharge of them, and the alarming tendency in the higher circles toward the decay if not the extinction of the family, the effect of this new temptation may be conceived.

The *secularization of the home* by the intrusion of political questions and disputes, is another impending evil consequence. Our home-life cannot afford to have any new secularizing or dissipating elements. Politics in the pulpit is more than many good men can endure. What then must it be to have the sanctuary of home profaned and its peace disturbed by partizan strifes and political divisions? What the effect on the strength of the marriage bond, already so fearfully relaxed, of this new disturbing and strife breeding element?

But *the effect upon woman herself* of the proposed reform is, perhaps, the worst evil to be apprehended. What this effect

will be may be partially inferred from the effect witnessed in some of our female agitators and politicians. That they have proved themselves able and eloquent champions, equal to statesmen of the other sex in all but the moderation of true wisdom, is really an argument against them. For in proportion as women resemble men in masculine traits and abilities, in just that degree are they repulsive as women. A woman with a beard, or of masculine size and muscles, is no more an anomaly to her sex than one loud and positive and even eloquent in debate. Woman's voice, if nothing else, indicates that she was not made for public speaking; and her native delicacy and modesty no less plainly declare that public life and government are contrary to her nature. The very qualities which by a perverse culture will fit her for the rostrum and the bar, will unfit her for her true place and influence in the home, and destroy that chivalrous love and devotion which is accorded to a true woman only as she keeps herself unspotted from the world. Hitherto only the stronger and more capable class of women have pressed into the public arena, and their superior abilities have disguised the anomaly under the charm of novelty. But when the door is fully opened by unlimited female suffrage, we shall see very different exhibitions both of speech and conduct made by the coarser and more unprincipled classes.

But we are told that the effect of allowing women's suffrage—and this is one great argument of its advocates—will be to purify politics and restrain the coarseness and corruption which now so largely characterize public life. To a certain extent this may be allowed, so far as outward decency and decorum is concerned, and so far as the better class of women avail themselves of their "rights." The presence of a pure and noble woman in a political assembly may act as a restraint on vulgarity, as the presence of a pure and virtuous statesman may do. But moral and political corruption is too deep a malady to be cured by gallantry or sentimental respect in the legislative hall any more than in the parlor or the *soiree*. The "barbarism" which such statesmen as Adams and Webster and Sumner were unable to repress, but only to provoke and make more violent, will hardly be controlled by a few misplaced women, however wise and good.

But the practical working of the scheme will be vastly different from the theory. It will not be the good, the wise, and virtuous who will chiefly influence politics, or exercise the right of suffrage, but the ignorant, the vulgar and unprincipled classes. From the fact that the reform in question is against nature and in violation of woman's truest instincts, it will fail to carry those in whom these instincts are most pronounced, the higher and better class, and be left to those of coarser mould. Some may at first deny their instincts and go to the polls from principle, as many good women have unsexed themselves by bold and unseemly acts through zeal in the temperance reform. But nature and instinctive modesty will finally prevail, and they will quietly stay at home, and leave voting and politics to those who are less modest and more ambitious.

With the prevalence of women's suffrage a new power will be introduced into politics, and its character and results will be vastly different from what its advocates imagine. With the better class of women refusing to vote, and the lower, the corrupt, and venal class, swarming to swell the majority of their favorites or their patrons, politics instead of being purified will become tenfold more corrupt by the corruption added to it of this new element. The example of the Mormon women voting in a body in the interest of that institution which degrades and enthralls them, shows what the vote of a certain class of women will be even on questions of temperance and morality. And this illustrates the fact already mentioned, that women are influenced less by abstract than by personal considerations. Their vote, like their opinions on any question, will be carried not by the truth or reason or wisdom of the measure, but by its effect on certain persons whom they like or dislike, and this even against their own interest. How much more when favor and interest are combined. The working of this principle may be imagined, when favoritism and personal charms and female intrigue on the one hand are met by flattery and reward on the other, and the social corruption of the court is added to that of political ambition.

The chief peril to our institutions, it is generally acknowledged, comes from the overwhelming tide of ignorant and un-

principled voters, under our present system of suffrage. When this tide is constantly increasing and thoughtful men are pondering the question whether universal suffrage is not a failure, is it wise or safe to augment this peril by opening still wider the door of suffrage to admit a larger and more incalculable element. Is it anything but blind infatuation to rush headlong into a revolutionary measure which at best is doubtful, and whose possible evil consequences, when once upon us, can neither be measured nor repaired?

It may be urged that the effects here indicated are imaginary, or at most theoretical, and cannot be held up as actually or practically true. It is claimed that "in England 600,000 women owning real estate, or paying rent, exercise the right of municipal suffrage without provoking revolution or social disturbance." But the experiment as yet, both in England and the United States, is too recent and on too limited a scale to exhibit its full grown fruits. The first fruits, however, of the woman's rights movement and the kind of character produced by it are already too apparent in modern society. The most recent testimony on this subject is the republication in London of the *Social Essays* written by Mrs. Linton, author of *The Girl of the Period*. This famous satire has lost none of its truth and application since its first appearance in the *Saturday Review*. The author declares herself now more than ever convinced that she has struck the right chord of condemnation, and advocated the best virtues and most valuable characteristics of women. Says Mrs. Linton:

"One of the modern phases of womanhood—hard, unloving, mercenary, ambitious, without domestic faculty and devoid of healthy natural instincts,—is still to me a pitiable mistake and a grave national disaster. And I think now, as I thought when I wrote these papers, that a public and professional life for women is incompatible with the discharge of their highest duties or the cultivation of their noblest qualities. I think now, as I thought then, that the sphere of human action is determined by the fact of sex, and that there does exist both natural limitation and natural direction. This creed which summarizes all that I have said *in extenso*, I repeat with emphasis, and maintain with the conviction of long years of experi-

ence." And this creed, thus sincerely and courageously uttered, not by a man, but by a woman of sense and culture and of wide experience and observation, we commend to the "shrieking sisterhood" of strong minded women in pursuit of what they call their rights.

We have already exceeded our limits in this discussion and have aimed to touch only on fundamental points of the question. But as Mr. Joseph Cook in his "Prelude" to one of his late Boston lectures, has adduced several practical arguments in favor of woman suffrage in the interests of morality and temperance, it may be well to notice very briefly some of these so far as they have not been already answered by anticipation.

He says, "Women have more reasons for attachment to the home, and hence if they have the power, may be expected to defend the interests of home more carefully than men have done." The same argument would require woman to build the house, and to furnish all the supplies of the family. The coöperation of woman in all that concerns home interests does not imply executive action, or the taking of all domestic matters into her own hands. The fallacy of this whole style of reasoning rests on the deeper fallacy of individualism. If the head of the family, the husband and father, cannot be trusted to protect its domestic interests, much less can the civil government, and all social unity is at an end. How much wiser is the divine constitution which makes man and woman one, and the family an organic unity, whose head being made responsible for its welfare, is thereby, if by any means, made capable and worthy of so sacred a trust.

Again, he says: "Women as a class are more free from intemperance and immorality than men, and hence may be expected to cast a purer vote for the reform of cities." We answer, not among the lower classes, for reasons already shown; while the better class would generally refrain from voting, thus diminishing instead of increasing the purer vote.

Again: "By endowment of heaven, women are more attached to children in their tenderest years than men are, and care more for the moral interests of fathers, sons, brothers and husbands; and so may be expected to purify the vote of cities in the interest of its households." This supposes that woman's vote out-

side of the household can do more for virtue and morality than her legitimate influence within it,—a most preposterous fallacy. Let woman exert the power which is hers 'by endowment of heaven' in the training and strengthening of the moral sentiments, and her vote will be needless, as now it would be ineffectual in most cases.

Again, he tells us: "Municipal suffrage for tax-paying women has worked well for many years in England; and a general right of female suffrage has worked well for fourteen years in Wyoming." There are doubtless two sides, or two verdicts on this question—an outside and an inside view. We hear only, or chiefly, from the former, from parties interested to report success. Other and very different reports have also come. Besides, the experiment is too recent to develop as yet all its results, especially among a different class of population yet to come.

"Voting," we are informed, "would increase the intelligence of women, and be a powerful stimulus to female education." It is the opinion of some judicious persons,—educators and physicians included,—that women in this age and country are receiving all the stimulus to education which they can safely bear; and that the kind and quality of intelligence that voting would promote, would not be in the line most needful or most useful to women. The principles of civil government are already taught, or should be, in all our schools and seminaries, but the newspaper discussions of party politics and rival candidates, which with the daily list of crimes and casualties, form the chief reading, if not education, of most male voters, are a wretched substitute for the intellectual and literary culture which many women do and all might attain, if no additional stimulus of political duties and ambitions were thrust upon them.

Again, he tells us: "It would enable women to protect their own industrial, social, moral and educational rights." It is here assumed that the rights of women are not and cannot be sufficiently protected by men; an assumption disproved by the recent history of legislation in behalf of women, and by the admission of Mr. Cook himself, who says: "The industrial, educational and social rights of women have been advanced

immensely in the last generation ;"—and this without women's suffrage! There is not one legitimate right of woman sought to be secured or protected by her ballot, which cannot be more effectually secured by petition. Where then is the need of taking the law into her own hands and asserting her political independence?

"Limited municipal suffrage, he admits, "would be an experiment, and if this experiment should not work well, it could be discontinued." Such experiment, as all must see, is designed as an entering wedge to draw after it the whole reform and revolution. Suffrage once granted to any class would be difficult, if not impossible, to be withdrawn.

His supreme argument is the last. "The whisky rings and other corrupt classes fear nothing so much as municipal suffrage for women; and that points out the most effective weapon that can be used against them." They fear it because they look only at immediate possible results. But the true legislator is bound to look beyond these to the ultimate effect on society and the family, which have interests outweighing and outlasting even the cause of temperance legislation.

Two fundamental errors underlie this whole movement, the correction of which would forestall and answer all arguments for women's suffrage yet adduced. The first is an exaggerated idea of the power of the ballot and of legislation to remedy moral and social evils. These evils are deeper than the outward surface of life, which is all that the law can reach, and can be remedied only by moral and spiritual agencies. What the law cannot do both for individuals and for society, can be done and is done by Christianity with its slow working grace and truth. Moral sentiment is before legislation and must become a power in society before it can be embodied in law, or enforced by civil authority. And to form this sentiment, to exercise this moral and spiritual sway, is preëminently the work and privilege of woman. Here is her true sovereignty.

The second error is a false conception of the nature and sphere and true glory of woman, and of what are called her political rights. This is connected with the false doctrine of individualism already mentioned, or the denial of the divine idea of the family and the State. The nature and constitution of

woman is before the modern doctrines respecting her, and will survive them and determine her place and duties in society, however for the time she may lose her true dignity and the respect which belongs to her by blindly striving against them. The family, too, is before civil government; and its constitutive idea, its organic unity, and its sacred interests, must not be sacrificed to it, or practically violated in blind obedience to a false theory of natural or individual rights.

ARTICLE IV.—TELEOLOGY, OLD AND NEW.

THE trend of our time is eminently materialistic. Its thought has been directed by those advances which are the glory of the age. Chemistry, electricity, and above all, biology, have revolutionized the older science. Such rapid progress could not fail to leave idealism and the purely mental sciences in the background. Philosophy, save that which is naturalistic, no longer achieves her former successes with the people. The cry is for museums and lecture courses. The great popular mind has become first attracted and then engrossed. More than to any other, this result is due to the investigation and writings of Charles Darwin.

Materialists there have been in every age, and in our own they have not failed to lay hold of the new science as a triumphant vindication of their philosophy. The boldness of the appropriation, the prestige of the claimants, the plausibility of their assertions carried the world by storm. Before the new truths were half realized, materialism cloaked the young science and henceforth seemed its natural robe. Commencing with the facts and inductions of science she passed, apparently without a break, to the inferences of philosophy, and landed the inquirer in the boggy syrtis of materialistic conclusions.

The chief claim of modern materialism is that recent science excludes from nature all possibility of the Christian's God. As part of this grand conclusion, teleology is swept from its ancient basis and the evidence by natural design to an intelligent, planning Creator is wholly wanting. That the friends of religion have regarded such claims as the teachings of science is much to be deplored. Science as well as religion needs vindication, and of theologians and men of science not a few have protested against the union of materialism with evolution.

The aim of this paper is not to prove teleology or to defend organic evolution, but to examine the argument of design in the light of Development and determine to what extent, if at all, it is modified thereby. First is presented a résumé of Design, second, of Development, thirdly, the discussion.

THE ARGUMENT OF DESIGN.

This is not, as usually stated, *from* design to a Designer. Let the evidence of design be established, and since design can exist only in intelligence, the conclusion to an intelligent Designer is immediate and irresistible. The work of the teleologist is to substantiate in nature the evidence of design. His is not the argument of the cosmologist to prove the existence of a First Cause from the universe as an effect. Nor is that part of teleology here discussed which reasons from the harmony and order of the universe as a whole, known as the argument from order. As here used, teleology refers to the skill and contrivance perceived in the adaptations of nature. Mr. Darwin speaks of "beautiful contrivances" and "marvelous adaptations." Dr. Romanes, an earnest advocate of the theory of development, says: "Innumerable cases of adaptation of organisms to their environment are the observed facts for which an explanation is required."

Design concerns not the origination of matter but its use, not the materials or parts, but their relations, which achieve an end that the parts without arrangement could not accomplish. Strictly, design is not in the arrangement or adaptation, but in the Intelligence back of them and of which they are the evidence. Design, then, consists in adaptations, which appear to be the result of foresight and intention. As design actually exists only in mind, which is not open to observation even in our fellow men, our only way to arrive at such a conclusion is through external phenomena, indicating purpose.

To account for adaptations, final as well as efficient causes are required. In adaptations there is no doubt of efficient cause, but there is more than this,—the idea beforehand of the end to be attained. This existed before material means were invoked to realize that idea. Every phenomenon has its material, efficient cause, its reason *how*, and in each combination and adaptation we seek these objective causes. But the mind is not satisfied in thus determining physical antecedents. In the human hand as an instrument, we are compelled to see more than physics and physiology. The reason *how* does not suffice to account for the eye. The larger factor remains unexplained

and leads us to inquire the reason *why*. We reply that the eye was made to see. This reason is needed to account for all phenomena that appear designed to accomplish definite results. The *why*, in distinction from the *how*, is named the mental, subjective, or final cause.

Some object to this reason, saying that for cause it puts effect. It is not the effect, however, but the idea of that effect, which constitutes the final cause. This idea precedes, but does not supplant, efficient agency. Efficient causes are the means which realize objectively what has first been ideally conceived,—just as man, before constructing a machine to accomplish a purpose, has that purpose in mind. This determination of the present to the future is the distinctive element of finality. To explain any adaptation, truth requires a spiritual as well as material factor. The two causes are complementary and harmonious.

Design possesses the same basis of fact as the natural systems of organic science. Homology expresses the fact that in nature there are serial relations, correspondences in type of structure, an example of which is the unity of type exhibited in a fish's pectoral fin, a bird's wing, a dog's fore-leg, a man's arm. Because of his knowledge of ichthyic relations, Mr. Agassiz was enabled to delineate from a single part, correctly as it proved, the skeleton of the fish from which it was taken. The reconstruction from a single part shows mutual adaptations in every portion of the skeleton. Homology, or the study of relations, the basis of all comparative science, finds expression in natural classification, the statement of those relations. Though homologies are but relations they are facts as shown by the instance given. Although classification is but a statement of relations it is an accepted scientific principle, a practical rule, a truth. Yet it is based only on the perception of relations. If these systematic relations did not actually exist in nature, natural science would be impossible, since it is systematized knowledge.

Now it is on these very same relations, or adaptations of part to part—witness the case cited,—fitted to accomplish an end, which constitutes the induction of design. Resting on the same basis of natural relations are teleology and scientific systems, alike only perceivable by intelligence and alike only

conceivable as the result of intelligent manifestations in those relations. Founded on this solid basis of actual relation in nature, Design is correctly termed by Mr. Mill, an inductive argument. As an induction is to be established like any other, by an appeal to the facts concerned, namely, adaptations.

Design is an induction, the value of which depends on the weight of evidence. Design cannot be demonstrated with mathematical certainty. The value of the induction from results which appear purposed depends on the weight of evidence. The presumption in any given case may be small or it may be great. The probability of design is increased by the repetition of results in an individual case, by the multiplication of cases producing like results, by specialization of structure, by uniqueness of function. The more complex and oft-repeated the adaptation of structure to function, instinct to action, species to environment, the greater the evidence of design, until at last it becomes a necessity of thought,—conviction like that which certifies to ideal, serial relations in geology and biology, and without which they would not be sciences but mere aggregations of facts. Probability lesser or greater, according to the ground of the induction, is the only support of scientific theories, and most departments of science considered thoroughly established, are only morally certain theories.

The human eye as an instrument for sight, with its supplementary parts, the complexity of the structure, the marvelous adjustments not only to an external medium, but between the several parts, from early time has been considered to present irrefragable evidence of design. Throughout nature countless adaptations roll up so great a body of evidence that the induction of design is not only unanswerable, but any other explanation, circumstances considered, is not conceivable. For instances in proof of design, reference is made to Paley, the Bridgewater treatises, and of recent works, to Janet and others. Some of Mr. Darwin's special works, as the Fertilization of Orchids, are capital cases in point. The force of the argument, the means for proving it, are within reach of all. Knowledge of processes is unessential since results—adaptations—are, and always have been, the facts from which the chiefest evidence is derived. The induction of design has commended itself to the common sense of all generations.

THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT.

Upon the study of living and fossil organisms, their processes and relations, external and internal, is based the series of inductions embodied in the theory of development. Development is the evolution of organisms by natural process. For ages its principles have been employed by breeder and horticulturist to improve old and originate new varieties. What man does only by working in obedience to natural law, nature accomplishes of itself, environment replacing man as the external factor. A tendency to vary is part of every organism, and this internal, physiological tendency responds to external change. But environment does not originate variation any more than the canal originates the stream which it directs. Heredity is the fact that offspring resemble parent, variation that they differ from parent. The efficient causes of resemblance and variation are unknown, save that they are physiological and not physical, dynamic and not mechanical.

Overproduction expresses the observation that many more individuals are produced than there is food or room for; hence arises a struggle for existence in which the weaker individuals perish and the stronger survive. This is the survival of the fittest or natural selection. The survival results because of greater ability to cope with and conquer adverse conditions of existence. This natural selection by which organisms are brought into harmony with environment is a negative result, since it operates only by suppressing weaker individuals. Thus each generation propagates from its best and each becomes more perfect than the preceding, just as in producing the race-horse, man selected the fleetest horses and bred from them; of the progeny the fleetest were in turn paired, and so on till the present result has been attained. Those results that are permanently helpful to the individual become developed by use and the variation is transmitted in an intensified form to descendants. Functions perfect organs, actions develop instinct, organisms are differentiated and specialized, brought into harmony with their respective surroundings, and species are created. The intermediate varieties, being less strongly characterized—weaker, are for the most part blotted out, and series which once connected species are lost.

Since the several factors are always operating and environment (climate, amount of food, etc.), is ever and gradually changing, "species" are not fixed, but are constantly responding to new conditions. "Species" and "varieties," therefore, are relative terms. Species, like individuals, succeed one another in serial lines. Successive ages, geology teaches, have produced increasingly specialized forms. The physical conditions gradually improving, from primal germs through the ages have developed all species past and present,—such is the teaching of the theory. Geographic zoölogy and botany evidence that species are variable and that many intermediate races and varieties now exist. Asa Gray says: "I have been at the making and unmaking of far too many species to retain any overweening confidence in their definiteness and stability. . . . I believe that they have only a relative fixity and permanence."

Variation, overproduction, struggle for existence, survival of the fittest—these are the facts of Development. That from primal germs, by increasing specializations and adaptations, has come the present wealth of organic species, is the theory, the series of inductions, based on those facts. It accounts for the greatest number of phenomena, appears eminently reasonable, is compatible with and explains other science, and is accepted by the great body of scientific workers. Like Design it is not strictly demonstrable, but as a matter of induction its probability is so overwhelming that it is considered established.

THE BEARING OF DEVELOPMENT ON TELEOLOGY.

Accepting the theory of development, what is its bearing upon Design? Have vegetables and animals "paved the earth with intentions," as Gray asserts, or is the materialist correct in claiming that in and of itself Development is sufficient to account for all the changes and improvements resulting in present species; that purely natural processes having accounted for adaptations, design is only an appearance?

Nature, they say, is the grand worker, matter and force the two elements of the universe. The eye, for example, is not the result of wise forethought, not an instrument designed for the purpose of seeing. It has become an instrument of vision

simply and only because light and other external influences operated on the tendency of antecedent ocelli to vary. All adaptations and contrivances are accounted for when their physical antecedents are traced back to their supposed origin. The marvelous correspondence of organ and function no longer exhibit design since environment, directing through ages the tendency to vary, harmonizes them one to another. So with instinct, and with species.

In short, all natural harmonies are only the working of unconscious, unintelligent, impersonal nature. The same system of natural law everywhere pervading the universe causes equally the pebble and the eye. The same immutable law manifested in gravitation falls the stone,—manifested in Development produces the human hand. There is no more intelligence shown in one than the other. The special adaptations of the hand to its uses are "not any more available as evidence of design than the adaptations of a river to the bed which it has itself been the means of excavating." Law, immutable law, nothing but law! Briefly, this is the position of the materialist who lays claim to evolution. It is plausible, it has gained more than a limited hearing.

Is it true? Is this the legitimate bearing of Development on teleology? In reply it is said:

Development does not preclude Design. Like all science the theory of development has to do with second or efficient causes, known and unknown. For this reason it cannot account for the beginning of things. Development implies material to be evolved and forces by which it is done, but itself neither originates nor explains that origin. The laws of development do not account for, but are only manifested in matter by the movements of force. To claim that life is the adjustment of inner to outer relations says nothing, since this adjustment is just what is calling for explanation. Mr. Darwin did not pretend to account for the origin of sensation or life.

Design is not excluded by supposing that Development explains all processes by which adaptations are evolved, even back to the first life-germ. Not accounting when or how materials and forces originated, Development has no reason to give why in those beginnings the factors by which design is

accomplished should not have been implanted. If intention existed in the first germ, undesigned formation cannot develop from it, since the extent of the implanted intention can be read only at the completion of such development. Nothing less than the oak is the measure of the acorn. That only an oak will come from an acorn is certain,—can be accurately predicted. In some way the plan for the product, since certain and predictable, is enfolded in the seed. Because true that the result of each developed acorn is an oak, is it not evident that the tree is a predetermined result? In like manner is it not eminently reasonable that other results,—adaptations and contrivances,—should be implanted in primal germs? Certainly, Development does not preclude Design.

Development presupposes Design. Such intricate combinations of force as are known to be employed in producing the infinite variety of organic adaptations presuppose that immutable laws, working individually, could not produce such results; otherwise, by the law of parsimony, nature would employ them. This harmonious working of a complex of efficient causes, producing unified results in adaptations, indicates a coördinating power, which cannot be force, since force is precisely what is controlled, nor an efficient cause because such are the very things whose combination is to be explained. This first cause, working from a higher level, combines and manipulates secondary causes under proper circumstances of space and time and produces such results as presuppose this first cause to be an intelligent Designer. Therefore, while Development is the summation of those processes—variation, overproduction, struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, etc.,—which physically considered produce adaptation, it presupposes other factors which itself does not explain, and accountable for only on the supposition of Design.

Development is presupposed by Design. That is, if there is design it would probably be accomplished by means of the processes of Development. Design (in any fair sense of the word) must proceed from a conscious, intelligent Designer, who to realize his purposes in nature must have will to choose and power to accomplish.

As the preceding section shows, Development does not preclude an intelligent First Cause. However impossible immediate creation when we consider Development as cognizant only of secondary or efficient cause, this First Cause, manipulating matter and force, may have resources not inconsistent with efficient cause and so be able to create immediately. So long as the induction of a First Cause be valid, the possibility of immediate creation cannot be absolutely denied. There is nothing, however, *a priori* against mediate creation, since absolute immutability of law may be the most perfect means by which intelligence could accomplish its purposes. If it be said that laws are not things but statements, it is replied that they express natural relations—that if nature is true they are true.

Immutable law and uniformity of nature are expressions for the observed harmony and regularity of natural phenomena. Results in nature which are now brought to pass are by natural process. We observe only uniformity in present methods of creation. There is every probability that in the production of past phenomena the same methods prevailed. The veracity of nature necessitates the conviction that like results in nature are produced by like means. All the instances of adaptations now going on are by natural process or Development. Hence the presumption that all adaptations in nature were so produced and the conviction—supported by all science which is based on the fact of uniformity in nature,—that if adaptations realize design it is by mediate creation. In other words, design in adaptations presupposes Development.

The induction of a process of creation between organic result and origin therefore in no wise destroys the evidence of design, but only that former postulate of teleology, immediate creation. In inorganic nature, geology has conclusively shown that seas, continents, etc., were slowly evolved. Their immediate creation no longer finds acceptance. The evidence in nature that the simplest means are always employed in the attainment of an end (the law of parsimony), declares against supernatural means so long as there are natural ones. So in organic nature, Development declares unnatural and improbable the assumption—for it is nothing more,—of immediate creation. The weight of evidence is all on one side. There is but one choice for the

student of nature, who is not only nature's disciple, but of necessity the interpreter of Him whose truths are expressed in nature.

Development is evidence of Design. According to the theory of development, the whole wealth of organic adaptations is due to its processes. All the inductions of design made from adaptations are therefore due to Development, which thus becomes the *sine qua non* and only evidence of organic teleology.

Design is manifested in one eternal act of creation. Since natural results are accomplished only by means of natural processes, whatever evidence of design exists in the results, or adaptations, must likewise exist in the means. Designed results cannot proceed from undesigned processes. Therefore the processes of Development, equally with the adaptations which they produce, are evidence of design.

The manifestations of a First Cause or organizing Power, manipulating matter and force in the organic realm by the processes of Development, discover not only intelligent design but an ever-acting, sustaining guidance. Development teaches that now as in the past, organs and species are being brought into fresh accord with gradually changing environment. Geology has long taught that the earth is in a state of constant change. What has been accepted in reference to inorganic nature, now finds its correlate and completion in the corresponding organic evolution.

One eternal act of creation, substantiated by the readings of science in the revelation of nature, is certainly a more worthy conception of an infinite Designer, than an infinity of separate interferences. Finiteness might produce separate creations, but only infinite Intelligence can create through the long and complex processes of Development. All admit that immediate creation meant special adaptation and special design. When infinite foresight, working age-long, through indirect and complicated means, produces adaptations capable of performing highly specialized functions, do such results indicate a less or a greater degree of intelligence? When man combines natural forces in indirect, complicated, specialized machines and produces, for example, a figured tapestry, we admit there is evidence of greater intelligence than when he throws a stone at a mark.

There is purpose in both, but the more specialized the process the higher our admiration. So with adaptations. The special adaptations of the hand to its uses *are* "more available as evidence of design than the adaptations of a river to the bed which it has itself been the means of excavating."

In view of this one "eternal act of creation—a never-ceasing process of divine energy," LeConte says: "There is still design in every object, but no longer a separate design, only a separate manifestation of one infinite design."

Whether Development and design find acceptance or rejection, the primary purpose of this presentation concerns only their relations. The only change wrought is to purge teleology from the untenable hypotheses of immediate creation and fixity of species, and to rest the argument on the facts of nature and not on imaginative assumptions. Science has demolished all probability of this "carpenter theory" of the universe. In place of mechanical origin is substituted the nobler conception of dynamic creation. Mediate creation supplants immediate and a process replaces a chimera.

The processes of Development discover a reason for increased admiration of divine wisdom, an overwhelming sense of the glory of the infinite One—of the majesty of the Eternal, an immeasurable exaltation of the Christian's God. Increasing through the ages, divine Development realizes divine Design. Its processes are the grand attestation to the wisdom and forethought of formative Intelligence.

Neither Development nor teleology directly concern the creation (origination) of matter and force, but their use, the creation (formation) of adaptations of species and organs and instincts. Being truths, each harmonizes with the other. In nature's temple they walk hand in hand, and it is well that truth-seekers imitate their example. The fabled shield should not separate the teleologist and the evolutionist.

Materialism finds no support in Development. She can not shut out an intelligent Designer until she makes processes account for *beginnings* by which alone processes are possible. Until then, away with her cloak of imposture from the new science!

Oberlin Seminary.

ARTICLE V.—THE EXTRADITION OF CRIMINALS.

ALL our problems of extradition arise out of the conflict of the claims of the several national groups in regard to fugitives from justice, who have escaped from the territory of one group to that of another. For instance, a citizen of a particular State commits a crime within its territory and betakes himself to the territory of another State, having a different form of government, laws, and customs. Is he still, in view of both States amenable to the tribunals of the State from which he has fled? And if so, by what means can the claim to jurisdiction best be enforced? The subject is of such a comprehensive nature that we shall have to confine ourselves to the answer to the first only of these questions.

The strict doctrine of jurisprudence teaches that between residents of two independent States, no legal relations whatsoever exist; but notwithstanding this theory the practice has grown up of regarding citizens of different States, for purposes of jurisdiction, as members of the same political community; treaties of international copyright and postage, the German Zollverein and treaties of reciprocity in trade give proof that the old system of national exclusiveness is fast falling into decay; and it is this feeling of international citizenship that has given rise to the extradition of criminals.

Extradition, as known to the ancients, was conducted without treaties, and for the purpose of retaking refugees accused of political crimes, chiefly; as, for instance, the extradition of Themistocles demanded of the king of the Molossi by the Athenians and Spartans, or of Hannibal obtained by the Romans from the king of Bithynia. The modern usage, however, has been to regulate extradition by treaties, curiously enough reversing the custom of the ancients by expressly excepting all political offences. The subject is one the development of which has been confined almost exclusively to modern times, and the steadiest and most rapid progress in it

has been made in the comparatively peaceful years that have elapsed since 1815.

The motive for extradition, as set down by international jurists, is two-fold: first, it is for the common interest of mankind that offenses against person and property, offenses against the well-being of society, and, if I may so use the term, against the common law of nations, should be repressed by punishment; and, secondly, it is for the interest of the State into which the refugee has fled that he should be immediately apprehended, since no State wishes to add to the number of its own unimprisoned criminals by offering itself as a refuge for the malefactors of foreign countries. For the first of these reasons, viz: that it is for the common benefit of all, it seems as if we might reasonably expect that all civilized nations would concede reciprocity in regard to the matter; and for the second, viz: that we do not wish any addition to our criminal classes, even if other States refuse to grant reciprocity, it is for our own self-interest to deliver up to justice the escaped criminals of other nations. It would seem to me, then, that treaties such as have hitherto been concluded by United States, in which are specified certain crimes, for other than which extradition will not be granted, are quite unnecessary; and should be concluded for the purpose only of making sure of the fulfillment of conditions under which the extradition is conceded. It should be our general policy to surrender to any civilized State, whether we have a treaty on the subject with it or not, any refugee from that State against whom has been made out a *prima facie* case that he has been guilty of committing some offense *by us* regarded as against the well-being of society.

The principle, often put forth and in fact contained in our treaties with Norway, Sweden, Austria, and most of the German States, that, if the fugitive be a subject of the State in which he is found, his extradition will not be granted for a crime committed in the foreign State, is carrying to an extreme the principle of national sovereignty; and, as is readily seen, is contrary to the principle of both the motives for extradition already set forth; and, too, is contrary to the whole system of the criminal law of this country, which has at its foundation the principle that a criminal should be tried in the place where

the crime was committed, in the *forum delicti*. The trial of the criminal in the country in which the crime was committed is manifestly more just, not only because the evidence is more trustworthy and more easily obtained, but also because it is the laws of that particular country that he has violated, and by these same laws should he be tried, and suffer such penalties as these laws impose. To put forward as the reason for not surrendering a criminal, the fear that justice would not be done by a foreign tribunal to one of our citizens, would be to offer a serious insult to the nation making the demand; for extradition is based on mutual confidence, and there is no more reason to distrust the fair administration of justice in such a case than in any other. This doctrine has especial force in such a country as United States, in which the principle of trial in *loco quo* is so strong, and which, unlike Bavaria and other German States, takes no cognizance of a crime committed by one of its citizens outside of its own boundaries.

In all the treaties of United States with foreign powers the offenses for which extradition will be granted have been specified to the exclusion of other offenses not so specified. The Ashburton treaty between United States and England negotiated in 1842 covers only seven specified crimes and expressly excludes all crimes of a political nature. If we review the general progress of our extradition policy, as exhibited in our treaties subsequently concluded with foreign powers, we should see that the tendency has been steadily in the direction of enlarging the meagre list of extraditable crimes, accompanied by the exclusion of crimes of a political nature.

Notwithstanding the high authority of Grotius, modern jurists are unanimous in thinking that extradition should not be granted for political offenses; for, although it is undoubtedly for the interest of every nation that its subjects should submit to the constituted government for the maintenance of internal peace and order, yet one country can scarcely be expected to have such an interest in the particular form of government or particular ruler of another, that it should aid in bringing to trial political offenders, who, it may be, are rather voluntary exiles than escaped criminals. Though the rebel who causes bloodshed from interested motives may be worthy

of the severest punishment, yet resistance to usurpation or tyranny may be inspired by the noblest motives, and in such political crises, failure renders him a criminal, success a hero. There is a wide divergence of opinion as to what constitutes treason, in different countries; in some dissent from the established church; in some freedom of the press; so it would be very difficult for a foreign nation to judge between the contending parties, and it may itself be divided in its views as to the merits of the particular case. It is then a safer rule to exclude crimes of a purely political nature; but this principle must not be carried to an extreme. Far different from such crimes are those of assassination and murder by weapons or explosives even when committed for the furtherance of some political or pretended political purpose. The making of such a distinction was the object of the recent extradition convention between United States and Belgium, which recognizes as a specific crime "the assassination or attempted assassination of the chief of State;" and it was agreed by European jurists that no European State would have refused to surrender to United States any of the parties concerned in the murder of President Lincoln, or to extradite Guiteau, had he escaped from this country. In regard to the proposed extradition of the Irish agitators, Sheridan from United States and Byrne from France, the *Pall Mall Gazette* says: "What is and what is not a political offense are questions the answer to which vary with the temper of the times, the prejudices of the judges and the political tendencies of the governments of the day. It has been our custom in England to give a very liberal interpretation to the term and we need not be surprised if the authorities in United States, if not in France" do the same; implying that, even if Sheridan and Byrne could have been proved to have actively engaged in organizing the Assassination Society in Dublin, England, from her past policy in regard to the extradition of Orsini, the would-be assassin of Napoleon III., could have had no cause for complaint, if extradition were refused on the ground of political motive. It is an essential characteristic of a political crime that it takes place openly and without attempt at concealment; but such a dastardly, skulking crime as assassination loses none of its atrocity

from its connection with a political or quasi-political motive. In general the United States should never refuse on the ground of the political purpose the demand for the extradition of a refugee accused of what, in the absence of such motive, would be an ordinary crime, unless it was committed in open insurrection. I say this should be our *general* policy, but, since peculiar cases might arise, discretionary power should be lodged either with the courts or the President, to refuse to deliver up a person so accused, if in their judgment any injustice would be done by complying with the demand.

Crimes, too, of a purely local nature should be excluded from extradition; for many nations pass laws in regard to military service, religion, etc., which provide for very severe punishment of offenses not recognized in other countries to be of a serious nature, or perhaps offenses at all. An instance of this is our revenue laws, the violations of which in this country are punished with great severity, while they are treated as very trifling in England.

Hitherto, as I have said, the crimes which shall be regarded as subject to extradition between United States and foreign nations have been limited to a list of certain specified crimes of a most serious nature. But I can see no reasonable objection to extending the list to *all* crimes against person or property, irrespective of degree or quality of the crime, whether it be a felony or merely a misdemeanor, retaining as the only limitations those already laid down, that it be of neither a political nor local character. With regard to other than political and local crimes, it may be safely taken for granted, that the foreign government will not demand the surrender of an offender for a merely trivial offense, especially as the expense of the extradition is borne by the government making the demand; and on the other hand no man is willing to become an exile from his native land except to escape the punishment due a crime of very grave nature. The United States have been greatly hindered in their administration of justice by the fewness of the number of extraditable crimes, specified in the Ashburton treaty; a forcible instance of this is the case of Miller in 1881 who, after having been convicted of burglary in Pennsylvania, escaped to Toronto, Canada, where the author-

ities refused to surrender him, as burglary is not one of the crimes specified in the treaty (though he was afterward surrendered on another charge); yet burglary is a crime the suppression of which is for the interest of all mankind, and it is obviously for the interest of Canada not to add to the number of her own burglars. What, then, prevents United States from extending her meagre list of extradition crimes to *all* offenses against person and property, political and local crimes alone excepted? Other civilized nations would soon follow our lead; or if they did not, it would be their own misfortune to become the refuge of our criminal classes.

In most of our treaties with foreign powers, it is expressly stipulated that a criminal extradited for one offense shall not be tried for any other: the reason for this stipulation is to prevent a man's being tried for a political or local crime after having been extradited for an ordinary offense admitted by the treaty. The British Royal Commission of 1878 reported against such a stipulation on the ground that, if political and local crimes be excepted, all injustice is removed. It does not seem to me however that their view is altogether sound. For we must not forget that, although in theory the delicate distinction between political and ordinary crimes is of great value, yet it is one that is extremely difficult to put into practice; and that, although attempts to make this distinction with such absolute clearness as is necessary have frequently been made, they have invariably resulted in failure. Demands on the country for extradition of a criminal on ostensibly political or religious grounds have long ceased to be made; but the same result would be brought about if, after his surrender for some ordinary offense, he could be tried for another, the political character of which was at all doubtful; so that, so long as the foreign country satisfied itself that the crime was not of a political or local nature, it would make little difference what decision United States made on the subject. Therefore I think the stipulation ought to be retained in all our treaties, not because I consider it unexceptionable in theory, but because, in practical affairs, more perfect justice can be administered in that way, than in any that I have heard suggested.

Hitherto what has chiefly hindered the development of the laws of extradition has been the old principle of national exclusiveness, which, I am happy to say, is rapidly giving way to feelings of a broader and more cosmopolitan nature now that the fundamental reasons for such laws are being looked into a little more carefully. The truth is, our international relations of both peace and war in every other respect have had a far more rapid and steadier growth than our laws of extradition, which have not kept pace with such advancement, and in consequence prove very inadequate for the needs of the present time. The incomplete state in which we find our present laws on extradition may probably be attributed to the fragmentary and partial manner in which the subject has hitherto been brought to the attention of the public. The discussions on the subject, which have lately taken place, have been chiefly between two countries, each fiercely partizan on each side, in arranging some special clause in some particular treaty, each acting for its own selfish interest, without having much of any reference to the broad ideas on which the subject is based. What is needed is an International Conference among all the great powers, which would give the whole system a thorough overhauling from the foundation, and remove the obstacles which now impede the administration of justice, by setting forth in a clear light the fundamental principles of the subject without reference to any topic of ephemeral interest upon grounds of an equitable and permanent policy.

ARTICLE VI.—MORAL DEFECTS IN RECENT SUNDAY SCHOOL TEACHING.

A VAST amount of conscientious, and in the main laudable, work is annually performed by the gentlemen (and ladies, too) who prepare the systematic biblical studies of Sunday schools. Here and there are slips. The committee who prepare the program sometimes have given away the Christmas or the Easter Sunday to Job or to Saul. The commentators, who prepare the question books for scholars and helps for teachers, have, as we shall now show, sometimes blindly followed the misplaced finger-posts of tradition, rather than the Scripture record, sound moral principles, and enlightened historical judgment. But the general merits of their work are not to be judged by such blunders, grave as they may appear to be.

It is, however, necessary to expose some of these blunders with an unsparing honesty, for the sake of the moral and religious interests imperiled by them. It is hardly to be doubted that much of the skepticism now current has no better foundation than the gross mistakes made by good but unwise men, who sincerely but blindly put error in the place of truth. At a time when the intensest light of criticism beats upon the teachings of the church,—certain as it is that lessons implicitly received by trusting childhood are destined to be tried in after years by the keenest scrutiny of a doubting intelligence,—it surely behooves all Christian teachers to remove early from the difficult problems of religious faith whatever is dubious and whatever is misleading.

The Sunday school studies on the first book of Samuel, during the last months of the year 1883, seem, in an unusual number of instances, to illustrate the proverb of the blind leading the blind. We have examined a large assortment of the question books and helps provided by different editors; and find them all, in varying particulars, justly liable, in any honest criticism, to such an indictment. The lessons for 1884 upon the second book of Samuel will be found open here and

there to similar strictures, as in the matter of Uzzah's "sin" (2 Sam. vi. 7), and the pestilence that was "sent in punishment of" the census (2 Sam. xxiv.).

The first strictures that we have to make are required by the treatment given to the narrative of *Eli's Death* (1 Sam. iv. 10-18). In this passage, the calamitous defeat of the Israelites is recorded, the fall of Eli's sons, Hophni and Phinehas, on the field of battle, the capture of the ark of God by the enemy, and the swooning and death of Eli at the news of the disaster. The lesson drawn from these events is that of a divine punishment upon parental weakness and filial disobedience, the ruin of children by the indulgence of parents. "The Golden Text" is, "His sons made themselves vile, and he restrained them not." "Recklessness in youth," so we are informed by the Sunday school commentator, "is usually followed by profligacy in age."

These are undoubtedly wholesome truths. Whether they have a genetic connection with the Scripture lesson to which they are annexed, or whether they have as little to do with it as some sermons have with their texts, is what we have to examine.

In the history, the events of the section referred to appear as the first burst of a storm, of whose devastations only a shuddering memory survives in the records of centuries long after, a catastrophe that fully equaled Samuel's prediction of it as

"a thing at which both the ears of every one that heareth it shall tingle."—Ch. iii. 11.

Israel succumbed in helplessness to the fury of foes who spared neither sanctuary nor age nor sex. Jeremiah, in foretelling the doom of the corrupt capital and its temple, could find no fitter comparison to the wrath to be wreaked by the Chaldaean armies, than the woe that had annihilated Shiloh five hundred years before:

But go ye now unto my place which was in Shiloh, where I set my name at the first, and see what I did to it for the wickedness of my people Israel. Therefore will I do unto this house, which is called by my name, wherein ye trust, and unto the place which I gave to you and to your fathers, as I have done to Shiloh.—Jer. vii. 12, 14.

The horror of that untold carnival of massacre and outrage utters its time-long wail in the chants of the second temple:

God forsook the tabernacle of Shiloh, the tent which he placed among men; and delivered his strength into captivity, and his glory into the enemy's hand. He gave his people over also unto the sword; and was wroth with his inheritance. The fire consumed their young men; and their maidens were not given to marriage. Their priests fell by the sword; and their widows made no lamentation.—Ps. lxxviii. 60–64.

In the fragmentary narrative of that time, Israel appears, in dismay at the threatening invasion in which they had suffered a premonitory defeat, to have resorted to an unprecedented expedient. They had brought the national palladium, the ark of God, from its sanctuary at Shiloh to the camp, with a reliance on its power that was doubtless superstitious, but which may have been, in a military point of view, as wise as the wisest means that a sagacious general can take to nerve the sword-arm of his soldiers by whatever will best inflame their courage and sustain their confidence. The sequel taught a lesson which fanaticism never learned, even to the last convulsion of zealot frenzy against the Roman armies,—that the faith of Israel stands not in material things, however sacred, but in the spirit of truth and righteousness. For the ark, when reduced to a fetich, God cared nothing.

In contemplation of the sequel, enviable would seem the fate of those who fell in valorous though unsuccessful struggle for their homes, their altars and their country upon the field of honor. Had Hophni and Phinehas had their choice, they would most gladly have accepted the death of patriot soldiers falling as they fell. They would have thought with Horatius at the Bridge:

“Then out spake brave Horatius,
The captain of the gate:
To every man upon this earth
Death cometh soon or late;
And how can man die better,
Than facing fearful odds
For the ashes of his fathers
And the temples of his gods?”

By their gallant death they escaped beholding or suffering the nameless outrages of cruelty and lust perpetrated by the victors

upon their families and their countrymen. However flagitious their lives, however deserving of the worst fate in retribution for their profanation of holy things, it is a prodigious *non sequitur* which points to their death on the soldier's bed of honor, the happiest of all the victims of that dreadful catastrophe, to teach the lesson that "weak, indulgent and neglectful fathers sow ruin for their children and sorrow for themselves." It is truly amazing to find an intelligent teacher forcing such a moral from the death of these two leaders at the head of 30,000 soldiers slain. If the death of these two shows that, what does the death of the 30,000 show for *them*?

But from what premises have our rabbis jumped such a gulf to such a conclusion?

The second chapter of the first book of Samuel records the sin of Hophni and Phinehas, and the doom denounced against Eli's house by an unnamed prophet in the name of God. But a careful scrutiny shows us what the rabbis have overlooked. The death of Hophni and Phinehas both in one day is there foretold as *a sign* of the doom that is coming:

And this shall be a sign unto thee, that shall come upon thy two sons, on Hophni and Phinehas; in one day they shall die both of them.—ii. 34.

That doom is described as two-fold, the downfall of Eli's house, and "the affliction of the tabernacle" (*Heb.*), the latter referring to the devastation of Shiloh. How the doom fell on Eli's house, the following history shows in chapter xxii., when his great-grandson, Ahimelech, accused of treason in showing favor to David, is slain, and eighty-five of the priestly race perished with him in the massacre of the entire population of the city Nob at Saul's command. The same doom pursues the sole surviving son of Ahimelech, Abiathar. In honor during David's reign, he committed the mistake of favoring the succession of Adonijah. Spared by Solomon on account of his meritorious service of David, he is nevertheless deposed from the priesthood, and the fall of Eli's house is final:

So Solomon thrust out Abiathar from being priest unto the Lord; that he might fulfill the word of the Lord, which he spake concerning the house of Eli in Shiloh.—I Kings ii. 27.

The prophetic word of Samuel is thus fulfilled :

For I have told him that I will judge his house for ever for the iniquity which he knoweth, because his sons made themselves vile and he restrained them not.—iii. 18.

It is noteworthy in passing that the two sons of Samuel were as bad in their way as Eli's sons. Samuel, though of a more rigorous nature than the amiable Eli, did not, perhaps could not, any more successfully than Eli, use his power as judge to restrain or punish their excesses, and it was in despair at the situation that the people began to entertain the project of a monarchy. We hear no more of them. Samuel's family like Eli's doubtless declined, in the common way of tainted families. The record of the doom pronounced on Eli's house has been preserved on account of its connection with an event of some historical importance in Israel, the transference of the high-priesthood from the house of Ithamar to that Eleazar. It is the "house" more than any individual member of it, that lies under the doom. The cause assigned is the combined weakness of Eli and excesses of his sons. An exact knowledge of the several personal characters of their descendants might perhaps show inherited defects of character contributing to the fulfillment of the doom which pursued the house. Most important is it, however, to insist upon the distinction which the record expressly makes between the *doom*, and "the sign" of it in the coincident deaths of Eli's sons. We are bound to censure the blind judgment which finds gross wickedness punished as it deserves by an honorable, and, as things stood, a fortunate death. We must protest against an illustration of the justice of God in distributing the wages of sin by a case in which the chief sinners got off with the least of suffering and the most of glory. Even the child, so far as thoughtful, must find a mystery in the two wicked priests faring no worse than many thousands of their countrymen.

For this preposterous blunder of mistaking the villains' honorable escape for the villains' punishment, how true a lesson, how close to the temptations of daily life, might have been substituted, if there had been discernment enough to see, as "the central truth" of this narrative, *the Divine judgment upon*

formalism. The ark, powerless to save its superstitious devotees, conveys a warning to all in every age who rely for salvation on forms rather than spirit; who trust in sacraments, in church-membership, in creed-profession, in their saying "Lord, Lord," in any thing short of faithfully doing the Lord's commandments.

We will not fail to do the "Lesson Helps" the justice to admit that some of them find this lesson among the teachings of the history, and plainly improve it by saying, "all external ordinances are powerless to save; they are valuable only as means to an end." But this is said in the fourth place, *firstly*, *secondly*, and *thirdly*, are devoted to the remarkable misimprovements we have criticized. It is with a tardy and comparatively feeble voice that intelligence at last emerges from the confusion into which tradition has gotten thought by cataloguing these specimens of sinners unpunished in the list of sinners punished.

A second instance of this fallacious deference to the labels which uncritical tradition has affixed to biblical events is afforded by the utter misinstruction given upon the narrative of the *institution of the kingdom* (ch. viii.).

A historical survey gives us the following data for a correct estimate of this as a good thing rather than a bad.

1. The antecedents:

a. Israel's victories in Samuel's best days.

So the Philistines were subdued, and they came no more into the coast of Israel; and the hand of the Lord was against the Philistines all the days of Samuel. And the cities which the Philistines had taken from Israel were restored to Israel, from Ekron even unto Gath; and the coasts thereof did Israel deliver out of the hands of the Philistines. And there was peace between Israel and the Amorites.—Ch. vii. 13, 14.

b. Decadence of Samuel's vigor.

And it came to pass, when Samuel was old, he made his sons judges over Israel. Then all the elders of Israel gathered themselves together and came to Samuel unto Ramah, and said unto him, Behold thou art old, and thy sons walk not in thy ways; now make us a king to judge us like all the nations.—Ch. viii. 1, 4, 5.

2. Signs of an imminent crisis.

a. Intimation of new distresses demanding a new deliverer

Now the Lord had told Samuel in his ear a day before Saul came, saying, To-morrow about this time I will send thee a man out of the land of Benjamin, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my people Israel, that he may save my people out of the hand of the Philistines; for I have looked upon my people, because their cry is come unto me.—Ch. ix. 15, 16.

b. An Ammonite invasion within a month (so the LXX.) after Saul is anointed by Samuel.—Ch. xi. 1.

c. The record of extreme prostration after two years of Saul's reign.

Now there was no smith found throughout all the land of Israel; for the Philistines said, Lest the Hebrews make them swords or spears: But all the Israelites went down to the Philistines, to sharpen every man his share, and his coulter, and his ax, and his mattock. So it came to pass in the day of battle, that there was neither sword or spear found in the hand of any of the people that were with Saul and Jonathan: but with Saul and with Jonathan his son was there found.—Ch. xiii. 19, 20, 22.

3. The obvious need, otherwise and generally, as apparent in the history of other nations—the England of the Heptarchy, for instance—of consolidation and centralization, in order to national development. Compare the Israel of the disunited and jealous tribes under the Judges with the Israel of the Davidic and Solomonic reigns. The development of the religious as well as the political life of Israel needed the strong frame-work of the monarchy as a lantern glass for the light of the spirit of prophecy.

4. The effects of the introduction of the monarchy, especially as apparent in the golden age of Israel, in the reigns of David and Solomon, attested it as a good thing.

5. The monarchy appears both in the earlier and the later Scriptures as an integral part of the providential design.

a. A progeny of kings was promised to Abraham and to Jacob (Gen. xvii. 6, 16; xxxv. 11).

b. The Deuteronomic law contemplates the monarchy as a step in the orderly and natural development (Deut. xvii. 14–20).

c. The prophets depicted the future glory of Israel under the figure of the Davidic kingdom (Is. ix. 7).

d. The angel of the Annunciation foretells the glory of Christ as a perpetuation forever of the Davidic kingdom (Luke i. 32, 33).

In view of these facts and Scripture testimonies, the Sunday School teaching on the subject of "asking for a king," finds the "Central Truth" to be this, that "God sometimes punishes by letting men have their way." This, of course, is an instance of such punishment. "God in his anger gives them a king," says a widely circulated "Help" for teachers. Aside from the immorality of such a representation of God, as a being like that Jupiter who sent to the clamorous frogs King Stork to eat them, how does it square with the Scripture testimony above quoted, that the king was ordained in mercy to save a distressed people? But enough. It doesn't square with any of the facts.

The whole drift of the Sunday school teaching on this subject contradicts both Scripture, history, reason, and the moral sense. It represents the institution of the kingdom as a bad thing for Israel, and as ordained in punishment for an error in prayer.

But from what did so monstrous a misconception take rise?

Partly from a misconstruction of the address of Samuel, in which he forewarned them of the irrevocable nature of the step they were about to take, and of the grievous burdens it would impose upon them (viii. 10-18). The free spirit of the loosely confederated tribes, unable as it was, without a more compact organization, to resist powerful invaders, would have to come under a despotic yoke, under which they would sigh for their ancient liberty. This was all the evil of which they were forewarned, simply the price of their ransom from the far greater evils of foreign and hostile domination. The address of Samuel upon this topic was only a rational fore-reckoning of costs.

Partly, also, from a misconstruction of Samuel's declaration, that the petition for a king was tantamount to a rejection of God as king (viii. 7, 21; xii. 17). But an open-eyed teacher will inquire whether this rejection of God lay in the *thing* sought, or in the *spirit* which sought it; whether it was the thing that was evil, or the spirit that was wrong. The lesson manufacturers have ground out their grist in such a hurry as to

miss an important and very obvious distinction here, which would have substituted for some gross errors a moral truth of daily practical application.

The sin of the people in the petition for a king is the sin of every one to-day who seeks any good thing, as a fortune, or an education, or a worldly position, in an irreligious spirit, simply for personal aggrandizement, and not for beneficent ends, or as a thing good in *itself* apart from good *uses* intended, and apart from the blessing of God upon it, and the use of it, and the user of it. It is the common sin of worldly-mindedness, putting faith in things, rather than in God, relying on contrivances and institutions, but not on the Providence who works in and through them. It is the common way in which men to-day reject God, as Samuel accused Israel of doing. Instead of a sound lesson like this, closely touching our present life, the Sunday school has been dosed with a decoction of crudities and untruths, biblical, historical, and moral, which has in most cases, we fear, been as blindly swallowed as blindly administered.

The third and remaining instance in which we find such faulty teaching in the recent lessons is on the subject of *the deposition of king Saul* (ch. xv. 15-26).

The children of the Sunday school are here brought in front of a subject as perplexing as any in the Old Testament, its massacres by ostensible Divine command. The intrinsic difficulty of the subject is here intensified by the fact, that a king, who had done nobly as a national deliverer, is treated with inexorable rigor for failing to execute one of these edicts of massacre to the very letter of an utter extermination. Still more is the problem deepened by finding, in connection with this implacable spirit, one of the purest and loftiest moral truths, the insistence on obedience as the most acceptable worship of God, which is characteristically a gospel truth. Then as if to gather all the conceivable difficulties of the subject into one Gordian knot, the destroying mission, which Saul is deposed for failing to execute, is expressly described, not as an execution of Divine wrath upon an abominable nation too corrupt to live, but as an act of retaliation for an act of justifiable war 400 years before.

We do not object to the bringing up of these grave moral problems before our Sunday school children. Sooner or later they are sure to be confronted with them, and probably sooner than some think. It is better to meet them first in the circle of faith inside the church, than in the ring of scoffers outside. Provided, however, that they be handled with a candor and honesty which fairly states and meets all the elements of the problem. But if there is more concern taken to save the character of a prophet, or an ancient theory of inspiration, than to do justice to the moral perfections of God, it were better to have avoided the subject entirely. Better for our children to be left to form their own opinions of the Old Testament in maturer years, from an exclusive indoctrination in the teachings of the New, than to be exposed to have their early faith in the Bible stranded ere long on a suspicion that their Sunday school instruction has been evasive, pettifogging, and false.

To sow the seed of just such a suspicion to germinate in the years of advancing intelligence, the recent Sunday school teaching on the deposition of king Saul seems too unfortunately well adapted. The record, and the historical references acquaint the reader with these facts.

When Israel came out of Egypt, they took their way across the territories of the roving tribe of Amalek, who very justifiably stood to arms. An altar commemorated Israel's victory, with an oath that the God of Israel "will have war with Amalek from generation to generation (Ex. xvii. 16)." The Deuteronomical law (ch. xxv.) retains an implacable memory of that encounter awaiting the time of revenge :—

Remember what Amalek did unto thee by the way, when ye were come forth out of Egypt ; how he met thee by the way and smote the hindmost of thee, even all that were feeble behind thee, when thou wast faint and weary ; and he feared not God. Therefore it shall be, when the Lord thy God hath given thee rest from all thine enemies round about, in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance to possess it, that thou shalt blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven ; thou shalt not forget it (Deut. xxv. 17-19).

In Samuel's time, after 400 years, this robber tribe of Amalek were hanging about the southern frontier of Judah very much as Indian tribes about our own western settlements.

Self-protection and military necessity dictated the same course that they have been held to dictate in the case of white farmers against red savages—a clean sweep of the pests, men, women, and children, like so many wolves. It had to be done. The best judgment and the highest necessity concurred in the demand. Not that God *actually* ordered it. To Samuel, however, it was *as if* God had ordered it. What his highest reason dictated, Samuel might well believe, as men now believe, that God approved. As he believed, so he spoke. Where men now say, “My conscience, my reason, supreme necessities command,” men then said, “Thus saith the Lord.”

It is one of the most unfortunate mistakes of ordinary Bible readers, which Sunday school teaching has done nothing to correct, that this phrase is always construed mechanically, in a literally objective sense. Thus taken, it sometimes represents God as taking on himself the responsibility of the most immoral proceedings. David, himself a prophet, as Peter called him, excuses the traitorous insolence of Shimei by saying, “The Lord hath said unto him, Curse David” (2 Sam. xvi. 10). It would seem as if the record in the present instance might have suggested the need of proper discrimination between an objective and subjective construction, between what God would or did actually say, and what men imagined him to say. For Samuel, in order to rouse the national spirit to the necessary vigor in the work of blood, touched the springs of revenge for injuries long passed.

Thus saith the Lord of hosts, I remember that which Amalek did to Israel, how he laid wait for him in the way, when he came up from Egypt. Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass (xv. 2, 3).

The Sunday school doctors blink this characteristic feature of the case, and try to poise the pyramid on its apex. The whole burden of difficulty is made to find support on a single and doubtful word fetched from the after-scene, in which the prophet reproves the king: “The Lord said, Go and utterly destroy the sinners the Amalekites.” *Sinners*; is it not sententious and decisive? It exactly fits the ancient theory, that the foes of Israel were felons, and Israel the hangman by Divine

warrant. It is not thought worth while to ask, whether "sinners" does not mean simply trespassers, as enemies and invaders. Our children are carefully pointed to the word *sinnners*: "this gives the reason why they were to be destroyed; they were a very wicked people." Even on this showing, it might be worth while to anticipate the question of some thoughtful child, whether the same God, who now bids us pity and convert the heathen, really preferred, for that time, to have them killed, babies and all,—whether God really said such a thing, or whether Samuel only thought he did. It might be wise to take such an occasion to impress the lesson, that the growth of religion will appear in the growth of power to distinguish between what claims to be divine and what is really divine. But the interest of a tradition is paramount here to the claims both of sound ethics and of the recorded facts. It is held "unsafe" to commit that solemn phrase, "Thus saith the Lord," to the possibilities involved in any allowance of a subjective construction; that phrase estops all inquiry whether the thing said is according to the character of God; it allows us only to vindicate it as best we can. And so this case of revengeful massacre by alleged divine command is gravely compared to the dispatch of criminals by the executioners of the law.

It is well, perhaps, that this case of Amalek has been brought up for an illustration of such a theory. For however such a vindication of the proceeding compares in transparent flimsiness with the old-time vindication of African slavery by Noah's curse upon Ham, the record itself exposes the falsity of such a view in the case of Amalek. Here it is set down expressly as a measure of revenge for an attack, which was in itself not unjustifiable,—considering that Israel was then the invader,—four centuries ago. This ignoring of the Scripture record is as arbitrary as that in which the LXX. translators inserted the word *not* in Leviticus xi. 6, to correct a mistake of the sacred writer. We protest against this mishandling of the text in the supposed interests of orthodoxy. Out of the infant believers subjected to such instruction we are likely to see growing some resentful skepticism by and by.

It is by no means apparent, we should note in passing, that the Amalekites were so much more wicked than the Israelites

themselves. They were not of the Canaanite race, nor had they, in the Sinaitic and Idumean deserts over which they roved, fallen into the vices which defiled the cities of Palestine. They were descendants of Esau, cousins of Israel, and no better or worse than the ordinary Bedouin of to-day. It is quite unhistorical to resort to the subterfuge of their exceeding wickedness. They were rovers living by their swords, like Esau himself, and simply a pest on the borders of agricultural settlements.

So much in the interest of that candor and honesty, the neglect of which, now if ever, in Sunday school instruction deserves rebuke. When the literal construction of the phrase, "Thus saith the Lord," would oblige us to affirm that God directed an act of revenge *as such*, it is time to modify our theories of inspiration,

"For fear divine philosophy
Should go beyond her mark, and be
Procuress to the lords of hell."

Saul was unquestionably not the man for the station to which he was called, except for the initial period in which, as a rude and mighty fighter, he gathered up the prostrate energies of the nation into a successful war for independence. More than independence was needed, a work of construction and consolidation, in which beside the qualities of a soldier, those of a statesman and a churchman were requisite, and were gloriously supplied by his successor. Saul, as the record states, did well the preparatory work of fighting, which made David's work as an organizer and institution-builder possible. But no student of the characters of the two men can regret that the one was displaced by the other. The course which Samuel took undoubtedly brought about the change, rousing a temper in Saul which drove David, his ablest lieutenant, into exile, and brought the king, thus weakened, to his defeat and death. But our approbation of the result does not require approbation of the actual events that produced it, except upon the assumption that whatever a prophet does must be right, and that whatever a prophet declares to be of God is undoubtedly Divine. The anathema of Samuel on Saul's shortcoming in the work of butchery is not the only instance in history, in which an un-

compromising but narrow religious spirit has ascribed the dictate of its own austerity to the direction of the Holy Ghost.

It is wonderful, yet reassuring, to find blended with the fanatical and imperious rigor of this father of the prophets, the purest moral truths,—such as the undivided heart toward God, the worship of God by obedience rather than ceremonies, the heart rather than the appearance the object of the Divine scrutiny. We recognize here, in an early stage of the religious evolution, the same Divine Spirit brooding over the embryonic faith of Israel, which appears in the Christ, bringing these same truths to their proper place in a perfected spiritual manhood. In the development of the lily from the swamp the one significant fact is the *life*, one in the bloom and in the root, whose outcome is from mire into beauty and fragrance. In the historical evolution of the faith of Israel from its raw to its perfected form in Christianity, the fact significant of a Divine direction and control is the development, out of a chaotic mixture at which the skeptic takes hasty offence, of the light and order of moral truth. Incompetent as Saul was for higher work than that which he so well achieved, candor must admit that fanaticism rather than reason furnished the recorded ground on which he was thrust aside. At least, we should so judge in any other record than that which has been so viciously misconstrued as the Old Testament. Advantageous to the hope of Israel as the change proved, it is not the only case in the sacred history in which the Divine counsel has been fulfilled not only in spite of, but by means of, the mistakes,—the intolerance, the ignorance, the passion, of conscientious but erring men.

We have to sum up our strictures upon the Sunday school teaching on this passage of the sacred history by remarking, simply, that it fails to comprehend the essential character of the Divine Revelation, as a *growing* revelation, not growing down from heaven *upon* men, nor merely growing in the world *beside* men, but growing, first, *within* men, by its fuller disclosures of the Divine character more and more effectively distinguishing the Divine voice from all other voices within the breast, and teaching its Samuels to discriminate more clearly between what God says in fact and what they imagine him to say.

The decisive and distinguishing characteristic of Divine inspiration is *its quality of moral power for a Divine work of illumination and regeneration*. In this, not in any alleged infallibility of a literary record, but in its continuous, efficacious, expansive energy, as demonstrated, in Israel alone among the nations, by a progressive riddance from superstitions and sins and a corresponding development of truth and righteousness, till the work is crowned by the advent of the Son of God, and in the diffusion of the finally purified faith of Israel as the religion of mankind,—is its impregnable sign and proof.

The teacher who has not grasped these fundamental principles is in danger of so confounding the word of God with the word of human ignorance or passion, that it will be a marvel if he do not in the end promote the skepticism which he deplora. His pupils, in after-contact with critics and doubters, are dangerously exposed to that keen though shallow form of unbelief, which is founded on the fallacies of well meaning but mistaken Christian teaching.

ARTICLE VII.—THE SUBSTITUTES FOR CHRISTIANITY PROPOSED BY COMTE AND SPENCER.

ONE satisfactory method of investigating a proposed theory, is to apply to it the tests used by its advocates to invalidate an opposing theory. It is logic as well as

“ sport, to have the engineer
Hoist with his own petard.”

The *argumentum ad hominem* becomes an argument of general value, in case the test proposed is a just and accurate test, capable of universal application. The issue is made complete if the test in question, after being used to invalidate the theory of its author, is then successfully applied to the theory or position he assails. In the present Article, inquiry is made as to whether either Comte or Spencer has proposed a criterion by which the relative superiority of Positivism, Cosmism, and Christianity, can be judged. A test proposed by Comte is treated as inapplicable, because it assumes the point under discussion. This test is known as the famous “law of the three stages,” which regards progress as marked by three modes of philosophizing—the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. A test proposed by Spencer is treated as a correct one and of universal validity as applied to religious systems. It is his much ridiculed, but philosophically profound, statement of the Law of Evolution, which, to use his own technical language, necessitates a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity. The result of the investigation is to show that not only the system of Comte, but Spencer’s system as well, is defective, when judged by the Spencerian test, while Christianity alone satisfies its requirements.

The question as thus made up, is the question of our times. More specifically, it is the question between

CHRISTIANITY AND ITS MODERN RIVAIS.

“Archaic,” “obsolete,” “outgrown,” “a worn chrysalis,” are the designations applied to Christianity in certain intellectual

coterie of the day. Proof that the chrysalis must perish, is found in the bursting forth of a more perfect form of life. The old is not old till it has been replaced by the new. As Christianity triumphed in the first century by the expulsive power of a new vitality superseding both heathenism and Judaism, so it will be done away in the nineteenth century only as it is forced out of existence by the outgrowth of a fuller vitality. It is easy to criticise. It is hard to construct. While destructive criticism of Christianity has been frequent, constructive attempts to provide substitutes for it have been rare. When they appear, they are to be cordially received and candidly examined. Prominent among such modern attempts, are the Positivism of Auguste Comte, and the Cosmic Theism of Herbert Spencer. Each of these systems is claimed by its founder to represent a higher form of development than Christianity. Each commands attention, because sufficiently well defined to admit of the same radical investigation that Christianity expects and invites. Positivism dedicates its shrines to Humanity instead of to God; Cosmism rears altars "To the Unknown and the Unknowable." The superiority of the Deity of Humanity consists in this: that it is "real, accessible and sympathetic, because of the same nature as its worshipers, though far superior to any one of them."* So we are assured by Comte. On the other hand, it is claimed by Spencer, with how much consistency this is not the place to inquire, that any attempt to pierce the inscrutableness of the Infinite is impious and impossible. He also claims that Cosmism, by recognizing this fact, presents a purer concept of Deity in the Unknowable than is presented in the semi-humanized God of Christianity. Positivism and Cosmism, then, assert themselves to be higher forms of development than Christianity for two exactly contradictory reasons: Positivism, because it is more anthropomorphic than Christianity, and Cosmism, because it is less anthropomorphic than Christianity. How are we to decide between these conflicting claims? By what criterion are we to judge whether either of the new religions can establish itself against the old? It is always courteous and fair to allow the challenged party to choose his own weapons. We therefore ask, in undertaking

* Comte's *Positive Polity* (translation), vol. i., p. 317. Cf. vol. iv., p. 80.

the criticism of these systems from the side of Christianity, has either Comte or Spencer proposed a test that can be applied alike to Positivism and Cosmism on the one hand, and to Christianity on the other? The Comtean "law of the three stages" is too well-known to be passed unmentioned in this connection. According to this theory, there are three modes of philosophizing: the theological, which investigates the cause of phenomena and endows it with volition and intelligence, as Christianity; the metaphysical, which asserts the ultimate cause of phenomena to be a mere abstract entity, as Cosmism; and the positive, which confines itself to the interpretation of phenomena, declining as futile all questions in respect to cause. Inasmuch as progress, according to Comte, consists in a gradual change to the views of the Positivist, the metaphysical mode of philosophizing being regarded as an inferior style of thinking, and the theological as worse still, it is manifest that the test proposed is useless for the present purpose, because it assumes the very point in question. A more practicable test is furnished by the Cosmic philosophy. Fiske, speaking of progress in the evolution of society, quotes the following with approval: *Old* "means not old in chronology but in structure; that is most archaic which lies nearest to the beginning of human progress considered as a development, and that is most modern which is the farthest removed from the beginning."* The scant century since Positivism and Cosmism have seen the light, when compared with the eighteen hundred years that have witnessed the steadily increasing growth of Christianity, does not, then, prove the latter to be less advanced or less suited to the needs of the time. Our query is reduced, therefore, to this: which one of the three systems in question lies "nearest to the beginning of human progress considered as a development"? "Old in structure" does not mean "old in years." What, affirmatively, does it mean? Again the Cosmic Philosophy, in enunciating an Evolution formula furnishes a reply.† "Progress," we are told, "from lower to higher

* *Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii., p. 195.

† If there is any doubt as to the applicability of this law to religious systems, Mr. Spencer dissipates it. After treating of the genesis of primitive religious beliefs he says: "How entirely natural is the genesis of these beliefs will be seen on now observing that the law of Evolution

forms is a progress from forms that are less, to forms that are more differentiated and integrated."* We are also told that "while the two correlative processes go on hand in hand, it is none the less true that a comprehensive formula of evolution must explicitly describe them both."†

Differentiation is the process by which the homogeneous becomes heterogeneous, that is, the process by which like units become unlike. Integration is the process by which the heterogeneity, or unlikeness of units, becomes more defined, and, at the same time, is fused into a higher unity or coherence. Fiske illustrates the difference between incoherence and coherence in organic Evolution "by the contrasted facts that a slightly-evolved animal, like a common earth-worm, may be cut in two without destroying the life of either part; while a highly-evolved animal, like a dog, is destroyed if a single artery is severed."‡ Differentiation and integration being both essential, it follows that Evolution necessitates a change

(a) from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous; (b) from the indefinite to the definite; (c) from the incoherent to the coherent. The homogeneous must become heterogeneous, and the heterogeneity must again become integrated, in order that development may take place. In other words, development involves a change, as the Hegelians would put it, from a unity without difference to a completer unity made up of distinct differences. Obviously, the Evolution formula does not differ, save in its Spencerian dress, from this fundamental principle of Hegel's, by which he distinguishes "all bad philosophy from what alone deserves the name of philosophy." Synthesis is valuable and "advanced" only as the analysis that precedes it is thorough and complete. As an example, we may take the science of Chemistry. Compare that theory of the ancients which regarded all substances as compounded of the "four

is as clearly exemplified by it as by every other process."—*Sociology*, vol. i., p. 450. And again: "The law which is conformed to by the evolving human being and which is consequently conformed to by the evolving human intelligence is of necessity conformed to by all the products of that intelligence."—*Sociology*, vol. i., p. 458.

* Fiske's *Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. i., p. 848.

† Ibid., vol. i., p. 847.

‡ Fiske's *Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. i, pp. 836-7.

elements" with the Atomic Theory now in vogue, and the difference between a superficial synthesis and a synthesis that follows delicate and accurate analysis is manifest. Richard Wagner's lofty ideal, already partially realized, of uniting all the arts into one grand "Art-work of the future" (*Kunstwerk der Zukunft*) is another admirable illustration of development, according to the theory of Evolution. Music and poetry were inseparably linked on the stage at Athens centuries before the theatre at Bayreuth was built. But music, among the Greeks, had no separate existence of its own, while dramatic action and scenic effect were almost entirely lacking. The result is that the modern synthesis is as much greater and richer than the ancient as the arts included in that synthesis are more individualized and perfected. Returning to the question in hand, and using a test proposed, not by Christianity, be it remembered, but by Spencer, we find the answer to be as follows: of the three systems, Positivism, Cosmism, and Christianity, that system which furnishes the most perfect unity, that is, the unity that clearly recognizes the diversity of the factors included under it, is best adapted to the highest needs of the time; on the contrary, that system which presents a homogeneity without heterogeneity—a factitious unity that fails to individualize the differences of which it is composed—or a heterogeneity that is not in turn integrated, or unified, lies "nearest to the beginning of human progress considered as a development." Such is the system which is to be thrown aside as archaic.

As we have seen, each one of the three systems, in its character as a religion, deals with the object of religious cognition, Christianity denominating it *God*; Comte, *Humanity*; and Spencer, paradoxically enough, *The Unknowable*. But, plainly, if the basis of religion is in an apprehension of the object of religious cognition, there must be an apprehending subject, or religion cannot exist. Is there any question as to whether man as well as God, the creature as well as the creator, is to be regarded as a factor in the religious problem? Prof. Whitney of New Haven thinks not. "No one," he says, "will deny that the object of religious inquiry, in all ages and stages, is to learn something about the Maker and Governor of the world

and our relations to him ;”* and again, the most eminent English authority on comparative religion, Max Müller, maintains the same view, asserting that “the broad foundations on which all religions are built up” are “the belief in a divine power, the acknowledgment of sin, the habit of prayer, the desire to offer sacrifice, and the hope of a future life.”† Primarily, then, the factors which are to be distinctly differentiated and again united by the three systems under discussion, as religious systems, are the individual on the one hand, and the object of religious cognition on the other, be it called God, or Humanity, or the unknowable Something. Without attempting to defend the Spencerian Law of Evolution as a universal law, we claim that, as applied and interpreted above, it furnishes a just principle for testing the validity and value of Positivism and Christianity as well as of Cosmism. The independent existence of God and man, and, at the same time, a perfect union between the two, has been the aim of religious striving, practical and speculative, throughout history. If it can be shown, therefore, as we shall hope to show, that Positivism is defective because it offers a unity without difference ; that Cosmism fails to meet its own test because it gives, at most, a heterogeneity that cannot be integrated, or unified ; and that Christianity alone makes possible a distinction that is not a separation, and a union that is not a confusion, we shall have, not a mere *argumentum ad hominem*, but a *bona fide* proof of the adequacy of Christianity to meet the needs of the world and of all times.

Positivism, while it boasts itself to be a religion without a God, furnishes the best of proofs that such a religion is impossible. Let it be repeated that Comte has a Deity—the “*Grand Être*,” which he regards as including within itself the collective existence of Humanity, past, present, and future. John Stuart Mill, after noting the fact that no one, before Comte, realized, so fully as he, all the majesty of which this idea is susceptible, says : “It ascends into the unknown recesses of the past, embraces the manifold present, and descends into the in-

* On the So-called Science of Religion. *Princeton Review*, May, 1881, p. 424, cf. p. 437.

† *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, p. 287.

definite and unforeseeable future. Forming a collective Existence without assignable beginning or end, it appeals to that feeling of the Infinite, which is deeply rooted in human nature, and which seems necessary to the imposingness of all our highest conceptions."* At the same time, as Mill himself notices, and as Comte frequently asserts, the *Grand Etre* is not to be conceived of as composed of "all individuals or groups of men, past, present, and future taken indiscriminately,"† but as made up solely of noble natures who have "played their part worthily in life"—a proviso that plainly impairs considerably the infinitude of the idea. Not Humanity as it is, but Humanity idealized, is to be substituted, like the Greek Jove, for the God of Christianity. Moreover, on the ground that only those who have proved themselves worthy of honor, should be incorporated into the *Grand Etre*, we are to regard it as composed essentially of the dead, the living being admitted provisionally merely.‡ Bearing in mind that the only existence accorded to the dead by Positivism, is subjective existence in the minds of the living, we need no further evidence of the indefiniteness and unreality of the Deity of the Positivist. Notwithstanding his hatred of metaphysics, Comte, in presenting this abstract idea as the basis of his religious system, affords a curious illustration of Aristotle's famous dictum: "If we must philosophize, we must philosophize; if we must not philosophize, we must philosophize;—in any case, therefore, we must philosophize."

But the Deity of Positivism is real and definite, or it is nothing. This vague and empty abstraction must, accordingly, be personified, in order to be appreciated. Suitable individuals are to be chosen and worship is to be offered to them as the representatives of humanity.§ Now, it makes no difference, so far as the principle of the thing is concerned, whether a human being is adored under the name of the Lama, as in Thibet, or under the name of Madame Clotilde de Vaux, as in the case of Comte. When we learn, in addition, that the animal races are to be included in the Great Being,|| we do not need the assur-

* *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, p. 135.

† *Comte's Positive Polity*, vol. i, p. 333.

§ *Positive Polity*, vol. iv., p. 96, et seq.

‡ *Ibid.*

|| *Ibid.*, p. 33.

ance which Comte gives us again and again, that Positivism is more directly connected with Fetichism than with any of the forms of Theology, being able to see clearly "how entirely the primeval adoration of the external world was in instinctive conformity with the ultimate tendencies of Humanity."* Without doubt Comte's system exhibits the same defect as is manifest in earlier and ruder forms of religion, inasmuch as he has failed to perceive the Creator and creature as distinct from each other, and has effected a union between the two by hopelessly confusing them.

If we turn to the secondary aspect of the religious problem, and ask what sort of union is established by the Religion of Humanity not only between man and the Deity whom he worships, but man and his fellow man, the result is no less disappointing. Notwithstanding the many noble sentiments inculcated by Positivism in regard to the relation of mankind to each other, we find that individuality is regarded by Comte as "anarchy," the "*élément perturbateur*" of society; that the idea of natural rights is abhorrent to him, and that he proposes to introduce uniformity of opinion by a legislation as arbitrary as the rule of an eastern despot. In whatever way we look at it, we cannot but conclude that the unity proposed by the Religion of Humanity, whether between God and man, or man and society, is a "homogeneity" without difference rather than a "coherent heterogeneity," to be compared to the undeveloped germ rather than to the full grown tree or animal, and to be regarded as better adapted to "the beginning of human progress considered as a development" than to the advanced thought of the nineteenth century.

It has been the confidence of the Spencerians, as it has been of the Positivists, that they represent the vanguard in the philosophy of religion. Does Cosmic Theism respond to the test of highest development—the test it has itself proposed? It is claimed that it does so respond. Let us remind ourselves that, if such be the case, this theory must account for progress from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the indefinite to the definite, from the incoherent to the coherent. Comte regards Deity as absorbed in humanity; Spencer, implicitly,

* *Positive Polity*, vol. iv., p. 181.

in his conceptions of the absolute and the infinite, which exclude the possibility of the independent existence of man, and, explicitly, in his denial of free will and even of a mental substance,* seems to regard humanity as swallowed up in Deity. Is not, then, the same objection applicable to Cosmism as to Positivism, that it presents a mere homogeneity without heterogeneity? Strictly speaking, yes. At the same time, the benefit of a doubt is to be conceded. For, however contradictory it may be, and however lacking in a logical basis, it is nevertheless true that Spencer declares the consciousness of personality to be "a fact beyond all others the most certain,"† and that Fiske expressly denies the charge of Pantheism as false,‡ while the worth and power of personality are emphasized and reemphasized both by Spencer and Fiske. So far, for the sake of the argument, at least, we do not deny Spencer's statement that "the theory of the Cosmos, beginning with fitful ghost-agency, and ending with the orderly action of a universal Unknown Power, exemplifies once more the law (of Evolution) fulfilled by all ascending transformations."§ These words close a summary of some eighteen chapters of the *Sociology* in which the development of primitive beliefs has been traced. Having stated that this development conforms to the Law of Evolution by exhibiting an increase in heterogeneity, etc., he adds, "Change from the indefinite to the definite is no less clearly displayed." . . . "The different kinds of supernatural beings grow more defined in their forms, dispositions, powers, habits; until, in developed mythologies, they are specifically and even individually distinguished by attributes precisely stated."|| In his *Essays*, Spencer carries the explanation still farther and shows exactly how the law continues to be fulfilled. "Supposed concrete and individual causal agencies," he says, "coalesce in the mind as fast as groups of phenomena are assimilated, or seen to be similarly caused. Along with their coalescence, comes a greater extension of their individualities. Gradually by the continuance of such coalescences,

* Spencer's *Psychology*, vol. i., pp. 500-503.

† *First Principles*, p. 65.

‡ Fiske's *Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii., pp. 423, 424.

§ *Sociology*, vol. i., p. 451.

| *Ibid*, p. 452.

causal agencies become in thought confused and indefinite. And eventually, without any change in the nature of the process, there is reached the consciousness of a universal causal agency, which cannot be conceived."* In the Sociology it is distinctly stated that the Law of Evolution is exemplified in developed mythologies by the fact that different kinds of supernatural beings grow more *defined*. The next step of progress, according to the Essays, is "a loss of distinctness in their individualities;" and from this point there is an advance not from the indefinite to the definite as heretofore, but from the indefinite to the more indefinite. Is it true, then, that this "theory of the Cosmos, . . . ending with a universal Unknown Power," exemplifies the law that necessitates an advance from the indefinite to the definite, or is entirely clear that it is out of harmony with that law? Either there is a mistake here in interpreting the facts of the religious development of the race as being toward an ever increasing indefiniteness in the concept of Deity, or else this is a signal instance in which the universal Law of Evolution fails to account for the facts. If Spencer's assertion is true that the object of religious cognition has, in all religious systems, always remained the same,† it is difficult to see why the multitudinous gods of polytheism should be regarded as separate factors in the religious problem, to be distinguished and again united according to the Law of Evolution, as Spencer himself has unsuccessfully attempted to do. The universal causal agent being considered as an indivisible and constant factor, the question as to the adequacy of any particular religion, will turn upon the clearness with which the relationship between the divine and human is apprehended.‡ However this may be, we repeat that, if it is a fact that Spencer's theory of the progress of religious ideas maintains an advance from the indefinite to the more indefinite, then it is not a fact that it exemplifies the Law of Evolution. Plainly, if his theory is to conform to the Law, the termination of that theory must be something other than the Unknowable. Even from his own standpoint as well as from the standpoint of many of his critics, it would seem necessary to reconstruct his defini-

* *Essays*, vol. iii., p. 67.† *Ibid*, p. 78.‡ Cf. Caird's *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 326.

tions of the conceivable as that which can be pictured by the imagination and the infinite as the indefinite—definitions which, at the very beginning of his investigations, assume the conclusions at which he arrives.

But farther; there should be, according to the Evolution formula, an advance not only from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the indefinite to the definite, but also from the incoherent to the coherent, i. e., from a loose or superficial unity to a unity that is intimate and complete. But what union can there be between man and an impersonal Deity that is retreating farther and farther into unknowableness? Suppose it be granted that reverence and fear are due to a Deity, union and communion with such an one would be impossible. It has been well said that "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, but it is only the beginning." Not without reason is it that, when Spencer comes to deal with character and conduct in his *Data of Ethics*, the Unknowable becomes the Ignored. As Comtism must be rejected as "old in structure," because it presents a unity without difference—a homogeneity without heterogeneity—so Cosmism must be rejected as likewise "old in structure," inasmuch as it furnishes a "differentiation" for which it can offer no corresponding "integration." In this case, unity without difference and difference without unity are equally meaningless, and either is palpably nearer to "the beginning of human progress considered as a development" than to that highest development that includes both differentiation and integration.

It remains to apply the same test to Christianity as has been applied to the two systems that have been offered to take its place. Having noticed the essential identity of the Law of Evolution with the Hegelian formula of unity in diversity, it is interesting to observe, in passing, that a prominent school among the Hegelians regard Christianity as a most perfect practical exemplification of this principle. It is conceded by all, no matter of what philosophic school, that Christianity, in its emphasis of moral responsibility, in its assertion of the freedom and equality of all men before God, and, we should add, in its proof that immortality is not a fiction but a fact, has been a potent agent in producing the recognition of individu-

ality that so distinguishes modern life and thinking. In this respect it is universally acknowledged that the times have not outgrown the Book. That Christianity is destined to become obsolete, is urged on other grounds, noticeably, because of its anthropomorphic conception of the Deity. This criticism, reduced to its lowest terms, means that Christianity, in ascribing personality to God, assigns human attributes to Him, and that, in so doing, it can only be regarded a refined form of fetichism, relative to human conception, and so, as insufficient in its nature for man's ever increasing spiritual needs as all the religions that have preceded it. In other words, that it is open to the same charge as Positivism, though in a less degree, namely, that it offers a unity that does not sufficiently distinguish the factors included under it—a homogeneity without heterogeneity. To claim that God possesses personality is to limit Him, it is said. Be it noted, however, that if He is to be known at all, it must be as a person. Spencer distinctly states that "we are totally unable to conceive any higher mode of being" than Intelligence and Will.* But, he continues, the finite cannot know the Infinite. To assert that it can, is to humanize the Divine. This argument is a boomerang in its return upon its originators. Agnosticism, by teaching the impotence of the human mind in knowing the Deity, teaches likewise the impotence of the Deity in making Himself known, thus imposing the most limiting of all limitations. Just here the especial point of interest for us, however, is the confession that, if there be such a thing as definite knowledge of the Deity, it must be of a Deity who is a person. As Mr. Spencer's Law of Evolution shows his Cosmic Theism to be defective in that it maintains an advance toward the more and more indefinite and incoherent, so here he indicates just where the defect lies, acknowledging by so doing, that the much criticised Christian idea of a personal God furnishes the only possible basis for resolving the heterogeneity of Cosmism into a coherent unity. We are brought, then, to the point that an idea of God, formed according to the Law of Evolution, must be an idea not of an impersonal, but of a personal God. With such a result, what becomes of Cosmic Theism? Another valuable illustration it

* *First Principles*, p. 109.

certainly furnishes of the constantly recurring fact that thought must be strengthened by numberless efforts to reach its goal by some other than the right way, and must be humbled by as many failures, before the truth can be approached as it is and received in its entirety. Only after centuries of travail has the world begun to recognize the idea as actual that, like lock and key, the personality of God and man fit each to each and are made each for the other. Again and again are we to be convinced that every attempt to break the lock or to throw away the key, shuts us out of the universe, and leaves it an unexplored mystery, while we knock unheard at its relentless gates, and lift in vain our helpless cries of—*whence? whither? and why?*

Stripped of their extravagancies, both Positivism and Cosmism seem to be selections from Christianity rather than its rivals. To live for others—*vivre pour autrui*—is the golden rule of Positivism. This familiar precept has been expounded by Comte with a force and fervor edifying to any Christian believer, while its meaning becomes vivid in the words of George Eliot, an admirer, if not an adherent, of the French philosopher: "What I look to is the time when the impulse to help our fellows shall be as irresistible as that which I feel to grasp something firm if I am falling." But in taking away the motive and impulse supplied by the conception of the Christian God, and in insisting that we must not only love our neighbor as ourselves, but better than ourselves, Comte increases enormously the demand on human nature, and, at the same time, reduces the supply of motive to a minimum, thereby teaching an altruism as impossible in practice as it is false in theory. Again, Positivism maintains, as Christianity does, that God, to be God, must be a God near at hand and not a God afar off. It recognizes with Christianity that mankind can never realize that God is very God, unless He be God incarnate. It fails to see that while the material element is necessary as an aid to spiritual apprehension, it is never (to personify) a vital member of religious development, but only a support to its infant steps or the staff to which it resorts, in its progress towards a perfected knowledge of the absolute and infinite God. Christianity admits the need of an incarnation only on earth and in

time, as in the historic Christ, and foretells its "end," when the incarnate Son "shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father," and shall himself become subject, that "God may be all in all." In contrast, Positivism affirms the necessity of a perpetual incarnation, and its deified humanity effectually turns the eyes of men from seeing Him who is invisible. Christianity permits, but provides against the materialistic instinct; Positivism pampers it. Finally, Positivism fails, and fails most of all, as we have seen, in that it gives the finite and human such preponderance as to exclude altogether the infinite and divine.

Cosmism, in offering its just and timely criticisms against anthropomorphic conceptions of the Deity, speaks from the very heart of Sacred Scripture and to one of the sorest lacks of the age. We are to be reminded that our God is the mighty Jehovah as well as the loving Father, and with bowed heads may pray from a felt need that

" More of reverence in us dwell."

Positivism and Cosmism furnish each a protest against the other, and, as is apt to be the case, both are extreme. Cosmism rears a modern Sinai and the natural reaction from the vague mystery of its cloudy summit is, as of old, to the bare materialism of the Positivist at its base. Positivism goes too far on the finite side; Cosmism goes too far on the side of the divine. Positivism tries to make the Deity too human; Cosmism tries to make the Deity too super-human.

While Christianity has shunned the error of Positivism by refusing to make God in the image of man, it has avoided the endless contradictions of Cosmism by recognizing the fact that man is made in the image of God. It is unique among modern as well as among ancient religions in that it preserves intact the personality both of God and man, emphasizing rather than ignoring the immense antitheses involved in the religious problem, and in that it offers, at the same time, a reconciliation that is real. Is it asked how wide a chasm is fixed by Christianity between absolute holiness and sin-defilement? Not till the arcana of the humiliation and sufferings of the Christ of Galilee are revealed, will it be

known. Thereon are written, in letters that burn themselves into the hearts of men, the words borrowed and emblazoned on the banners of Cosmism: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways . . . For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts." Is the question as to how complete a redemption for mankind has been provided for by Christianity, and how perfect a union it has made possible with his Maker? When the mystery of the personality of the God-man is understood, the question can be answered, never before. Not the truth as the church has understood it, but the truth as Christ has left it, is Christianity. The conscious grasping of the truth as it is in Christ, has been the goal that Christian speculation has ever been striving to reach. Notwithstanding many lapses, a progress is still traceable which steadily tends toward a theoretical and practical recognition of a divine personality immanent in the universe, yet distinct; through all, in all, but above all; and of that independent God-dependence which alone constitutes real manhood. Nevertheless, the church has been and still is far from apprehending the truth in its completeness. Rather does history show that the word of Christ and his Apostles in every generation "stretches beyond and over each, as the all-sufficient norm, even to the end of time."

Christianity "archaic?" "outgrown?" What, then, is to take its place? Even from the modern standpoint of Evolution, it must be confessed that "other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ."

ARTICLE VIII.—PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LUTHER.

THE statement that Martin Luther is the greatest of modern prose writers, in the same sense in which Shakespeare is the greatest of modern poets, will seem exaggerated to most men. For it is but the few that are familiar with the writings of the German reformer. Those who are, will not hesitate to place Luther, as a writer of German prose, by the side of Shakespeare, the greatest of English poets. It happens, also, that neither the one nor the other was a professional writer, who lived by his pen, or intended to enrich his nation with literary master-pieces which were to shed honor and glory alike upon the writer and his country. Both writers, however, were conscious of their superiority, both knew that they wrote for ages to come as well as for their own time, and both were remarkably careless about the editing of their own collected works. There have been long periods during which both Luther and Shakespeare were very little read; but again and again there has taken place a great revival in the interest which men of ability have taken in the writings of these masters. Yet as a popular writer, Shakespeare has been the more fortunate of the two, while Luther has been more popular as a man and as the champion of German ideas. The writings of Shakespeare are more the property of all educated nations that have a stage, while Luther, emphatically a German, is yet to be appreciated at his true value by the world at large. But it is not too much to say that the reading of Luther's prose alone will repay the trouble of learning the German language.

It is a fact worth mentioning that, while Shakespeare has been studied assiduously and not without fair success in the United States, Luther has only been less fortunate, in that his works are widely read by the clergy and laity of a denomination by no means insignificant, and that several scholars of high standing have gone to much labor and expense, in collecting not only the earliest editions of Luther's very numerous publi-

cations, but also the tracts of the times in which the mighty name of Luther was on the lips of all Christendom. Yet the fact remains, that even in Germany, the writings of Luther are not read as generally as they deserve. The greatest philological master of this century never wearied of praising the language of Luther, and many hundreds of German books have been written in honor of Luther's writings. Just now the German government is engaged in the honorable work of publishing another complete and critical edition of Luther's writings. But the world, outside of Germany, knows Luther chiefly as the leader of the Protestant Reformation, and half the Protestant world remembers him as an opponent of unbounded severity. In Germany, however, the mere name of Luther is still a great popular power; his sayings are current coin, and his sentiments find a responsive echo in the breasts of high and low, of profound students and the plain people, who rarely forget a true friend. So good an observer as Hagenbach, the Calvinistic historian, remarks shrewdly that there was an aristocratic tone in Calvin; Luther was democratic, not because he believed in popular power, for he never did, but because he was a man of the people, and because his writings retain the elements of the truest popularity after the lapse of nearly four centuries.

The titles of Luther's principal writings alone would fill the entire space of the present essay. Walch's edition of his writings is not complete, and fills twenty-four stout quarto volumes. The more critical Erlangen edition is even less complete, and makes about a hundred duodecimo volumes. Yet a reader really familiar with Luther's writings will be reluctant to recommend a selected edition, and to name the literary masterpieces which have dropped from the pen of Luther, as showers drop from the skies. The reader of Luther's letters may think them most characteristic of the man; but in turning to his reformation pamphlets, these will seem essential, while, on general principles as well as upon special investigation, the great theologian's exegetical works may well be held to occupy the place of honor. There remain the volumes of sermons, the catechetical works of immortal value, and the miscellaneous writings. To say what is best of all these riches is like guessing what is best in Shakespeare's plays. It may seem rash to

advise that men learn German in order to read Luther, and it may be rash to recommend all that Luther has written. But it is certain that the reader of Luther's letters, pamphlets, essays and commentaries, will be repaid precisely as is the student of all Shakespeare's plays, and it is probable that Luther has never written a page that does not bear the vestiges of the great mind to which neither poetry nor philosophy, neither man nor nature, neither Greek and Latin antiquity, nor the logicians and scholastics of the Middle Age were strangers,—a mind filled to overflowing with sentiment, imagination, learning, literary impulses, and, above all else, a religious faith that shook the world. Surely, such a mind and such an author will be studied for ages to come, and as long as men are thirsty for what is noblest and strongest in literature.

It is true that Luther abominated Popery as an institution, and that he turned against the Swiss reformers. Accordingly neither ultramontanism nor distinctive Calvinism will derive much comfort from the tenets of Luther. But nearly as much may be said of the Lutherans themselves, if they go to Luther to find aid and comfort for their modern doctrines and tendencies. It is a reasonable question, however, whether the nineteenth century has any right to go to the sixteenth to find out what it should believe, or how it ought to conduct its affairs. For better or worse it has pleased Divine Providence to let us live nearly three hundred and fifty years after Luther, and these centuries cannot have been given to be merely forgotten. We do not ask physicists and astronomers to return to Copernicus for the only or final wisdom. But precisely as we return to Shakespeare for true poetry, so it is ever safe to go back to Luther as a great prose writer, though he wrote in German, and to study the Saxon reformer, if we wish to get the benefit of a singularly impressive writer, who was at the same time a great patriot, a great theologian, a great character, and a very great author. Quite likely, but few readers will be disposed to accept Luther's theological tenets, although it would be rash to call them moribund, even in this country. But we do not read Shakespeare for doctrines; why then should we read Luther for theological opinions, inasmuch as he never cared to inaugurate a system of theology any more than he attempted

to organize a new church or a new sect? As we read Shakespeare for poetry, and are not alienated by the Elizabethan's occasional harshness, so it is well worth while to read Luther for his prose,—despite his passion, despite his theology, and despite his sixteenth-century learning. As men descend into the bowels of the earth for gold or coal, so the modern student may well plunge into the depths of Luther to win gold, silver, and hard iron,—to catch the mighty forces that lifted the better part of Christendom out of dependence, and to learn from personal contact with a profoundly religious character, that a great theological mind somehow commands more power than men of the world are prone to acknowledge.

The year 1530 brought rising Protestantism to a crisis, for the German Emperor had resolved to avenge the schism which the Augustinian of Wittenberg had occasioned. Luther's friends insisted that he should not risk his life by attending the diet at Augsburg. He remained in Koburg, the name which he playfully reversed into Grubok. From there he wrote a series of epistles altogether unique in the history of letters. Luther himself had been outlawed, and could not even visit his father, who died about that time. In order to be near his friends at Augsburg, Luther went to the fortress of Koburg, where he promised Melanchthon that three tabernacles should be made,—one for the psalms, one for the prophets, and one for *Æsop*. To the students whom he used to have at his table in Wittenberg, he wrote the following letter:—

Grace and peace in Christ! *Dear Gentlemen and Friends*—I have received your joint letter, and learned how goes the world. That you may understand in return how things go here, I let you know, that we, namely, myself, Master Vitus and Cyriacus, shall not go to the diet at Augsburg; in fact, we have come to a different kind of diet. Just below our window there is a grove, like a little forest, where the jackdaws and crows have appointed a diet. There is such a coming and going, and such a noise, day and night without end, as if they were all drunk and mad. Young and old scream together that I wonder how long their voices and breath will last. Fain would I know if any of the gentry and knightly squires still tarry with you, for methinks that they have come here from all the world.

I have not seen their emperor; but their noblemen and big Johns flutter and sputter constantly before our eyes. They are not dressed very preciously, all having one uniform color, being black, with grey eyes to match; and they sing the same song, but with a lovely differ-

ance between old and young, the big ones and the little fellows. Neither do they respect our palace and hall, for their hall is vaulted by the fair, broad sky, their carpet is the open field, decked with fine green branches, and the walls are the end of the world. They do not care for horses and armaments. They move on feathery wheels, with which they escape the guns and flee from persecution. Great, mighty lords they be; but what they resolve, I know not. From an interpreter I learn that they propose a mighty campaign against wheat, barley, oats, malt and grains of every kind, and many of them mean to earn the knighthood and do great deeds.

Thus we sit here in the diet, look and see with loving joy, how the princes and lords together with all the estates of the realm sing merrily and live happily. But we have particular joy when we see them swagger knight-fashion, brandish their bills, and run down all opposition, that victory and honor may be theirs against corn and malt. We wish them all hail and luck, that every one of them may be speared on a fence rail. And I hold that such are the sophists and papists, with their sermons and essays. I must have them all before me in one company, that I may hear their lovely voices and sermons, and behold how very useful they are to examine whatever there is on earth, while they kick from too much leisure. To-day we have heard the first nightingale, for hitherto it would not trust in April. And we have had delightful weather, no rain, save yesterday a little. With you it has been different, perhaps. And now good-bye; keep our house in good order. From the diet of the jack-daws, April 28, 1580.

MARTINUS LUTHER, D.

From the same exile, as he called it, he wrote the famous letter to his son John,—probably the prettiest letter ever received by a young boy. Another letter told in detail what kind of a seal Luther desired to have made for his use, namely, a black cross fixed in a heart having its natural color, because the cross “does not corrupt nature;” the heart was to stand in a white rose, and the latter in a sky-blue field surrounded by a golden ring. At the same time he wrote to princes of the realm and complained bitterly to Melanchthon that he and the Protestants at Augsburg had looked to Luther. “If it is my cause, I alone will attend to it,” he said: “I will not have it that you recognize and name me as the principal and the beginner of this cause.” His wife he addressed as “my dear master, Lady Kate,” and to a friend in Nuremberg he sent the address, in which he recommended the establishment of public schools together with their compulsory attendance and their support out of the public funds. He congratulated the elector of Saxony on his escape “from the hell at Augsburg.” A friend

in Augsburg was thanked for two boxes of confectionery, and was told that Luther had lost more than half his time through "a noise and rattling in the head." The peculiar resolution finally adopted in Augsburg Luther ridiculed as "worldly wisdom" going to show that Christ can govern "not only talkers, but also fools." Indeed, as he had been shocked from the beginning by the absurdity of the Papal arguments, so he was now amused by the impertinent order that the gospel should remain a strictly local affair. If his adversaries would but keep the peace, he was very glad to accept it, "for the Turk is after us." "We will suffer and yield whatever we can. But we beg that they will not ask of us what is not in our power." To a statesman in Augsburg, Luther expressed fair hopes for political peace, and added :

The other day I saw two miracles,—the first, when I looked out of my window, the stars in heaven, together with the whole, beautiful firmament of God ; and yet I saw no pillars, on which the master had rested his vault ; but the heavens did not fall, and the mighty vault still remains firm. There are those who look for the pillars, and would fain touch and feel them. Inasmuch as they cannot, they wriggle and tremble as if the skies must surely fall from no other cause than that they cannot see and hold the pillars. If they could grasp them, the firmament would stand firm. And the second miracle consisted in vast heavy clouds that hung over us with a weight that one might liken them to a vast ocean ; yet they had no foundation on which they rested ; neither were they contained in a great vessel. Nevertheless they did not fall upon us, but greeted us with a wry face, and hurried off. When they had passed away, there shone forth the foundation and our arch that held them, namely, the rainbow. Forsooth, it was a delicate, thin, slender foundation and arch, that vanished in the clouds, and was rather a haze, such as one sees through colored glass.

From the same fortress, Luther addressed an open letter to the primate of Germany, the cardinal-archbishop of Menz, who was also a secular prince. Agreement in matters of faith was declared impossible as between Protestants and Catholics, but political peace was offered and urged in pathetic terms. "Good God," Luther added, "our faith does not injure you ; it keeps the peace, teaches peace, leaves you undisturbed, and teaches that we must take nothing from you, but leave you everything. That alone ought to be enough to move you to peace, if the truth alone could not do it. Verily, it helps to keep you all, and has done so hitherto." In the same letter

Luther appeals to the cardinal-archbishop as a patriot: "If German princes should attack one another, it would please the Pope, that fine product of Florence, and with a laugh he might say: Go to, you German brutes, if you will not have me for a Pope, take that." The letter concludes: "I cannot help it, I cannot but think of my poor, wretched, forsaken, despised, betrayed and inveigled Germany, which shall have from me no evil, but good alone, as is due to my own dear country."

One of Luther's companions at Koburg mentioned that often the reformer would pass three hours a day in prayer. His working hours he devoted to the translation of the prophets,—a masterpiece which is, like the whole of Luther's Bible, the foremost source of pure German, and so perfect in its way that all attempts at revising and correcting have been unpopular, although no well-informed scholar believes that Luther's translation is as accurate as is even the common English version. Nor is it a mere sentiment which has made Luther's translation so dear to all Germans, the wisest Catholics included. In a very large sense it is the matchless style which has made Luther's translation peerless. And for this reason the greatest students and masters of German prose have been uniformly averse to that revision for which there is sufficient reason on the ground of accuracy and scholarship. But Luther did not boast in vain that he had made the Holy Spirit speak honest German; he might have added that he had made the Germans speak a language, the spirit and syntax of which may be obscure in unskilled writers, but are none the less precise, clearly defined, and singularly philosophical. No one, however, has surpassed Luther's own style, which is to German prose even more than the diction of Shakespeare is to English poetry. Thus the few weeks of the year 1530, which Luther passed in Koburg, reveal the character of the man as a son, husband, and father, as a loyal and patriotic citizen, as a man who dealt with princes and statesmen on terms of equality, as the lover of ancient learning, as the harbinger of the present age which has returned to Luther's love of roses, as the great author engaged on his masterpiece, as the gay companion and friend, as the comforter of those in spiritual distress, and above all else as the profoundly religious character that loved God as a child loves

its father, and feared God as the culprit dreads his judge. If Luther presented such a picture as an outlaw, what must he have done during the many years that he was free! One answer is to be found in the stout quarto volumes of which he filled annually one during the thirty years of his authorship; another and less direct answer is to be found in the Protestant churches and states of our time.

A characterization of Luther as a great theological and religious character has no right to become a mere eulogy, for the greatest and truest honor which we can pay to an eminent man consists rather in understanding him than in agreeing with his statements or in accepting his conclusions. And simply to agree with a man, because he has acquired great authority or fame, is less noble than it is to appreciate him, to understand his growth, and to comprehend his characteristics. For this reason it is always safe to apply to an eminent man like Luther the strictly historical method, to learn his story as the judge in court learns the facts of the cause before him, to apply to the record the critical knife, which separates fictions from facts, and to proceed altogether in a judicial spirit that is bound to learn the truth and to accept the consequences. Nor is it, perhaps, altogether unreasonable or unprofitable to hold up to the present time a picture of Luther, the theological character. For whatever may be the glories of the present age, its reverence for theological study is not among them. In fact, the Germans themselves have done greater justice to Luther's secondary and subsidiary attainments than to his central achievement. Scholars are impressed by the weeks and months which Luther passed in his ravenous, omnivorous, desperate studies, prolonged until he would sink down on his bed in physical exhaustion. The German philologists have traced the slow stages by which Luther acquired, mastered and shaped the German language. Professor Franz Delitzsch has described the manner in which Luther became a master of Hebrew. Professor Köstlin has compiled the facts of Luther's life with great accuracy. But one enters a larger world in passing from the historians and eulogists of Luther to the man himself, as he appears in his daily walk and work, and in his publications. He was undoubtedly a great man, a man of genius, and a

giant. But he will be misunderstood, unless he is treated first and last as a religious character.

Men of the world outside of Germany are disposed to under-rate what is characteristic in Luther, namely, his national and his religious individuality. But it is these rather than any other traits that make up the personality of Luther. It would be unhistorical to elevate Luther, and to lower Calvin. Quite likely Luther never appreciated Calvin; but that is no reason why we should do likewise, any more than we follow Shakespeare in studying English history. It is useless, also, to elevate Luther; he needs no elevating, and it is childish to think what Luther would be, if he lived now. He does not live now, and he can no more be our principal teacher in dogmatics, than can Augustine. On the other hand, it is useless to explain his theology away, or to deny that his greatness as a man rested in the main on his religious and theological character. The sixteenth century was not more theological than is the present time, and it was not the spirit of the age that made Luther religious, but it was Luther's religion, right or wrong, that made him the most powerful writer of his day, and the greatest man of his century. Nor is it, perhaps, a mere accident that the foremost writers of English, French, and German prose in our day have been theological writers like Newman, Renan, and Strauss. In any event, Luther's greatness cannot for a moment be separated from his religious character. Indeed, he himself foresaw with his usual penetration that a later age would think him a politician, a revolutionist, or a sectarian leader. But he protests against this view. He desires his writings to be simply a stepping-stone toward the purer faith which he found in the Bible. His religion, therefore, is at the same time his honor and his limitation; it is the test by which he must be judged. He himself demands this, for a few months before he went to Koburg he published a remarkable confession of faith in which occurs the following passage:—

As I see that there is the longer the more of schism and scepticism, and no end to the fury and rage of Satan, lest now or hereafter people help themselves to my writings and misquote them in order to cover their errors, as the Sacramentarians and Anabaptists have begun to do, I shall confess in this writing, before God and the world, my faith from point to point,—wherein I propose to remain until death, to die, God

helping, and to appear before the judgment seat of our Lord Jesus Christ. And though some one should say after my death, if that Luther lived now, he would teach and hold differently on this or that article, for he has not considered it sufficiently: to this I shall say then as now, now as then, that by the grace of God I have considered all these articles most diligently, that I have dragged them often, again and again, through Scripture, and that I should defend them as surely as I have now defended the sacrament of the altar. I am neither drunk nor rash. I know what I say, and feel what it will mean to me on the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ to the day of judgment. For this reason no one shall treat my writings as loose talk or an amusement. I am in earnest. For I know Satan, by the grace of God, fairly well. If he can pervert and confuse God's Word and Scripture, what will he not do with my words or another man's?

It would be very wide of the mark to assume that Luther intended to teach systematic theology. Theology in his mind was not a body of dogmas, but a living religion. Still less did he ever intend to found a new church. He does not use the word dogma, he never thought of writing a theological or any other system, and probably the best theological treatise he ever wrote is his smaller catechism, which is still used in all Lutheran schools. In Luther, therefore, as in all true divines, the theological, religious and purely human elements are blended into one harmonious personality, and it is this blending of many elements that makes his individuality. Like Shakespeare he appropriated freely whatever came under his observation. But unlike Shakespeare he was a laborious student who wrote two languages with ease, besides having mastered Greek and Hebrew. Like Shakespeare he was an acute observer of nature, and it is not certain that he lacked Shakespeare's psychological insight. In dealing with men, he was simple and almost naive. It never occurred to him to organize his followers, and from first to last he confined himself to religious work, just as Shakespeare confined himself rigorously to poetry and the stage. It is essential to observe that Luther viewed the true church as a matter of faith, not as an institution or a corporation, that he regarded church government as altogether secondary, that he cared very little for church ordinances, and that he was entirely unwilling to interfere with civil government or secular affairs. It can be charged against Luther that he alludes with a certain contempt to the German peasants, who

were then mostly serfs, and that he looked upon princes as having something like divine rights. The true explanation of this remarkable fact is, perhaps, that Luther accepted the social and political institutions of his time as beyond his jurisdiction. Accordingly he never preached political or doctrinal sermons. On the other hand, he was intensely German, and his allusions to the other nations of his time are quite meagre. His acquaintance with ancient Greece and Rome, however, was intimate.

What Luther strove after was the salvation of his immortal soul. Heaven, hell, the justice of God, the day of judgment, and the saving death of Christ were to him as real and definite as the facts of natural history are to us. It was natural, therefore, that he turned from the law, for which his father intended him, to theology and religion. He began his public career as a professor of philosophy. But immediately he plunged into theology, and it was as a doctor of divinity that he began Hebrew, and perfected himself in Greek. With his usual thoroughness he did not stop toiling until he had fairly mastered these languages, and he perfected himself in German in order to make his sermons intelligible to his plainest hearers. Incidentally he stumbled upon Popery as a human institution; but Luther devoted more attention to his own necessities as a sinner that needed a Saviour, and to the religious necessities of those who followed him, than he ever did to Popery, bishops and ecclesiastics. He has been criticised harshly for his treatment of Calvin and Zwingli; this criticism should be applied no less to the singular severity with which Luther treated his own friends and himself in all theological matters.

Theology was to him an objective reality such as the Rocky Mountains are to us, and it was foreign to his mind to beg that men might acknowledge the fact. He accepted the Bible as the Word of the living God, and it is not strange that he measured all things by its revelation. His own profound agitation was due no less to his temperament than to his unqualified acceptance of the Old and New Testaments as the literal Word of God to be accepted under the pain of everlasting damnation. Luther never ceased to dread the justice of God, and to tremble at the day of judgment. By the side of this profound terror, his treatment of opponents in theology is con-

sistent, although his language is unbridled and at times terrific. No honorable historian defends the horrors of the French revolution, but history explains them. In a like sense the unmeasured violence of Luther against theological opponents and himself, as well as his friends, is explained, when we remember the power of the Papacy, and the unswerving firmness with which Luther accepted every syllable of the Bible as the Word of the righteous God who judges the quick and the dead. Calvin made and defended a system in which there was hardly a flaw. Luther had no system, and wished for no system ; he assumed the Trinity, plenary inspiration, and the accuracy of the early creeds, precisely as he did not assume God to be merciful on the ground of justice. This belief was not so much linked to a heroic soul, as it made him a hero, and fairly forced him into gigantic proportions. It was his religion that called into activity and enlarged whatever nature had planted in his breast. And having grown up toward the ideal demands of his stern, great belief, it was no wonder that he could readily respond to the gentler appeals which innocent childhood or modest piety made to him. For his children he wrote this Christmas hymn :—

I. SONG OF THE ANGEL.

From highest heaven come I here,
To bring you news of goodly cheer ;
So much of good came I to bring,
That I will of it say and sing.

This night to you was born a child
Of holy virgin meek and mild,
A lovely child so sweet and bright
To be your joy and your delight.

It is the Christ, our common Lord,
To guide you and all help afford ;
He will himself your Saviour be,
And from all sin will set you free.

He brings you all beatitude,
Which from his father he has sued,
That you may dwell with us above
Through all eternity in love.

Hear, then, the sign that you may know—
The swaddling-clothes, the oxen's low,
And in a manger there is laid
The child whose hand hath all things made.

II. SONG OF THE CHILDREN.

Then let us all right joyous be,
And with the shepherds go and see ;
Let us behold the Son most dear,
Whom God hath sent, who now is here.

Behold, my soul, and look thereat !
What lies there in the manger, what ?
Who is the child so dear and fair ?
It is dear Jesus lying there.

Be welcome, welcome, honored guest,
However poor, in thee I'm blest ;
Thou comest wanting down to me,
What shall I offer, Lord, to thee ?

Ah, Lord, by whom all things were made,
Thou hast aside thy glory laid,
And on poor hay thou liest there,
Of which the toiling cattle share.

And though the world were twice as great,
And full of gold and pomp and state,
E'en then too narrow would it be
To make a cradle, Lord, for thee.

Instead of silk and velvet gay
Thou hast coarse swaddling-clothes and hay,
And there, thou King so great and wise,
Dost lie as if in paradise.

And this was pleasing all to thee,
To point the truth out unto me,
That all the world, its honor, might,
Must count for nothing in thy sight.

Ah Lord, my love and my delight,
Make thee a bed all pure and white,
And dwell and be enshrined, in me,
That I may aye remember thee ;

That I may ever joyful be,
And leap, and sing, forever free :
Sleep, little child, this lullaby
Sings all my heart that thou art nigh :

Praise, honor, glory be to God
Who unto us his Son bestowed,
Him all the angels praise and sing,
And to us now a new year bring.

It is not strange that Luther has never found outside of Germany that appreciation which his countrymen have for him. He is one of them in a stronger sense than Shakespeare was an Englishman. Luther wrote pamphlets for his countrymen, and for these writings there is no universal demand, save with such rare scholars and students as would approach Lord Bacon, Augustine, and Aristotle. The perennial magic of Luther's name in Germany is less due to his theology than to the marvelous and heroic proportions which religion gave to his German mind, heart, and aspirations. It is not an accident that the language of the German people is full of expressions, puns, and witticisms coined by Luther; for he created the literary language of his country, and he could do it, because he lived, felt, and spoke like a true-hearted German. Next to his religious character, then, it is his German way of thinking with the heart that reveals the nature of Martin Luther. Had he not been a German, he would not have called himself Doctor through life, and on all occasions. Few people, except the Germans, would ransack all scholarship and history in order to find arguments for the dogmatic assumption with which Luther started, and to which he clung tenaciously. Like so many eminent Germans, Luther was somewhat imaginative in his conclusions, dogmatic in his assumptions, and not always original in his fundamental ideas. In one respect he resembles Alexander Humboldt, who never published a line which the world would wish to perish. But a more perfect parallel may be drawn between Shakespeare, the poet, and Luther, the German prose writer. As a religious character, Luther is unique for his want of secular prudence and executive skill, for his self-concentration upon purely religious interests and for a certain neglect of ethics. For to him the acceptance of God's revelation in Christ outweighed all matters of secular conduct. It is not strange, therefore that the Lutherans of the present time are lacking in organization, and that they exalt their pure doctrines above morality. Neither is it strange that they glory in the name of Luther,—a name which will probably be uttered with increasing joy, when a century from now the Protestant world celebrates the five hundredth anniversary of Luther's birth.

ARTICLE IX.—CATHARINE ADORNA.

THERE is a strong desire on the part of many professing Christians for higher attainments in holiness. The standard to which the majority of Christians aspire is felt to be below that which the New Testament sets forth. It is felt to be not enough to have a comfortable hope that one is renewed of God, and is numbered among the true friends of Christ. Something higher, more sure, and therefore more satisfactory, is sought.

It is indeed known and felt to be a privilege to cherish a comfortable hope, even a feeble hope, of acceptance with God. The soul has gone to the fountain that Christ has opened. The taste of those living waters is sweet and reviving. In the weariness of the way, the toil and trial of travel, that fountain offers coolness and refreshment; and the pilgrim, who came to it dusty and way-worn, departs with renewed energy and joy. But he is not satisfied with the taste. He wants the fountain within him, welling up into continual nourishment and life. He must have something more than a timid, uncertain, wavering hope. He wants assurance of faith, a joyful, confident trust in the Redeemer, in which the soul can abide peacefully, through the events of a turbulent life, and the last conflict, and the entrance upon the realities of the future.

Christians of this type desire to "walk with God," to enjoy His recognized presence, to live daily as seeing Him who is invisible. They open their Bibles, and they find many expressions there applied to believers which have never been realized in their experience, but which they would like to have so realized. They do not yet know what it means to *live by faith*. They know that their only hope is in the Redeemer, that they trust Him for their salvation; that they have gratitude, deep, heartfelt, for that. But the principle of faith, rather faith itself, is not with them a controlling, animating reality. The whole spirit and life are not permeated and transformed and transfigured by it. There is something in such a passage as this: "For ye died, and your life is hid with Christ in God:"

which is beyond them. They have not reached its fullness. They are not yet dead to the pulsations of sin and of the world. They are conscious that they walk by sight, and so that their life is not hidden in God. They would have rest, some repose of soul that shall be satisfactory, above the region of mists and tempests, in the calm and light of assured faith.

As far as we have observed, this desire belongs to intelligent and thoughtful Christians, not to those who are preëminently so, but are so in fact. It is often the issue of severe trial, under which the soul has lost, in some measure, its relish for the world, and has come to feel that the only good is in God; or it is the ripened fruit of a prolonged Christian experience and the study of God's word; or, sometimes, it is the consequence of a new consecration to Christ after a period of great worldliness, or a serious violation of solemn vows. Whatever the cause, the desire is one of deep and permanent power. We have known of those who have sought for years, with intense interest, for a personal solution of this subject in their own experience, but have failed to reach the fullness of peace which they had hoped to gain.

However we may theorize about it, the aspiration is one of great practical importance, and one that challenges attention and study. No doubt there are times when it is felt, to a greater or less degree, in the history of every true Christian. There are conjunctures of experience when the believer is peculiarly wrought upon for his sanctification. There are blessed seasons, when hopes cherished through wintry months are ready to burst into beautiful blossoming, and when the fruits of laborious culture can be gathered in glad and abundant harvests. There is a spiritual perihelion when the soul is brought near to the central sun, the source of all its light and growth, and is drawn with divine attraction and power into the kingdom of grace. There are periods when the soul is powerfully summoned to new and greater devotion to God, and to an unwavering faith in Him; when upon all around us we see the titles of vexation and vanity, and feel that God alone is our unchanging and satisfactory portion. There are propitious junctures of mercy, when prayers, long offered in faith, are to meet with blessed answerings; when the longings of burdened hearts are

to be realized; when divine truth, which has been apparently "as water spilt upon the ground which cannot be gathered up again," is to be made savingly effective; when the world, as the supreme good, is to be utterly renounced, and God is to receive an unalterable trust.

It is not enough, at such seasons, to exhort the Christian to labor for Christ. That he longs to do; that he does. He is glad to serve one so worthy as he then realizes his Saviour to be. But in his work he desires an inward experience which cannot come from external activity. He desires to labor *with* the right emotions, not *for* them.

The prevalence of these feelings has caused a demand for certain writings, and has given favor to the views of certain "schools," which set forth a peculiar doctrine of holiness, which has met, correctly or otherwise, a want in many Christian hearts.

The "Life of Madame Catharine Adorna," by the late Professor Upham, is a little book which has been extensively read by the class of Christians here alluded to. It is a pleasant and popular study, and contains much cheering utterance for one who is inquiring for the "way of holiness." Its complete title is: "Life of Madame Catharine Adorna. Including some leading facts and traits in her religious experience, together with explanations and remarks, tending to illustrate the doctrine of Holiness."

The life of Madame Adorna, and the facts and traits in her experience, however, are not the substance of the book. It is the book of the writer. He speaks in it, and Madame Adorna and the facts of her life, are illustrations of the truth which he would enforce. But this is a pleasant feature of the little work, and shows the philosophy of the author. We prefer to hear the utterance of one who lives in our conditions, and who has an understanding of our times and our environment, rather than to listen to the voice of one who belonged to a different or a distant age, especially if the matter concerns present practical experience. While the Life which illustrates the truth may as well be the charmed life of a saint of the fifteenth as of the nineteenth century.

Little therefore need be said of the life of Madame Catharine Adorna, or, to speak in the language of her times, Saint Catharine of Genoa. She was born at Genoa, in luxury, and was the descendant of an illustrious Italian family. Her early religious experience was interesting; and at the age of twelve years she exhibited the marks of saving grace. At the age of sixteen years she was married to Julian Adorna, a gay young nobleman of the city.

There was no harmony in their character, so that her life with him was one of peculiar trial. By his excessive dissipation, her husband soon squandered his entire property, and so she lacked even the advantage from union with such a man which wealth would have purchased. Her trials, which should have led her to God, and which were designed ultimately to do so, caused her for a while to seek satisfaction in the gayeties and frivolities of life. But the experience of their worthlessness became the means, by the grace of God, of drawing her nearer to Him. For she still had love to God in her heart, and the consciousness of her folly and guilt led her to deep repentance and to a new consecration to Him who had bought her with His blood. Having tasted the fountains of the world and found them bitter, she was not again so strongly tempted to forsake the living fountains of salvation. From great wanderings God had called her to Himself; and she abode with him. The world and its pleasures were from that time forsaken. Still mournful memories haunted her mind so that her religious life was of mingled sunshine and shadow.

At the age of twenty-four years she entered a new era. In connection with a pious priest, who apprehended the soul's need and the divine plan for our recovery, new and blessed light beamed into her mind. Her own wretchedness and God's goodness appeared in strange and striking and overpowering forms. She fainted; and when she came to herself her soul was attracted by a wonderful power to God. She saw all excellence in Him; the sweetness and beauty and glory of His perfections entranced her. From that time her course was onward and upward. She loved God, as the narrative tells us, with an undivided affection. She felt that she could not serve God and Mammon. She consecrated herself, mind and body, to the

Lord. She gave Him all that she possessed. She felt that she was bought with a price, and therefore she desired to glorify God in her body and spirit, which were God's. She practiced many of those austerities which were common, and which were enjoined, in the age in which she lived; and she endeavored in various methods, to subdue the carnal appetites and affections.

In consecrating herself to God, she consecrated herself to His service. Her life was to be a holy, active life. While her sympathies went forth to the perishing abroad, she did not neglect her domestic duties. Soon, as the result of her radiant and holy life, and in answer to her fervent, believing prayers, God permitted her to rejoice in the conversion of her husband. The heart of the proud, gay nobleman was subdued; he became as a little child before God; and during the short period that he lived, after this change, he exhibited the evidences of a new life.

The death of her husband gave to Madame Adorna a wider sphere of usefulness and benevolent labor than she had before occupied. She devoted herself to the care of the sick in the great hospital of Genoa, where she lived for many years as the Mother Superior of the House. There she performed the most disagreeable duties, relieving the sick, soothing the miserable, and pointing all the sufferers to the Great Physician. Nor were her charities and sympathies confined to the hospital; they extended to the smitten and wretched throughout the entire city. Amid all her varied cares and duties, she lived the life of faith. Her confidence in God was increased by all that she constantly experienced of His love; and the sweetness and sincerity of her life proved that the smile of the Father was upon her soul.

The close of her days was marked by peculiar physical suffering; exhibiting one of those mysterious events, under the providence of God, which are beyond our finite comprehension, and which lead us to say with calm submission and confidence, "Yea, Father; for so it was well-pleasing in thy sight." Her faith did not fail her as she went down into the dark valley; for it was of that nature that it took a firmer hold of God the greater was the need of divine strength.

On the fourteenth of September, 1510, in the sixty-second year of her age, she fell asleep in Christ.

This brief sketch of the life of Madame Adorna illustrates, and is here designed to illustrate, certain important, practical religious doctrines.

The leading doctrine which is enforced and exemplified is that of *present entire sanctification*. The ordinary view is that sanctification is a progressive work, which is continued during the earthly life of the believer and is perfected only when he enters the heavenly state. But this view is that the soul may become entirely sanctified, that the life in this world may be a life of holiness, a life of perfect love. According to this doctrine the Christian experience need not be of mingled sunshine and storm, of mingled sin and holiness. "You will ask," says the author, "Why so little is said about her sins." He answers the question as follows: "I desire to say, in all humility of spirit, and with sincere thankfulness to God, that, having given herself to the Lord, to be His wholly and His forever, and believing the Lord would help her, she found God, as He always will be found, faithful to His promises. Her business, as she understood it, was not to transgress against God, but to believe in Him and love Him; and to fulfill with divine assistance, His holy purposes." The author would have us understand that man may now come into that state where sin is no longer to be committed. He acknowledges that there may be errors of judgment, mistakes, errors in feeling or in action, all of which demand humiliation and penitence; that, under the power of some sudden temptation, sin of a flagrant nature may perhaps be the result; but these are to be considered as rare exceptions, while the life as a rule, is to be one of complete sanctification, of sweet, intimate, holy communion with God.

By present, entire, sanctification is not meant that faith and love do not increase. They do constantly increase; their progress is like that of similar principles in the minds of holy angels.

Subordinate to this comprehensive doctrine of sanctification, is that of personal *consecration to God*. This is considered a fundamental truth, an act without which sanctification cannot exist. There must be an "unreserved and perpetual consecration" of the person to God, "to be His, in His own way, time, manner and degree forever." This is the starting point of the life

of holiness. "This," says our writer, "is a principle which is necessary in the beginning, and is equally necessary in the continuance, of the inward life. We cannot begin to live without it: we cannot continue to live without it." In thus giving ourselves to God, nothing must be reserved. Not a bodily sense, not an intellectual gift, not an affection, must be kept back. No entrance must be left unclosed and unguarded for the entrance of the tempter and destroyer. The individual must give himself to God, fully and entirely, for ever.

This act must take place in dependence upon God. While it presupposes man's freedom and personal responsibility, it must acknowledge God's gracious agency and aid. "A strong will," is the language here used, "resting upon God's will, is necessary to inward victory."

This is the ideal Christian life. The soul is brought into blessed harmony with God. There is no longer conflict. There is no longer even murmuring or mourning. There is rest in the promises, on the character of God, on the whole wise ordering of Providence. Earth and heaven meet. Man and God are at one.

The next distinctive point of doctrine, is in regard to the *faith of acceptance*. The act of consecration, in order to be a consecration in reality, must be attended by the full and firm present belief that God now accepts the individual. It is based on the veracity of God. It assumes the truth of His promises, and the agent acts as though they were verities. He goes forward as though God meant what He said, as though the promises of the Scriptures were for actual life; not as exhibiting God's heart or will and stated for effect, but as giving a basis for our conduct, a real ground for our definite and actual confidence. "In that act of consecration," says Professor Upham, "which is a consecration completed, or a consecration in *reality*, we not only give ourselves to the Lord, but we give ourselves to Him, *to be His*. A thing which is never done, and never can be done without believing that He does now accept us. To give ourselves to the Lord, and not to believe that He accepts us, is almost in the nature of a contradiction in terms." "And hence, unhappily, there is too much reason for saying that many persons who think they have really consecrated them-

selves to God, have really come short of such consecration, when considered in its true and just extent."

There must be faith in God. This is the solution of the great problem. We must know that the promise is for our present actual acceptance. As we put confidence in the word of a fellow-man, of an honored parent, and build implicitly on it, knowing that it will be literally and exactly fulfilled, so we must put confidence in God's own word to us. Man must take God at His word, and believe that He means what He says and will do as He promises. As a sinner, returning, through the Atonement, by repentance and full consecration to God, he must believe that God, according to His promise, accepts the consecration. Faith must rest upon the sure word of God. Man must believe that God does now accept the consecration which He demands and which He has promised to accept.

Another doctrine of this little work is that of assurance of faith, beautifully illustrated by the life of Madame Adorna. Many other points of deep interest to one who is studying "the doctrine of holiness," for instance, those of perfect love, the relation of faith and consecration, the extent of sanctification, the state of divine union, et cetera, are here presented in a form charming and impressive, as suggested by the actual life of a saint who has lived as we live in the world.

Whatever may be thought of the philosophical and theological correctness of the views which are here set forth, how far soever the difference in the experience of Christians who hold these views from the experience of those who walk by the catechism and the standards, if there are now such things, may depend upon their theoretical faith, there certainly are some points of deep practical interest which are enforced by the principles and the practice of the holiness-school, which, to say the least, ought to be carefully and widely considered. We allude to one or two of them.

If we are not mistaken it is a very common opinion among Christians that it is *necessary to sin* while they remain in this world. They would not put that statement boldly into their creeds; they would not assert it in their exhortations to young disciples; they would not dare to state it in form in their prayers to God. But their confessions of daily sin have that under-

tone in them, and their daily lives are graded down to that standard. They are not surprised at themselves when they see that they have need of the confession of sin; they would be surprised if they had no such need. They do not regard it simply as a certain truth that they will sin, but as a necessary truth that they must be expected to sin. They regard sin, especially in regard to Christians, more as a misfortune than a crime. Because they have been sinners, they look upon it as a kind of unavoidable doom that they must be so still. It belongs to their imperfection. They long, perhaps, for deliverance from sin, but this amounts, with their creed, to a longing for heaven. With such views there cannot be that struggle against sin which is the duty of the believer, nor that freedom from sin which should be the aim of a holy life. There must be the hope of success to encourage effort, and the accepted promise of success also.

The book before us presents a different view. "Her business as she understood it," says the narrator, of Madame Adorna, "was not to transgress against God, but to believe in Him and love Him; and to fulfill, with divine assistance, all His holy purposes."

So far we can go. So far Christians ought to believe. That standard is a practical and a practicable one. To go beyond this, and to claim that they are free from sin, actually and entirely, to claim that they have attained and are already perfect, must be within the domain of radical error.

An interesting doctrine of *faith* is also developed here. It is not a cold, abstract principle. It does not rest in intellectuality. It is a warm, generous, cordial, influential confidence in God. It takes God's word at its full value, at its plain meaning. It not only accepts it as a revelation, but as a practicality. It builds life on the word, as well as doctrine.

We emphasize the fact of life, laborious, useful life, unceasing service. Our Lord could say, "I am in the midst of you as he that serveth." And they who by faith apprehend Him must be like Him who came "not to be ministered unto, but to minister." They must here be in preparation for that world where the inhabitants "serve Him day and night in His temple."

There is a view of the life of faith which rests in quietism. It is a sentiment of faith rather than a doctrine of faith. It is

eloquently described by the author of "John Inglesant." He says: "It spoke to men of an act of devotion, which it called the contemplative state, in which the will is so united to God and overcome by that union that it adores and loves and resigns itself up to Him, and, not exposed to the wavering of the mere fancy, nor wearied by a succession of formal acts of a dry religion, it enters into the life of God, into the heavenly places of Jesus Christ, with an indescribable and secret joy. It taught that this rapture and acquiescence in the Divine Will, while it is the highest state and privilege of devotion, is within the reach of every man, being the fruit of nothing more than the silent and humble adoration of God that arises out of a pure and quiet mind; and it offered to every man the prospect of this communion—a prospect to which the very novelty and vagueness gave a hitherto unknown delight—in exchange for the common methods of devotion which long use and constant repetition had caused to appear to many but as dead and lifeless forms. Those who followed this method . . . applied themselves to preserve their minds in an inward calm and quiet, that they might in silence perform simple acts of faith, and feel those inward motions and directions, which they believed would follow upon such acts."

Such was not the life of faith which was illustrated by Madame Adorna. In consecrating herself to God, as we have seen, she consecrated herself to His service. In believing the promises of God, she believed them as practically applying to her work for others. Her life was intensely useful, and devoted to the help and conversion of all whom she could influence. Her domestic duties were done as in the love of God. Her missionary efforts sprung from the same source. This doctrine of faith honors God. It does not doubt the divine veracity. Accepting it, men walk by faith with the same confidence with which they would walk by sight. Faith is sight. It is influential not only in the subjective personal experience, but in all objective efforts for the kingdom of the Lord.

This view is cheering. That which we want in these worldly times is a faith which is spiritual, which is also alert and intense with forces which are parallel with the tremendous activities of our advancing life.

ARTICLE X.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

KADESH-BARNEA.*—The first impression made by this book, after observing its elegant construction, is the pleasant impression of thoroughness. We are presented with a volume of 478 pages on a single biblical site. The body of the book consists of six chapters, which all tell the reader of Kadesh-Barnea: (1) Its manifold Importance; (2) the Biblical Indications of its Site; (3) the Ancient References to it outside of the Bible text; (4) the later Attempts at its Identifying; (5) the Story of a Hunt for it; (6) its Sites compared. These six chapters are followed by a special study of the Route of the Exodus, and by some thirty pages of well-made Indexes.

The question is inevitably raised: Why should there be a book, and especially so large a book, upon a single biblical site? Anticipating this question, the author answers it in his introduction by noting the facts, that "Kadesh-Barnea was a site of importance forty centuries ago," that it was "more than once the scene of events on which, for the time, the history of the world was pivoting," and that for nearly twenty centuries its location has been "a matter of doubt and discussion among Jewish and Christian scholars." To the answer of the author we will add one of our own. It is worth while for biblical scholarship to do all things thoroughly. It is worth while to make every practical protest which can be made against the haste and shallowness that are the bane of American students of the Bible, and against the demand (fostered, alas! by too many of our religious papers) that Christian scholarship shall yield no fruits that are too large and too solid for the so-called popular taste. It is particularly well worth while for an editor to give to the younger students of theology and criticism a product that shows thorough work.

The peculiar value of this book, and of the work of its author, consists in this, that it confirms by another eye-witness the discovery of Rowlands in 1842. By Dr. Trumbull's visit to 'Ayn

* *Kadesh-Barnea*. Its Importance and probable Site, with the story of a Hunt for it, including studies of the Route of the Exodus and the Southern Boundary of the Holy Land. By H. CLAY TRUMBULL, D.D., Editor of the "Sunday-School Times." New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884.

Qadees (or 'Ain Kadées as Rowlands would spell it) most, if not all, of the objections which are urged against the identification of this place with the ancient Kadesh-Barnea are removed. The name of Rev. John Rowlands, therefore, fitly stands first of the three to whom this book is dedicated.

To him who reads between the lines a certain lesson of moral import may be learned from this book. After Rowlands' discovery, many of the leading German geographers and biblical students, judging the matter on the basis of the evidence, accepted his view. Winer wrote (in his *Biblisches Realwörterbuch*, 1847): "This conjecture (viz. that of Robinson), which has no positive evidence at all in its favor, must yield to the discovery which Rowlands made in 1842, when he accurately investigated the region south of Gaza and Gerar." But the opinion of "the critical, thorough and impartial scholars of Germany" (p. 216) was lost upon the English and American public through the influence of "the followers of Robinson on this point—men who controlled the avenues to *popular* biblical knowledge." Robinson had identified Kadesh-Barnea and 'Ain el-Waybeh, a desert spring near the western slope of the 'Arabah (p. 208f). In the effort to sustain the identification of Robinson, Rowlands was accused of confusing 'Ain el Qadayrât with 'Ayn Qadees—an accusation which, says Dr. Trumbull (p. 224), a single reference to his original report would have corrected—and in general of being "fanciful, visionary, and full of credulity." In 1874, President Bartlett, being deceived by his escort, "brought a new element of confusion into the discussion, by asserting that there was really no such fountain as 'Ayn el-Qadayrât in Wady el 'Ayn." (p. 232). This assertion was made with all the more confidence because *he* (Bartlett) had searched the wady thoroughly. At the same time, Bartlett, standing at 'Ayn Qasaymeh, "one of the two sites named by Rowlands as westward of 'Ayn Qadees," and of course, not finding it correspond to Rowlands' description of the latter place, had no hesitation in speaking of this discoverer as exhibiting "excessive confidence," and of his statement as "loose," "overdrawn," and "confused." But where there are conflicting opinions, time shows which is mistaken, confused, and over-confident. In this particular case, therefore, the indications of Rowlands, from these accusations, so needlessly and carelessly made, has a certain moral value.

EXCURSIONS OF AN EVOLUTIONIST.*—The title of this book suggests the nature of its contents by a charming figure of speech. It both warns and invites us not to expect a very thorough or serious discussion of any particular subject. There is to be no campaign or long journey in any of the well-known or the unexplored fields of inquiry. The word "Excursions" fitly describes the light, rapid, and stimulating, but rather unsatisfactory way in which the author comes into contact with the edges, as it were, of a number of difficult and important truths. That the excursionist proposes to himself to consider everything from one point of view—viz: from that of an "evolutionist," or, more definitely, from that of a pretty thorough-going believer in evolution of the Spencerian type—is also made clear in the title. Casting quick glances at a variety of objects from this one point of view, the author enables us to see with him how it is possible for an evolutionist of this particular type to philosophize a little about them all. We have presented to us chapters on the Arrival of man in Europe, on our Aryan Forefathers and their language, and on a Primeval Mother Tongue, on Hero-worship, on Protestantism, its Origins and True Lessons, on Evolution and Religion (speech at a farewell dinner given to Herbert Spencer, in New York, Nov. 9, 1882), on Mind Stuff, and In Memoriam of Charles Darwin. All these subjects may be said to be presented as they appear almost at first blush to a devoted disciple of one kind of the development-theory.

It need scarcely be said that these essays are never tedious; on the contrary, there is not a page of them which does not contain some remark that is interesting and stimulating. To be sure, the interest is often one of quiet wonder or amazement; the stimulus often of the kind which provokes to a gentle opposition. The style is pure and clear; the remarks *indulged in*, not infrequently show much penetration and acuteness. A certain quantity of naïveté, both of thought and expression, lends an additional charm to many passages. For example: The author recollects (p. 283) "once asking Mr. Spencer's opinion on some question of pure ontology." To this question that great master—whom our author believes to "have made greater additions to the sum of human knowledge than have ever been made by any other man since the beginning of the world"—replied that he had no opinion. The reason for Mr. Spencer's remarkable confession of ignorance is

* Boston; Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1884. pp. 379. Price, \$2.00.

stated to be that "he was so entirely occupied in working out the theory of evolution . . . that he had not time and strength left to expend on problems that are confessedly insoluble." Of course, it could never have occurred to our author that there be those who think that Mr. Spencer has made greater additions to the cruder assumptions of ontology than almost "any other man since the beginning of the world." Again the author praises highly (p. 331) the "beautiful method" and "fresh light" of Clifford's theory of "a universe of mind-stuff." But he thinks that a trifle too much of "anti-theological bias" led Clifford to overstep the bounds of his own theory, and declare "that the complex web of human consciousness cannot survive the disintegration of the organic structure with which we invariably find it associated." But this conclusion of Clifford's concerning the soul, is really the very foundation of his theory of mind-stuff.

What further can more strikingly illustrate this same charming naïveté than the author's declaration (p. 296) in his after-dinner speech, that "Mr. Spencer's work on the side of religion will be seen to be no less important than his work on the side of science?" Nevertheless, the way in which he conceives of these important services of Spencer, and the statement (p. 369) that the final effect of Darwin's work may make him one of the best of religious teachers, because "he who unfolds to us the way in which God works through the world of phenomena" may well be called such a teacher, are only two among many tokens that Mr. Fiske possesses gifts of prophetic insight which enable him to see much further into the real truth of religion than either Clifford, Spencer, or Darwin.

CLAVIS RERUM.*—The history of human thought is largely made up of speculations as to the nature and destiny of the universe, and "Clavis Rerum" is perhaps the latest attempt at what has hitherto baffled human ingenuity. The author tells us that this brief essay is "the result of many years of study, observation, and reflection." He has striven to formulate a harmony of the universe. It would be impossible adequately to criticise a theory of the universe in two or three pages, and so we must content ourselves with an imperfect attempt to give some idea of the author's style and reasoning.

The author at different times appears in the threefold character of a Platonist, an Evolutionary Pantheist, and a Christian

* *Clavis Rerum*, pp. xiv., 142. Norwich, F. A. Robinson & Co., 1883.

Mystic. At other times we seem to be reading a revived and invigorated Neo-Platonism. We constantly meet with examples of the Platonic theory of ideas. Evolution, too, finds a prominent position in these pages, while the Emanation theory of Plotinus, and its complement, absorption into the infinite Divinity, may perhaps be said to form the basis of the system advanced in *Clavis Rerum*. All this is of course unavoidable in an eclectic system, for it is the aim of the writer to gather fragments of truth wherever he can find them and with these fragments to form a symmetrical structure. The Universe, according to this theory, is made up of the following "elements" or "modes of being":

Created	Matter,	"	Extension and Impenetrability."
	Force,	"	Action.
	Life,	"	Reproduction.
	Soul,	"	Intellect and Will.
	Spirit,	"	Consciousness of God.
	God,	"	Uncreatedness.

Then comes an exposition of the combination of these elements:—

Matter and force appear in their lowest form in natural phenomena.

Matter, force, and life appear in their lowest form in plants, thence rising to animals and men.

Matter, force, life, and soul enter into the constitution of animals and man, the first three forming their bodies, while soul forms their intellect and will. Man receives the further endowment of spirit giving him consciousness of God. The author then describes the epochs, causes, and development of these combinations which make up the world. These elements proceeded from God or were created by him, the consummation is their assumption into His being. The soul of man is trained by its previous existence in animals. In other words, "the animal creation is, and has been, a *training school* for souls." This Platonic theory he makes further use of. Throwing away the doctrine of innate ideas and apparently deeming Spencer's race experience inadequate to account for some of the primitive notions, he advances the theory that these notions are the results of the experience of our animal existence in the immense past.

In matters of style we think the author has too great an inclination for fine writing. The temptation is strong of course to try to relieve such a discussion of heaviness by the use of graces of

style. But such a temptation must be yielded to very cautiously. The author adopts Dr. Pressensé's theory (we believe it is his) of the Mosaic account of the creation, that it was communicated by a vision. He then departs from the paths of severe thought and (see p. 16) gives a loose rein to his imagination in describing what that vision was like. His description with its variations of utter darkness and dazzling light, each followed by new scenes, reminds us irresistibly of a stereopticon exhibition. Again the author tells us (p. 56) that "there was an age of Birds, whose giant footprints still remain to mark the tomb, where saurus and dragon lie in *sculptured death*." At first thought it would strike us that the bird tracks show where the birds had once lived. "Sculptured death" is entirely beyond us. On p. 60 he asserts that the only music of our parents "was the song of birds, the æolian breath of nature." What, pray, is an æolian breath, or even "the æolian breath of nature"? With a few exceptions of this kind the style is good and, for such a discussion, eminently readable.

DR. FIELD'S TRAVELS AMONG THE HOLY HILLS.*—Dr. Field has excellent qualifications as a traveler. He is genial and sympathetic. He has an eye for the discernment of that which is good and attractive, even when evil is mingled with it. He has none of the egotism which feeds itself on fault-finding. He is catholic in his religious charity and in his theological judgments. While intelligent and critical, where there is a call for criticism, he is not a cold observer of sacred scenes. It is a pleasure to accompany him through Palestine. He has not given us a dry, methodical guide-book, nor has he written pages of sentimental comment on the historic places made familiar in Holy Writ. Fact and reflection are mingled naturally and in just proportions. Jerusalem and its neighborhood, Bethel and Shiloh, Nazareth, the towns of Samaria, the Sea of Galilee, Damascus, Baalbec, Mount Lebanon—these are prominent among the spots which the reader of this volume is permitted to visit in the company of a veteran traveler, familiar with the Scriptures, and with a mind open to the impressions of natural scenery and historical associations. There is no prolixness in this narrative of travel. It is a well

* *Among the Holy Hills*. By HENRY M. FIELD, D.D., Author of "From the Lakes of Killarney to the Golden Horn," etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

written story, neither curt nor diffuse, of a journey, by an experienced and competent traveler, through a country fraught with interest, not only to every historical scholar, but, also, to every Christian believer. It has the freshness, to use a phrase of his own, of "a handful of wild flowers from Palestine."

SCHAFF'S CHURCH HISTORY, VOL. III.*—Dr. Schaff advances rapidly in the issue of the volumes of his extensive and very valuable History of the Church. But the rapidity is due to his well-known industry, and to a thorough preparation, through many years of study, for the task. The present volume is on a level with its predecessors in excellence. The literary aids, which are pointed out, are a feature which every good student will know how to prize. The discussion is able, the spirit fair. We are led through the great controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries by a competent guide—one familiar with the paths, and of a catholic temper. The entire work is abreast of the times, and when completed will stand as a worthy monument of the esteemed author's remarkable ability and learning.

THE PARABLES OF JESUS.†—This work is designed to investigate the original meaning of the parables under the guidance of a thorough, methodical, and exact exposition, and thus to supply a want which their common catechetical and homiletical treatment does not meet. It is also designed as a check to the caprice with which they are often treated. The work has found considerable favor in Germany. The translator quotes a commendation of it by Dr. Weiss, as characterized by "solid exegesis, sound judgment, and sober, skillful interpretation." Twenty-seven pages are devoted to a brief discussion of the nature of parabolic teaching; the remainder is devoted to the interpretation of the parables. Notwithstanding all which has been written on the subject, there is still a place for this book, and it will be found valuable to ministers and others who wish to make a careful study of the parables of our Lord.

* *History of the Christian Church.* By PHILIP SCHAFF. A new edition, Vol. III. Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity (311–900). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

† *The Parables of Jesus: A Methodical Exposition.* By SIEGFRIED GOEBEL, Court Chaplain in Halberstadt. Translated by Professor BANKS, Headingley. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street, 1883. From Scribner & Welford, New York. x. and 460 pages.

MARTIN LUTHER.*—This is one of the volumes called forth by the recent commemoration of Luther. It does not profess to be a biography of the Reformer, but aims to portray the man in his salient characteristics and to indicate the lines in which his influence for four hundred years has been making itself felt. The longest essay discusses Luther's relation to the Peasants' War. The author regards Luther as a Rationalist. "Luther stands for Rationalism. He stands also for Intellectualism in religion." "Coming into the science of our time with the same spirit with which he came into the science of four centuries ago, Martin Luther would have been, not Joseph Cook, nor Moody and Sankey, but Theodore Parker." One hopes this is not a complete alternative, and that Martin Luther, living now, would have been neither the one nor the other. The book is sprightly and attractive, and presents some vivid sketches of the reformer in several of the critical points of his life. But the author evidently does not adequately appreciate the religious side of the movement and its immense power in that line of influence.

THE WORDS OF CHRIST.†—The design and dominant idea of this book is indicated by the author in his preface: "The exact facts of the Gospels may escape us; we may easily cast on them endless doubts and raise with them endless difficulties. They are shrouded by the gathering mists of centuries. Not so is it with the truths of the Gospels. They have lost nothing and have gained much by intervening years. They are like light that is light at every point which it reaches, and may be pronounced on without reference to its sources; they are like the light of the sun, which gains reflection and diffusion by the medium through which it is passing and the things on which it is falling. . . . No matter what we may establish about facts which have now passed into the oblivion of nineteen centuries, we must still ask, What are the controlling incentives of the present hour? No matter what we fail to prove concerning these facts, we may still hold fast a spiritual faith, wholly defensible by virtue of the liv-

* *Martin Luther*: A Study of Reformation. By EDWIN D. MEAD. Boston: George H. Ellis, 141 Franklin street, 1884. 194 pages, price \$1.25.

† *The Words of Christ as Principles of Personal and Social Growth*. By JOHN BASCOM, author of *Philosophy of Religion*, etc. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York: 27 West 23d street. London: 25 Henrietta street, Covent Garden. 1884. vii. and 220 pages.

ing and potent principles present with us from that place and that period which define the life of Christ." The subjects treated are: The Personality in the Words of Christ; Rationality in the Words of Christ; Spirituality in the Words of Christ; The Law of Truth; The Law of Love; The Law of Consecration; Individual Growth; Social Growth; Growth of Society historically; The Natural and the Supernatural.

THE HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY.*—This book is written by a man who has an idea. It is written with a purpose. He gives a history of Democracy in ancient Greece, and shows to his own satisfaction that the results of Democracy in Athens were evil continually, and brought about its downfall. Contrasting the polity of Greece with that of Rome he says, one was Democracy, the other Republicanism. "The Romans under Republicanism arose from a low estate to be a great nation, and continued in that greatness, under Republican form of government, five hundred years, and became the most powerful people upon the face of the earth. It is true, Republicanism in Rome was superseded by an empire which ruled the world six hundred years longer, but Democracy in Greece, and the people whose virtues it turned into vices, sank into abject slavery under the Philip and Alexander dynasty, and thence into slavery still more abject under the Romans, and soon thereafter into the oblivion of the grave. From the days of Republicanism in Rome to these days, the word has lived as a system and expression of human rights throughout the world, and has been applied to many nations as the synonym of their government and institutions. From the days of Democratic Greece, for the space of more than two thousand years, so far as history informs us, no people used or applied the word Democracy as a political name or system, or as the synonym of liberty, equal rights or any other moral or political virtues among mankind. Democracy among the Romans was known as agrarianism, and is so regarded at the present time by nineteen-twentieths of mankind."

He gives the history of the Democratic party in this country during President Jackson's administration, under whom it was inaugurated, for there was no Democratic party before Jackson's

* *The History of Democracy, considered as a Party name, and as a Political organization.* By JONATHAN NORCROSS. New York, published for the author, by G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1883.

time. The leading principles of the party, carried out into action, were a reversal of the system of internal improvements, the overthrow of the protective tariff, and of the Bank of the United States; and the advocacy of the dogma of State sovereignty. Other measures, advocated by the party in later times, are the inflation of an already inflated currency, the taxation of the government bonds and their payment in paper.

But what is this Democracy? The author says, "The Democracy means everywhere, and on all occasions, a class or a political party composed in the main of the ignorant, the dissolute, and the discontented." "Its tendency and intention is to gather into its ranks the discontented and dissolute, the depraved and the dangerous portion of society, as its chief strength and support."

The intensity of feeling which is manifested in every page of the book gives it a certain kind of interest and its resumé of President Jackson's administration from a partisan's view is well done.

THE ART AMATEUR for January, consisting of sixty folio pages, gives more than a hundred illustrations, not counting numerous full-size supplementary working drawings for china-painting, wood-carving, hammered brass, monograms, and embroidery designs from the South Kensington Royal School of Art Needlework. The Pedestal Fund Art Loan Exhibition is fully and critically noticed, with a biography of M. Bartholdi and pictures of his best sculptures. There are two pages of illustrations of the collection of Cosway miniatures, shown by Edward Joseph, of London, with other works of art, at the Loan Exhibition; and interesting examples are given of the new very artistic Haviland "grès" ceramic ware. Other illustrations are of Detaille's painting, "Saluting the Wounded." Editorially, Ward's statue of Washington is criticised somewhat severely; "Montezuma" in "My Note Book" exposes new frauds in the picture trade, and Clarence Cook discusses the Salmagundi Club and Brooklyn Academy picture exhibitions. \$4 a year, 35c. a single copy. Montague Marks, publisher, New York.

THE MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN HISTORY for January, 1884, contains an article on the Van Rensselaer Manor, illustrated with sketches of the manor-house in its palmy days, its great entrance hall, drawing-room, and library, together with portraits of distin-

guished members of the Van Rensselaer family. Among other contributions to this number are: The Beginnings of the New England Society of New York, with finely executed portraits of its first president and first secretary, and the History of the Location of Our National Capital. Publication office, 30 Lafayette Place, New York City.

The February number of the *MAGAZINE OF ART* contains a full page engraving of "A Pleasant Book;" "La Liseuse," from the terra-cotta by Dalon.—Pictures of Cats. By Walter Herries Pollock, with four engravings.—An American Landscape Painter Charles Henry Miller, N. A. By S. G. W. Benjamin, with portrait and two engravings.—Women at Work. By Leades Scott.—"Pausias and Glycera," from the picture by L. Scifoni.—Conceits in Cups. By Llewellynn Jewitt, with nine engravings.—The Lower Thames. By Aaron Watson, with six engravings.—Love among the Saints. By A. Mary F. Robinson.—Fashions for the Feet. By R. Heath, with three engravings.—The Constantine Ionides Collection. The Realists. By Cosmo Monkhouse, with five engravings.—Two Busts of Victor Hugo. By W. E. H., with two engravings.—Dachs and Hilda. From the group by W. Tyler.—The Chronicle of Art.—American art notes. Cassell & Co., Limited. 739 Broadway, New York. Yearly subscription, \$3.50; single numbers, 35 cents.

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Clark's Foreign Theological Library. New Series, volume xvi. The Life of Christ. By Dr. Bernhard Weiss, Professor of Theology in Berlin. Translated by M. G. Hope. Volume ii. 8vo, pp. 403. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh.

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THE
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No. CLXXX.

MAY, 1884.

ARTICLE I.—THE FRENCH IN INDIA.

DURING the bitter struggle between the French and English in India, rare courage, enterprise, and resolution were displayed by both parties. But the French were often, and at critical moments, openly opposed or but weakly supported by their own government.

The policy of the English government with regard to its servants in India much resembled, in principle, the policy adopted by the Church of Rome with regard to enthusiasts. As the Romish Church added largely to its strength by judicious encouragement of those who, like Loyola, ardently wished to advance their religion, but, in some manner, outside of the lines laid down for their guidance by the rulers of the Church, so England added India to her dominions, by encouraging and supporting those enthusiastic men who, wishing to serve their country, wished to serve her by conquering a magnificent realm, instead of by following, as they were expected to do, in the lines of trade and commerce.

For many years after Vasco da Gama braved the perils of an unknown sea, and successfully completed the voyage which has rendered his name so famous, Portugal continued to be the

only European nation carrying on a maritime commerce with the rich islands and countries laved by the Indian ocean. About the beginning of the seventeenth century, however, both English and Dutch merchants began to trade with India, and Richelieu, in the last year of his life, founded a French East India Company, in order to secure to his own country some share of the magnificent commerce.

Considering the possession of Madagascar important to the commerce in the Indian Ocean, a fort was constructed on that island, and many native chiefs acknowledged the supremacy of the French. But although the Company displayed considerable energy it was not sufficiently encouraged by the government, and was unsuccessful.

To Colbert, the famous peace minister of Louis the Fourteenth, the India trade seemed of great consequence, and he earnestly endeavored to form another East India Company. The king favored his plans, and, in 1664, there appeared an edict establishing the Company which was now to enjoy the privilege of commerce and navigation in the East Indies. The Company was granted all such lands, places and islands as it might conquer or occupy, and it is worthy of mention, that with the zeal for the advancement of their religion in foreign lands which has so strikingly distinguished those of the communion of Rome, the French government ordered that in all territory coming under the control of the Company, the faith of the conquerors should be taught to the conquered.

The new Company, like that of Richelieu, endeavored to maintain a settlement in Madagascar, but the efforts put forth resulted only in disgrace and failure; and it was but a short time before African France, as the island was called, was deserted. Most of the colonists determined to settle in the Isle of Bourbon.

Still, the objects of Colbert were to some extent realized. At Surat and Masulipatam stations were established. Permission to trade without paying duties was obtained from the ruler of the Carnatic. At Porto Novo, near Madras, was built a fortress. In Java a station was established in hopes that the French might there successfully compete with the Dutch.

By the grant of certain land on the coast of Brittany, the

Company was provided with a location upon which the necessary warehouses and arsenal might be erected. The military and naval station established on the land thus granted received the name of L'Orient.

A few years after the establishment of the Company, war seemed imminent between France and the Ottoman Empire, and the philosopher Leibnitz presented to the French King an address, setting forth that Egypt should be the point chosen for attack. He adduced weighty arguments to prove the feasibility of his plans. Success would give the French control of the commerce of India.

Had the plan been successfully carried out it is difficult to say what might not have been the result. Once in actual possession of Egypt, it is not too much to believe that the nation which was even then connecting the Mediterranean with the Atlantic by means of the great Canal of Languedoc would have constructed a Suez Canal, two hundred years before the time when, by the genius of a French engineer, that work was actually accomplished. Had Louis then been content with attempting great conquests in the East; had he refrained from madly drawing against himself the power of all Europe; he might have raised France to a state of unexampled prosperity. He was at this time the most powerful monarch in Europe. He might easily have defended his own territories against any aggressor, while at the same time sending large forces to carry out plans of Eastern aggrandizement. But he rejected the plan of Leibnitz, and, deciding to avoid any conflict with the Turks, hurled his armies against Holland.

Meanwhile, although two new settlements, Pondicherry and Chandernagore, both afterwards famous, were established, the affairs of the Company grew decidedly worse. The Java settlement was abandoned, as was also Masulipatam.

For a moment it seemed possible that in Japan the French might compensate themselves for their failure in India. Japanese dislike of the Jesuits drove the Portuguese from the island empire, and it was thought by Colbert that French Protestants might be allowed to take the places of expelled Portuguese Catholics. But Louis would not consent to break his rule of excluding Protestants from all the colonies. Swift's

bitter satire, of a somewhat later date, on the humiliations which the Dutch were willing to endure in order to secure the profits of the Japanese trade, will occur at once to every one.

In Siam it also seemed for a time that the French might obtain signal advantages. The Siamese monarch favored them and granted them liberty of commerce and the privilege of teaching Christianity. But at that king's death the French were at once expelled from the country.

Little else of importance occurred during the reign of Louis the Fourteenth. In 1693 the Dutch captured Pondicherry, but the place was restored by the Treaty of Ryswick. The Isle of France, more commonly known by the name given it by the Dutch in honor of their great Maurice, Prince of Orange, and celebrated as the scene in which the touching story of Paul and Virginia is laid, was, on account of its good harbors, very valuable as a naval station, and in 1715 was occupied by the French.

Early in the new reign the famous Mississippi scheme was projected, and the Company of the West, formed to carry out the plans of John Law, soon annexed to itself the East India Company, the African Company, and a recently created China Company, thus gaining control of almost all the colonial commerce of France. It now took the name of the Company of the Indies.

The commerce with the East began to exhibit new life, and now rapidly increased. The town of L'Orient became a prosperous city, and splendid buildings arose on the spot where but lately there was a mere trading station containing less than one thousand inhabitants.

But while commerce flourished, and protection for it was of vital importance, the miserable government of France neglected the navy, as that of Charles the Second had done at a critical period, and the ships of war were allowed to decay and fall to pieces at their docks.

Two great men, Dupleix and Labourdonnais, upheld the French interests in the East. The abilities displayed by Labourdonnais, both in private affairs and in the service of the Company, procured him in 1734 the appointment of Governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon. In this position he gave

signal proof of his immense energy and capacity. He wished to create great improvements and to carry out reforms, and earnestly did he set himself to the task. Under his administration the defences of the island were greatly strengthened, the condition of the inhabitants was improved, and evil customs were abolished. But he found that one who earnestly strives to reform abuses is certain to encounter much opposition even from those who most should assist him.

Dupleix, while still a young man, obtained, through the influence of his father, a position in the Council at Pondicherry. By means of his commanding abilities he soon attained a far higher position. His genius was recognized and he was sent to direct affairs at Chandernagore, which rapidly became an important center of trade. The French commerce in Bengal soon far outstripped the English. In 1740 Dupleix became Governor of Pondicherry and presently obtained the title of Governor General of the French possessions in India.

War was declared between France and England, and Labourdonnais, after overcoming the greatest difficulties, set sail with a fleet for India. Early in July, 1746, he sighted the English squadron, but only a distant cannonade followed, and he proceeded to Pondicherry. Here he met Dupleix. The two men, each equally anxious to attain the same end, differed widely as to the choice of means. Their respective powers were incapable of and the jealous nature of Dupleix rendered him undefined, acting in harmony with his energetic and ambitious associate.

Dupleix was asked for assistance in strengthening the fleet, and responded by allowing an inadequate supply of cannon and ammunition. He further granted a supply of water, but so bad as to cause sickness on board the fleet. Labourdonnais was again unable to bring the English squadron to an engagement, and, still opposed by Dupleix, proceeded to Madras. On September 15th he arrived in front of the town. For several days a bombardment was kept up, when, seeing that resistance was hopeless, the English governor capitulated. It was stipulated that but a moderate ransom was to be exacted and that the place was to be restored to the English. Labourdonnais honorably protected the inhabitants, and, while confiscat-

ing the magazines and warehouses of the English Company, seized no private property.

On hearing of the agreement to restore Madras to the English, Dupleix began a bitter opposition, but his arguments and expostulations could not induce Labourdonnais to break the treaty. Without assistance, however, the goods could not be removed from Madras before the time agreed upon for the surrender of the place, and this Dupleix refused. By agreement with the English the time was extended, but to avoid the terrific storms of the season Labourdonnais was forced to withdraw with his fleet, and Dupleix at once took command.

Baffled, and bitterly disappointed, Labourdonnais sailed for home. Taken prisoner and carried to England, he was there treated with the greatest respect and allowed to proceed at once to France. There he was thrown into prison and held in confinement for about three years. He died soon after his release. The policy of the French government in this case did not materially differ from that of those kings who assured Gulliver that they had never knowingly preferred any man of merit.

Soon after the departure of Labourdonnais from Madras, his rival declared the treaty of capitulation annulled, and, besides refusing to surrender the place, ordered the seizure of considerable private property. The Nabob, believing certain promises made him by Dupleix to be insincere, sent a large force to attack the French, only to meet overwhelming defeat at the hands of the well-drilled garrison of Labourdonnais. This battle first proved the decisive superiority of modern European arms and discipline when opposed to the unwieldy masses of Asiatic troops.

The same year in which Madras was captured, the English made an attack upon L'Orient with the object of seizing the stores of the Company. The place was weakly fortified and garrisoned. The commander capitulated. Suddenly, however, the English became impressed with the belief that the French were in some way deceiving them, and, hastening to their boats, they sailed away, seized with a panic, not unlike that which infected the troops of the Swedish general Horn when, at Bamberg, they hurriedly fled before a mere advance guard of Tilly's army.

After the fall of Madras the English still held Fort St. David, a settlement but a few miles from Pondicherry. Dupleix endeavored to capture it, but the Nabob had joined with the English and against the united forces he failed. He then endeavored by ravaging the Nabob's territory to induce him to withdraw his army from before St. David, but this also was unavailing. In January, 1747, a few French ships arrived, and Dupleix represented his force as greatly increased. At this the Nabob promptly abandoned the English cause. The arrival of English reënforcements still prevented Dupleix from carrying out his plans. In January, 1748, Major Lawrence took command, and Admiral Boscawen arrived with reënforcements in August.

The English now took the offensive, and, in a series of curiously inefficient operations against Pondicherry, not only utterly failed in their object but also suffered the loss of Major Lawrence as a prisoner to the enemy. Want of sufficient knowledge of the ground upon which they were to operate contributed largely to this failure. Horace Walpole, in one of his letters, mentions a rumor that Boscawen was sent out to India to take part in the expedition against Pondicherry through the influence of one who desired to see him disgraced and who believed that the expedition would most probably fail.

Soon the news of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle arrived, and Madras, much stronger than when last held by the English, was given up by Dupleix in accordance with the terms of that treaty.

But though the two rival powers were at peace in Europe they were not in India. Dupleix had matured plans for securing French ascendancy by interfering in the quarrels of the native princes, and the state of affairs now allowed him to put his plans into execution. Nizam al Mulk, Subahdar of the Deccan, died in 1748, and Nazir Jung, one of his sons, became his successor. A strong competitor arose in the person of a grandson of the Nizam, Mirzapha Jung. Nominally the Great Mogul possessed the right of appointment, but his power did not equal his right. He contented himself with selling to each of the competitors a commission to hold the office.

An'war ad dien was Nabob of the Carnatic. A rival for this position was found in Chunda Saheb, a representative of a family formerly in power. These two pretenders united their forces. They were joined by a body of French soldiers. The combined forces marched against the army of An'war ad dien, who, though over one hundred years old, commanded in person. The forces of the Nabob were defeated; he himself was killed, and his son, Mahomed Ali, retreated to Trichinopoly.

This battle gave control of the Carnatic to the victors, but it soon seemed as if they in turn would be overpowered. Nazir Jung, with an army it is said of 300,000 men, advanced into the Carnatic. Dupleix intrigued with him, but owing to the arrival of an English force in Nazir's camp his advances were declined. Mirzapha Jung surrendered himself. The French soldiers became demoralized. Before such a host it was found necessary to retreat to Pondicherry, while over the surrounding country the enemy spread his tents, and from that "City of War" arose the customary sounds of an Eastern encampment:

" Ringing of arms, and flapping in the breeze
Of streamers from ten thousand canopies ;—
War-music, bursting out from time to time
With gong and tymbalon's tremendous chime."

But soon the tide again changed. The native camp was but carelessly guarded, and a bold night attack of the French so dismayed Nazir Jung that he at once retreated to Arcot. Mahomed Ali, at the head of a large body of troops, was attacked and defeated by the French. A greater success followed. A night attack up the almost inaccessible heights of Gingee; a vehement, fearless dash over frowning redoubts and fortifications, gave the French possession of what was the strongest fortress in the Carnatic if not in all India.

Disheartened by his losses Nazir was now willing to treat with his enemies, but Dupleix had meanwhile been intriguing with some of the chiefs in the camp of the Subahdar, and these traitors now sent to inform him that an attack might successfully be made. A small force of French, assisted by Sepoys, at once advanced and attacked Nazir's army. They were joined by the traitors. Nazir himself was killed, and Mirzapha Jung was

taken from prison and elevated to the position from which his rival had just been so suddenly hurled.

The new Subahdar showed himself not ungrateful. Dupleix was treated with the greatest consideration and honor, and made governor of a large territory. The Nabob of the Carnatic was his deputy. He made great display of his dignity and power; somewhat, no doubt, from vanity, but mainly from his knowledge that by such display he could best maintain his influence. William the Third sent a magnificent embassy to France to impress the subjects of Louis with a high idea of the strength of the English. The policy of making a show of power was even more judicious in the case of Dupleix, for the people of India knew nothing of the real strength of France; it was, therefore, wise to overawe them with splendid pageants.

Mirzapha Jung and his army, accompanied by Bussy with a French force, soon left Pondicherry. A revolt broke out among the native troops and Mirzapha was killed. For a time there was terrible confusion, but Bussy promptly set up as Subahdar, a son of Nizam al Mulk, Salabut Jung, who was then with the army. The new Subahdar agreed to carry out the agreements and promises made by Mirzapha. He established himself at Golconda, and, by the aid of Bussy, was able to defeat and subject all who opposed him, and the French obtained still further acquisitions of valuable territory.

Mahomed Ali made offers of the greater part of his claims, but this did not satisfy the demands of the French. He retired to Trichinopoly and was at once besieged by Chunda Saheb and the French. To create a diversion in favor of the besieged, Clive seized Arcot and held the place in spite of desperate efforts to dislodge him. The English, largely reinforced by native troops, forced the French to raise the siege of Trichinopoly and made many of them prisoners. Chunda Saheb was assassinated.

In spite of reverses Dupleix was soon again in a position to face the English, but he labored under one great disadvantage; the troops which were sent out from France were despicable characters. The siege of Trichinopoly was however undertaken, but failed of its purpose. Another great change was at hand.

Both the French and English Companies had long desired peace; the French, because they were blind to the enormous advantages that Dupleix was securing; the English, because by peace alone could they hope to retain the little power in India which they still possessed. In August, 1754, Godeheu arrived as successor to Dupleix, and distinguished himself by concluding a treaty of peace which relinquished all the advantages gained by the French, and all the vast acquisitions they had made. Dupleix, poorer than he was when made Governor of Pondicherry, returned to France.

Important events soon occurred in Bengal. Suraja Dowla, ruler of that province, attacked and seized Calcutta, the city in which, half a century later, Thackeray was born. The English who had not fled were thrust into the Black Hole; and there most of them miserably perished. Clive, at the head of an expedition, at once left Madras for the purpose of restoring the English power. There were three hundred French in Bengal. Should they join Suraja Dowla, the success of the English would be almost impossible. The breaking out of the Seven Years' War seemed to make such a course probable.

But the French proposed to Clive that in Bengal the two nations should observe neutrality towards each other, and without actually signing a treaty to that effect, were given to understand that their proposition was accepted.

Clive was therefore not interfered with, but no sooner had he secured his ends than he suddenly turned against the French and captured Chandernagore. At Plassey, on June 23, 1757, the army of Suraja Dowla fled in confusion before a small opposing force, and the English were now indisputable masters of Bengal.

Meanwhile Bussy was greatly distinguishing himself in the Deccan, and had he been placed at the head of affairs, even Clive might not have been able to thwart him. In April, 1758, the French received a considerable accession to their forces, but with these reënforcements came Count Lally, to act as Commander-in-chief. He had acquired a high reputation for enterprise and courage but was to prove himself unfitted for high commands. As was said of the Emperor Galba, he would always have been considered worthy of exercising power, had

he never obtained it. He was arrogant, presumptuous, and vain. He began his career in India by making enemies both of his own officers and of the native population. Still, in spite of these difficulties, the large force which he commanded enabled him to capture Fort St. David.

He had but an unfavorable opinion of Bussy and placed little value upon his achievements. That able officer was therefore recalled from the Deccan and the French cause thereby suffered great injury. It is pleasanter to read that six officers who arrived with Lally and who were of higher rank than Bussy, requested that he might be considered as their superior.

In the latter part of the year 1758 Lally began the siege of Madras. Although he displayed both bravery and military skill, he failed in his attempt. The French were now greatly in need of both money and supplies, and discipline could with difficulty be maintained. On January 22, 1760, after suffering many losses, they met Colonel Coote at Wandewash. Lally, under the impression that the enemy's line wavered, ordered his cavalry to charge. Neither officers nor men obeyed. The infantry did better. Charging gallantly, they carried all before them, but, unsupported, fell back. The Sepoys refused to fight. Bussy was taken prisoner and Lally was forced to retreat.

The victorious English now captured in rapid succession posts still held by the French and finally besieged Pondicherry. Lally made brave resistance, but in January, 1761, was forced to surrender. Returning to France he was thrown into prison, tried, and, most unjustly, condemned to death. On the 5th of April Gingee surrendered, and the French had no longer a military post in India.

One of the last to surrender was Law, a man who had valiantly demeaned himself in manifold difficulties. With but a few of his countrymen he took part in a battle in which the English were victors. Knowing the French cause in India to be now hopeless, and disdaining to flee, he grimly mounted astride a cannon and awaited the end. Examples of such pathetic desperation are rare, and yet the attitude is not without an element of the ludicrous. The English commander,

with several officers, hearing of Law's strange freak, ride up and dismount. Respectfully saluting him they compliment his bravery and request the surrender of his sword. The Frenchman, careless of life, is not willing to surrender if he is to be deprived of his sword. The point is at once yielded, and Law is placed in the English commander's private palanquin. Appreciating a brave man's feeling inquisitive visitors are not allowed to see him. A native, high in authority, speaks slightly of the captive, but is at once sternly rebuked. "The age of chivalry is gone!" exclaims Burke, but we must still believe that so late as 1761 the spirit of chivalry was not entirely extinct, when we see a modern and less exalted Black Prince making captive of a modern and less exalted King John; treating him with the utmost courtesy; and, to further soothe him, praising highly his martial exploits.

By the Treaty of Paris the stations which had been possessed by France at the beginning of 1749 were restored. It was but a few years, however, before the French Company ceased to exist. War again broke out between France and England. In 1778 Pondicherry, after a most resolute defence, was again captured, and in 1779 the French were again without a settlement in India.

Hyder Ali, a native ruler whose abilities were of the highest order, suddenly poured an immense army into the Carnatic, and it was decided to send a French force to join him against the English. Early in 1782 some two thousand Frenchmen were landed at Porto Novo. Before the close of the year, Suffren, the French naval commander, a man possessed of indomitable courage and rare capacity for command, sustained four conflicts with the English fleet.

At Madras the condition of affairs was for a time pitiable. The troops of Hyder Ali had spread themselves over the surrounding country, and great numbers of the inhabitants fled to the English settlement for protection. It was impossible to obtain supplies, and a terrible famine ensued.

In December, 1782, Hyder Ali died; but soon after, Bussy, who had formerly so distinguished himself, arrived with reinforcements from France and landed at Fort St. David. He was now old, and weakened by disease. Outnumbered by the

English he still fought a furious battle, but soon found himself blockaded between a hostile army and fleet. The English fleet, however, fiercely attacked by Suffren, was forced to seek safety at Madras. Again did the prospects of the French brighten, but whether any permanent advantages could now have been gained in face of the firmly established power of England can never be known. News of peace between France and England put an end to strife, and India remained in the possession of the English. The French were allowed to hold a few settlements, and were granted the valuable privilege of surrounding Chandernagore with a ditch sufficient for purposes of drainage.

While Lord Cornwallis, whose surrender at Yorktown had compelled the recognition of the United States as a nation, was Governor-General of India, hostilities once more began between the French and English, and the unfortunate French settlements were again seized. To a subsequent Governor-General, the Marquis Wellesley, the security of the English possessions seemed to be dangerously menaced by the existence of a body of troops, officered by Frenchmen, in the service of a native prince who was half a subject, half an ally, of the English. The Frenchmen were therefore compelled to return to Europe. In 1799 an embassy was sent by Wellesley to Persia, and besides a number of other very valuable concessions, it was provided that not only was no French army to be allowed to enter any Persian possession, but that the Persian governors were to be free to slay any individual Frenchman who might enter their provinces.

The Mahrattas who opposed the operations of General Lake in 1803, were largely officered by Frenchmen; at the battle of Delhi a Frenchman commanded; and Frenchmen commanded a considerable part of the large force with which, on that memorable 23d of September, Wellington, with but a small number of troops, was so unexpectedly confronted on the field of Assaye; when, knowing that while it was dangerous to risk an attack it was even more dangerous to attempt a retreat, the future victor of Waterloo gloriously charged upon the enemy and gloriously won.

It has been supposed that the French invasion of Egypt in 1798 was an endeavor to carry out the plan which Leibnitz

had presented to Louis the Fourteenth. The execution of such a plan required the possession of a fleet, but while Louis had possessed one not excelled by those of England or Holland, that of Napoleon on the other hand was weak and inefficient, and the Battle of the Nile put an end to French designs in the East, as the Battle of Trafalgar a few years later destroyed the last hope of an invasion of England.

In 1815 France was again granted possession of a few settlements, which are still retained.

Great has been the decline of the French colonial power. In North America the possessions of France which the persevering zeal of French missionaries and the impetuous energy of French explorers first laid open to European eyes, were of vast extent. A few fishing stations on the dreary coast of Newfoundland still serve to keep in remembrance the fact, that bold Frenchmen once laid claim, in the name of their sovereign, to the territory surrounding the Great Lakes and to the immense tract drained by the Mississippi and its tributaries. In India the French gained control of large provinces; princes became subject to them; millions looked up to them with fear; vast treasures were at their command; it seemed as if little was needed to attain as complete an ascendancy as that which the English have since acquired. But their possessions have dwindled to a few trading stations, and, in place of reports of provinces conquered, of rulers yielding homage to the successors of Charlemagne, come bulletins of trade at Chandernagore; of the exports of Pondicherry; or notes on the commerce of Karikal.

Cleveland, Ohio.

ARTICLE II.—ON CERTAIN POINTS OF RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN ORTHODOXY AND NATURE.

By "Nature," for present purposes, is understood the material universe, including all phenomena with which the non-metaphysical sciences deal—the whole body, one might perhaps say, of concrete truth, about which, so far as satisfactory investigation has been pushed, we feel positively sure; the actual facts, excluding all hypotheses which are from their nature incapable of demonstration. By "orthodoxy" (neglecting the etymology of the word), is meant a certain system of belief on subjects in regard to which neither the senses nor pure reason can furnish any direct testimony—the common opinion of the so-called "evangelical" churches. This system of belief indubitably includes, among others, the following points:

1. That all men, everywhere, incline naturally to evil rather than to good; and that no one makes persistent progress toward a strictly virtuous life without supernatural assistance.

2. That man, nevertheless, is entirely free in his choices as a moral agent, and is therefore responsible for all his deeds; and yet that God not only foreknows to the minutest particular whatever comes to pass, but also so directs the course of events as to work out fully his own will, both in the general history of nations and in the personal life of every human being.

3. That the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children, to the third and fourth generation.

4. That man's eternal well-being depends upon his complying with certain conditions which are stated in a number of ancient manuscripts, written in languages that no man for centuries has ordinarily spoken, and for the most part not explicitly formulated even in these writings, but expressed in general terms, or left largely to be inferred by the reader, in such manner that there is wide room for differences of opinion on many not unimportant points.

5. That very many men, leading sober, honest, industrious, kindly and useful lives, are nevertheless the continual objects of the wrath of God, and pass at death to a state of suffering—

6. From which it is at least doubtful whether there shall ever be deliverance.

That these tenets are regarded with more or less dislike by a very large number of the people to whom they have been propounded—excluding such persons as have never distinctly apprehended their purport in its depth and fullness, and excluding also such, at the other extreme of the scale, as have either been able to reason out for themselves, or have received understandingly from others, a satisfactory system of theodicy—goes without saying. Some accept them, or suppose they accept them, in an unthinking, implicit way, as matters too sacred for prying curiosity or impartial discussion, while secretly—half unconsciously, perhaps—wishing that most of them were not true. Some hold their judgment in suspense, seeking salvation for themselves indeed in the manner prescribed by the orthodox faith, and laboring, very likely, to persuade others to follow their example, but really entertaining all the time a certain degree of suspicion that perhaps they are taking unnecessary trouble, and a certain degree of hope, consequently, that their friends who neglect entirely the alleged essentials of salvation may fare just as well in the next world notwithstanding. Some reject them utterly and contemptuously as inconsistent with each other, incompatible with the conceptions they have formed as to what ought to be the character of God, or as on other grounds unworthy the belief of independent and fearless thinkers. Now it is the purpose of this paper to point out that certain striking parallelisms to these, the most “unpopular” dogmas of the Christian faith, may readily be discerned in nature, the physical universe that surrounds us and of which we form a part.

I.

The doctrine of total depravity, how it has been, and now is, scorned and execrated by turns! Yet divorce the idea from theology and theological phraseology, consider it as a practical

every-day subject ought to be considered by a rational and prudent man who has other men to deal with, and how do the facts look? Do the persons that one knows the most about, generally exhibit a marked tendency toward discovering for themselves, and then abandoning, their faults and bad practices? Are our social and business regulations adjusted on the presumption that men may commonly be trusted and that evil purposes are rather the exception? Does one ordinarily receive strangers into the intimacy of his family on the strength of personal attractiveness and courteous mien, without proper introduction and the implied or expressed guarantee of some trusted friend? Does the proprietor of a great mercantile establishment allow his subordinates to keep their accounts as they please or not at all, taking for granted that he will receive from each of them the correct amounts of money? Are important agreements—no matter how simple—usually settled by word of mouth, without the execution of formal papers that will bind the signer in a court of law? Is it thought useless to take a written receipt for a payment because the person to whom it is made is not likely to forget the transaction? Are loans effected at the Stock Exchange without furnishing tangible security? Are good habits as easy of acquisition, and do they hold one's life as firmly in their grasp when established, as bad habits?

Such questions answer themselves; any child old enough to understand them will give the correct reply. Put this case to any group of young people, a class at school, for instance: "Suppose there are two boys of the same age, living next door to each other, in houses just alike; their fathers are employed at the same rate of pay in the same factory, and in every respect the two homes are very similar. Suppose, however, that one of these boys has been brought up to speak the truth at all hazards, to abhor dishonesty and impurity, to control his temper, to thank God every morning for protection through the night, and to seek divine pardon every evening for the sins of the day—while the other boy lies and steals and fights and swears. Suppose now that the two become intimate friends, and are constantly together. What do you think will happen? Will each learn of the other—the one, good things; the other, evil things? Or will one of them gradually copy the other in

all things?" I have tried the experiment several times, and have never yet failed of receiving the same reply: "The bad boy will spoil the good boy!" And the experience of mature life, it can hardly be doubted, will confirm the opinion thus formed under the guidance of the clear instinct of childhood. Practically, all sane men concur in it.

I was traveling, one pleasant autumn afternoon, through the great fruit region of Western New York. Two men sitting near me, whose words I could not choose but hear, had been discussing religious (or irreligious) questions in a manner which left no doubt, though that particular point had not come up, that they would both have pooh-poohed total depravity as the nonsensical fancy of an antiquated age. But as the wide-spread apple orchards, heavy laden, met our eyes in every direction, the conversation turned upon fruit, its production and marketing, and it transpired that one of these men was a buyer of apples in large quantities. The risks and losses of the business were spoken of, and especially the frauds attempted by dishonest shippers. The fruit-buyer remarked, however, that he knew just one man, only one, whose apples he received without examination; they were always exactly what they were represented to be, or if there was any difference, they turned out rather better than the grower described them. "Well," answered his companion, "my private opinion is that some fine day when you take an unusually large lot from that fellow at a high price, you will find yourself egregiously swindled; and then he will play off his good character on you, and have some plausible story about its not being really his fault, and you'll never get satisfaction." The first man laughed, and said, yes, he supposed so; it was the way of the world.

I thought then, and think now, that this anticipation of villainy was not justified by the facts as stated. I believed then, and believe now, that in every half-christianized country there are thousands of men in every walk of life whose word is as good as their bond, and who hold their personal integrity above all questions of loss or gain of money. But the point of interest in the conversation is that these speakers—hard, practical men of business, accustomed to driving bargains with

all sorts of buyers and sellers, and to forming quick and shrewd judgments of the character and intentions of those with whom their vocations brought them into contact—that these men had derived from their experience so low an opinion of the actual morality of their fellows; that they had plainly reached the conclusion that there are few indeed who are really honest except so far as they think it their best policy to be so. See what the fruit-buyer's words really come to: In all his dealings with the growers, he had never encountered but one trustworthy man, and he would not be surprised to have even *him* turn out a knave on the first especially favorable opportunity; it was "the way of the world!"

Now the point I wish to make is just this: We ordinarily treat our fellow men as if there were a strong presumption that they would take unfair advantage of us if they could; we know by experience (if the trial has been made) how much easier it is to acquire new faults than to relinquish those we have, while observation clearly teaches that evil communications are far more apt to corrupt good manners than are good manners to over-awe evil communications; and we shall be told every day, on inquiry of the men most experienced in the rough struggle for life, that "it is the way of the world" to assume a cloak of virtue to hide the intention of vice—confirming Herbert Spencer's generalization that in the management of business, "instead of assuming, as people usually do, that things are going right until it is proved that they are going wrong, the proper course is to assume that they are going wrong until it is proved that they are going right."*

These facts, established and indisputable, do not entirely cover the ground of the theological doctrine of total depravity; but do they not furnish us, in phenomena of which every student of the human race is bound to take account, a close parallel to that doctrine, which is often overlooked by mystical believers in the "something good" in every depraved and abandoned man?

* *Popular Science Monthly*, December, 1882, vol. xxii, page 272.

II.

The world wearied long ago, as well it might, of the endless disputes in which many thinkers capable of better work have engaged about free will and foreordination. There is perhaps no more unprofitable task than to endeavor to reconcile in words these two conceptions as harmonious with each other. But let us keep clear of metaphysics and look at nature.

That man is *free in his choices*, surely few persons outside of jail and bedlam will deny; whoever affirms that he is unable to decide as he pleases on every question of right or wrong doing, may well be suspected, if he speaks seriously, either of fraud or insanity. One may of course persuade himself that he is *too weak to carry out* his purposes, and so may go wrong while he says he means to go right; but that is quite another matter. It is the decision, the choosing, with which only we are here concerned; and the drunkard of most frequent drunkenness, or the profane person of the most multifarious oaths, while pleading earnestly the tyranny of long established habit as an excuse for his bad practices, will invariably use language that presupposes and admits his unimpaired ability to resolve upon a reformation. "I honestly meant to go right home that night, but I had to pass so many drinking places, and you don't know what struggles I went through before I yielded to the temptation"—what employer, about to discharge a dissipated man, has not heard language like that, in palliation of the last disgraceful debauch? And what employer, or what court of justice, though pitying and at the same time despising the weakness of the culprit who only means and wishes to do right, while persistently in fact doing wrong, will acquit him of responsibility for the results of his vicious courses on the ground that he could not abandon them? The whole structure of every description of government and discipline, from the family up to the nation, has for its fundamental principle and corner stone the universally accepted belief that man is morally free.

Yet what feature is more obvious in our daily experience than this—that the most carefully considered course of action is apt to bring about results entirely different from those de-

sired, and that not only one's visible career but even the inner personal life very often shapes itself, so to speak, into forms quite other than those that were intended? "So strangely," writes Macaulay, "do events confound all the plans of man! A prince who read only French, who wrote only French, who ranked as a French classic, became, quite unconsciously, the means of liberating half the Continent from the dominion of that French criticism of which he was himself to the end of his life a slave." The same conception has crystallized itself into a dozen popular proverbs: "man proposes—;" "the best laid plans—;" "there's many a slip"—how familiar, how threadbare, is the idea! And how few men there are who ever either do or become what they intended! How little is mental development, how little are our tastes and habits, governed in the long run by deliberate purpose; or rather, how often do they grow in directions diametrically opposed to the fixed intention! No man surely who knows anything of himself or of mankind, will compare a human soul to the steamer that plows her way through the billows regardless of wind and current, or even to the ship that may be tossed about this way and that, but finally reaches the port of destination. Rather does it resemble the climbing vine, embodying indeed a principle of growth and of a certain kind of growth, but depending chiefly for its form and its direction upon circumstances lying entirely outside of its own nature. Now the orthodox doctrine asks only a slight extension of these well-known truths. Substitute for Macaulay's vague term "events," the perfectly clear and intelligible conception of a higher power influencing events, and one sees instantly that the free will of the creature may have its fullest exercise, while yet the purposes of the Creator are brought to pass.

And in regard to the operation of the higher power and its bearings upon the responsibility of the beings whom, free though they be, that higher power directs and restrains, do we not see every day how a stronger will may control a weaker, without trenching in the smallest degree on its freedom of action? The father of a bright, active boy, devoted to the sports of the field, may have a practically certain prevision that an invitation to go gunning will be joyfully accepted; and

his giving the invitation is just as truly the cause of the boy's willing to avail himself of it, as any one event can be the cause of another. The boy's volition to go is absolutely free, and yet is the inevitable result of the father's action. Now suppose a father omniscient and omnipotent, understanding to perfection the disposition of his child, and possessed of every conceivable facility for presenting every kind of motive—what difficulty is there in understanding that he may exercise an unlimited control over the child's actions, while yet the child is free and must therefore justly be held responsible, both by his own conscience and by every tribunal in the universe, for whatever he does?

It may be thought, however, that there must be a fallacy somewhere in this reasoning; that though we think we see one will perfectly controlled by another, while yet acting with perfect freedom, the two processes are mutually inconsistent and cannot go on together. But it needs no more than an extremely superficial acquaintance with the elements of physical science to exhibit the folly of rejecting either one of two well attested truths because we cannot make them agree with each other. As has been well said, no satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of light can be made, without supposing the existence of a medium which presents the most contradictory and seemingly impossible properties. The cosmic ether is infinitely more attenuated than any gas, but yet in many respects bears a much closer resemblance to solid bodies! It is matter, of course, and all matter is supposed to be made up of unchangeable and distinct particles; yet, for many reasons, the ether cannot be thus constituted. And indeed the whole atomic theory—universally accepted as it is, necessary as it seems to be for the scientific statement of scores of classes of phenomena, and almost demonstrated to be true, as it is, by the results of countless experiments in chemistry, is yet, considered as a whole, a bundle of contradictions. From one point of view, it seems to be certain that the atoms of all substances are exactly alike; from another, equally certain that they are intrinsically very different in size, weight and character. There are strong reasons, almost conclusive proof, for believing the atoms to be perfectly hard, mechanically unchangeable; and

equally strong reasons for supposing them highly elastic. Yet the very investigators who are most busily engaged in developing this atomic theory, would have it believed that only the "scientific" view of any subject is worthy of attention, and that "science" (by which they mean physical science) is always intelligible and self-consistent. Nor will it do to answer that the undulatory theory of light, and the atomic constitution of matter, are only working hypotheses. The simple truth is that all the facts point directly toward light-waves and the existence of atoms, as the only generalizations that can satisfactorily explain them, and that the waves and atoms are therefore believed in, notwithstanding the contradictions in which the thinker immediately finds himself involved beyond hope of extrication. How absurd then, how trivial a complaint it is against the theological doctrines of natural inclination to evil conjoined with moral responsibility, and man's free will conjoined with God's sovereignty, that we do not know how to state them without seeming contradictions! In natural science, dealing with brute matter that can be seen and handled and weighed and analyzed, we accept any fact for which satisfactory evidence is presented, without caring in the least for our inability to make it agree with other facts equally well attested. Shall we then in spiritual science, where the phenomena to be considered are infinitely more complicated, their laws infinitely more involved, and where our powers of comprehension and reasoning are hardly adequate to even skimming the surface of the great ocean of unknown and perhaps to us unknowable truth—shall we in spiritual science demand that every statement must be seen fully and exactly to square with every other before it can be rationally believed? If the student of natural philosophy, or the chemist, demands that this be done, he at the same time condemns his own methods of procedure as fundamentally erroneous, and their results as the delusive figments of his misguided imagination.

III.

In the anxiety which many foolish people display to find cruelty, oppression and injustice in the primary tenets of the orthodox faith, a forced and unnatural interpretation of the

doctrine that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children, is often insisted on. To the unprejudiced reader, the words of the Second Commandment, whatever may be thought of other passages of Scripture (among which, the 18th chapter of Ezekiel should never be overlooked), convey no hint of the *imputation of sin* or of the descent by inheritance of divine *displeasure*; but merely embody a truth that is simply indisputable. Our scientific friends at all events, who regard every phenomenon of whatever kind as the necessary result of a congeries of indestructible forces acting strictly in accordance with unvarying laws, ought to be the last people in the world to object to the manifest deduction that a child must suffer for his parents' sins. Indeed the fact is too obvious for argument. So far as a just God's judgment upon each man's moral character is concerned, that judgment must be conceived as made up of an inconceivable number of elements, the soul having credit, so to speak, in the divine mind for every disadvantage, however trifling, under which it may have labored, and being charged, on the other hand, with every act of willful transgression and with every neglect of opportunity of improvement. In this balancing of accounts, the transgressions of the father must certainly be placed to the credit of the children just so far as they have operated to incline the latter involuntarily toward sin; it were the grossest injustice to expect from the child of a depraved wretch the same clean record that is looked for from the members of a Christian family. But so far as the course of our earthly life is concerned—that also being the resultant of an immense number of conflicting forces—it is manifest that every transgression of any sort of law must put the children of the transgressor at a certain disadvantage for all futurity; physically, mentally, morally, they can never be quite what they might have been had they sprung from a line of sinless progenitors. To put the thing into concrete form, every scrofulous baby is a monument of transgression of physical law committed years before its birth. Nobody imagines that God blames the poor child for its ailments; but the regular operation of divine law will nevertheless inevitably bring upon it a train of untold miseries, as the fruit of the fathers' folly and sin. The fact is stated to mankind as a motive to

abstain from transgression ; what stronger motive, to a parent worthy of the name, could the Infinite Father offer ?

“But the cruelty involved ? the innocent sufferers ? You orthodox people will not let us look at the operations of nature as natural. You insist upon it that a personal God acts directly through them all, and acts freely, however regularly. How then, if he is really a loving father, can he bear to bring misery upon innocent children in consequence of transgressions for which they are in no manner responsible ?”

Well, the goodness of God is established by another chain of arguments. Remember, please, that many highly unorthodox thinkers profess to find *nothing but beneficence* in nature, and feel perfectly easy in the conclusion that the author of nature is too soft-hearted even to punish sin. “The infinite goodness that I have experienced in this world,” writes Renan, “inspires me with a conviction that at least an equal goodness pervades eternity ; and in that I put my trust.” But as to the possibility of God’s permitting grave evils to light upon the innocent and well-deserving, what do we see every day around us ? Surely no one can suppose that *inherited* suffering is the only example of suffering without special corresponding blame-worthiness. “The deists have contended,” says a professional infidel,* “that the Old Testament is too cruel to be the work of a loving God. To this, the theologians have replied, that nature is just as cruel ; that the earthquake, the volcano, the pestilence and storm, are just as savage . . . ; and to my mind,” he goes on—a remarkable admission—“*this is a perfect answer.*” Thus is orthodoxy supported on diametrically opposite sides by the observations of “freethinkers,” one party stoutly maintaining that the Creator certainly loves mankind, while the others insist that the course of natural events is just as cruel and “savage” as any doctrine of revelation. Each of these opinions is doubtless true ; but exaggerate either of them far enough to come into conflict with the tenets of orthodoxy, and it forthwith annihilates the other !—which is just what we should expect, if nature and orthodoxy are from the same hand.

* *North American Review*, vol. cxxxiii., p. 113.

IV.

The ancient Jews have no lack of modern sympathizers in demanding a sign from heaven before they will believe. A true revelation from God, it is said, would speak in trumpet tones to every human being; there could be no doubt of its divine origin, and no difference of opinion as to the meaning of the message. Can it be possible, it is asked, that if the Creator desired to impart to man the momentous truth of a future life and the conditions of attaining immortal felicity, he would speak only, or chiefly, in hints and suggestions, communicated at long intervals of time to selected individuals, and preserved for future ages through the instrumentality of fading parchments? Can it be that the possibility of our escaping from eternal woe depends upon our ability to decipher old manuscripts, written in languages long since disused and well-nigh forgotten? And what, after all, does the so-called revelation reveal? How diverse, how contradictory, are the conclusions drawn by different students of that heterogeneous collection of books called the Bible! How can one be sure of the correctness of any doctrine without thorough investigation for himself—without studying the documents patiently in the original tongues and acquiring considerable knowledge of the historical circumstances of their composition? Yet this, few men can do. Life is short, and its physical necessities demand our first attention. Is it reasonable to suppose that our heavenly Father, if there is such a being, would trust his messages to a channel of communication so extremely precarious? In learning what God desires of us, must we really place so much dependence, not only on the investigations of other men, but even on their mere interpretations and opinions? “A direct revelation to myself, so conveyed that I cannot doubt its celestial origin, so clear that I cannot misconstrue its purport—this I will accept; but as to revelations to other people, centuries ago, with no satisfactory opportunity afforded me to examine their signs of authenticity, and embodying statements that I do not at all understand, together with many things that I am quite unwilling to believe—that is another matter altogether. It is unreasonable to expect me to receive deliverances of this

kind at second-hand, and in so confused and uncertain a form besides. No! Let God speak, and I will hear him. But as to records in books of what other men say he has spoken, I have something else to do than to study them; I cannot puzzle my brains over such mystical and enigmatic compositions."

How then is it with nature? It is of a good deal of importance to man—is it not?—to know that poppy-juice will produce sleep, and chloroform insensibility to pain, and nightshade death. It is quite desirable to be aware that small pox spreads by contagion and may be warded off by the use of bovine virus. It adds considerably to our comfort to be able to smelt iron ore, and to find coal-beds by the indications of geology. It materially facilitates navigation to discover that the barometer falls before a storm, and that a magnetized needle, swinging free, points always northward. Now has nature proclaimed these truths in a voice which all must hear and none can misunderstand? Are a system of materia medica and a summary of the laws of hygiene written legibly on the surface of our bodies? Are the strata of the rocks plainly labeled, "Here is Iron," "Below is Coal," in characters which the first man as well as the latest could interpret at sight? Are the truths of natural philosophy self-evident without experimentation and reasoning? Do we owe nothing to the researches of those who have gone before us, and is one man's opinion as good as another's, in questions of material science? Nature is a mine wherein are embedded diamonds beyond price. Health, strength, long life, the ability to do and to be, the reputation of a Copernicus or a Newton, the intellectual exhilaration that accompanies important researches and adds the keenest pleasure to great discoveries—these are the prizes that she offers to the successful explorer of her secret ways. To many persons, such jewels appear to be far more attractive than the promise of a celestial crown. But how one must toil for them! How few, how vague, how easily mistaken, are the indications that visible nature gives us of the positions of her precious nuggets! How often do explorers, though gifted with the sharpest mental vision, go woefully astray and end in ludicrous or miserable disaster! Ages innumerable have elapsed, we are told, since man, with intellectual faculties essentially the same as those he

now employs, was developed from the anthropoid apes. Yet it is scarcely six generations since alchemy became chemistry and some sound knowledge of the constitution of matter began to be acquired. Four centuries have not passed since it was demonstrated that the world moves; and the time is hardly yet arrived for the mass of mankind to grasp the rationale of the changes in the appearance of the moon and to understand that her phases have no relation to terrestrial events. How little, even yet, do we know of physiology and minute anatomy! Who can tell us the cause of neuralgia, the peculiarities of action of a diseased nerve? Why, it is not much more than two hundred years since the very elementary discovery was made that the arteries carry blood! How slowly and painfully have we acquired the mere smattering of knowledge that we now possess as to the universe at large and even as to the mechanism of our own bodies! How then can it consistently be expected that the God of nature should proclaim aloud, in clear and unmistakable tones, the attributes of his own being, the existence of a future life for man, and the conditions of attaining felicity beyond the grave? Not thus does he smooth the path for our feet in seeking the knowledge that we most need for the amelioration of our earthly life. One position is believed to be impregnable: the truths that absolutely must be believed, and the duties that absolutely must be done, in order to escape the divine wrath with which his conscience threatens every sinner, are revealed so plainly in the Scriptures, and sanctioned so unmistakably by the reason and the conscience, that the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err—just as the elementary fact that our physical systems require food and drink and sleep, is taught us by nature without our seeking. But as one who would make any progress in physical life must bestir himself to learn other things than these, so must he who desires to attain any considerable knowledge of the spiritual world, or any purely intellectual grasp of the evidence that the Scriptures really did come from God, search for it with painstaking diligence, availing himself whenever he can of the investigations of others, and never absolutely certain that on many points he is not more or less in error. It has been well said that the Bible contains a system

of divinity in much the same sense as that in which a system of geology lies enfolded in the rocks. If the author of the one is the same being as the maker of the other, ought not such a similarity of plan to be confidently expected, rather than seized upon as a ground for maintaining that while the rocks were certainly not constructed by human agency, the Scriptures were ?

V.

The doctrine that a great many agreeable and useful persons are lost, while some very unpleasant people are finally saved, is often regarded as a hard saying—who can hear it? But has the objection any better basis than mere confusion of thought? To clear the ground of extraneous matter, let it first be distinctly admitted that the man who cares not at all to be of service to his fellows, and who makes no effort to correct his own infirmities of temper and disposition, deceives himself greatly if he imagines that he enjoys the favor of God, depending for salvation upon his intellectual belief or his emotional experiences. Let it be further admitted—what is the mere dictum of common sense—that the benevolent and kindly soul must fare better in the next world, other things being equal, than the selfish or malicious transgressor. But this being fully understood, the great fact remains that if there is a personal God, the obligations resting upon every human being as a moral agent divide themselves into two classes, duties toward the Creator and duties toward man; and that even the absolutely perfect discharge of one of these sets of duties, were that possible, can furnish no excuse for the neglect of the other. That is to say, the most benevolent and useful man on earth, if he lead a godless life, never thanking his Creator for his goodness, never perhaps giving himself seriously to the consideration of the question whether the Creator has demands upon his attention or has made a revelation of his will to mankind, should not be surprised at finding an appalling indictment lodged against him at the great assize on charges entirely unconnected with his demeanor toward his fellow-men, whatever that demeanor may have been.

A similar principle appears plainly enough in human transactions, and is universally recognized. An undutiful son, detected in an act of base ingratitude and disrespect toward his father, will hardly be allowed to plead, in extenuation of his fault, that he treats his own children kindly. A defaulting bank cashier would be considered silly as well as dishonest should he expect the directors to overlook his crime because of his scrupulous observance of all the commandments except the eighth. A careless railroad engineer, on trial for manslaughter in having recklessly brought about a terrible disaster, will scarcely undertake to defend himself by showing that he always pays his debts and keeps the machinery bright. In each case, the virtues referred to may be rightly claimed as his own by the culprit; but that fact is entirely irrelevant to the matter in hand, and would be so considered even by the illogical sentimentalists who imagine that

“ Christ aint a-going to be too hard
On a man that died for men,”

However irreligious or grossly immoral may have been that man's whole life.

There is another way of looking at the question. We of the orthodox faith believe that the Saviour's atonement is offered to mankind both as a cure for the injuries inflicted by sin upon our moral nature and as a protection from terrible evils yet to come. How is it with wounds and ailments in our bodies? A bone of the leg is broken; will any degree of general health, or any perfection of muscular development enable the patient to walk while that fracture is unrepaired? A man has a raging fever, and needs aconite; can you reduce his temperature by placing him in a luxurious bed and supplying him with nutritious food and refreshing drinks? Nature cares nothing for the fine physique in the one case or the favorable environment in the other. *The needed corrective must be applied*, or the activity of the body is ended. There is no possible escape from the alternative.

And how is it in regard to protection from the terrible wheels of the material universe that will crush us remorselessly if we willfully or ignorantly fall in their way? We live in the

midst of dangers, from which indeed we are liberally provided with the means of escape, but which will brook no trifling. It is a winter evening while I write. Outside my windows blows a whistling storm of fine dry snow that cuts and sears like fire, and the mercury has been for hours near zero. Inside, there is warmth and safety and comfort. Coal burns, and gives me heat. Brick walls, heavy doors, double windows, a tight roof, defy the tempest. But suppose I fail to take advantage of the shelter. Suppose I go forth, scantily clothed, into the open fields. What pity can I expect from nature?—that same beneficent nature that offers me, in such lavish profusion, coal for fuel, and wood for timbers, and clay for bricks, and sand and lime for glass. She will ask no questions, but summarily destroy me for my foolhardy presumption. The principle is everywhere and always the same; not one single transgression of the thousand regulations that nature has prescribed for our life will be forgiven or overlooked in consideration of our scrupulously observing the nine hundred and ninety-nine. Each infraction, however trifling, is surely punished; and if one offends on a vital point, there can be no result but certain death. *Beneficence*, provision for our wants, is everywhere; *mercy*, the overlooking of transgression, is nowhere to be discerned.

It surely therefore must be from some source very different from the study of nature that men have drawn the conclusion that they can expect the God of nature to pardon their neglect of himself, on the ground that they have been useful and agreeable to their fellow-men—which is exactly equivalent to pardoning the infraction of one law because another has been fulfilled!

VI.

And in respect to the endless duration of the punishment. It has been said, in high-sounding phrase, that it must be impossible for a finite being to commit against the Infinite any sin deserving eternal suffering. That may be true; the proposition is of such a nature as hardly to admit of satisfactory discussion. But surely it is quite too mechanical and limited a conception of the world of woe to think of it only as a torture

chamber wherein pain is deliberately inflicted by higher powers in execution of a judicial sentence—so much sin on earth, so much the wretchedness of expiation beyond. What the Scriptures tell us is that such persons as deliberately reject in this life the means of salvation, pass at death into an estate of misery. They do *not* tell us that further sin is impossible. Blessed be God, they do not positively and in set form proclaim that repentance is impossible either; the door of hope is not absolutely and certainly, beyond all question or doubt, closed at the portals of the grave. But how is it about sinning and repenting here? Can any truth be more manifest than that the probability of a transgressor's forsaking his evil ways diminishes with a fearful ratio as he goes on in years and in wickedness? The principle of inertia is to be discerned just as plainly, by those who care to look for it, in spiritual as in physical motion. On what other principle do our laws act, in distinguishing so sharply between the first transgressions of youth, heinous though they may be, and the misdeeds (perhaps less black in themselves) of old-offenders, and in making of juvenile delinquents a class by themselves? The young lawbreaker *may* be saved, and we send him to a reformatory; the hardened malefactor of mature years, there is no hope for him—let him go to a prison, and the longer the better!

Now what reason can analogy suggest for the belief of our Universalist brethren and the "free-thinkers" who outdo them, that this downward motion of the soul is to meet with a check at the grave or beyond it? A cannon-ball is shot out into space—when will its motion cease? A child's spine grows crooked for a dozen years—when will it begin to straighten? A little aneurism forms on the aorta—when will the artery consolidate itself into its normal dimensions? A man acquires habits of falsehood and dishonesty, and they grow upon him for fifty years—when will he probably cast them off? A rational creature of God passes his whole life, so far as we can see it, in entire neglect of his Creator—when will he begin to reverence the Eternal Purity? Let death come soon or late; death is only the crumbling back of the corporeal organs to their elements; why should the steady progression of the *spirit* toward evil, that we have watched for thirty, or fifty, or eighty years,

be even retarded by its freedom from physical restraints? Does not the analogy of all things here suggest rather an accelerated movement, accelerated with ever increasing velocity, in the same line as before? If there is one solemn lesson that the observation of nature forces more than another upon the attention of the observer, it is surely this: Processes of deterioration, once well established, generally end only when there is no more material to work upon. The mould propagates itself in all directions; the rust increases; the ulcer spreads; the gangrene advances toward vital parts; the dishonest boy, unrestrained, makes a dangerous man; the liar at fifteen, unless some powerful influence of good transforms his moral nature, is a defaulter at twenty-five; the man of occasional excesses in middle life becomes a confirmed sot in later years. *Facilis*, ever *facilis*, is the *descensus Averni*; and if sin brings suffering now, why not a century from now? Why not a million centuries? An immortal soul, eternally going wrong—why not eternally suffering the penalty?

If now the points of resemblance that have been suggested between the system of belief that is called "orthodoxy" on the one hand and the constitution of nature on the other, are justified by correct observation, one of two conclusions would seem certain. If it be maintained that orthodoxy is like nature because it has been developed from the study of nature, the deduction must instantly follow that its doctrines are probably sound. It is one of the lamentable infirmities of thinking very apt to result from that exclusive attention to material things which now-a-days so often usurps to itself the name of "science," that many great investigators of this lower realm of phenomena are prone to fail to recognize, and therefore to reject, their own methods when applied to higher objects of thought. They work by analogy without scruple in determining the probable condition of affairs on the planet Jupiter, or the mode of life of the palæozoic fauna; and they deride analogy as the *ignis fatuus* of imaginative dreamers, the moment you apply it to the study of our spiritual nature! A thinker of broader intellect can hardly fail to perceive that careful and well based deductions from what happens here and now, in the

psychological no less than in the material universe, are extremely likely to prove trustworthy guides in regard to the events of all the future.

But in point of fact, we know very well that no system of sacred philosophy was ever developed, in large degree or in small, from the study of nature. Theologians have been men of the closet, not of the laboratory, the field, or the marketplace. Taking as a basis the sketchy outline furnished by the writers of the Scriptures, they have applied to it the methods of ordinary logic, often going wrong, no doubt, but successively correcting each other's results, till the comprehensive system on which, in every essential point, all evangelical churches are agreed, has gradually assumed its present form and dimensions, including no small number of points of unlooked-for similarity to the manifest operations of nature. *Whence came the original outline?*—involving as it does so much that man would never have either expected or desired, so much that is mysterious if not incomprehensible, so much that is not only seemingly inconsistent and irreconcilable with itself, but in conflict with human reason as well—and withal, so much that on close inspection reminds us of similar processes and similar riddles in the world of every-day phenomena all around us.

The simple, natural, almost unavoidable conclusion would seem to be this—that the First Cause of nature (say "God" or not, as you please) must have been in some manner the inspirer of the teachings of the Bible in regard to our relations with the Creator, our duties, and our future—the author, that is to say, of the great conceptions and beliefs that lie at the foundation of the orthodox faith. If a more probable hypothesis can be framed, better accounting for all the facts, neither materialist nor agnostic has yet told us what it is.

ARTICLE III.—JAMES MORISON AND HIS
COMMENTARIES.

A History of the Evangelical Union. By FERGUS FERGUSON, D.D. Glasgow : Thomas D. Morison, 1876.

A Critical Exposition of the Third Chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans. A Monograph. By JAMES MORISON, D.D. London : Hamilton, Adams & Co. Glasgow : T. D. Morison, 1866.

A Practical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Mark. By JAMES MORISON, D.D. Boston : N. J. Bartlett & Co., 28 Cornhill, 1882.

A Practical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Matthew. By JAMES MORISON, D.D. London : Hodder & Stoughton. Boston : N. J. Bartlett & Co., 1883.

GEOGRAPHICALLY, New Haven is situated between Andover and Oberlin;—theologically, her Divinity School has been supposed to hold a corresponding position in relation to those flanking forces, East and West. But, by the signs of the times, Andover and Oberlin seem to have exchanged theological positions, yet New Haven remains unmoved. Out of the serenity of a conquered peace with all truth new and old, she, who long ago hailed Andover as orthodox, and Oberlin as one day so to be, has now the privilege of hailing Oberlin as orthodox, and Andover as one day so to be. So much for a catholic position to begin with. And, it is as holding this position,—*Nul- lius addictus jurare in verba magistri*,—that *The New Englander* may take some notice of a Theologian, who, as a scholar and a reformer, has had a career, at many points, the counterpart of those its columns represent. Like the New Haven divines of forty, fifty years ago, James Morison and those about him have contended, and we think, *successfully*, for the right of Protestants to find out for themselves what the Bible contains; and to vary, if need be, the applications of its truths to the

varying needs of the soul. The nicknames and the personal contempt cast at those men have already gone the way of all things worthless; the benefits of their claims for a reverent yet free investigation of the unchangeable Word are at length appearing. But let us not anticipate,—let us rather present a brief sketch of this fellow-helper to the truth, and direct attention to his stately Commentaries, now in their latest editions made accessible to American readers.

- At his graduation, James Morison left Edinburgh University not only a successful prizeman, but under the special encomiums of his instructors. Greek and Philosophy have always been favorite studies at Edinburgh; and in these specialties, Mr. Morison gave early promise of eminence. His Professor in Greek (Pillans), offered to see him advanced in the Established Church if he chose to enter it. His Professor in Philosophy (Wilson,—“Christopher North”), wrote on the back of his ticket, that “Mr. Morison had manifested as much intellectual power as had ever been displayed in his class.” From the University the young graduate passed into the Divinity Hall of his Church,—the United Secession, now the United Presbyterian Church,—where he had the instruction of such men as Dr. John Brown,—then without a peer in Scotland, as an exegetical theologian,—Drs. Balmer, Mitchell, and Duncan. At his licensure, in 1839, Dr. Brown declared that the young scholar was “the hope of their church.” And, according to George Gilfillan, about that time the three “young Hannibals,”—the lions’ brood of the Secession Church, were John Eadie, John Cairns, and James Morison. Dr. Eadie, held in honor while he lived, has passed away, Drs. Cairns and Morison are still at such posts of honor and responsibility as seem to make good the words of the literary prophet.

During his probationary year, spent mainly in home missionary work in the bleaker counties of the North, Mr. Morison came under searching and serious religious impressions; and, having had to read his Bible for his own eternal life, his naturally deep and earnest nature became “seized and possessed” of the glorious gospel of the Blessed God, in an intensely practical way. And, what had blest himself he desired to proclaim to others; so, as he had come into “the

peace that passeth understanding" by a simple belief in Christ as his personal Saviour, because presented as a Saviour for all men, "Christ for every man" must thenceforth be his theme of themes.

Not only was the young preacher born again, his preaching was born again,—his language, manner, methods, aims, all took the intensely practical turn that usually characterizes the newly quickened. Here might follow the story of the crowds and conversions, the protracted meetings, the new measures, the alleged extravagances of statement,—sometimes no doubt justly enough alleged,—the peculiar directions to the inquiring, and the discussions thereupon,—but, after allowing for the differing manners of different countries, the story is what the dwellers in this region are all familiar with.

In 1840 Mr. Morison was ordained pastor of Clerk's Lane Church in Kilmarnock; but he was not peaceably settled. His Presbytery, and a small minority of his congregation, took exceptions to several doctrinal and practical points in his teaching, almost all of them turning upon his views of the Scriptures on the nature and extent of the atonement. To the Presbytery's credit, the preaching of the unrestricted propitiation for sin was not one of the counts in the libel, served upon him within a year after his ordination. Yet, it is noticeable, that in all the ensuing discussions of the case, the great difference, or source of difference, between Mr. Morison and his brethren was on the matter of the atonement. *His* contention was that according to the Scriptures, Christ had died for all men, without distinction and without exception; *their* contention was that neither the Bible nor the church's standards admitted of any such assertion; that the atonement, in itself considered, had a limiting reference to believers, and so far had an aspect, or particular reference coördinating it with election, justification, sanctification, and redemption. Mr. Morison's preaching drew distinctions, sharp and clear, between the coördinated blessings just enumerated, and the ground of them all, the dying of the Lord Jesus; *that* he preached, in itself as really available for one man as for another. But during the discussions between Mr. Morison and his Presbytery, he did not deny that his teaching, upon this and other theological

points, differed from the Church's subordinate standards. And we have no doubt that Mr. Morison believed, with many other enlightened Presbyterians, Charles Hodge, Albert Barnes, and others, Old School and New, that he had a liberty, within the standards, to give his own expositions of particular Scriptures; to favor certain experiences; even to maintain the changed aspects of certain doctrines, provided he held to the grand outlines of the Protestant faith.

Before his Presbytery Mr. Morison said:

"That he preached no doctrines contradictory to the *main scope* of the Church's standards of faith. He had a high veneration for those standards, and he conceived them to embody the grand peculiar Protestant doctrines of grace. With those grand doctrines he had never preached anything at variance. His subscription secured that he would not teach anything like Pelagianism, Socinianism or Roman Catholicism; but it did not bind him, he conceived, to every minute tittle and iota within these subordinate standards. * * *

He himself had been taught by his own professor things expressly at variance with those standards. The eternal generation of the Son of God is explicitly taught in the confession of faith; but he had heard it as explicitly contradicted by his venerated instructor. * * *

He took no license with the standards that other ministers did not take. *He stood pledged to maintain the grand Protestant doctrines of grace, and to adhere to the main scope of the standards; but he could not permit himself to be so positively imprisoned by their human formularies as not to take his own views of certain doctrines, and his own modes of presenting all of them to the minds of his hearers.*"*

Speaking in a claim for substantially the same liberty, opposing a proposition for a Church Commentary which should accord with the faith of the word of God as briefly set forth in the standard of the Westminster Assembly, Dr. Charles Hodge, a Presbyterian of the conservative order, deservedly high in honor among Presbyterians everywhere, says, "We could not hold together for a week, if we made the adoption of all its professions [*i. e.* of the Westminster confession] a condition of ministerial communion. Who can tell us the Church's sense of the confession: it is notorious that as to that point we are not agreed."† That the Presbytery citing Mr. Morison for his departure from the standards did not take that view of them, appears in a significant sentence closing the first count in the

* Ferguson's History of The Evangelical Union, page 65.

† Quoted by Professor Dwight in *The New Englander* for March, 1881.

libel served upon him. They complained that his view of the Atonement

“ Represented it, as if it had been fitted to secure the salvation of all men, irrespective of the electing grace of God. Because, in order to lay a foundation for immediate and permanent assurance to the believer, it taught a doctrine which involved a security for the salvation of all men :—viz : that there is a fact in Scripture which has only to be barely seen to be true, in order to give to any man the assurance of salvation. *It was true that Mr. Morison did not say that this proposition involved that doctrine ; but this could not alter the nature of the proposition, nor warrant the Presbytery to tolerate its being taught.*”*

According to this, if we understand it aright, forty years ago a Presbyterian minister might be excinded, not for what he said, but for what he did not say, provided his co-Presbyters' logic concluded against him. The Apostle Paul asked, “ Why should my liberty be judged of another man's conscience.” What might he have said had his doctrines been condemned upon another man's interpretation of them ? What he did say in an analogous case, see Romans iii. 8. Indeed, in certain Presbyteries, the right to demand that each member's doctrinal instructions shall be, virtually, subjected to the judgment of the others, is still insisted on. The case of Dr. McLane, now of New Haven, is a case of relief sought from this very thing. If we are not misinformed, his co-Presbyters, not contented with what he *did* say, insisted that he should say more to satisfy those who thought “ the gospel ” was not preached unless *their* views of it were presented in *their* way.

But we have no wish to delay upon this difference of opinion regarding the amount of liberty possible to ministers in a confederated Church. We refer to it here not to criticise any Presbytery in a given case,—that were both gratuitous and ungracious, for every Church Court has its own business in its own hands, and strangers do not well to intermeddle,—but to inform ourselves on the way an assertion of the Protestant right of private interpretation was met ; and to note what numbers of the Church Catholic stand condemned, if these deliverances against the preaching of Christ as really and truly available for every man, seriously amount to anything. Formally they may, as the decision of a majority against such of their own

* Ferguson's History, page 61.

confederacy as claim more liberty than that majority allows; but essentially, such decisions ought not to damage any evangelical thinker's standing, as a Protestant loyal to the truth. At his appearance before his Synod, Mr. Morison claimed that his was the common Protestant ground. As a fact, at the date of his excision, he was at one with the Marrow-men of the 17th century* upon the object and the act of faith, with his own instructor Dr. Brown, with Dr. Chalmers, Thomas Binney, and others high in honor, and mighty in the pulpit. Upon the extent of the Atonement and the nature of Divine influence, as moral and not mechanical, he was at one with the Baxters, the Wesleys, the Edwardses, the Dwights, and their successors in the Englands Old and New, who have had no scruple in maintaining that there is more than a formal "offer of salvation" for every man in the gospel, and who trace whatever there may be of inability to believe the gospel, to the *can-not* that is in the *will-not* of the human spirit.

Mr. Morison's appeal, as standing on this ground, was dismissed by the Synod, Dr. Brown's able and eloquent defence followed by his formal dissent, and Dr. King's plea for a forbearing and catholic spirit, availing little against the evidently excited minds of the judges, who, hot from their own debate, were ready to settle as ecclesiastical senators, what they had just discussed as theological disputants. And so, to the surprise of many, himself included, the young hero of the Secession all of a sudden found himself outside the church of his fathers. And not only so, he heard his friends and brethren, yes, even his own father as a minister of the same church, forbidden to hold any ministerial intercourse "with the said James Morison," either by preaching for him, or allowing him to preach for them.

As we pass to a new turn in Mr. Morison's career, we may say, without any invidious reflection upon the excinding church, or the excinded minister,—for great ability was shown by both parties, and doubtless a conscientious discharge of duty, according to their light, was claimed by both alike,—still, we may say that this controversy has numbered itself among the

* See "The Marrow of Modern Divinity," by Edward Fisher, A.M., Oxford, 1644.

many theological conflicts that according to Cardinal Newman, "have been the occasion of much infirmity, the test of much hidden perverseness, and the subject of much bitterness and tumult." "But," as His Eminence proceeds to say, "the world has been moved in consequence of it, populations excited, leagues and alliances formed. . . . Even zeal, when excessive, manifesting a sense of the preciousness of its object, though anomalous in its details, from the peculiarities of individuals, or the interference of strangers, still, upon the whole, there has been the development of an idea."* To this there is a witness in the width of view opened to the Scottish theological mind, and in the increasing spirit of toleration towards differing beliefs, in which this minister, and this same church, have both borne a conspicuous part. Years have done what ecclesiastical courts could neither help nor hinder. Interest concentrated upon one case has become diluted over many cases; and growth into a calmer wisdom, and a fuller Christian charity are healing the hurts that at that date, scarification and excision only irritated and inflamed.

Before calling attention to Dr. Morison's Commentaries, it may be well to notice the rise and progress of the Evangelical Union, with which though now relieved from his pastoral charge in the city, Dr. Morison is still connected as Professor of Exegetical Theology. This Union was formed by the cluster of ministers and churches, that between 1841 and 1843 had to leave the United Secession Church, on account of their break with its limitarian theology. Immediately after Mr. Morison's excision, his father, Rev. Robert Morison, of Bathgate, and two of his brother clergymen, Rev. Alexander C. Rutherford, of Falkirk, and Rev. John Guthrie, of Kendal, having dissented from the Synod's action, on the ground of their own sympathy with the doctrines condemned, were themselves excinded; following their leader out of the church they were affectionately attached to, and within which they were surprised to know that their preaching of a free gospel was not acceptable, —not so much to their congregations, however, as to their fellow-presbyters. The basis of the new Union, in the main, was (1) the love of God to all men, the work of Christ for all men,

* J. H. Newman's *Fifteen Sermons*, page 816.

the striving of the Spirit with all men; (2) the placing of the saving element of faith not in the subjective exercises of the believer, but in the objective power of the Saviour; (3) the accounting for the loss of the soul, *wholly* by its own persistent unbelief, instead of by a decree of unconditional reprobation—which doctrine of reprobation these brethren maintained, they saw no escape from, by the way they were expected to preach the gospel of the Confession. In fact, had our new Congregational creed been before them, and had they not been excited upon certain aspects of theology peculiar to their ecclesiastical position, that creed had served them admirably for their new statement of belief.

These brethren did not long remain alone. The word *Union* seemed prophetic; for owing to the growing spirit of revival, in connection with an increasing discontent among earnest souls with the current forms of religious experience, not only did churches born of the new effort multiply, an accession was soon made to their number from the Congregationalists. Five churches with their pastors, and nine divinity students just on the eve of being licensed to preach, allied themselves to the new denomination. Some time after, two churches of the "Relief" section of the dissenting Presbyterians came into the Union;—and so it has gathered and grown, until it now enrolls, in all, between eighty and ninety churches. After keeping aloof for several years, the Congregational Union of Scotland,—seeing perhaps that these earnest Christian men were *not* "increasing more unto ungodliness,"—has of late exchanged delegates with the Evangelical Union.* The English Congre-

* This halting action is not a solitary fact in the history of a reform. The all but perfect identity in experience among Eastern and Western thinkers, in their efforts to get out of a close and exacting system into the freer action that meets the world's needs, tempts into this foot note the following lines from President Fairchild's recent Baccalaureate Sermon :

"The shadow of the Westminster Confession rested upon all the Puritan churches. Under this sign Lyman Beecher and Albert Barnes had fought their battles. The new school theology, which had spread in a superficial way through the land in connection with the great revivals, had come to be regarded with suspicion even by its friends, because it was feared that it logically led to Oberlinism; and the New School Presbyterian Church, east and west, hastened to vindicate its

gationalists have always welcomed the Union ministers to their pulpits,—Principal Fairbairn, of Airedale College, Joseph Boyle, of London, and Robert Craig, of Manchester, being some of their more distinguished guests of recent years. 'The American Cumberland Presbyterians also exchange ecclesiastical courtesies with the Evangelical Union. And as the catholicity of Christendom perfects itself by reason of use, by and by it must cease to be of an offence to Christian comity, to see and to present aspects of truth not visible to Christian thinkers in the sphere of their birth and training. "Holding the Head" is the apostolic test of unity in fellowship; keeping the limbs of the growing body in the cramping bands of a younger age is not suggestive of any unity that is vital. But a truce with the disagreeable past,—we have to do with present results instead of bygone prognostications; and so it is with genuine pleasure that we commend to the reader the expositions by Dr. Morison named at the head of this article.

The critical exposition of Romans, third chapter, not being so accessible as the others, merits our fullest notice. In his preface, in strong and graphic language the author describes his entrance into the school of the prophets and apostles. This third chapter of Romans he treats as a text book in a Spiritual University; and in examining it he describes his elation of soul at coming into contact with so many other scholars,—patristic, medieval, modern, and more modern,—whom he found clustering about their incomparable instructor, Paul. He exclaims with Melancthon: "*Quid est enim Paulo rarius?*"

After further information upon the nature of his Monograph, the author places all Theological instructors in his debt, for the following weighty deliverance upon the bearing of exegesis on systematic and polemic theology:

orthodoxy by disclaiming all responsibility for Oberlin doctrines. The Congregational churches, always a little apprehensive lest they should seem less orthodox than their Presbyterian neighbors, stood aloof with averted countenance."—*The Oberlin Jubilee* of 1888, page 107.

May we add this also, from Professor Park's pamphlet on the Andover Associate Creed, (page 40): "It has been said of the Hopkinsian Calvinists that 'they dreaded a *semi*-Arminian more than a thorough one, a *semi*-Pelagian more than a complete one.'" And yet, who were the *Hopkinsian* Calvinists? Were they not modifiers of historic Calvinism?

"The author has had in view at once the permanent interests of Biblical Exegesis, and the present phases of some great theological controversies. He has the conviction that it is a matter of special moment that the minds of theological inquirers in general, and of theological controvertists in particular, should be recalled, at frequently recurring intervals, to the calm investigation of the biblical idea *as they lie in continuity on the page of inspiration*. If such investigation does not exhaust,—as it does not,—the possibilities of doctrinal analysis and synthesis; if it leaves indeterminate,—as it does,—the measure of vital elasticity, as regards form, of which the essential realities of theology and religion are susceptible in thought;—it shows nevertheless,—at least when conducted with sufficient freedom from sectarian prepossession, and with adequate literary skill and scientific intuition,—what were the actual representations of things which were evolved in the minds of the inspired writers. When these actual representations are actually ascertained, a touchstone is got hold of, that is of inestimable value for testing the legitimacy of the theological conceptions which are either already current in the churches, or which are pushing their way into public notice, and seeking or demanding ecclesiastical recognition. The farther, undoubtedly, that any doctrines diverge in form from the forms that are explicitly exhibited on the pages of the Book, the less is the likelihood of their resolvability, in substrate, into the biblical forms; and the farther, consequently, must they be removed, so far as real authority is concerned, from the sphere of men's consciences. The more unwieldy, too, must they be in the matter of adaptability for exerting a wholesome ethical influence on men's hearts and lives."*

From page 279 to 305 the critical reader will find a piece of work to repay his attention; and if he is one of those younger theologians whom Dr. Morison seeks to aid, he will find the reading not only richly instructive, but in the English of a former age, "vastly entertaining." The way he disposes of his fellow-students of St. Paul who have not taken Dr. Routh's advice and "verified their references," is a lesson on thoroughness and accuracy that should do them good all their days. The main point of criticism is upon the force of *ἱλαστήριον*,—in the version of 1611 rendered as a substantive, *propitiation*, (Romans iii. 25). But, as in other cases, Dr. Morison has anticipated the Revised Version's marginal reading,—concluding for its adjectival meaning and renders it *propitiatory*;—"Whom God set (publicly) forth (as) propitiatory,—(available) through faith in his blood,—for demonstration of his righteousness because of the pretermission of the sins of former times in the forbearance

* Critical Commentary on Rom. iii. Preface, pages vii., viii.

of God,—in order to the demonstration of his righteousness in the present time, that he may be righteous even in justifying him who is of faith in Jesus."

And, to the results of this masterly search after the exact import of the word, let the following passage testify :

"There can thus be no doubt of the actual conventional usage of the word as employed adjectively. And its simple adjectival force in the passage before us is really all that can be desired. It is in substance approved by Winzer, Matthias, and Mehring. It comprehends and harmonizes, indeed, all that is aimed at in all the other interpretations ; but it embraces them in the ampler folds of that indefinite applicability that is characteristic of its own peculiar adjectival import. If Christ Jesus is set forth as *propitiatory*, then it must be true that he is set forth as a *propitiation*, and set forth as a *propitiatory sacrifice*, and set forth, too, at *the antitypical fulfillment of all the symbols of propitiation that were divinely instituted under preceding dispensations*. It was Christ himself, in his theanthropic personality that was thus propitiatory. He was in his intermingled *satisfactio* and *satispassio*, the meritorious cause of God's relation of propitiousness to the human family. It is in consideration of his propitiation that God, as the moral governor of the universe, is willing and is ready to forgive and to justify all such of the "ungodly" as will be induced to take up, by means of faith in the propitiator, that one mental position that will insure their voluntary reception of such divine influences as are needed to renew the heart and assimilate the character to the archetypal character of God."

And, as an illustration of the power that the exegetical theologian secures for the statement of truth in doctrinal form,—as a lesson also to younger theologians, upon the value of meditation upon the *words* within which the living truth is to be found, let the following paragraph, born of the foregoing investigation, be not only read but studied :

"Propitiation assumes, indeed, that the great moral governor,—considered personally, and as distinct from his abstract moral government,—has been displeased. It assumes that he has been greatly offended, and greatly offended God has really been ; offended at rebellion and with rebels. His infinite heart has been stirred. His infinite conscience has been aroused. His holy indignation has sprung up, and gone forth. But other feelings and other principles were at work all the time, and thence arose the idea and the scheme of propitiation. In the accepted propitiation the divine anger has been so turned away that God is now willing, and ready, and eager to forgive the guiltiest of the guilty, treating them for eternity as if they had never sinned. He is willing, ready, and eager, in consideration of the propitiation, to render them who had madly made themselves liable to everlasting

death the heirs of everlasting life. The propitiatory work of Christ is thus the great unique fact in the divine moral government, in consideration of which God, as the great moral governor is willing and ready to forgive. Such is its essential nature. But, let it ever be borne in mind that it was in virtue of a self-originated desire in the divine heart,—a desire to be willing to forgive,—that God himself devised the scheme of propitiation.”*

But one more citation from this able book can be made,—it is from the criticism upon the outcome of the discussion,—verse 31. *Do we then abolish law through faith? Far be it! On the contrary, we establish law.*

Before quoting it, let us say that not once in all these four hundred and twenty pages upon this one chapter, does the author's interest seem to wane, or his mental power to flag; and here, at the last, there comes out upon the reader as with a fresh unction, this admirable handling of that majestic sentence, “*We establish law.*”

The law, indeed, had not *fallen*, and was not *lying prostrate*, so far as its legislative validity and authority were concerned. In the sphere of legislative validity and authority, its position was the same that it had been from the beginning, and will be to the end. It was as stable as the throne of God himself. But when the law is contemplated in a lower sphere,—the sphere in which it comes into contact with human volition,—the sphere consequently of its actual or factual moral influence upon the inner and outer life of man, we see that there is a sense in which it has been, with awful impiety, not only pushed aside, but overthrown and trampled under foot. It has been *upset*. It has been *overthrown*, and laid prostrate as in the dust. Nay, it has been *broken*. And men in their infatuation, have danced deliriously over its fragments. Such is sin. There is an insult in it, in reference to the law and the authority of the lawgiver. This is solematter of fact. And the apostle was thinking of it; as is evident from the scope of the entire preceding part of the epistle.

Now, his doctrine of *justification by faith in the propitiation of Christ* not only meets the wants of men in the direction of pardon for the past; it also meets their wants in the direction of purity for the future. It involves provision for the establishment of the moral influence of moral law. Into whatever soul it finds an entrance,—in that soul it raises up, as from the dust the prostrate law and makes it stand. It *sets-up* that which was *up-set* by sin. It *establishes* in the sphere of the soul's inner and outer activities, an ethical influence, which is really,—when we let down our line into the depths of the subject,—nothing more, nor less, nor else, than the native moral influence of the moral law. There is a point whence both propitiation and legislation respectively start, and whither they return.”†

* On Romans iii., p. 305. † Critical Exposition of Romans iii., p. 415.

The commentaries on Matthew and Mark are written upon a different plan from the work on Romans iii. They are practical in their intent, and though more popular in their style, contain almost all the scholarship available even to the scholar, not only upon questions of textual genuineness, but upon doctrinal and critical opinion. This it is that has called out the unstinted commendations of the discerning, in all sections of the Church. Critics of widely differing theological opinions are at one upon the learning, the labor, the patience, the skill, the soundness of doctrine, the devoutness of spirit shown in these stately volumes. They have their own excrescences, as what able books have not? Yet, the *Sword and Trowel*,—Mr. Spurgeon's paper,—says, "It is a hopeful sign of the times that there is a market for such massive expositions; and we are thankful to Dr. Morison for his addition to the works we prize above all others; viz: comments upon the word of God." The *Edinburgh Daily Review*,—Free Church paper,—says: "Dr. Morison is laying the Christian Church under deep obligations by his able and elaborate commentaries" Even the *United Presbyterian Magazine*,—the literary organ of the church refusing to let Mr. Morison continue in its fellowship, advises its young ministers to secure these commentaries, and ponder their method and contents.

As a specimen of Dr. Morison's introductory matter, let the following be taken upon the aim and plan of Matthew's gospel. Thinking Delitzsch's detection of an exceedingly subtle plan of the gospel hardly borne out by its contents, the author holds that while the composition systematically carries out its aim of setting Jesus forth (1) as He really was, and (2) as the Messiah, shadowed forth in the whole of the Old Testament history, it does so by a plan finely free, easy, and inartificial."

"It is *Memorials* which the evangelist is engaged in composing. And hence groupings or constellations of things come frequently in, to the great intensification of the ethical influence of the narrative upon the mind of the reader." There are groupings of facts, the natural *Magnalia* of the Messiah of God, though marvels and miracles to us. There are groupings of far-reaching remarks, which are often like miracles of thought, and which are certainly the germs of theology, sociology, religion, and goodness for all time to come. There are groupings of parables which come within the amphitheatre of our vision like Christian Muses in a troop, with hand locked in hand. They tell their tales;

they chant their music ; and then retire ; leaving behind a trail of beauty that lights up forever the whole spiritual scene. In short, the *tout ensemble* of the Memoirs has all the effect of the highest art. The attention never wearies. The interest never flags,—the details of things are so intrinsically catching and captivating, and the range of variety is so great.

A child can look and wonder. So may the full grown man, if with the loss of childishness, he have not also lost that childlikeness which is the most beautiful and healthful feature of true maturity of soul.”*

To show Dr. Morison’s theological position, in connection with his expository skill, and his reverent spirit, let a suggestive extract serve :

Matthew xxiii. 37. . . . How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not. . . . “*Wished I*: Some of the older expositors stop at this expression and set to work, by might and main, to reconcile it with the doctrine of unconditional reprobation. How could the Saviour, they ask, say *I wished*, when, if He had really wished He could and would, in an instant, have controlled all their wills and successfully gathered them together under the wings of love and protecting care? He speaks, says Beza, “concerning his external ministry.” . . . Says Piscator “of his human will,” as distinguished from his Divine. . . . Says Pareus, “of his Divine will indeed, but only of his preceptive will,” and *not of his will of good pleasure*.” We cannot accept any of these answers. Not Beza’s, for “external ministry,” is neither internal *wish nor will*. Not Piscator’s, for Christ’s mere human wish or will, apart from His Divine, would have been of no particular significance to the Jews or to any people ; and, moreover, there is no reason to believe that it would be at variance with the Divine. Not Pareus’s, for the Saviour is not speaking of what he willed or wished or enjoined others to do, but of what he himself willed and wished to do. Every interpretation that would explain away the reality of the Saviour’s sincere and most gracious desire to have all the Jews without distinction or exception *gathered together under Him*, into the enjoyment of his love and protecting care, is deeply to be deplored, as at radical variance with the fundamental principle of “the gospel.” (See John iii. 16.) . . . And ye would not. The language is evidence, as Dean Alford justly remarks, “of the freedom of man’s will to resist the grace of God. Calvin was led astray by the theology which he inherited, when he denied the validity of the evidence, and accused those of sophistry who adduced it (*a sophistis arripitur*). He did not anticipate the progress of philosophic thought, and perceive that *the denial of all theology, natural and revealed, is involved in the denial of the freedom of the will.*”†

* Commentary on Matthew, pages lvii., lviii.

† Commentary on Matthew, pages 449, 450.

Our work is done, in simply directing attention to these expositions,—in doing so by giving some desired information concerning their author. Apart from that, these volumes have a solid value of their own; their intrinsic excellence will continue to invite the criticism, and reward the study of the scholarly, of all shades of evangelical thinking. The new editions, reaching us through an American publishing house, appear among us at a significant time. We are just getting under the new flag of a genuinely catholic creed; and this catholic theologian, is just passing out of his forty years of public life into his well earned retirement. And as he does so, the Scottish press accompanies him with the assurance that “few ministers living are regarded with profounder respect than the founder of the Evangelical Union, which now consists of nearly a hundred congregations.”

Yet, forty years ago, this man was denied “a name to live” in a Protestant communion. He desired to lengthen the cords of the church he loved. But no: he might strengthen the stakes already driven, but for lengthening the cords there was *then* no provision. And so being cast out, he took the cords of the gospel with him; and while it is true that being out, he went further than his first intent, still having stretched the cords to their fullest tension, he has of late been “strengthening the stakes,” on the old ground as well as on the new. No better orthodox book upon the Pauline view of the Atonement has seen the light of late years, than this author’s “Romans Third.”

At last, however, the times have signs that the Church which has Augustine and Arminius in her membership, which sings Toplady’s and Wesley’s hymns out of the same book, is evidently about to let the followers of Augustine and Arminius and the singers of Toplady and Wesley live, without reproach, in the same communion. Out of his retirement, therefore, and from under a less bitter *odium theologicum*, we shall look with interest for Dr. Morison’s long-promised “Galatians.” He, of all men we know, has the apparatus, the skill, the personal and spiritual experience, the sympathy with the “rare man,” Paul, that fit him to bless our common Protestantism, by giving it a full, scriptural, forcible exposition of its grand Magna Charta,

—the Epistle to the Galatians. And may others follow that uncompleted work. The opportunities are opening, more widely than ever, for the genuine gospel to get a hearing without theological prejudice on account of diversities in Christian belief. In these widening spheres for “the truth as it is in Jesus,” we believe that James Morison has earned the right to be heard. He is heard; and will be more fully heard by all who welcome the spreading liberty of Christian thought and speech; as one who by fighting his own way into this liberty, has fought the battles of many; as an expositor with the strength of Trapp, the precision of Calvin, and the unction of Matthew Henry; as a noble minister of the gospel, who “through good report and bad report,” still held his place as a preacher of unwonted power, and,—as many live to testify,—a friend to the weary heart in search of God.

ARTICLE IV.—PAUL JANET ON FINAL CAUSES.

M. JANET'S "Final Causes" is, beyond a doubt, a most important work, and, indeed, an almost epoch-making book in Natural Theology. It has attracted much attention from all classes of thinkers, scientific, philosophic and theologic, and has already taken its place as a standard work on the subject. The book was first issued in the original French in 1876, and in the second and revised edition was translated into English by William Affleck and published in Great Britain, and this translation has quite recently been published in this country. In style it is marked by that perfect limpidity and transparency which is almost peculiar to French writers. As to originality, while it is plain that M. Janet has read very widely, it is also plain that the work is no patch-work, no crude and hasty compilation, but a carefully wrought out system. He has been much influenced by Leibnitz and later German philosophers. He is also, of course, much indebted to French writers, Bossuet, Fenelon, and later ones. He has also drawn somewhat from English sources, specially Newton, Clark, and Paley.

As to general method and spirit, M. Janet's work is not a polemic, but a philosophical examination and discussion of the subject, and it is conducted throughout with the greatest calmness and candor. Objections are put and answered somewhat after the Platonic style. The argument is closely knit and thorough. Not a corner but is searched, and there is everywhere the evidence of scrupulous thoroughness, which seems at times almost fastidious. The author does not heap up facts of adaptation after the manner of the *Bridgewater Treatises*; but he is concerned in applying a philosophical dialectic to the principle of final causes, to the discussion of the question whether or not the principle of inferring design from adaptation is a valid one, and, as the author expresses it, this is accomplished by "what the English call *cross examination*."

"The present work," he says, "is not altogether of the same kind as those of which I have just spoken," (referring to

"*Bridgewater Treatises*," "Duke of Argyle's *Reign of Law*, and Professor Flint's *Theism*." It is not a treatise of natural theology, but an analytical and critical treatise on the principle of Final Causes itself. Different times require different efforts. Philosophy has, in our days assumed a new aspect. On the one hand, the development of the sciences of nature, which more and more tends to subject the phenomena of the universe to a mechanical concatenation, on the other hand the development of the critical and idealist philosophy that had its center in Germany at the commencement of this century, and which has had its counterpart even in Scotland with Hamilton and Ferrier, and in fine, the progress of the spirit of inquiry in all departments, have rendered necessary a revision of the problem. The principles themselves must be subjected to criticism. At the present day the mere adding of facts to facts no longer suffices to prove the existence of a design in nature, however useful for the rest that work may still be. The real difficulty is in the interpretation of these facts, the question is regarding the principle itself. This principle I have endeavored to criticise. I have sought its foundations, authority, limits, and signification, by confronting it with the data and the condition of modern science, as well as with the doctrine of the boldest and most recent metaphysics." (pp. iv., v.)

The treatise is divided into two books, the first of which treats of the phenomena of finality, and the second, of the cause of finality. Herein is a division of labor in teleology which has been little, if ever, regarded by other writers, and which is considered by M. Janet as of great importance. He says :

"This inquiry divides itself into two problems: 1st. Is finality a law of nature? 2d. What is the cause of that law?

These two questions are quite distinct, and much obscurity arises from having confounded them. We will treat them separately in two different books." (p. 13.)

M. Janet seeks to show in the first book that there are phenomena in nature characterized by "adaptation to the future," as, for example, the wing of a bird is in forming adapted to a future action, flight. Such phenomena are not sufficiently explained by physical causation, and we must consider not only

the cause as influencing its effect, but also the effect as influencing its cause either by ideal design or otherwise. We must read organic phenomena not only forward—efficient causation—but backward—final causation—that is, in such phenomena not only does the past control the future, but in some way the future also controls the past. In short, to show that there are means and ends in nature, not only in organic, but also in inorganic nature, that is to show that “finality is a law of nature,” this is the object of the first book. In the second book M. Janet seeks to show in what way the ends in nature control the means, that it is not an unconscious instinctive operation, like that of a beaver building a dam, but conscious and intelligent, comparable to the action of an architect building a house. The “first cause” of the law of finality—the law that there are means and ends in nature as well as causes and effects, that the future controls the past, as well as the past the future—is shown to be a Personal Intelligence. To acknowledge finality is one thing, and to acknowledge the cause of finality as lying in the ideal design of an intelligent Being is another thing. One may thus be a teleologist, yet not a theistic teleologist, as witness, for example, Hegel and Hartman.

Mr. James Sully, in a notice of the “Final Causes,” in *Mind* for January, 1877, disparages this distinction, and asserts that even M. Janet does not keep to it. He says that design is meaningless unless it means “ideal pre-representation.” On pages 61 and 92 the author does indeed state “ideal pre-representation” as the method of finality, and in the first instance certainly as being a formal statement of the law of finality, it ought to have been made broader and included unconscious finality. However it is plain from the whole tenor of the first book, and from such passages as on pages 11, 103, 124, 187, etc., that M. Janet does recognize the distinction, and keeps to it, as much as is necessary.

We think that Mr. Sully’s criticism on this point is a failure, and Professor Flint, in his preface to the translation, strikes keenly at another criticism which Mr. Sully makes in this same notice.

We can only consider in this paper the first book by way of exposition and criticism.

In the preliminary chapter on the problem of final causes, the author briefly discusses and sets aside the notion of finality as an *a priori* truth. We think that this portion is hardly as thorough and satisfactory as it might be; but we simply give his conclusion. The idea of efficient cause is plainly, he says, a necessary and universal truth, but not so the conception of final cause.

"Doubtless the human mind can apply the idea of finality even to the preceding cases, and for example, believe that it is for an unknown end that there are mountains, volcanoes, monsters, and so on. I do not deny that it can, I say only that it is not forced to it, as it is in the case of causality properly so-called. Finality in these different cases is for it only a means of conceiving things, a hypothesis which pleases and satisfies it, a subjective point of view, to which it can abandon itself, as it can refuse to do so; or else the consequence of a doctrine which is believed true. On the other hand, causality is a necessary law of the mind, an objective law of all phenomena without exception, a law necessary and everywhere verified by the constant reproduction of phenomena under the same conditions, in a word, to employ the expression of Kant, finality in the examples cited is only a *regulative* principle, causality is always a *constitutive* principle." (pp. 6, 7.)

M. Janet believes that finality "is a *law of nature*, obtained by observation and induction;" and he closes the chapter with that statement of the problem as two-fold which we have already quoted.

The first book begins with a chapter on the principle of final causes. He here seeks to show in a general way the insufficiency of any theory of chance or mechanical causation to satisfactorily explain concordance of phenomena to a future phenomenon. The argument may be put briefly in this way: We see certain effects—e. g., human stomach, eye, etc.—which are characterized by "adaptation to the future." A future operation, viz: digestion is to be performed, and an organ for performing that operation is prepared in nature by coördinating numberless indefinite elements into the definite result, a stomach. The question then is, how, out of an infinitude of possible combinations, there results this definite effect, a human

stomach, performing a definite work, digestion. The only comprehensible way of answering this question is to acknowledge that in some way the effect has influenced the causes, circumscribing and selecting to itself, that is, there has been finality. Whether the influencing of the causes by the effect has come about by foreseen plan or blindly is not now to be considered, but is to be discussed in the second book. M. Janet, referring to the examples adduced of the stomach, eye, etc., thus clearly summarizes this view :

“From these examples it is clear what we mean by the determination of the present by the future. We will choose in each function its essential and characteristic phenomenon (for instance, in nutrition, assimilation, in respiration, the oxygenation of the blood, etc.). We will commence by considering this phenomenon as a simple result of the properties of organized matter; that is what we call *the future phenomenon*. Meanwhile, in studying the condition of the production of this phenomenon, we shall find that there must be, in order to produce it, an enormous mass of coincidences, all landing in precisely the same result. This we call the harmony of the phenomena with the future. Now, how would so many diverse causes happen to converge to the self-same point if there were not some cause which directed them towards that point? Such is the succession of ideas in virtue of which the result becomes an end.” (p. 42.)

This chapter is thus a general demonstration of the principle of finality upon the basis of the principle of causality. Accepting causality as a valid principle, we are bound in applying it to certain cases at least, phenomena of organic nature, to come to the theory of finality. In the chapters which follow the validity of this way of inferring is discussed with reference to the facts of nature, the industry of man, and the theories of evolution.

The arrangement of the chapters in the first book after the first chapter is not clearly indicated, and, in fact, there seems to be a misplacing. The second chapter is concerned with the Facts, and this is followed by a chapter on the Industry of Man and the Industry of Nature. Then there is a chapter on Organ and Function, followed by a chapter on the Contrary

Facts. This is followed by a chapter on Mechanism and Finality, and then there are three chapters on Evolution. The chapter on the Facts is not connected by the author with the previous or the two following chapters, but he very appropriately introduces the chapter on the Contrary Facts by a reference to that on the Facts. Chapter III. is directly connected by the author with Chapter I., and should properly follow it. The fourth chapter is connected with the third by M. Janet, and the sixth chapter would naturally follow it, and then the chapters on Evolution. The natural and scientific order of treatment thus seems to be, first, a general and abstract demonstration of the principle of finality, and this is effected in the first chapter. Having this general statement, it would next be in order to consider the particular steps of the process whereby we may validly reach finality; and this is given in the third chapter. The principle and method of finality being understood in this way, they might be further emphasized and illustrated by contrasting with and defending against physical causation; and this is effected in a general way in chapter sixth, and with special reference to physiology in chapter fourth. The particular facts in nature *pro* and *con* would then be appropriately considered; and this is done in Chapters II. and V. The chapters on Evolution very properly close the discussion.

This is evidently the natural order, and the one which was in the author's mind; and this will be the order of this paper. The book was largely remodeled by the author in the second edition, and we hope that it will be still further improved in this respect in future editions.

Chapter third, the chapter on the Industry of Man and the Industry of Nature, was to us, perhaps the most interesting and suggestive of any in the volume. By what process do we attain the notion of final cause in nature?

"It must be confessed that, if experience had not given us beforehand somewhere the type of the final cause, to all appearance we could never have invented this notion. We do not know beforehand and *a priori* that every agreement of a phenomenon with the future supposes an end, but this agreement requiring to be explained, we explain it after the model which

we find in ourselves, when we make some combination with a view to the future. The foundation of this conclusion, accordingly, as has always been thought, is analogy." (pp. 92, 93.) And he further remarks (p. 97), "As the only really efficient cause which we know is ourselves, so the only final cause that is immediately perceptible to us is in ourselves." It seems necessary that a person should have the capacity of designing, before he can recognize design, for the machine is unmeaning to the idiot. We know ourselves as designers, as planning and executing according to plan; and from comparing the seen effects in the case of our own conscious designing with like phenomena associated with our fellow-beings we come by the simple formula, like effects, like causes, to attribute design to our fellow men and the higher animals.

"There is, therefore, at least one case in which the final cause is established by experience, namely, the case of our personal and voluntary activity. From this center we can radiate around ourselves, and the first certain step which we take beyond ourselves is to affirm intelligence, causality, desire, and finally, finality, in our fellows." (p. 98.)

We then arrive by analogical induction from ourselves, to a belief in the industry of man, but how shall we attain to the notion of industry and art in nature? By the comparison of our own works with those about us we come to the conception of human industry, and by the comparison of human works and natural products we arrive at the idea of nature's industry. We see in both, for instance, that the principle of division of labor applies.

"It is not at random that the organized substance passes from that homogeneous, amorphous, indeterminate first state, which appears to be its beginning, to that state of skillful complication in which it is seen in the superior animals. It is according to a law, the law of the progressive perfecting of functions at the rate of the progressive differentiation of the organs. This the law which M. Milne-Edwards has ingeniously called the *law of the division of labor*, and to the high importance of which in the development of animals, he has rightly drawn attention; but in the very expression of this happy formula, who does not see how difficult it is for science to

avoid the comparison of human labor and the labor of nature, so evident it is that these two sorts of labor are only degrees of one and the same thing? In the first instance, in humanity, as in the living organism, all the wants, all the functions, are in some sort confounded, the diversity of function commences with the diversity of organs and of wants, the first division of labor is that which nature has instituted. But in proportion as the wants multiply, the actions and functions of individuals separate, and the means of performing these actions with more convenience and utility for man multiply in their turn. Human industry, therefore, is nothing else than the prolongation and development of the labor of nature. Thus nature makes prehensile organs, the arms and the hands; industry lengthens them by means of stones, sticks, bags, pails and of all tools for felling, digging, picking, trenching, etc. Nature creates organs for the mechanical trituration of food; industry prolongs them by its instruments, which serve to cut, to tear and dissolve that food beforehand by fire, water, and all sorts of salts; and thus the culinary art becomes, as it were, the succedaneum of the art of digestion. Nature gives us organs of motion which are themselves mechanical marvels compared with the rudimentary organs of mollusks and zoöphytes, human industry prolongs and multiplies these means of locomotion by means of the different motor machines and of animals employed as machines. (pp. 134–135.)

It may be added that not only do we prolong natural instruments, but we steal from nature. Nature ornaments herself with feathers and flowers, and we steal these for our own ornaments. We steal the bear's robe and the beaver's. Man steals nature's weapon, as when the savage makes his shark's-teeth spear. Moreover, we perceive analogies between artificial and natural instruments, and we apply to artificial objects names drawn from natural objects, as when we speak of the teeth of a saw, or the arm of a lever. The reverse process of calling natural objects by names drawn from artificial objects is, perhaps, still more common, as when we speak of the sword-fish, saw-fish, tailor-bird, etc. It is evident that there is an analogy of form, structure, and use between man's instruments and nature's, and that this analogy is owing mostly to an unconscious imitation on man's part.

We see precisely the same objects aimed at in art and nature and accomplished in both by coördination upon the same principles; and since in the former case the problem is solved by design, we infer that in the latter case the solving cause is designing intelligence. That this analogy remains good notwithstanding certain differences is thus strikingly emphasized by M. Janet:

“What difference is there between the act by which nature has created a crystalline, and the act by which man constructs lenses? What difference between the act by which nature creates molar teeth, and the act by which man makes mill-stones? What difference between the act by which nature makes fins, and the act by which man creates instruments of natation?

“There are two differences: the first is that nature does not know what it is doing, while man does; the second, that in the one case the implements are internal, in the other external. But these differences do not destroy the profound analogies of the two kinds of action; and there still remains in both cases a creation of machines. Now, how could the same machine be considered here as a collection of means and ends, there as a simple coincidence of causes and effects? How should the construction of an apparatus for flying infer in the case of man, if it were discovered, a miracle of genius and invention, so complicated is the problem, so difficult in this case to adapt the means to the end, and yet the solution of the same problem found by nature itself, be the simple effect of a coincidence of causes? Can we thus assign two absolutely opposite causes to two absolutely identical actions?” (pp. 107, 108.)

Again, we may note that a certain contrast between art and nature, mentioned by M. Janet, has in it an element of likeness which is worthy of consideration at this point. M. Janet remarks upon that contrast between the works of man and nature which has often been noticed by thoughtful observers, namely, that man's are works not self-repairing and reproductive as nature's are. He approvingly quotes from Fenelon: “What would be thought of a machine that should flee to purpose, that should recoil, defend itself, and escape in order to preserve itself when it was sought to break it? What is more beautiful than a ma-

chine that repairs and renews itself incessantly? What would be said of a watchmaker who could make watches spontaneously, producing others without end, so that the two first watches should be sufficient to multiply and perpetuate the species on the earth?" However, it is worthy of notice that if man's works are not reproductive, they are productive and indirectly reproductive. Man's machines perpetuate, not their own kind, but another kind. The foundry lathe does not turn out ready made foundry lathes, but bolts and many things which contribute to the making of lathes as well as to the making of many other machines. The works of man are inter-dependent, as are also the works of nature. Self-repair and reproduction are phenomena of the highest class of nature's works, living beings. While man has not yet succeeded in forming a fully self-repairing and reproductive machine, he has made some approach to this in the construction of self-regulating and self-feeding machines. A self-lubricating machine is in its measure a self-repairing machine. The difference between art and nature is in this respect, as it appears to us, rather one of degree than one of kind, and as such it is of value in the analogical argument.

The analogy, then, on the whole, between the industry of man and the industry of nature is most striking, and has always been remarked upon by man. As has been already noticed, man recognizes this analogy in the naming of both natural and artificial objects. The scientist recognizes the analogy in many ways, as for instance in nomenclature, in such terms as *division of labor* applied to organic nature by Milne-Edwards, and *Natural Selection* applied to organisms by Charles Darwin. The analogy has often afforded a clew to the scientist in his work, very notably so in the case of Darwin's famous investigation. He repeatedly refers to it as the guiding principle of his works upon variation in nature. For instance, we may cite these words from the introduction to the *Origin of Species*:

"It is, therefore, of the highest importance to gain a clear insight into the means of modification and co-adaptation. At the commencement of my observation it seemed to me probable that a careful study of domesticated animals and of cultivated plants would offer the best chance of making out this obscure problem. Nor have I been disappointed in this and in

all other perplexing cases. I have invariably found that our knowledge, imperfect though it be, of variation under domestication, afforded the best and safest clew."

We think that it adds to clearness and force to put this analogy of art and nature into the shape of a ratio, something which M. Janet does not attempt. The facts of physical science are the facts of teleology; but the scientist rises from facts to principles directly, the teleologist rises from the same facts to different principles indirectly. The scientist very generally employs simple induction, he rises from an accumulation of facts directly to a general principle, while the teleologist employs compound induction and rises indirectly to a general principle through the employing of another group of facts and principles to help out his work. The scientist forms a simple ratio, the teleologist, a compound one. The compound ratio may be exhibited thus:

Man's work: Man :: Nature's work: x (God). Or to take a particular instance, the heart, it would be put thus: Man's work—pump: Man :: Nature's work—heart: x (God). The first three terms are given and known, and the fourth term is to be determined. More exactly according to the formula of analogy, like effects, like causes, the ratio would stand thus:

Man's work—pump: heart :: Man: x (God).

The general order of the argument from analogy may then, we think, be put thus: We, from perceiving that certain acts are connected with our own conscious designing power, infer that similar acts in beings about us proclaim the action of a similar cause, a conscious designing power. Gradually we attain the power of recognizing design even when the personal agent is external and absent, as when we find a watch upon a heath, or a chipped flint in a gravel bed. We come to recognize intelligent design not only by seeing beings in action, but also we attain the power of inferring from relics of intelligence—e. g. machines or machine marks—to an external, non-resident contriver; for instance, we see a man hoeing in a field, and we conclude that he is doing this with the conscious design of aiding the growth of his crops, but we might come upon the field when there was no man hoeing, and yet conclude from marks that the field had been hoed with conscious design.

Mechanics that animal and vegetable bodies are subject to the same mechanical laws as other bodies, in Chemistry the division between Organic and Inorganic Chemistry is being done away with, and in Biology theories of evolution are propounded which apply equally well to animate and inanimate nature. To acknowledge universal finality is not, however, it seems to us, to acknowledge universal equality of finality. Finality *per se* may be derived equally from any concatenation; but this is not to affirm that there is as much finality in the stone as in the eye. We see in the eye a more complex concatenation than in the stone, a circumscription and constraining of a greater number of efficient causes to the given function, and a greater particularity and speciality in the function itself. M. Janet throughout his work insists that finality is peculiarly noticeable in organisms, and one reason for this, different from the ones we have just mentioned, he puts very strongly as follows :

“The reason why final causes will always be sought by preference in the sphere of living beings is, that there alone a fact is met with which may be considered as having a veritable *interest*, and which may consequently be an *end*—namely, sensibility. There only, where the possession, the preservation of being is felt, can existence be considered as a good, and consequently as an end to which a system of means is subordinated. What does it really matter to a crystal to be or not to be? What does it matter to it whether it have eight angles in place of twelve, or be organized geometrically rather than in any other way? Existence having no value for it, why should nature have taken means to secure it? Why should it have been at the expense of a plan and a system of combinations to produce a result without value for any one, at least in the absence of living beings? So, again, however beautiful the planetary and sidereal order may be, what matters this beauty, this order, to the stars themselves that know nothing of it? And if you say that this fair order was constructed to be admired by men, or that God might therein contemplate His glory, it is evident that an end can only be given to these objects by going out of themselves, by passing them by, and rising above their proper system, to doubt it is the same as re-

gards living beings, if one would rise to the absolute end, the final and last end, but in themselves and for themselves they have already a sufficient though relative end, namely, to exist and to feel it; this is for them a good, and one can understand that nature has taken precaution to assure it to them. It is not the same with inorganic beings." (pp. 190, 191.)

M. Janet thus briefly states his conclusion as to the relations of physical science and teleology :

"To sum up. There is no contradiction between our principles and the most recent scientific conceptions. No fact, no law of nature warrants us to eliminate the final cause from the human mind. Science, so far as it is science, is mute on the problem." (p. 145.)

We have thus endeavored to give an exposition of the chief fundamental ideas in the first book of the *Final Causes* together with some reflections on the subject which have been stimulated by the study of M. Janet's work. We have said nothing with reference to the chapters on the Facts and Contrary Facts, as there is nothing of very great newness or interest to be noted in connection with them. They are as remarkable for clearness, candor, and thoroughness as is the rest of the discussion. The weakest portion of the book, as it seems to us, is the discussion of evolution in the last three chapters. While there is much here that is suggestive and valuable, yet it did not satisfy us as some other parts of the book did, as revealing perfect mastery. Any worthy consideration of these chapters would itself call for an Article, and cannot be compressed into a few words at the close of this review. The writer has, moreover, an Article on this subject in the *New Englander* for September, 1883, in which M. Janet's position is to some extent considered.

We must say in conclusion that we think that every one, of whatever opinions, who really loves candid and thorough thinking, cannot but be interested in this work; and we believe that it will do more to put Teleology on a truly scientific basis than any other work of this century has done.

ARTICLE V.—OEHLER'S OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.

Oehler's Old Testament Theology. With the translation revised, an Introduction and Notes, by GEORGE E. DAY, Professor of the Hebrew Language and Literature, and Biblical Theology, in Yale College. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.

SCHOLARLY candor, generous and accurate learning, carefulness of statement, and a pious, fervid but not bitter spirit, characterize the treatise of Oehler on Old Testament theology. These qualities of the original work, in connection with the faithful revision and valuable notes of its American editor, Professor Day, fully justify the claim of this book to be the best one as yet obtainable for the instruction of theological students in its subject. For mature students, however, it is in some important respects inferior to the "Old Testament Theology" of Hermann Schultz. The latter often shows more of intellectual pith and of ethical grasp than does Oehler; moreover, the positions of Schultz with respect to those questions of Old Testament Introduction and Criticism which underlie the systematic treatment of the theology of the Hebrew writers, are, if not always so "safe", yet more clearly defined and more intelligible. In reading Oehler, one who reads between the lines is frequently led to wonder what the final answer of its author would be to some of these fundamental questions. One is sometimes led to inquire how Oehler himself would reconcile his own position as a critic with his treatment of certain points in Biblical theology. None the less true is the persuasion that Oehler's book for the purpose of opening the subject before beginners is a better book than that of Schultz. For in certain very important respects the theological position of Oehler was such as to give a just additional value, in the minds of his American readers and admirers, to his opinion on critical and historical inquiries. That position, in its relation to these inquiries, it is the purpose of this Article very briefly to set forth.

In discussing the doctrine of Sacred Scripture, I have elsewhere called attention to this fact of history and of present experience : " It has come about that certain works on hermeneutics, and certain commentaries, are much used and highly praised by men who reject with horror the very principles which give all their value to these works, as soon as the principles are expressed in dogmatic form." In the same connection I have also ventured to speak of " the stolid predisposition," which so many show, " to maintain the post-Reformation dogma of inspiration, while enjoying the fruits of the very research which has quite undermined that dogma." The truth of these statements is now being illustrated in an instructive way by the reception given to Oehler's " Old Testament Theology." Its good service, as rendered against a truly " destructive criticism," and its pious spirit, have called forth a due reward of praises from nearly all quarters. The praises are well deserved ; but are they always intelligently rendered ? We wish that those who have uttered them would ask themselves this question seriously, and would then try conscientiously to think out the import of their answer. On the other hand, at least one or two of those newspaper theologians who are by nature or long practice alarmists, have made the absurd discovery of " rationalism " even in the conservative and pious Oehler. " Rationalism !" indeed : When will such theologians learn the alphabet of theological and critical terminology ? When will they begin to school themselves so as not to fling epithets upon the winds so aimlessly ?

The " position " of Oehler toward questions which are on fire, and which will in time burn themselves into the consciences and minds of even the most stolid in the midst of our land and day, may be learned (sufficiently for our purpose) from the following brief statement. The statement will include certain facts from his life and certain quotations from his work on " Old Testament Theology."

There are some interesting, and perhaps not altogether superficial, resemblances between the forces which shaped the character of Oehler and those which shaped the character of the philosopher Kant nearly a whole century earlier. Both were of weak physical constitution ; both suffered much from

physical pains and physical limitations. Both received from their parents, and especially from the mother, an inheritance of conscientiousness, and a strong development of that inheritance through early "Pietistic" training. Both had the disposition to carry this conscientiousness into the inquiry for truth. Both had a strong ethical desire to acquire for themselves, and to impart to others, a thirst for scientific knowledge, and a willingness to pay the full price for such knowledge, in careful, painstaking inquiry. Both waited many years, and suffered repeated disappointments, before reaching the place of professor in the department of learning which they coveted. Of course, beyond these resemblances no parallel would hold. But it cannot fail to be observed that the early pietism of Oehler was a determining factor in his subsequent theological and critical position, as the early pietism of Kant was a factor in his ethical and philosophical development.

The two teachers who had most to do with shaping the earlier scholarly tendencies of Oehler, were C. F. Schmid and C. F. Steudel. Schmid taught him what Biblical Theology is, and gave him an impetus, and ideas concerning its method, which were determinative of his future inquiries. Steudel was always his admired teacher, and was subsequently his beloved friend, as well as father-in-law. But we are assured by his biographer that the young Oehler was not blind to the great faults and gaps which lay in those "premises of the old supernaturalism" which Steudel believed and taught.

The treatment which Oehler received during the early years of his professional career at the hands of the rationalistic party in Tübingen, undoubtedly had some influence in confirming his native conservatism. It amounted almost to persecution; if the effort to prevent cherished hopes of position and influence as a teacher of the young can be called persecution. For some time Baur and his followers prevented the promotion of Oehler. But the course of these Rationalists compares very favorably in this regard with that of the *ultra-Orthodox*. For who does not know that the name of Hengstenberg must remain as the synonym of theological bitterness and acrimony?—a warning, if such men would take warning, to his theological descendants in the present generation. It is

cheering to read that, in later years when Oehler came to Tübingen, Baur met him in such a noble and humane way as to erase all traces of the severe pain he had formerly occasioned.

The earlier theological views of Oehler were broadened by a more critical study of the Old Testament, and of the writings of that master of the art which recognizes the claims both of breadth and of intensity, Dr. Martin Luther. His teaching of the young men of Germany, in connection with his experience of the powerlessness of the older dogmatic views and dogmatic methods to win and keep the best convictions of these young men, had the same broadening effect. Nor can his intercourse with Beck, Weizsäcker, and others, be left out of account. But above all, his own inherited and cultivated conscientiousness, and his scrupulous fidelity to truth in the examination of truth, prevented him from espousing partisan opinions, whether so-called liberal or so-called orthodox. That it cost Oehler something intelligently to arrive at and faithfully to maintain this middle position,—mediating but not compromising, evangelical but not orthodox after the fashion of Hengstenberg,—there is proof enough. Like all conscientious souls, he had to work his way out into the light; he had by a way of trial to find the place where faith and faithfulness to his own intellectual powers, given of God, could unite. In 1847 we find him writing to Dettinger as follows: "*In heart an opponent of the destructive criticism, in intellect taken captive by it, I am swimming here between two seas, on the one side accusing myself of unbelief, on the other of dishonesty. Oh this Pentateuch, Joshua and Judges especially!*" Significant words are these as indicating that honest and thorough inquiry, without which the work of no man can stand in the searching fires of the present century. Concerning the ultimate effect of this inquiry we find his biographer making the following assertion: "His unpartisan sense of truth caused him finally to discover the true point of standing on this domain. Later on he could never bring himself to be friendly with a positive and conservative criticism that drives things to an extreme, and just as little with apologists who, like the friends of Job, 'lie for the honor of God.' He, therefore, could not avoid adopting certain weighty isagogic results of the more thorough

criticism; for example, the existence of several historiographic currents in the Pentateuch,—even earlier than the similar confession of Delitzsch.”

All the influences already mentioned conspired to equip Oehler well for his work as a systematic expositor of the Hebrew writers. The same influences, however, resulted in his being always confined within certain limitations. He was not great in the gifts of speculative inquiry or of dialectical skill. He was not a discoverer of hidden truths or a forerunner of a new evangel. He produced, as his friendly biographer admits, no single work of preëminent distinction. He was, indeed, as the same writer claims, in some sort “predestined” to be an interpreter of the Old Testament. For he had the characteristics which the aged peasant styled, “a narrow conscience and a broad heart.” What was unscientific and what was hypocritical alike displeased him. He was perhaps, as he would have himself confessed, too much “a man of the law,” an *Old Testament* man particularly. But he did his work thoroughly, with “*German* industry” and “*German* fidelity.” And his influence was, and will be, as Diestel affirmed of it, wider than he in his modesty supposed possible.

This indication of the position of Oehler, as derived from the facts of his life, can be confirmed, though only imperfectly, by quotations from his book on “*Old Testament Theology*.” For a clear and satisfactory definition of the position of its author toward the fundamental questions of criticism and history, this book leaves much to be desired. None the less true is it, however, that the indications which it does afford are in full accord with what has already been said. In the book Oehler always appears as the opponent of the views espoused by the school for which Kuenen and Wellhausen stand as representative names. This fact is so apparent that it has doubtless betrayed some of his more superficial readers into the belief that Oehler was the advocate of a total disregard of the results of modern criticism, and of the post-Reformation dogma of inspiration as applied throughout to the books of the Old Testament. Let not those who wish to admire him for such a pitiful reason, so egregiously deceive themselves.

Oehler, in his work on "Old Testament Theology," repeatedly insists upon the necessity of approaching the Hebrew writers from the historical point of view. At the outset (p. 1) he declares that whoever "has not learned to understand the Old Testament in its historical connection . . . lacks the right key to its meaning." The history of Israel must be subjected to a process of critical sifting in order that it may give us "the real historical facts which the theology of the Old Testament reproduces as the contents of faith" (7 f.). In accordance with this position, we find Oehler insisting that the Bible shall not be used as a kind of *promptuarium*, or store-room, made up of proof-texts gathered from all parts, and all estimated as of like value (p. 2). He declares (p. 3) that "the old atomistic system of Scripture proof must be superseded by one which shows that the truths of salvation formulated in doctrinal statements are the result of the whole historical process through which Revelation has passed." He sharply criticises (p. 21, 27) the theologians who continue to hold the post-Reformation point of view, and who "find in the Old Testament the metaphysical doctrines of Christianity." He truly asserts that "for a long time *supernaturalism* did comparatively little for Old Testament theology" (p. 36). The dogmatist, who "forces the doctrinal contents of the Old Testament into a framework brought to it from without," does not secure the approval of Oehler (p. 42). But the first and great leaders of Protestantism did not deal with the Hebrew writings in this unlawful way; even Reuchlin, and he especially, rendered "immortal service" in claiming that "exegesis should be independent of the traditions of the church." Very little of the Old Testament is to be considered as dogmatic; except as it is historically preparatory to Christianity it does not claim to limit Christian faith. "Dogmas, the positive doctrines of faith and life which demand acknowledgment and obedience," says Oehler (p. 6 f.), "are found in the Old Testament, for the most part only in the Pentateuch. . . . The further development of religious knowledge, which is found in the prophetic books, the Psalms, and the books of the *Hhokhma* (Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes) are inaccurately characterized by this expression" (viz: dogmatic). "The

theology of the Old Testament, therefore, has to handle as such *what is only in germ*, and of the nature of presentiment; it has to show how the Old Testament, in the narrowness and unfinished state which characterizes in many parts its doctrinal contents, points from itself to something higher." The Judaism (I will add whether among the Jews or in the Christian Church) which finds the *completion* of dogma in the Old Testament, he fitly compares with the Mohammedan view of the Koran (p. 7). In very truth, this whole way of looking at the Hebrew sacred Scriptures is not Christian, whether judged by the New Testament doctrine or by the permanent doctrinal views of the Christian Church. It is not even Protestant doctrine; its origin is in Rabbinical grounds, its outgrowth was the temporary and abnormal excrescence known as the post-Reformation dogma.

The foregoing statement of Oehler's position toward the study of the Old Testament in general might lead us to conjecture somewhat securely what his position would be with respect to the nature of revelation and of Sacred Scripture. Revelation in general, he believes to be "God's witness and communication of Himself to the world for the realization of the end of creation, and for the reëstablishment of the full communion of man with God." Of course, then, the heathen are subjects of this general revelation. The revelation of the Bible, which "first appears in the form of a covenant between God and a chosen race," is special (p. 15). But this special revelation is not, as the older theology believed, essentially and almost exclusively a revelation of doctrine. For, if this were all, "it would in fact have been better if it had pleased God to send directly from heaven a ready-made system of doctrine. This is, as is well known, the Mohammedan idea of revelation" (p. 17). The special revelation "falls into two principal divisions, the Old and the New Testament, which stand to each other in the relation of preparation and fulfillment" (p. 18). These are different, and the New Testament emphasizes the difference; it speaks of the Old Testament teachings and institutions, divested of their fulfillment in Christ, as poor and beggarly rudiments (p. 19). "The Old Testament itself . . . acknowledges that the manifestation of God's kingdom at that time was imperfect and temporary."

On the "burning question", What is the Bible?—or, as the same question is ordinarily phrased, on the "Inspiration of Scripture"—the views of Oehler are, as a matter of course, only very briefly expressed in his "Old Testament Theology." But the same views which are only briefly *expressed* are *implied* in almost every discussion it contains. In one passage, at least, Oehler has distinctly informed us what he considers to be the true doctrine of Sacred Scripture. This passage is particularly commended to the consideration of his admirers in this country. It plainly will not do to say that so brief a passage, even if its conclusions be rejected, cannot affect one's admiration for and confidence in Oehler; because brief as the passage is, the position which it assumes is a fundamental one for all his subsequent discussions. In criticizing the view of Rothe, Oehler says (p. 8): "*The Bible is not revelation itself; it is the record of revelation.* (The italics are ours.) Neither do we deny the proposition, that he to whom the reality of revelation is made certain by means of the Bible as its record takes toward the Scriptures 'a free position of faith.' " Our author next remarks upon the necessity of receiving the Bible, as such a means for attaining certainty in faith, "without preconceived opinions," and then adds the following pregnant sentence: "He who has won in this way the conviction that Holy Scripture is the truly witnessing record of the divine purpose of salvation, and of the historical facts which serve to its realization, and that *in it is contained the word of God as the means by which every one can lay hold of salvation*—he, in the joyful consciousness of his faith in revelation, will certainly fail to be bound by human traditions concerning Holy Scripture, whether these originated with the Jewish scribes, *or with our older Protestant theology*, whatever be the respect which he may feel due to them; but neither will he surrender himself to a criticism in which we can everywhere see that it does not rest upon the *consciousness of faith* which Rothe commends." Our Lutheran friends in this country should consider well the words which I have italicised; for their author remained throughout a consistent and devoted Lutheran, a distinguished defender of the Lutheran Confession. If those who bear the name of the great Reformer cannot bring

themselves into sympathy with Luther's views concerning the nature of the Bible and of the Christian "consciousness of faith," let them at least respect the memory of comrades like Tholuck and Oehler.

Oehler's general view of the nature of the Bible as the "record of revelation" and the "vehicle of the Word of God," to be interpreted and accepted with a blending of free criticism and that "consciousness of faith" upon which right criticism rests, is certainly very far from the view of the post-Reformation dogma. It is to this latter view that Oehler refers when he connects the "older Protestant theology" with "the Jewish scribes." Nor is this connection an accidental affair. He who knows Church history at all thoroughly, knows that the ancient Jewish scribes and "the older Protestant theology" are, in the springs of motive and the methods of domatizing, singularly alike.

The particular applications of the above-mentioned view of Sacred Scripture, which occur in Oehler's "Old Testament Theology," are too numerous to admit of mention. It accords with this view, when Oehler, at the very beginning of his work (p. 2) answers the question, What makes the Old Testament to be Holy Scripture? by agreeing with the opinion of Hofmann: "Our position is, that the history contained in Scripture being the *history of Israel*, is what makes it Holy Scripture; for Israel is the people whose history is the call to salvation." With regard to the critical and historical questions of the origin of the Pentateuch, Oehler nowhere in this work, so far as I am aware, clearly defines his position. Such a fact is reasonable ground of complaint against any scientific expositor of Old Testament theology. We have seen from his life, however, how sharply and deeply this question had cut its way into his soul. The importance which he attached to it would even seem exaggerated to many equally conscientious and devout students of the Bible. We have been told by his biographer that he admitted that criticism has proved its main position, viz: "the existence of several historiographic currents in the Pentateuch," and that he made this admission earlier than did Delitzsch. In view of the utter disregard of truth of fact which has recently been shown by those who

have undertaken to teach the people on this important subject, it needs to be repeated that in Germany, for some time past, the number of scholars who have not coincided in this admission can be counted on the fingers of one hand. In spite of Oehler's failure clearly to define his critical position, certain expressions in his book point out the direction of that position. Thus on page fifty-two we find him speaking of "the redactor of the Pentateuch, who in so many cases shows his skill in fitting the different sources into each other." In another passage (p. 75), after remarking that "the structure of the legislative portions of the Pentateuch belongs to the department of Old Testament Introduction," he adds: "The *succession of the laws* has not the systematic arrangement of a formal code, but each law is put in the place in which its publication appears to be necessary." As to the date and origin of Deuteronomy, his "Theology" does not appear to contain any clear indication of his opinion. Oehler frequently seeks relief by the opportunity, which his subject offers him, of relegating the underlying critical questions to the discussions of Biblical Introduction.

The mediating position of this author is further illustrated by his treatment of such topics as the "angel of Jehovah," the Old Testament doctrine of future life, the doctrine of miracles, the nature of prediction and its fulfillment, the nature of the writings called *Hhokhma*. On all these topics his opinion is, in all important respects, as conservative as is consistent with a right general position toward the doctrine of Sacred Scripture, and as can be vindicated in the light of the past century of intense study of the Bible by Christian scholars. It is for this reason that I wish to sink the plea for Oehler, and for every other individual critic or author, in the plea for a fair and genial consideration of the claims of honest Christian scholarship. Upon these claims, and upon the way in which they are being dealt with at present in this country by a portion of the religious press, I wish to speak the following plain words.

In the first place, it is manifest that a large number of those who criticise these mediating and evangelical views, whenever such views are derived from a frank and hearty acceptance of

the results of biblical research, have themselves no firm ground of standing. Neither their praise nor their condemnation is given with an open eye; he will, therefore, surely be misled whose judgment is in the keeping of such critics. I do not speak of those careful and candid scholars who, after due inquiry, cannot even go as far as does Oehler, or of those who find themselves compelled to go much further than he toward certain negative positions of the so-called higher criticism. I speak of a large class of uninformed or prejudiced writers, who, for the most part with their names concealed, make an impression upon the public (great numbers of the ministers included) through the religious newspapers. The shifting attitude of these writers shows that they are dimly conscious of never having found any tenable position for their own faith in the Bible.

It is also manifest that this shifting and half-hearted traditional attitude toward Sacred Scripture cannot much longer maintain itself against the firm and rapid advances of Christian scholarship. Men will not be able forever to play fast and loose with the fundamental questions of theology and criticism. The majority will in time see the inconsistency of admitting the existence of even minute historical errors in the Bible and then affirming a dogma which is overthrown by a single such admission, of apologizing for the relative moral imperfection of much of the Old Testament, and then advocating a theory of "verbal" or "plenary" inspiration, in any historical meaning of those terms. The Church of Christ, even in America and in the nineteenth century, will soon come to feel no alarm at the exercise of its Pauline privilege of distinguishing between the spirit and the letter of Sacred Scripture. It will know whether there be any Holy Ghost within itself. It will learn in time to hear again the words of Christ and the Apostles, and the voice of the Church Catholic in all the ages, rather than the voice of Jewish Rabbis and of theologians like Calovius, and Quenstedt, and Gerhard. Protestantism will have, in time, more respect for its birthright, and will esteem the judgment of the great Reformers concerning the Bible, and concerning the analogy of faith, as more valuable than the contorted formulas of the *post*-Reformation dogma.

For it is well worth while in this connection to call attention again to the position of the best scholarship toward the question of Sacred Scripture. The question as to what this position really is, is often pronounced upon as though it were a question of epithets. It is purely a question of fact. The conservative and pious Oehler may be considered as just within the lines which this scholarship considers it desirable to try to defend. A very large body of men whom the Christian Church will never unchurch, have already retreated very much further in toward the central defences. Will these defences be best guarded by the irregulars who are firing far short of the advancing enemy from worn-out fusils and flint-lock muskets? The very course of these irregulars shows that they are uneasy in the consciousness of their defenceless position. Why otherwise do they appeal with such shouts of welcome to the "German" scholars, when they think to derive help from them, and then sneer at everything "Teutonic," when they find these scholars cannot be drilled in their company, or made to fight with their antiquated weapons. Why are Oehler, and Dillmann, and Strack, and Delitzsch, and Riehm, quoted as authorities against Graf and Wellhausen, and then abused under the breath when it is found that they have all abandoned the traditional views of the Jewish Synagogue, and the views of the post-Reformation theologians? Why are Weiss, and Meyer, and Tholuck, and Bleek, treated to sugar plums with one hand and threatened with the rod with the other hand? Is it because those who praise and blame, alike ignorantly, cannot always reach the real views of these conservative critics, since the originals are to them *sealed books*? Or is it because newspaper critics in general cannot be expected to wait even to read the translations of these German masters of criticism?

It is further to be noted that Oehler plainly did not accept certain alternatives which are current among us. We are, indeed, being treated just now to a number of most amazing alternatives. Among such alternatives are the following: Either the synagogue tradition of the Mosaic authorship of the whole Pentateuch or else the vagaries of Graf and Wellhausen; either the affirmation that the sacred books are alike and throughout infallible or else the surrender of all confidence in

their authority ; either the complete identification of Proverbs, and Canticles, and Esther with the Word of God in the strictest sense, or else the denial of the existence of any Word of God ; in fine, either the post-Reformation dogma as we hold it in direct succession from its eminent advocates of the seventeenth century, or else the acceptance of the modern naturalism and agnosticism. I will venture to put these alternatives, and others like them, into one final form which shall represent the substance of them all ; either the spirit of Calovius, whose daily prayer is said to have been—*Imple me, deus, odio haereticorum*,—or else the spirit of Thomas Paine ; either the views of ancient Jewish Rabbis and their modern representatives, or else the views of Strauss and Renan. But who gave these wise men in the midst of us their right to impose upon their brethren such amazing alternatives ? And who, that knows the case, will for a moment submit to such an imposition ?

In view of the position and manners of those to whom allusion has just been made, we hail with pleasure the dissemination of works like that of Oehler. We heartily desire that translations of similar German works, as they have been given to the English-reading public by the houses of T. and T. Clark, of Edinburgh, of the Scribners, of New York, and by other publishing houses in England and in this country, should have the widest possible circulation. The circulation of such books will help to bring forward the cause of truth and of liberty. Nor can we refrain from expressing our pleasure at the fact that Oehler's "Old Testament Theology" has already been introduced as a text-book in the Seminaries of Yale and of Princeton. We shall take a great interest in noting how the positions of Oehler, as we have truly stated them in his own words, are made to conform with, or to modify, the teaching in systematic theology which is given in this latter Seminary.

ARTICLE VI.—THE SOCIETY SYSTEM OF YALE COLLEGE.

“Zeal for the public good is the characteristic of a man of honor, and a gentleman, and must take place of pleasures, profits, and all other private gratifications. Whoever wants this motive is an open enemy, or an inglorious neuter to mankind, in proportion to the misapplied advantages with which nature and fortune have blessed him.”

OF late years the secret society system of Yale College has been challenged with increasing frequency. In 1875 the Sophomore societies were abolished by the faculty; in 1876 an organized band of students broke into and claimed to have rifled one of the Senior Society halls. This unprecedented vandalism was continued, in 1878, by another set of collegiate marauders defacing with paint both Senior buildings. The offenders were tried in the City Court, but escaped free of fine or imprisonment, through technicalities, much to the disappointment of some of the most prominent citizens and best legal talent in New Haven.

During this year a daily anti-Senior Society newspaper was started and vigorously conducted so as to thwart the society men in every way.

Soon afterwards the Freshmen Societies ceased to exist, by order of the fates which control the destinies of the University—and the marking-books! Following this period of unrest came an elaborate pamphlet from a man who had belonged to the societies of each year, from first to last, who sought to prove that the whole system was pernicious and should be abolished. Lastly, this year, the crusade against the societies was transferred to the columns of prominent metropolitan journals, where alumnus and undergraduate emulated each other in striving to point out enormities committed by the societies.

To deny that such a retrospect is in the highest degree unsatisfactory would be insincere; for there are many first class colleges possessing a greater number of societies than Yale, at

which the utmost good feeling prevails on this subject, among the faculty and the students themselves. Whether the Yale Societies are guilty or not of the charges made against them is not the first question in order. The very fact that almost every year the students are more or less divided on this score, that twice within the past ten years the faculty have thought necessary to exercise their rarely used prerogative of suppressing time-honored student customs—the Freshmen and the Sophomore Societies—augurs that germs of further dissension may exist fatal to that harmony which is indispensable to the greatest usefulness of the University.

Silence has always been the policy of the societies when assailed, however unjustly, because they have realized that to do justice to their cause they would have to reveal much which, even though highly commendable in itself, rightly concerned no men excepting their members. The Societies have never yet, even with a mob at their doors, been forced to capitulate or offer explanations to their assailants, and it is extremely improbable that they ever will condescend to do so. But when the controversy concerning them is taken from the college arena and the reading public is invoked to act as judge, when the good name of the University is dragged through the mire by her own sons, and the faculty and the corporation directly appealed to, “to right a crying evil,” we believe the usual conditions of “society etiquette” to be altered—that plain words, between man and man, are best; that reformers should be held to prove their damaging charges, or silenced with the deserved contempt which awaits men who have not hesitated, intentionally, or unintentionally to compromise the innocent. The time for delay, for allowing things to “adjust” themselves would appear to have passed. The charges against the societies themselves and against the management of the College for allowing them to exist, have been formally presented; and now, in common justice, the condemnation of the body of the alumni should be centered against the societies on their demerits, or in case no valid objections can be raised against their existence, they should frankly be bidden to go their way unmolested, without the constant reproach that the advantages which they offer are selfish ad-

vantages, for a few, obtained at the expense of the many. A mere attempt at friendly discussion will often go far toward the settlement of a serious difficulty, unless the parties are hopelessly estranged. Surely no society abolitionist, however radical, will claim that the body of society men and the body of "neutrals" are hopelessly estranged from each other or from their college. Perhaps, too, a simple statement of the points at issue and of the principles which underlie them, will disclose the remedy for any evils which may chance to cause this "misunderstanding"—if that word is strong enough to explain "why graduates of Yale have boasted that they dissuade young men from joining their Alma Mater and that they will never give of their own means to her so long as the present society system exists."

Few simple things have been more misstated and misunderstood, than this same system. It dates from 1832. In that year a Senior Society of fifteen men was established. A second Senior Society followed in 1842. The first Junior Society was founded in 1836; a second in 1838; the third in 1844. They each took about twenty men from a class. The first Sophomore Society—a relic of "Bully Club" days—was acknowledged to the public in 1838; a second dates from 1846. On the death of these, two more Sophomore Societies were established, in 1864. Their membership was larger than that of the Junior Societies. One Freshman Society saw the light in 1840; a second in 1845; a third in 1855. They included virtually the whole Freshman class. The very rapid succession of these societies—no less than nine within fifteen years—indicates that there was a positive need of their existence. The opportunities for literary and social culture afforded by the College were then far fewer than now. Textual instruction in *belles-lettres* was furnished by one Professor. The library facilities were comparatively small. The College press was not yet in existence. The old College dormitories were too small and uncomfortable to allow any considerable gathering of undergraduates in one room for purposes of relaxation and culture. The houses of public entertainment in the neighborhood of the College were ordinary hotels or saloons, unattractive in appearance, or perhaps of disreputable character. An

undergraduate club, with smoking and billiard rooms, and restaurant attached, was yet an undreamed dream of the far future. True, there was, at the beginning of the epoch alluded to, a place of daily though hardly popular resort, managed entirely by students, anything but exclusive in character, for its name was—*Commons*! But if tradition is not misleading on this point, or unless the said institution has degenerated very rapidly of late years, the frugal cheer of that ancient establishment was not such as to induce its patrons to linger long about the festive board. The venerable open debating societies, Linonia and Brothers, were then in a transition period. The loss of good fellowship, engendered by their frequent theatricals, finally prohibited by an edict of the faculty, had not yet been atoned for by the establishment of grand tourneys of debate, nor had the noisy strife for the largest membership, characteristic of their later days, begun to hold full sway. Of course real society pride was not to be fostered where membership in either society was placed wholly at the option of every unproved Freshman. Nor was devotion to society interests expected except in so far as it would promote selfish ends or consume idle moments.

The tendency, therefore, for men of congenial tastes and similar habits to form themselves into small groups for wider and more positive culture, than they could otherwise obtain in the Yale College of those days, and, also, for the cementing of intimate friendships, was both natural and altogether praiseworthy. That these small groups should be kept strictly within class lines, was wholly in accord with the traditions and character of the College. Following the ceremonious etiquette in vogue in the English Universities at a corresponding period, our oldest Eastern Colleges enjoined many tokens of respect upon the new comers towards those whose residence among the classic shades was of greater standing. The years are recorded when in those institutions the Freshmen became hewers of wood and drawers of water for the Seniors, to say nothing of their attending to the tutors' coal—though this was sometimes put through the window instead of coming in by the door! Yale, the most conservative of the large colleges, has always been noted for preserving these class distinctions.

Long ago her students learned not only to endure cheerfully, but to glory in class feeling. In the early days of the societies there were no "optional" studies which brought together students from different classes. All classmates studied the same portion of the curriculum at the same time, underwent the same "polishing" process at the hands of the faculty—and the other classes! hence always became devotedly attached to the leaders of their own class, intellectually, socially, and physically. Given these conditions, it followed almost inevitably that if there were to be secret societies at Yale, they would be class societies.

The theory of the system is equally clear and no less reasonable. The Freshman societies flung wide open their doors to every Verdant Green who chose to knock at them; or rather, unless he had been pledged and instructed beforehand, he was hustled through those doors at a very lively rate, on recommendation of the Scylla or Charybdis delegation of Sophomores—whichever had happened to meet him first—on his advent into the old New Haven R. R. Hades. The one and only useful feature of the Freshman societies was that they made men acquainted with each other early in the course. Recommendation to a Sophomore society was mainly of a social character. Cards and theatricals gave the lighter element of a class a chance to have its day, or rather its nights. In Junior year when the discipline of the curriculum had begun to tell and men's abilities were recognized at their true worth, these conditions were reversed. The Junior societies aspired to, even if they did not always attain, scholarship and literary work of a high order. The Senior societies became the necessary and logical climax to the others, recognizing friendships, which had been formed, perhaps, in Freshman year, appreciating the sociability displayed in the Sophomore societies, looking critically though justly at the literary work of Junior year, seeking to mingle in fair proportion in their membership all of these elements without slighting any one of them. So that viewed from the vantage-ground of historical knowledge this same system, which has often been called "hopelessly confused and purposeless," is seen to be at once simpler and fairer to all conditions of men, and likely to prove more lasting than

those in vogue at any other colleges. In most of these colleges men are "rushed" into general, all-class "fraternities" early in Freshman year, before they can possibly be acquainted from personal experience—the only satisfactory test—with the connections and friendships they are thus pledging themselves to for a life-time. But many men in each class, perhaps the majority of them, who would like to do so, are never asked to join any fraternity. At Yale, no man is or was, when the Freshman societies were in existence, refused a chance to demonstrate his society qualifications. Neither was any one asked to take a more honorable seat until he did make that demonstration. To reach the final goal was not a matter of one month or one year, but of three years' open, honorable competition, with many men, of many kinds.

Undoubtedly there are some valid objections to any customs which magnify class distinctions. Where embryonic bullyism exists among the Sophomores, for instance, this nuisance may sometimes be hatched into vigorous being by mistaken class enthusiasm. At all first-class Eastern colleges, however, the old obnoxious forms of hazing have dug their own graves and will soon cease to be regarded as bugbears by the most timid of faculties. By not "running" with cronies in other classes the "hail fellow! well-met" element may lose some opportunities for the noisier kind of sociability. Likewise, a few of the best intellects in a class may occasionally feel themselves hampered in confining their close friendships to class lines. To read some of the criticisms which have been made, it might be supposed that to go beyond those boundaries a hair's breadth constituted a criminal offense. This is of course nonsense. Very strong affinities will find themselves out under all circumstances; especially is this true with the friendships of young men. The worst that class feeling can do, is to frown at too great a display of friendship, in public, between men of different classes, as in bad taste because calculated to reflect slightly on the classmates of one or both friends. In other words, a reasonable, if not liberal view of the question is, that where classes range from one hundred and fifty to two hundred liberally educated young men, any one such body furnishes every opportunity for legitimate friendships to flourish;

that in fact they will there perfect themselves to a degree under any other circumstances impossible. To value one another through life men must be welded together by some such process. Often to the worldly man the name classmate is a magic spell, softening the impulses, leading back the imagination to scenes of youthful buoyancy and high resolve.

We have dwelt upon class-feeling because writing from the conviction that the present societies cannot, as has so often and so glibly been suggested by outsiders, be modified so as to include men from several classes at the same time. All attempts to do so at Yale have hitherto failed ignominiously. The oldest Junior society after an honorable career of more than a quarter of a century, waned and died in opposing college opinion on this point of admitting Sophomores and Freshmen. The presence of Sophomores at Freshmen societies was their *bête noir*. The Juniors contributed much more than the Sophomores themselves to the riotous proceedings which broke up those societies. The presence of many Seniors at the Junior societies, except on extra occasions, is regarded as rather a nuisance. Unless the Junior buildings were greatly enlarged, at much expense, they could not possibly accommodate a quota from several classes, unless the representation from each was made so small as to omit at least half of the available material. This reasoning is negatived in the case of smaller colleges without much class-feeling.

The critics of the Yale society system, differing with the faculty, have invariably ignored the Juniors' societies while laying much stress upon the Seniors'. Presumably, therefore, in their opinion, the former are satisfactory and in no need of reforming. From the charge that the Senior societies dominate and have muzzled the college press, an extra-college reader would infer that all the editors are society men. As a matter of fact on all the college press proper (*i. e.*, excepting the *Yale Literary Magazine*, which, as its name implies, pays little or no attention to current topics) the non-Senior society men always greatly outnumber the elect. Only a half dozen of the two score or more of editors appointed annually are chosen as society representatives, and then never until they have won their position by fair competition and long apprenticeship as

contributors. The reason that the editors are appointed instead of elected by the class is that this was found by practical experience to be the only way of keeping up the literary standard of the college press. Formerly mere personal popularity put men into these very responsible positions. Certainly no one looking over files of the Yale papers since this change has been made can complain that the new *régime* has not been steady and true to its cause. The society men have never striven to establish an organ of their own. The society abolitionists—more correctly, two or three of the most radical of them—have tried this experiment, during intervals of several years, and it has always ended in flat failure. Many men have complained because they thought newspapers had done injustice to them or their hobbies. It remains for the society abolitionists to feel injured because the college press never alludes in any way to the subject of societies. A moment's serious reflection will convince the most skeptical that this is the only course not sure to be fraught with constant vexation, without the slightest compensating gain, to all parties concerned. The society men differ among themselves, and to preserve a constant equilibrium between the three or more factions, if general society discussions were allowed to overload the columns of college newspapers—as was the case a few years ago, much to everybody's disgust—would be simply an impossibility. The leading New Haven journals have regular departments for daily college news, contributed by college men, usually “neutrals”; and unlimited space would be granted them to ventilate any real wrongs of which the societies were guilty.

So far as we are aware only one opponent of the society system has had the hardihood to affirm, “the evil worms itself into our religious life, it introduces friction into our religious development,” *i. e.*, by estranging from their classmates the “deacons” who are society men. If substantiated by a single fact this ought to be regarded as a very serious charge against the societies. But coming merely as an anonymous and unauthenticated assertion, in the *N. Y. Nation*, it may be dismissed with the remark that between the supposition that men of the character of class deacons would become “estranged” from

their classmates, or the alternative, that men of the stamp of society abolitionists would become "estranged" from the "deacons," there probably will not be any great hesitation on the part of any observer of the types of young men as exemplified at Yale.

A statement that the societies are over-expensive bears its refutation on its face. No men, however bitter, have boasted that they were left out of the societies simply on this score. In both societies almost every year are found several students of very little financial means. It should not be forgotten that they are institutions of forty or fifty years' standing, whose property has been fully paid for. As they increase in age they will doubtless become almost self-supporting, perhaps able to lend aid rather than compelled to ask it.

With the "old graduates"—if there are any who answer to this honorable appellation—doubtless the strongest bias against the "small" societies is that they have interfered with the "great" ones, Linonia and Brothers in Unity. Facts cannot, however, be twisted into supporting this theory. The epoch from about 1840 to 1860, of the greatest development of the "small" societies, the foundation of their prestige, was coincident with the greatest prosperity of the old debating societies. Then it was, 1853, that their halls were provided and their library facilities largely increased; a regular system of prize debates, 1850–1853, was established in both of them. Men felt that they could make or mar their reputation more in those debates than in the regular college exercises. Competition for elections to the select societies insured the honors and offices of the large ones being held in high esteem and also drew the large attendance which is the prime element of success in such gatherings. Politics certainly thrived under, perhaps were fostered by, this *régime*. The old societies did not die from politics, however, but from neglect. There were many natural and unavoidable causes at work to produce this neglect. A long list of new attractions claimed the undergraduates' attention and time; enlargement of the curriculum so as to include optional studies; athletics; development of the college press; increased ease in dormitory life, etc. Besides all these good and sufficient causes for a lessening of the

college student's interest in the old style of debating, the taste of the times had moved steadily in the same direction. In Congress, in legislatures, in correspondence, clearness, force, brevity, were now preferred to studied elegance. Facts and figures ruled the day. As useless to cry out against the telegraph and the rapid mail itself, or to join Ruskin in his Lilliputian squeaks against railroads, as to inveigh against bright college boys for following the all-pervading, all-controlling taste of the times. In deference, however, to repeated appeals from respected alumni to whom, perhaps, their own early efforts in oratory appeared magnified in retrospect, a fair trial was given, six years ago, to revive the old system. Both Senior societies, both Junior societies also, gave a hearty support to the movement, which was carefully planned and inaugurated with every prospect of success. That the experiment ended in failure was not the fault of the management but of the plan itself. This was not the first element of an education once deemed essential, and very likely really indispensable at the time, but long since discarded as useless for present needs. We have yet to learn of Harvard or Johns Hopkins, the leaders in the University idea, supporting great debating societies like Linonia and Brothers were in their prime. Yale is well equipped with class debating societies, admirably conducted according to modern canons. The only advantage of a general debating society would be for wider practice in parliamentary law.

It is straining at a gnat to deny that "college work deteriorates about the time the society elections are announced"—the hottest portion of the spring. This is literally and so conspicuously true that the discerning faculty, either by reason of their well known partiality to athletics, or to make student-life in general more blissful, or, possibly, having some remote thought of the coming "annuals," invariably shorten the advance work and institute review lessons. But what connection there is between the societies, where a few hours are spent on one or two evenings of each week, and deterioration in scholarship, is not patent on the surface.

"Politics" exist at Yale and are to some extent increased by the presence of the societies. Also, "politics" sometimes

of a more objectionable kind, exist at every large College where there are no secret societies. Young blood must find occasional excitement either in competition or in dissipation. Given any body of five hundred or a thousand young men, living together, with leisure at their disposal, and there will be sure to be among them personal rivalries and jealousies, for leadership in the thousand and one organizations which spring up about a great University, whether societies are included among them or not. The wisest faculties have long since discovered that in most cases the students can govern themselves, socially, far better than any one else can govern them. American students are proverbially haters of shams; shams will not long be tolerated among them with their consent. High sounding and hasty charges which sometimes are bandied about until they create a little tornado of excitement in a particular class, are usually soon settled in a manly class debate. Concerning the Senior Societies, the author of "Four Years at Yale," a non-Senior Society man, and not over partial to them, states in his book, "The part played by them in politics is simply a negative one."

Still more specious is the charge that favoritism rules the elections, that relationships and personal friendships are acknowledged before merit. Year after year the nearest relatives, sons, brothers, nephews, the most cordial friends and room-mates, are left out of both Senior Societies simply because they fall below the required standard for membership. Of course the societies are urged strongly to take them, and of course they wish to do so—but their reputation and prosperity are dependant upon their impartiality in bestowing their honors. If the Yale Senior Societies are remarkable in anything it is in this—that they have striven so rigidly and courageously to live up to their own ideas. It may be confidently asserted without fear of contradiction, by any one who will base his views on specific comparisons, that no other college societies, or clubs in this country, have been so uniformly consistent in this particular. This may be idealism, when birth, influence, money, are outranked by personal character and attainments; but if so, it must be classed with the mistakes which make the world a more useful and kindly place of abode. More than

their selectness, their age, their etiquette, or all of these combined, has the independence of the Senior Societies upheld their prestige. Should they lower their requirements but for a few years, they would be left, as Carlyle has pictured the unsuccessful editor, to die simply of neglect. The societies being administered by young men are liable to make mistakes in their estimates of men, which they probably regret more keenly than any one else as soon as they have been demonstrated. Upon this point the author of "Four Years at Yale" says: "Every year almost there is a great show of indignation over the injustice in the Senior Society elections which bring several big men to grief, yet it rarely happens that the good policy of the society in leaving them out is not indicated within a twelve month."

We hasten on to the crowning arguments against the societies, viz: that men admit just *before* they join the societies they are bad for the College; that they tend to keep the non-society men from coming back to Commencements and other re-unions after graduation. The first pits the vague impressions of boys, who are quoted as saying they do not believe in the societies, but are most anxious to join them! against the avowed statements of mature men, many of them eminent men, including about half of the faculty and corporation, that the societies are properly conducted, useful and beneficial to the College. They give their presence and their influence and their money to upholding the societies. They are not the class of men likely to be untrue to their trusts as guardians of the College, to seek to perpetuate what was a selfish advantage for thirty men in one hundred and fifty or one hundred and seventy-five. Resignation from any society or club is an easy matter for any one who becomes dissatisfied with the principles or management of the organization with which he is connected. How many resignations have there been from the Yale Senior Societies, with their combined total of ninety-four years and membership of over fourteen hundred men? Just *one* on public record, so far as we have been able to learn.

Upon the other point we have taken pains to collect some fresh evidence. The secretaries of three of the largest Eastern colleges, representing the widest extremes of society and

non-society life, upon being appealed to for information as to the attendance on class re-unions, reply as follows, without knowing the object of the interrogations. The Secretary of Yale College, under date of March 22d, 1884, says: "The Triennial meeting is the one of the most enthusiasm, and the numbers of recent years have I think been about seventy; at the decennial of course there are fewer and so on to the semi-centennials." The Secretary of Harvard College, under date of March 22d, 1884, writes, "Every Commencement day is a sort of re-union for all classes here, and each one secures some particular room or rooms in the College dormitories for the purpose. Probably not a fifth, on the average—of classes graduated within ten years are got together and of older classes still less. Each class I believe, also—certainly most of them—have a dinner every three years about Commencement time. These occasions are of course rather better attended." The Secretary of the College of New Jersey, writing on March 24th, 1884, replies to our letter, "Class re-unions take place every three years (men coming up for A. M.); then, sometimes, on the fifth anniversary; after that every ten years; but there is no uniformity of practice and we have never kept any record of attendance."

In other words, at Yale, where class-feeling and its natural resultant, the societies, have fullest sway, class re-unions after graduation are by far the most frequent and largely attended. At Harvard where class feeling is not strong and societies are less potent the reunions are not so large; at Princeton where there are no secret societies the attendance on class gatherings is apparently smaller still and less regular. The logic of this is plain. By reason of their class intimacies, which the society system does more than any other one thing to encourage, the Yale non-society men come back to New Haven more regularly and in larger numbers than the alumni of non-society colleges. The Senior Society men as a rule come back oftener still. Even if their so doing kept away an equal number of chagrined neutrals—an inconceivable exaggeration—the attendance on the Yale reunions would still be far above the Harvard level—the real difference being, as we have shown, between about one half and one fifth; but the number of disappointed

men for Senior Societies never reaches thirty, rarely indeed exceeds twenty, at most; so that the proposition that Senior Society influence destroys class reunions is a *reductio ad absurdum*.

In short, this bill of particulars against the societies is far more remarkable for what it omits than what it contains, no charges being made against the general morality, scholarship, and good behavior of members of either society for any one year or any series of years. Never have these reform movements at Yale been headed by men who were not candidates for the societies up to the very hour of election! At every other college where secret societies exist quite a fair average of the most desirable men in every class prefer not to join any society though urged to do so. At Yale, public sentiment is overwhelmingly in favor of the societies—almost never does a man refuse the elections of both Senior societies. A reform movement called into being by personal chagrin and jealousy may deceive outsiders; but is not calculated to receive, and does not deserve, the respect of the students themselves invited to join the societies, who are the only parties really able to mar their prosperity or change their management.

“ They that are in *will* grin !
They that are out *will* pout ! ”

is too obviously the gist, in a nut-shell, of this whole loud-sounding controversy.

For it must not be imagined from the prominence given some of the charges, for their more perfect refutation, that the burden of proof for their continued existence rests with the societies. The facts in the case necessitate the reverse opinion. Both Senior societies are chartered institutions, with expensive buildings, costing, approximately, fifty thousand dollars each, paying taxes, and entitled to the protection of the municipal and State authorities. It is doubtful if the faculty and corporation themselves could abolish them without legal proof that they had abused the privileges which had been guaranteed to them. Should such a trial occur doubtless many of the most distinguished members of the University who for years had been consistent society members would use their utmost endeavors to defend the societies. At present, therefore, this

whole question of "abolishing" the societies is rather more of an ethical than of a practical character.

The advantages of the societies could not probably be fully appreciated by any except their members. Nevertheless certain of their apparent ends are very obvious and praiseworthy. They gather together representative men of every class and imbue them with a strong affection and respect for one another and the college. They set a goal of ambition for right living, and fine character and solid attainments before every young man entering the institution. They are extremely useful as introducers of men of congenial tastes in college and afterwards. They promote hospitality to Yale men traveling in all parts of the country. They serve the college in a way which nothing else could serve it, by handing down its traditions by word of mouth and by sacredly preserving many of its relics, which, trifles in themselves, though rich in historical significance, would otherwise be consigned to dishonored dust and decay. In proportion to its size the society element has probably contributed more than any other to the financial prosperity of the college. The largest literary prize in the University has been established and sustained by one of the Senior societies, thus proving a desire to do unselfishly all in its power to increase the prosperity of the college. Some rich non-society men have said they *might* give more to Yale *if* there were no societies. They might and they might not, if these conditions were altered. Yale College without societies would not be Yale College as they had known it. It might be better or it might be worse—there may be doubt which—but certainly it would not be the same college.

That the societies unless held to strict account by public opinion are tempted occasionally to abuse their privileges is true enough. Their "etiquette," for instance, which prevents them from discussing society matters with outsiders, thus being directly opposed to wire-pulling, is a commendable thing itself. When it is perverted into rudeness to strangers, or swaggering with under-classmen it is puerile and snobbish. As Chesterfield has said, with his usual acuteness, "A proper secrecy is the only mystery of able men; mystery is the only secrecy of weak and cunning ones."

Measuring one college generation with another it is evident

that unnecessary display is on the decline. Patience must be exercised while any such modifications, if necessary, come naturally; otherwise they would, like Cadmean teeth, soon be springing up again, in new and perhaps more objectionable forms. It should not be forgotten that if the Senior societies have hitherto erred from too much ceremony, going to the other extreme would cause them to be in danger of degenerating into mere clubs. Let those who will, strive to prove that even the best of student clubs, such as those at Harvard, compare in influence, in dignity, in usefulness, in interest of members, with the Yale Senior societies. Appearances are all against the former. A thousand temptations and dangers beset the elaborate student club, from which the society is free. The one system seems to us wholly in accord with good government, good feeling, and good work at college, and the other almost as directly opposed to all three. In the club the student is apt to waste his time and money, and is of course absolutely his own master. In the best societies he is so identified with other men that for their own reputation they cannot afford to let him go the "primrose way" without serious and friendly remonstrance. A choice between the one or the other systems would appear to be the only alternatives now open to the largest colleges.

"Supping," currying favor with society men, allowing society men to "run in" their candidates for office simply because they are society men, are of course highly contemptible proceedings. They will be tolerated a single day only in so far as the tone of the institution grows lax or unmanly. The societies may influence but they cannot make the spirit of the University. Speaking for one of the Senior societies, we may say candidly that even a vague suspicion of cringing on the part of a candidate would be borne with far less patience than laxity in almost any other particular.

From time to time, unhappily, doubts of a graver character prevail in some quarters. Men who do not belong to either Senior society, who are not hostilely inclined toward them on general grounds, fear that society influence pervades the faculty and corporation, influencing the bestowal of prizes, appointment to tutorships, etc. If such cases can be authenticated they are danger signals of the downfall of the one society, or

both, which would seek to perpetuate or tolerate such gross injustice. The college has seen dark days, but the blot of injustice has never so far fouled its escutcheon. The body of the alumni will be slow to believe such a charge ; woe to the reputations of the offenders if it is proved against them. The standard of their society will be trailed in the dust. The name "neutral" is no badge of disgrace ; it stands for the great body of the alumni. Because they can be less easily organized than society men, because they are as a rule less acquainted with one another, is no reason why they should be deprived of one jot or tittle of their rights either in the classroom or in the management of the University. It is not too much to demand that the faculty and the corporation fulfill the letter and the spirit of Jefferson's plea for "equal and exact justice to all men"—of whatever society or non-society persuasion. In the natural order of events society questions will never intrude themselves into the meetings of these bodies, directly or indirectly. The truest society men should not hesitate to coöperate with neutrals toward the attainment of this end in the future. If extra painstaking will dispel any unpleasant impressions which exist on this score at present the effort is worth the cost. Properly conducted, we believe that, for the reasons we have given, the society system is of positive benefit both to its members and to the college. We cannot but look forward to the next epoch with especial interest. Whether the system can retain all of its usefulness now that the bottom has been knocked out of it, so to speak, by the abolition of the Freshman and Sophomore societies ; whether there may not be and ought not to be more Junior societies, so as to cut down the membership of the present ones, now that the classes are so large ; whether the new Senior society, begun so auspiciously, is not in itself the best antidote for quieting all the discontent against the old societies—are problems which time alone can solve. Expansion and improvement rather than abolition seem to be the real order of the day. The sincere hope of every loyal son of Yale, whether a society man or not, will be that the dawning era shall prove one of good feeling not less remarkable in its narrow sphere, than that publicly associated with the name of James Monroe.

**ARTICLE VII.—THE CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT AND
THE CHARTER OF YALE COLLEGE.**

IN our Article, published in the *New Englander* in May, 1882, respecting The Charter of Yale College, the import and reach of its changes we did not think it necessary to consider, and do not now think it necessary very fully to discuss, whether the colony under its charter had the right in 1701 to pass the act, entitled "An act for Liberty to erect a Collegiate School," or the right in 1745 to pass the act entitled "An act for the more full and complete establishment of Yale College in New Haven, and for enlarging the powers and privileges thereof." But it may be proper to say something on the subject to complete our view.

If the legislature of the colony had the right under its charter in 1745 to found or establish a college and to incorporate it, it obviously had the same right under the same charter in 1701. If it had not this right at either period, it appears to follow, that the college had no valid charter prior to the American Revolution and perhaps still later.

We are not ready to accept this conclusion nor do we think that the jurists of the State of Connecticut or of the country are likely to accept it. The charter of the college has been held to be valid from the beginning, whatever fears may have been felt at first of interference or question, if the rights of the colonists were too ambitiously put forward. It has been recognized by repeated acts of legislation, both before and since our revolution, until at last, when in 1818, the charter of Charles II. was superseded by a State Constitution, it was confirmed and perpetuated by that instrument. The officers of the crown never interfered with the charter of the college by proceedings against it. This is presumptive evidence, that they saw no sufficient reason for interference. We shall not argue the case for the crown in their behalf. We have received no retainer for that purpose and at this late period can hardly expect any, and we certainly shall not volunteer. Rector Clap, who some

years later showed his knowledge of the law, by his noted and able argument on the right of visitation and who drew the proposed act of 1745, "the skilled lawyer," as he is called, Governor Fitch, who revised the draught, the trustees who presented it, and the legislature who enacted it, could not have believed that the act would be invalid, nor could the trustees, who afterwards acted upon it, have been of that opinion.

But if "the colony, in strict law," (the epithet on what is in the nature of a constitutional question is of no consequence), "had no power to create a corporation,"* it will be difficult, we ought perhaps rather to say impossible to support its validity. The object of that act was to continue and modify a corporation, or as is alleged to create one and to bestow additional powers upon such corporation, that is, to do what it is supposed the colony had no power to do. If the college were not a corporation, it could not as such take and hold lands and a non-existing corporation could not acquire title to lands by possession. A similar argument respecting the power to found a college leads to the same result. The right to found a college is said to belong to the king, and that a college can only be founded by his authority or license. Adams & Lambert, 4 Reports, 107. There are authorities for saying, that the former right is implied in the latter. Phillips *vs.* Bury, 2d Term Rep., 353, was a case, which turned upon the right of visitation and deprivation of the Rector of Exeter College, Oxford. Chief Justice Holt, in the course of his argument says, "the name of a college, which always supposeth a corporation." In Adams *vs.* Lambert, *supra*, which was founded upon the Statute of Edward VI. (1 Edw. VI., ch. xiv.) by which colleges, chantries, etc., were given to the king, the court resolved as to the second clause: "Secondly, this second branch explains, that they ought to be incorporations by law or in reputation as is aforesaid," that is as the court explains and distinguishes rightfully reputed as such, having a lawful source or

* "It is indeed probably true that the Colony in strict law had no power to create a corporation." Prof. S. E. Baldwin, vol. iii. Transactions of New Haven Historical Society, p. 412. The founders of Yale College obtained in the act of 1701, a license for a College "from those claiming to act by his [the king's] authority."—Id. p. 429.

beginning, but with some defects in the manner of their creation, "or otherwise land could not belong to them." If the colony had no power to found a college or to incorporate one, we are thus led to the spectacle of one of our, oldest and most venerable colleges being for nearly a hundred years, and until the recognition of its charter by the State, without a valid charter. A growing feeling of independence would not save it, as long as the colony was subject and acknowledged its subjection to the English crown and acted under its charter. The voluntary requirement in the act of 1745, of oaths of allegiance and loyalty (the colonial charter required no oaths of allegiance), is not very pregnant proof of such feeling of independence. We cannot but suspect error in the positions or reasoning, which lead to such an extraordinary result.

Unquestionably by the law of England, a charter of incorporation or of a college must have proceeded from the crown or from parliament. The pope had no right or color of right to found the College of Greystocke and give its Rector and six priests presentable livings, as was the case in Dyer. But that does not touch the point of inquiry. The question is not as to the rights of the crown but as to the rights of the colonists. The charter of Charles II., bearing date April 20, 1662, proceeded from the crown and went into full operation on the union of the colonies of Connecticut and New Haven in 1665. It gave certain power and authority, derived from the crown, to the colony, and the question is as to the extent of such power and authority.

We shall consider first, the extent of the grant, and secondly the restriction upon it. As to the first of these points, and in support of our construction, we premise that so liberal were the provisions of this charter, that under it as a State Constitution the State of Connecticut until 1818, exercised all the powers of a sovereign State with the approbation and support of its courts. It chartered incorporations, as for example incorporated cities and banks, and if it did not found a college or give leave to found one, it was because Yale College was already founded, which it recognized, to which it made grants, and of whose corporation after 1792, its Governor and Lieutenant-Governor and six senior assistants, and afterwards six senior

senators became members. The amplitude of the grant contained in the royal charter for the purposes of government, it would seem, cannot well be questioned. This charter created a public corporation, with governmental and political powers over a vast territory, whose boundaries extend westward to the South sea. The crown granted all this territory to the colonists with the reservation only of a royalty on the precious metals. It established the government of a Governor, deputy Governor, and twelve assistants, and the deputies of the towns, all annually elected, the assistants and deputies being required to meet in General Assembly twice a year. It authorized the colony to have a common seal, to create judicial tribunals, make free-men and officers, impose fines, to array the citizens in military force for the common defence, to resist invasion, to exercise martial law in all cases where it might be necessary, and to carry on commerce.

Among other things, the charter gave to the Legislature power as follows: "From time to time to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, ordinances, directions, and instructions, not contrary to the laws of the realm of England, as well for settling the forms and ceremonies of government and magistracy fit and necessary for said plantation. . . . As by the said Assembly or the major part of them shall be thought fit, and for the directing, ruling and disposing of all other matters and things whereby our said people inhabiting there may be so religiously, peaceably, and civilly governed as their good life and orderly conversation may win and invite the natives to the knowledge and obedience of the true God and the Saviour of mankind and the Christian faith," etc.

It is to be considered, that the charter is for no definite period but is for the present and future government of a great territory in the Western World then in a great measure unknown. The colonists were then indeed few, but immigration was permitted and encouraged by the charter itself and was expected. It is to be noticed, that there is no limitation of the kind of laws which might be enacted, except that they were to be wholesome and reasonable. The expression is "all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws." "As by the said Assem-

bly or the major part of them shall be thought fit." The Legislature was to judge of their fitness. That was left to their discretion. They were not intended to be laws for an ignorant and degraded people but for a religious, peaceable and civilized community of Englishmen and their descendants, of such a nature that the colonists by the conspicuous example of their good life and orderly conduct should win and attract the savage natives of the country to the Christian faith. Had the Legislature no power to provide for the education of such a community according to its wants? Evidently it had and to determine the kind of education which should be provided and the institution, "fit" for that purpose. It is reasonable to conclude, that it was expected and intended that persons should be educated in such manner as to be qualified for the different offices of magistracy and representation provided for in the charter and as successors to supply the place of the ministers of the gospel in the colony, many of whom were college men, as teachers of the Christian faith and those who would give like instruction to future immigrants and to the descendants of the colonists. This is what the original charter of Yale College intends.

The colonial charter is not to be construed with the strictness of a penal statute but with the liberality of a remedial one or the fairness with which a constitution of government should be construed, so as neither to enlarge or contract its meaning and according to the familiar rule by which the words of a grant shall be taken most strongly against the grantor, because he chooses his own words and, if he intended to restrain their meaning, should have so expressed himself. Whether that rule ordinarily applies to the crown or not is of no consequence. The charter itself provides that all the king's subjects in the colony shall enjoy all the privileges of free and natural subjects within the realm of England and that it "shall be construed" as shall be "most favorable on the behalf and for the best interest" of the colony, "although express mention . . . of the certainty of the premises or any of them . . . is not made." The final provision is: "And lastly we do for us our heirs and successors grant to the said Governor and Company and their successors by these presents, That these our

letters patent shall be firm, good, and effectual in the law, to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatever, according to our true intent and meaning hereinbefore declared, as shall be construed, reputed, and adjudged most favorable on the behalf and for the best interest and behoof of the said Governor and Company and their successors, although express mention of the true yearly value or certainty of the premises or any of them or any other gifts or grants by us or by any of our progenitors or predecessors . . . is not made, or any statute, act, ordinance, provision, proclamation or restriction heretofore had, made, enacted, ordained, or any other matter, cause or thing to the contrary whereof notwithstanding."

This favorable and beneficial construction solves the doubt, if any could be justly entertained, that "all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws" include the right of the colony to provide for education both higher and lower, to charter a college for that purpose, if the General Assembly "thought fit," and as a necessary means of its proper and successful management, and to enable it to hold lands, to incorporate it, unless there is some legal restriction, which restrains in this respect the fullness of the grant.

Under the Massachusetts charter a charter had been granted to Harvard University by the legislature of the colony, as must have been well known in England, and to this time had remained undisturbed. No charter for a college in America had been granted directly by the crown. The charter of William and Mary in 1693 and that of Dartmouth in 1769 bear date, the one more than thirty years, the other more than a hundred years after the date of the Connecticut charter. The charter of King's [Columbia] College, founding and incorporating it, although in the name of George 2d, did not proceed directly from the king. It was granted in 1754, on a petition to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of New York and his council, by the Lieutenant-Governor with the assent of the council under the seal of the province, and was directed to be recorded in the book of patents of the province, not of England. That charter was confirmed by a statute of the State of New York in 1787. So the charter of Queen's College in New Jersey, now Rutgers, although in the name of

George the Third, was granted in 1770, by letters patent, under the great seal of the province of New Jersey by the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the province. This charter was confirmed by the State in 1781 and 1790 with few exceptions. The corporate name of trustees of Queen's College, New Jersey, given in the charter, was in 1828 changed to trustees of Rutgers College in New Jersey. It is not necessary to claim that the king could not afterwards have given a special charter for a college in Connecticut in consequence of his delegation of power. A power of attorney or an agency does not usually disable the principal, nor the creation of a corporation prevent the creation of another, as has been held even in the case of contiguous bridges. *Mohawk Bridge Co. vs. Union & Schenectady R. R. Co.*, 6 Paige, 554, *Charles River Bridge Co. and Warren Bridge case*, XI. Peters R., 420. The colonists, possibly for want of good advice, which often comes too late, did not think it necessary to apply to the king.

Ten years earlier, or in 1652, the General Assembly of the colony of New Haven had resolved to establish a college at New Haven, if Connecticut would join. In the years 1654 onward to 1660, measures had been taken in the same colony for the same purpose, donations made in New Haven and Milford and under Gov. Hopkins' will for that object and an act of the legislature passed to promote it (1 Trumbull, 291, 292). The colonial charter was procured by the agent of the colony of Connecticut. Governor Winthrop, a well known college graduate of Trinity, Dublin, and said to have been connected with the foundation of the Royal Society, though it appears that he was not one of the founders but the friend and correspondent of some of them, was the agent and the chief promoter. The interests of education could not have been forgotten. There is nothing in the circumstances to narrow the natural and beneficial construction of the charter but much to give force and direction to it.

The revisers of the revision made in 1821 of the Statutes of Connecticut on the adoption of the State Constitution, Ch. J. Swift, Lemuel Whitman, and Thomas Day, Esq., the well-known reporter of the decisions of the highest Court of the State, under their signatures, say of the scope of the charter,

"they" (our ancestors) "obtained from Charles II. a charter bottomed on the constitution which they had formed by voluntary compact, which not only secured the most extensive rights and privileges, but rendered them almost independent of the British crown. It is inexplicable that such a monarch as Charles, who had little regard to the rights of his subjects at home, should have given to a distant colony such extensive powers. . . . They had unlimited authority to erect judicatories, to appoint officers, and to establish all necessary laws and regulations. A government more popular, in form and in principle, can hardly be imagined. So slight had been our connection with that government, and so little had they interfered in our internal concerns, that the transition from a dependent to a sovereign State, was almost imperceptible. No alteration was necessary but to erase the name of 'His Majesty,' from our legal proceedings, and insert the name and authority of the State; and the administration of the government proceeded in the same manner as before the declaration of independence" (Preface to the revision). The diligent and accurate historian of New England, Mr. Palfrey, says: Gov. Winthrop "had obtained for his colony a royal charter conveying the most extraordinary privileges." "The charter contained no reservations as to any of the powers appurtenant to a political community strictly independent, except that the local legislature could make no laws 'contrary to the laws and statutes of the realm of England;' a provision which had little practical significance, inasmuch as no obligation was imposed as to annulling laws objectionable in this respect, or transmitting laws to England for examination. It was not even enjoined that the oaths of allegiance and supremacy should be taken in the colony, though two assistants were to be empowered to administer them ['to all and every person or persons, which shall at any time hereafter go or pass into the said colony of Connecticut].'" 2 *Palfrey's History of New England*, 540, 541.

Mr. Palfrey suggests as a reason why Lord Clarendon was "brought to make a formal grant of what almost amounted to colonial independence," the desire to raise up a rival power to Massachusetts in the New England Confederacy. (Id. 542). We do not think that we mistake the scope of the grant in the charter.

The restriction contained in the language "not contrary to the laws of the realm of England," does not qualify the grant but defines it, as not authorizing any illegal acts or measures. The law would have implied that, if the words had been omitted "Illegality is not to be presumed" (1 B. and A. 461, *Nelson vs. Eaton*, 26 N. Y., 415). An authority lawful on its face will not be deemed to authorize an illegal act, unless it is otherwise shown that something illegal was intended. It should be so construed as to be valid rather than fail. They merely forbid a construction which might avoid the grant and remind those to whom the grant is made of the duty of obedience to the law. They are the usual and formal clause of restriction in acts of incorporation. Similar language is used in the original charter of the college and in the act of 1745. The former authorizes the trustees to make such rules and orders as "to them shall seem meet and most conducive to the aforesaid end thereof, so as such rules be not repugnant to the laws of the civil government." The act of 1745 authorizes the President and Fellows "to make, ordain and establish all such wholesome and reasonable laws, rules and ordinances, not repugnant to the laws of England, nor the laws of this colony, as they shall think fit or proper for the instruction and education of the students, and ordering, governing, ruling and managing the said college, etc., which shall be laid before this Assembly, as often as required, and may also be repealed or disallowed by this Assembly when they shall think proper." They are only to be laid before the Assembly when required. No approval or action upon them by the Legislature is necessary. It may repeal or disallow them, as Congress may repeal or annul the laws of the territories, or as the King or Queen in Privy Council could repeal colonial statutes. So held as to the colonial laws of New York (*The People vs. the Rector of Trinity Church*, 22 N. Y., 49 and 50), and that they were in full force until disallowed.

No right of visitation is conferred or reserved. No power of initiation is given. No right of interference with the administration of the college by its officers and faculty or with the decisions in particular cases. Nor is any right of removal vested in the Legislature, for that is regulated by the act and

is placed in the corporation together with the right of appointment of all officers, professors and tutors of the college. Only the rules, ordinances and regulations of the President and Fellows are to be so laid, when required. Thus the college, in which are interested its graduates and friends in all parts of the United States, we might almost say in all parts of the world, is placed in a good degree of safety from political and popular and local impulse, to pursue its high and peaceable vocation.

The restriction "not contrary to the laws of the realm of England" in the charter of Charles II. must also mean: 1. Such laws as are binding on the colony. Those statutes, in which the colonies were not named did not extend to the colonies or bind them. "Our American plantations are . . . not bound by any act of parliament unless particularly named." 1 Bl. Com., introduction, see 4. 2. Laws which were applicable to the condition of the colony. "Such colonies carry with them only so much of the English law, as is applicable to their own situation and the condition of an infant colony." 1st Bl. Com., *ibidem*. For example, laws relating to feudal tenures, to non-conformity, to the support of the established religion, to municipal government and local taxation, would not apply and the colony was not required to conform to them.

3. Laws which were inconsistent with the grant, which the king had made and might lawfully make, were not included. The king granted the territory to the colony in free and common socage. After that he could have no feudal rights. They were inconsistent with his grant. The law which secures the owner of land in his proprietorship, after his conveyance of the land in fee simple secures as owner not him but his grantee. If no college could be founded without the license or authority of the crown in the colony, yet if that license and authority were granted to the colony and he could lawfully make the grant, the objection disappears.

The statute of Edward VI. (1 Edw. 6, ch. xiv.) which gave colleges, etc., to the king, did not, as we understand it, restrain the king. It could not name or designate the American colonies for they did not then exist. It also would appear that the act is limited to colleges, which were in being before its passage. Its language is, "all manner of colleges, free chapels,

chauntries having been in esse within five years before the first day of the present parliament, which were not in the actual and real possession of the said late king [Henry VIII.] nor in the actual or real possession of the king, our sovereign lord that now is [Edward VI.] not excepted," etc. It is also provided that the act shall not extend to any college, etc., had or obtained by the assent, license, grant, etc., of the said Henry VIII. or Edward VI., who were Protestant princes. That act was intended to suppress superstitious uses. *Adams & Lambert's case*, 4 Rep. 107. See preamble. This was an action of ejectment for the recovery of the possession of real estate. The court say that the statute gives five branches to the king, which it enumerates, only the first two of which are applicable to colleges and touch the question. The court say, "Are given to the king. 1st. All manner of colleges, free chapels, chauntries, etc.; 2d. All manors, lands, tenements, etc., belonging to them or any of them." As to the 2d clause it was resolved: "1st. That those words were necessary to be added, for otherwise by the gift of the college, chauntry or free chapel nothing would be given to the king but the scite of the college, or chauntry or free chapel, as is agreed. 7 Eliz., *Dyer* 233, b, pl. 15 and 29. Ass. 53."

Without further examination of the statute, which we have not thought necessary, it appears to us that the statute does not apply to the English colonies in America.

The superstitious uses which it was intended to suppress did not exist there. Does any body suppose that the sites of William and Mary and Dartmouth Colleges and the lands belonging to them were transferred by the statute to the king? Or that the title to the site and real estate of Yale College would have been vested in the king, if it had been chartered directly by him? The charter of the king itself granted to the colony all the land within its bounds. But whether the statute by its silence, its terms, and the nature of its provisions shows, as we think it plainly does, that it was inapplicable to the colony or not, it does not restrain the fullness of the royal grant. The charter of Yale College was granted, not in opposition to the king but by virtue of his authority. No other law of England is suggested as having been contra-

vened or which might have been contravened by the college charter.

But it is said, that in 1784, in a suit between the crown and the colony of Massachusetts, the Court of Chancery in England cancelled or declared forfeited the charter of that colony, for acts of the government of that colony. What then? How does that affect Yale College? It is said that the officers of the crown took exception to the act by which Harvard University had been chartered and that the words of the particular grant bearing on this subject in the Connecticut charter, were copied from that of Massachusetts. The officers of the crown probably alleged many acts of forfeiture with the intention of sustaining, if found necessary, such as they could. The allegations of counsel in a litigated action are no evidence as to the facts in issue, nor much of the law, except as supported by authority. What is alleged on the one side, is usually denied on the other. An unconstitutional legislative act of a State, which is a public corporation (6 Hill, N. Y., 33) is never, and an illegal ordinance or law of a municipal or other public corporation is not usually, a ground of forfeiture. The courts in a proper cause declare void, or disregard the illegal act or ordinance, or may restrain any action under it, or the people by their suffrages, or the Legislature by limitation or resumption of powers or by penal enactments provide a remedy. Harvard University was not a party to that suit, was not heard, was not bound by the decree, and could not legally be affected by it, except so far as it might be affected by the termination of the colonial charter. That decree was rendered at a time of high-strained prerogative, in the year before the death of Charles II., when he was governing England without the aid of the parliament and leading on to events, which four years later deprived the Stuarts forever of the British throne (1 *Macaulay's Hist. of Eng.*, London ed., pp. 208, 211-213, 215, 216). In a cause of a political nature the arbitrary temper and control of the crown would be likely to influence and did influence the courts, the judges of which held their offices at the pleasure of the king. The forms of law might or might not be observed, but justice was hopeless. None was expected. What important principle of law a decree on default for non-appearance, without trial

or hearing, which default the court refused to open and give time for a power of attorney to be procured, declaring that a corporation should always have its attorney in court, could establish, we are at a loss to understand.

The true cause of the forfeiture of the Massachusetts charter was the spirit of liberty in the colony and the usurping disposition and purpose of the king. The soil of Massachusetts has always stirred under the foot of oppression. The charter was vacated for political reasons. If the colonists had submitted, as was proposed to them, all their rights and liberties to the king, proceedings would not have been taken or would have been stayed. But the colonists were too bold and free, had too much English blood, too much Puritan blood, to assent to an absolute despotism. The process went on. We select by way of illustration one or two items as to Harvard College. June 19, 1683, Cranfield, governor of New Hampshire, wrote to Sir Lionel Jenkins: "I spent my time in this colony (Massachusetts) on purpose to pry into the intrigues and politics of this government; among other things I have observed that there can be no greater evil attending His Majesty's affairs than those pernicious and rebellious principles which flow from this college at Cambridge, which they call their university, from whence all the towns both in this and other colonies are supplied with factious and seditious preachers. This country can never be well settled or the people become good subjects till the preachers be reformed and that college suppressed. If the Boston charter were made void, etc." Writing on the same day to the Lords' Committee of the Privy Council, he says: "When the charter shall be made void, it will be necessary to dissolve the University of Cambridge, for from thence all the several colonies in New England are supplied." (3d vol. *Palfrey's Hist. of N. E.*, pages 413 and 414, note).

In the Dartmouth College case Mr. Webster said (4 Wheaton, 559): "The illegal proceedings in the reign of Charles II. were under colour of law. Judgments of forfeiture were obtained in the courts. Such was the case of the quo warranto against the City of London and the proceedings, by which the charter of Massachusetts was vacated." (3d *Palfrey's Hist. of N. E.*, 390 to 394, and note, including letter of Horace Gray, Jr., Esq., now

judge of the U. S. Supreme Court, *Hume's History of England* for year 1684, 6th vol., 257 to 260, Harper's ed., 1 Trumbull, 355, 367, 386). The proceedings against the Massachusetts colony were begun by quo warranto in the King's Bench, but the sheriff appears to have objected to making a return of service, that the process was served after the return day, and that he doubted his right to make service out of his bailiwick. Counsel also declined to appear for the colony because the action was not against the governor and company by their corporate name, but against individuals. A new suit was then begun in chancery. A scire facias was issued to the sheriff of Middlesex, England, and returned nihil; then an alias issued to him, which must have had and did have the like result, and thereupon, without notice to the colony, the decree was rendered (see last mentioned note in Palfrey, *supra*).

We turn from this odious and worthless precedent, of which it has been difficult to write with patience, to the enlightened jurisprudence of the State of Massachusetts. We remark that the point of inquiry is not the colonial charter, but the validity of the original charter of Harvard College. Its validity has been directly adjudged in one, probably more, of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. In 1828 (in *Hardy vs. The Inhabitants of Waltham*, 7 Pick. Reports, 108), it was held that under the colonial act of 1650, which exempted all lands, tenements and revenues of Harvard College, not exceeding £500 per annum from taxation, the lands first acquired by the college before their annual income amounted to £500, would never be liable to taxation as long as they were owned by the college, and that they were equally exempt from taxation in the hands of a lessee. Chief Justice Parker, speaking of the act, "which," he says, "is considered as the original charter of Harvard College, taken in connection with previous acts of 1636, 1640, 1642," proceeds: "This grant or charter was irrepealable in its nature and it began to operate on the property then belonging to the college and such as should be afterwards acquired, until their real estate should exceed in value £500 a year, after which all real estate acquired by the college would be liable to taxation, unless exempted by subsequent legislative acts. This original grant is expressly con-

firmed by the chapter of the constitution respecting Harvard University."

Thus it was held that the charter of Harvard College was *ab initio* valid, and began immediately to operate, that it was an executed contract, which of course implies parties capable of contracting, one of whom was the corporation of Harvard College, created by the act of 1650, and that such original charter was confirmed by the State Constitution.

This decision authoritatively decides in favor of the validity of the original charter of Harvard College and supports our construction of the Connecticut charter and in effect decides that the original charter of Yale College was valid and that the colonial legislature had the right to incorporate it. Neither did the court nor the counsel on either side as reported, even mention the decision of the English Court of Chancery respecting the Massachusetts charter, it being apparently considered as not having the slightest bearing on the question. The Constitution of Massachusetts of 1780 ratified and confirmed the existing rights and privileges of Harvard College. "It is declared that the President and Fellows of Harvard College, in their corporate capacity . . . shall have, hold, use, exercise and enjoy, all the powers, authorities, rights, liberties, privileges and immunities, which they now have or are entitled to have" (Chap. 5, Sec 1, Art. 1).

Not less conclusive has been the action of the State of Connecticut. The Connecticut charter was not vacated, though this was repeatedly attempted. Following the policy of his brother, James II. signally attacked corporate rights. Hume says that "by the practice of annulling charters the king has become master of all the corporations, and could at pleasure change the whole magistracy" (VI. Hist. of Eng., 320). As to university of Oxford, Id. 322. In 1686 two writs of quo warranto were served on the governor and company of the colony of Connecticut, for the purpose of vacating its charter, but the time of appearance had passed, and afterwards in the same year a new writ of quo warranto was served. The colony petitioned the king against the proceedings, but a prayer in the petition, that if the charter were vacated the colony might be put under the government of Sir Edmund Andross, was unwarrantably

and groundlessly construed as a surrender of the charter, which was never intended (1 Trumb., 368 to 371). In 1687 Sir Edmund Andross tried to take away the charter by force, but the charter-oak intervened. However, for nineteen months he governed the colony despotically, and without any regard to the charter, without any General Assembly, levying taxes and making exactions, and appointing officers, civil and military, as he pleased, and the colony submitted. Upon the revolution in England, and the corresponding revolution in Massachusetts, and the seizure there of Sir Edmund and his council, on the first news of the landing of the Prince of Orange at Torbay, Connecticut after a few weeks resumed its powers under the charter, and declared that the laws enacted according to it should be in full force (1 Trumb., 371, 372, 376, 377). In 1690 the case of Connecticut was submitted to three learned lawyers in England, Ward, Somers, and Treby, and they severally gave their opinion, that as there had been no judgment entered against the colony, no surrender under the seal of the corporation, and none enrolled of record, that the charter was good and valid in law, and that the involuntary submission to the government of Sir Edmund Andross did not impair the rights under it. (Id. 387. See Wilcocks on Munic. Corporations, pp. 325, 332). About 1715 a bill was introduced into parliament to repeal the charters of the American colonies, but after a severe struggle the attempt to repeal the charter of Connecticut was defeated. We have not learned that it was ever even suggested that the charter of Yale College was a cause of forfeiture. About 1720, in a probate case between John Winthrop, son of the last governor, and his brother-in-law, Thomas Lynchmere, in regard to the settlement of Governor Winthrop's estate, Mr. Winthrop, after an unsuccessful controversy in the courts of Connecticut, appealed to the king, in privy council we presume, and it was decided that the colonial law as to intestate estates, was null and void, as repugnant to the law of England, because it did not give the land to the male heirs only, and admitted daughters to a share. The colony had not been heard, and alarmed made its petition and application to the king, and it is said "the charter was preserved, and the colony was allowed to proceed in their former

practice in regard to intestate rights" (2 Trumb., 54 to 56). We understand by this that the former decision was overruled. This must have been on the general ground that laws not applicable to the condition of the colony were not binding on it and to be enforced, which corresponds with our construction of the charter. The proceedings in regard to the Connecticut charter show the temper of the times and illustrate the case as to the Massachusetts charter.

The charter of Connecticut was the same, and conferred the same powers before as after the Revolution. It may be said that the restriction "not contrary to the laws of the realm of England," was removed by that event. But we have already disposed of the matter of that restriction. If the grant by the king were broad enough to authorize the incorporation of a college for the purposes of education, the restriction did not stand in the way. Now the legislature of Connecticut, under the same colonial charter, incorporated a literary society, the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1799, the President and Fellows of the Medical Society in 1792, incorporated cities, as the city of New Haven in 1784, the city of Hartford in 1784, the cities of New London and Norwich in the same year, a borough, the borough of Bridgeport in 1800, incorporated banks, as the New Haven bank in 1792, the Hartford bank in the same year, the Bridgeport bank in 1806, the Eagle bank in 1811; insurance companies in 1797 and 1803, aqueduct companies, fishing companies, a missionary society; in short granted charters of incorporations for any purpose which "they thought fit," if they deemed the laws "wholesome and reasonable." It is hardly necessary to say that such legislative action has been recognized and upheld as proper by the courts and the legal profession. This legislative construction of the charter for seventy-five years before our Revolution, and nearly forty years afterwards, has a force which can neither be repelled nor evaded. The State constitution of 1818 leaves the corporations previously existing on the basis of the colonial charter, only subjecting them to its regulations and restrictions. (Art. 3, sec. 3). "The rights and duties of all corporations shall remain as if this constitution had not been adopted, with the exception of such regulations and restrictions as are con-

tained in this constitution." It thus assumes as previously existing the power to create such corporations.

After the Revolution the legislature did not profess to give vitality to the charter and incorporation of Yale College, but recognized them as already existing in full force. Thus the charter of the city of New Haven, enacted in 1784, provides "that nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect any of the corporation rights of the corporation of Yale College." The act of 1792 appropriates, certain balances of taxes and debts due "to and for the use of Yale College in New Haven," and provides that "in case this grant shall be accepted, . . . the governor, lieutenant-governor, and six senior assistants in the council of the State for the time being, shall ever hereafter by virtue of said offices, be trustees or fellows of said college, and shall, together with the present president and fellows of said college and their successors, constitute one corporation, by the name and style mentioned in the charter of said college; and shall have and enjoy the same powers and privileges and authority in as full and ample a manner as though they had been expressly named and included in said charter." Is the charter treated as valid from its passage, or void? The fourth section provides, "This act shall not have any force or effect so far as respects the appropriating said balances to the use of the said college, or in any respect adding to or varying the charter and constitution thereof, unless the same shall be accepted and approved by the present corporation of said college in legal meeting assembled."

Was Yale College at this time not a legal college nor a legal corporation? If the colonial legislatures of 1701 and 1745 had no legal power to charter it, the State legislature of 1792 under the same colonial charter had no more. The State Constitution of Sept. 15, 1818, provided in Article VIII., Section 1, as follows: "The charter of Yale College as modified by agreement with the corporation thereof [the then existing corporation, capable of so agreeing], in pursuance of an act of the General Assembly passed in May, 1792, is hereby confirmed." The constitution does not say the charter contained in the act of 1745 or the new charter as the act seems sometimes for brevity and convenience but never in any statute to

have been called, but "The charter of Yale College as modified," etc. That means in our judgment the charter properly so-called, the law by which the college was chartered, as amended by subsequent acts, including the act of 1745. That was then the charter (See *Hardy vs. Inhabitants of Waltham*, supra). It is to be noticed that the Constitution implies, that the colonial charter of the college and its corporation had a valid existence in 1792.

There is therefore no stain upon the origin of our Alma Mater. A doubt is a stain, but we think that we have shown that there is not the least reason for doubt. The charter of the City of New Haven or of the New Haven Bank might as well be doubted. We apologize for this long discussion of what in our opinion is so plain a point.

We do not appeal, because it is unnecessary; if it were necessary we might appeal with decisive force to the familiar principle adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, and we believe in the jurisprudence of every State of the Union, that a legislature in the exercise of its powers must judge in the first instance of the construction of the constitution or instrument under which it acts, and that this construction will not be overruled, unless manifestly erroneous, but the legislative act will be held valid and legally enacted and in full force (*Dartmouth College vs. Woodward*, 4 Wheaton, 518; VI. Mass. R., 417; XII. Mass. R., 252; XIV. Mass. R., 340; 1 Cow. [N. Y.] R., 450; 5 Sandf. [N. Y.] R., 10; *The People vs. The Supervisors of Oswego*, 17 N. Y. R., 241).

Tried by this rule the laws we have been considering were legally passed and were within the legislative power. We also have not cited the decisions, which with like unanimity we believe hold, that, where general legislative power is given to the legislature of a State, the legislative power is unlimited, except as it is restrained by the constitution of the State or that of the United States, that is, by some paramount, positive provision of law. The analogy is obvious, with the pertinence and force of such decisions. The legislative power of the British Parliament is unlimited, as it is not restrained by any such positive provision of law. But our conclusion needs not this support, though as to the extent of the grant in the charter

of the colony no sufficient reason is perceived why it should not be freely accepted.

Accordingly the Colonial Legislature in 1701 passed the act entitled "An act for liberty [that is, license] to erect a collegiate school." Messrs. Sewall and Addington do not say, as they could hardly refrain from saying if they thought so, that the Connecticut colonial charter did not authorize the incorporation of a college, but they were afraid of "wind and weather." Therefore, throwing over the project a veil of modesty, they call the proposed institution in their letter an academy, and in their draught of a proposed charter, which was however not adopted, a collegiate school. In the same spirit they did not *expressly* "incorporate it." Perhaps that is all they meant, though they cautiously forbear to use any word, of which an injurious or imprudent use might be made. But this is immaterial. We have discussed the incorporation of the college by the act of 1701 and shall not go over the same ground. But, if we may be excused, we will state briefly a few things additional in confirmation of our opinion.

There is no particular form of words requisite to make a corporation (*Denton vs. Jackson*, 2 John. Chan. R., 320. See pp. 324-5). It is settled, that when a power is given to private individuals, all must concur in the exercise of it (*Green vs. Miller*, 6 John R., 39; *Franklin vs. Osgood*, 14 Id. 527; *ex parte Rogers*; 7 Cow., 526; 1 Barn. & A., 608. So as to trustees, 3 Term R., 592; 8 Cow., 543; *Hill on Trustees*, 305).

The act indeed gives the power to the trustees or "the major part of them," but in this it does not agree with a power given to private individuals, but with that given to corporations, and the grant is in terms "to them and their successors." In 1722 the General Assembly gave expressly to the trustees the right to use a common seal, which is appropriate to a corporation. If the trustees conveyed as a board, a board may be a corporation, and they would seem not to have conveyed as individuals, especially if under a common seal. The preamble of the act of 1723 states, that whereas "certain trustees for erecting a collegiate school . . . have erected the said school in the town of New Haven, which school is now known by the name of Yale Colledge." Here the denomination is given

to the trustees of "Trustees for erecting a collegiate school,"* and the school is said to be "now known by the name of Yale College," and in the body of the act it is enacted, "a rector of the said college shall by virtue thereof become a trustee of the same," etc. Here the school is declared to be a college, Yale College. Lord Holt's words already quoted apply, "the name of a college which always supposeth a corporation" (*Phillips vs. Bury*, *supra*), and the words quoted in the same connection from *Adams vs. Lambert*, *supra*. The practical necessity of incorporation for a college is well expounded by Sir William Blackstone at the beginning of the 20th chapter of the first volume of his commentaries.

Previously in the same act it is said, "And it is hereby further declared and enacted to be the true intent and meaning of the act aforesaid [of 1701], that the said trustees shall be empowered and they are hereby declared to have power to meet together for considering and advising about and resolving upon all matters belonging to the trust of the said college committed to them as aforesaid." The trustees of Yale College are declared to have the power of meeting, and considering, and resolving upon all matters belonging to the single, common trust committed to them, and such is declared to have been the intent of the charter of 1701. If the legislature had had no right to charter a corporation, it would have been a strong argument for such a construction as would preserve the validity of the charter. But we are met with no such difficulty. The opposing argument runs into this dilemma. If the act of 1701 did not create a corporation, and the act of 1745 did, and the colony had in strict law no right to create a corporation, the act of 1745 so far from repealing the charter could not even affect it, except so far as it might contain independent provisions, unconnected with the incorporation.

It is a mistake to suppose that religion is only mentioned in the preamble of the charter. The preamble is, as far as it well could be, incorporated by reference in the enacting clauses. "The said school," refers to the school described in the preamble, "the aforesaid end thereof," "the aforesaid mentioned

* The corporate name of Dartmouth College is by its charter, The Trustees of Dartmouth College.

end thereof," "the end aforesaid" emphasized by this repetition, refer to the end mentioned in the preamble. The end of the school is the end, for which liberty is given to "erect" it. That is thus stated in the act: "To the intent therefore that all due encouragement be given to such pious resolutions [of the petitioners], and that so necessary and religious an undertaking may be set forward, supported, and well managed, Be it enacted." The undertaking was therefore a "religious" one in pursuance of "pious resolutions" previously stated.

The desire and design or resolution of the petitioners was to uphold and propagate "The Christian Protestant religion by a succession of learned and orthodox men," through the instrumentality of a collegiate school "wherein youth may be instructed in the arts and sciences, who through the blessing of Almighty God may be fitted for public employment, both in Church and Civil State," that is by means of a Christian, Protestant College. In no other way could the object of the petitioners and founders, the object of the act be accomplished. If a part of the preamble be suppressed or treated as suppressed or omitted, the conclusion may be less obvious. Youth are to be instructed in a collegiate school, who through the blessing of God may be fitted for public employments in Church and State, but how fitted? By an education in such a Christian, Protestant institution as has been mentioned. Would a Roman Catholic college conform to the requirements of the charter? Why not? Would an agnostic or deistical college? Or a college in which there were no religious instruction or religious exercises? These questions have been already answered. The Christian character is written upon the structure of the college by the designation of ten ministers of the gospel solely to organize and manage it, and by the provision that their associates and successors shall also be ministers of the gospel, public teachers of Christianity. In all the changes of the corporation a majority of the successors of the original trustees has been carefully preserved and of course the power of ultimate control by them for the purposes of the charter, if it should ever become necessary to exercise it to preserve the college from being diverted from those purposes. Such character is also written upon the whole history of the college.

The usage is not to be answered by calling it tradition, as if it were a mist which would disappear before the rising sun. It is an usage based upon a construction of the charter and only traditional in the sense that it has been continued for one hundred and eighty-two years. Since the charter was granted, property has been given (and undoubtedly was before) in trust for the use of such Christian, Protestant college, a large part of which would not have been given if the college had not been of this description. It ought never to be necessary to inquire whether the trust can be legally enforced. It is binding in honor and conscience. Not only upon the members of the corporation but upon the graduates, who have had the use of such property and upon the legislature and people of Connecticut. Religious instruction is not less required, because there is now a school of theology, connected with the college, unless the intellect only should be educated and the heart and conscience neglected. That was not the view and intention of the founders. Our own opinion is, that in a complete education the whole nature, moral, mental, and physical, in due proportion, should be trained and educated, and that character, not in an indefinite sense, but, moral character, is more important than intellectual superiority, though we would not in the least depreciate that. It is not thought that the undergraduates should not be instructed in the principles of civil government and the elements of jurisprudence, because there is a school of law, however excellent it may be, connected with the college.

We assume that in our former article we have sufficiently shown that the charter was not repealed but amended by the act of 1745, and that the provisions, which make the college a Christian, Protestant college, and that relating to vacancies in the office of trustee, remain unrepealed and in full force; but our eyes are open to the light. If, however, on the subject of reconstruction any one cannot see the difference between that act and the act of the New Hampshire legislature, invading the rights of Dartmouth College, declared unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court of the United States, the difference of eye-sight cannot be remedied by reasoning. That there have been many cases of the reconstruction of corporations, and of

the incorporation of voluntary societies, which are not cases of reconstruction, has no tendency to prove that in this case "the spiritual body" of the trustees (Dr. Woolsey, Hist. Dis., p. 101), was, as alleged, entirely reconstructed.

A curious and amusing argument in favor of the repeal of the provision as to the supply of vacancies is drawn from an erasure. It appears that the draught of the bill presented by the petitioners to the General Assembly, is on file among the archives of the State, and that in this draught after the words "elect and appoint a president or fellows in the room and place of," were first written, "him or them yt. shall remove out of the colony," but that these latter words had been struck out. Now it is said that this draught appears to be in the handwriting of Gov. Fitch, that he probably copied it from President Clap's draught as far as he approved of it, and that copying these words he wrote them down, but as soon (why as soon?) as he had done it he struck them out by drawing his pen through them. Had he not read and considered the draught which he revised? What evidence is there that the words were in the original draught, which he revised? Experts even under oath make great mistakes as to handwriting, but the handwriting of an erasure, by drawing the pen through words, must be peculiarly difficult. It is entirely uncertain by whom the erasure was made. The draught, as revised, must have been returned for approval. It is agreed, and this only seems certain, that the erasure was made before the draught was adopted by the trustees or presented to the legislature. The supposition that Governor Fitch, not then but in 1753 governor, at first saw no objection, and so wrote down the words, which implied that the provision in the charter was not repealed, and that he afterwards thought it would be repealed by the act and struck them out, is a pure piece of imagination. If Governor Fitch or some one else struck them out, he (or the trustees) may have concluded that a fellow who removed out of the colony, would of course resign, having no longer one of the qualifications required by the charter, or that the office would be *ipso facto* vacated by the removal, or that having removed to another province or abroad, and formed new connections, and the journey to the college being long and expensive, he

would soon not desire to continue in office, or become subject to removal for "unfaithfulness, default or incapacity," or that when ministerial settlements were for life with a legal support, the contingency of removal and a refusal to resign, was too remote to require a provision, for which experience had shown no necessity, as it has shown none since, or there may have been some other reason.

But who ever heard of a rule of law, that the construction of a statute can in any degree be determined by the changes made during the preparation of a bill by petitioners to be presented to a legislature, or by what occurred in the consultations between them and their counsel? So remarkable a proposition requires authorities for its support. Even in contracts where the parties remain the same, all prior negotiations are merged in the contract. What certainty would there be in the law, if it rested at all upon facts of which the only knowledge might lie in the breast of the petitioners or, under the seal of confidence, of his counsel, to be disclosed at pleasure? An erasure in a bill presented to the legislature, is not read to it, known to it, acted upon by it, and forms no indication of its intention.

The controversies between the Old Lights and the New Lights in the Congregational and Presbyterian denominations, as to certain forms and phases of Christian doctrine, did not affect their fidelity to the common Christianity, or render either school disposed to make the college other than a Christian, Protestant college, or desirous to remove any security therefor, so that it should no longer be under the control of ministers of the gospel. The argument seems to be that through fear of opposition to the bill, if the provision on the subject in the charter were inserted, the petitioners not only did not insert it but drew their bill, so as to repeal it, or may have acted from this reason. If the provision had been inserted, a successful opposition could only have resulted in an amendment striking it out. No evidence is adduced of any opposition or fear of opposition. No opposition to the bill in its progress appears to have been made, although eleven ministers of the gospel, then trustees, were named in it as president and fellows, with the right of perpetuation, and the only amendment to it made was to make it as to taxation more favorable to the college and its officers.

Where the words of a statute are plain and precise, we are told, resort cannot be had to the title and preamble. This is a fair argument, entitled to consideration. Ordinarily, for sometimes the intention overcomes the letter, where the words of a statute and their meaning are plain and precise, they declare the law and there is no room for construction. So far as the sixth section declares the occasions on which the President and Fellows may elect and appoint to vacancies in their number and the right of removal, the section is clear and precise. But it is inferred, because in this particular section no class is stated, from which the choice is to be made, that the right of choice is unlimited. This inference is not expressed in words, plain and precise, or at all. If in a previous or subsequent section, the class from which the choice must be made were stated, there would be no inconsistency in this with the sixth section, whereas, if that had said in clear and precise terms that the right of choice was to be without any limitation, there would be a direct contradiction. There is no more inconsistency or contradiction, when the designation of the class is contained in another statute, the charter. It is also inferred that the provision in the charter is repealed, because it is not repeated in this section and a limitation to any class is omitted. But this inference is not expressed plainly and precisely, or otherwise in this section or in the statute. These inferences open the whole subject of construction and resort may be had to the title and preamble and other evidences of instruction, as to the intention of the Legislature, according to the ordinary rules of construction.

The very recent case of *People ex rel. Rosenkranz vs. Carr*, 86 N. Y. R., 512, in the New York Court of Appeals, gives an useful illustration. The act of 1847 provided for the election of a recorder and surrogate, "who shall hold their respective offices for three years." It is also provided that in case of a vacancy occurring during such term, it should be filled by election for the unexpired part of the term. The act of 1869 provided that "the term of office of the persons who shall hereafter be elected to the office of recorder, city judge, and surrogate, respectively, for the city and county of New York, shall be six years." The terms are absolute and unqualified. No

reference is made to holding for an unexpired term in case of vacancy, or to the provision in relation to filling a vacancy. The Surrogate of New York, elected in 1876 on the happening of a vacancy, claimed that by the later act the former limitation was repealed and that he was entitled to hold for the full term. But the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decided otherwise. The latter Court say: "There is no more inconsistency between the provision which fixes the term of office and that which provides for filling a vacancy for an unexpired term, when contained in two acts, than when contained as they originally were, in one act."

But it is said the fellows are not trustees, a point to be proved. Not only the act of 1792, but also the act of 1819, calls the fellows of the college trustees, using the terms synonymously. The act of 1792 enacts that "the governor, lieutenant governor and six senior assistants in the council of the State shall ever hereafter be trustees or fellows of said college, and shall together with the present president and fellows constitute one corporation." The act of May, 1819, in like words enacts that "the governor, lieutenant governor and six senior senators for the time being shall ever hereafter by virtue of their said offices be trustees or fellows of said college and together with the president and fellows of said college and their successors shall constitute one corporation." The use of one instead of the other of these equivalent names does not carry the consequences supposed. The fellows are "the true and lawful successors" of the original trustees, deriving their title as such from them, are trustees in the management of the same college and same property, upon the same trust and with the same power of appointment and removal of officers and instructors, and are in substantial identity with the original trustees and their successors. They also with the president compose the same corporation, as did the rector and trustees.

We read the act as it is. We do not read between the lines of that or any other composition, for there is nothing to be read there. Lord Granville lately remonstrated in the British parliament against what was called reading between the lines, giving the same reason and adding in substance, as nearly as we can recollect, that it was a way of imputing the supposi-

tions, conjectures, and inferences of the reader to the writer. It is believed to be a late invention.

It is difficult to see what toleration could have had to do with the question, if it had been raised, between clergymen and laymen, but toleration did not about this time begin to appear upon the statute book, but began to disappear. "In 1708, an act of toleration was passed, copied from the celebrated toleration act of William and Mary, declaring that all persons who should conform to that act should have liberty of worshiping God in a way separate from that established by law; but should not be excused from paying taxes to the approved ministers of the churches, established by law." In 1727 an act was passed that where there was a society of the Church of England, with a person in orders according to the canons of that church, settled and abiding among them and performing divine service, so near to any person who had declared himself to be of that church, that he could conveniently, and did ordinarily attend public worship there, his tax should be paid over to the minister of such church, and if the taxes so collected were insufficient for his support, the society might tax themselves. In 1729 similar exemption was granted to Quakers and Baptists. But in May, 1743, the act of toleration passed in 1708 was repealed. The repealing act disappeared five years after the act of 1745 in the revision of 1750, as did also the act next mentioned. This is the notorious and disreputable ministers' vagrant act passed in 1742, "intolerant" Dr. Woolsey calls it, a reference to which we have hitherto avoided, and to which we will only thus briefly refer; the policy of which was continued in a further act of 1743, also disappearing at the same time. The act of 1742 is said to have only affected Congregationalists, but did Presbyterians also. (Prof. Kingsley's *Hist. Dis.*, note I; note by the revisers of the revision of 1821, pp. 431, 432; Woolsey's *Hist. Dis.*, 106.)

The heated protest as it has been called of President Clap and the tutors in February, 1745, against Mr. Whitefield could not have shown much of the spirit of tolerance and conciliation. It could not have equalled in extravagance the denunciation of Rev. Gilbert Tennent, one of his followers or adherents, by Dr. Cutler, ex-Rector (Woolsey's *Hist. Dis.*, 107).

Statutory exposition from a phrase in a diary is unusual. The words "new charter" applied by President Stiles in a place in his diary to the act of 1745 probably mean or may mean only a new grant to the college. The word, charter [charta], was formerly used for a deed or grant, especially from other than private individuals (Black. Com., chap. 20, Webster's and Burrill's Dicts. on words charta and charter,) as the sovereign or legislature. So President Clap in his argument as to the right of visitation speaks of the "first charter or grant" and Ch. J. Parker in the quotation already made from him of "this grant or charter" of Harvard College. So the great charter, Magna Charta, is a grant bestowing and assuring certain rights and privileges. The statute referred to was a new charter in this sense, a new legislative grant, but what the second president afterwards called it is unimportant.

We have so far not gained much additional light by our patient analysis, but this completes the arguments in favor of repeal, except certain opinions, which were expressed and events which occurred some years subsequently, and which could not influence the act in question or its construction, the opinions being expressed in three anonymous pamphlets from 1755 or ten years after the passage of the act to 1784, nineteen years still later, strengthened as is said by the want of contradiction, and also a suggestion to President Stiles by Governor Trumbull in 1777, and the events the election of Dr. Day and Dr. Woolsey as President, who were not then ordained ministers of the gospel, but who became such before they were admitted to the presidency or assumed its duties. The cases of the president and the fellows are distinct, though perhaps leading separately to similar results.

"Nil agit exemplum, litem quod resolvit lite."

It is useless to try to settle an unsettled point by a point, which itself remains unsettled. It is useless to argue that the president may be a layman, and therefore that the fellows may be laymen, until the point assumed be clearly established, and even then the argument will be entirely inconclusive. In the instances of Drs. Day and Woolsey, the corporation judged, as we may infer from their acts, that it was sufficient, that they

were ordained ministers, when they were "associated" and became president. This appeared to it to be in substantial conformity with the intent and requirement of the charter. An argument founded upon a particular construction of the charter and statute cannot be supported by a practice under a different construction. The votes that the presidential committee in concurrence with them take measures for their "ordination" as well as "induction into office" were adopted by the corporation as a corporate not an ecclesiastical body. They were ordained of course by ecclesiastical councils for the usual reasons and the usual purpose, to preach the gospel.

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[To be continued.]

ARTICLE VIII.—TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

I. THE RIGHT OF TAXATION.

PHILIPPE AND Co., manufacturers, of Geneva, Switzerland, recently sold a consignment of watches to Brown and Co., of New York, merchants, for one thousand dollars, charges for shipment included. The goods were seized by the government upon arrival at New York, partly for verification of the accompanying invoice, partly as security for the *ad valorem* duty of twenty-five per centum; that is, they were subject to a farther charge of two hundred and fifty dollars before delivery to the consignees. The full value of them having been already paid the manufacturers, what right had the government, or since the government is but the arm of the law, and the law but the articulate expression of the will of the people, what right had the people to impose the additional charge? In other words, what exactly are the origin, nature, and limits of the right of taxation.

It is clear to begin with that the perfect legality of the act does not at all determine its moral character. The people is well able to will what it pleases and to express its will with all due formality, but if the thing willed is itself wrong the effect of the law is simply to generalize the wrong by extending it to include all cases of the same kind. *Summum jus summa injuria*; the worst injustice is the literal construction and strict enforcement of an unjust law. So there is really no property within its reach which the people cannot most lawfully appropriate. But like other moral agents it can rightfully appropriate only what belongs to it; a self-evident truth of ethics and in logic an identical proposition. What the people rightfully appropriates is its own; what is not its own it cannot rightfully appropriate. So in the case supposed, the government is ready if need be to enforce through its tribunals the claim of the manufacturers to the stipulated price of the watches; put upon its defense outside of them it must be able to show that its own title to the duty upon the watches is

equally valid. The whole cost of the goods to Brown and Co., is \$1,250, four-fifths of which are the rightful property of the manufacturers; is the remaining fifth equally the rightful property of the government, and if it is, is it so under the same title or under a different one?

I. The earlier title of the two explains itself without difficulty. The manufacturers at Geneva have offered in the open market and subject to no constraint other than the conditions of the market itself a certain number of watches for a certain sum of money, and the merchants at New York, subject only to the same conditions, have accepted the offer; or conversely, one party having sold the goods for the money, the other the money for the goods. Allowance made for errors of judgment and for incidental exigencies of business there has been an exchange of equivalents with the full and free consent of both parties to the exchange, a type of the legitimate transactions of commerce the world over. The result is that Brown and Co. acquire a title to the watches on payment of the money; Philippe and Co. a corresponding title to the money on delivery of the watches; a title issuing clear and indisputable from the transaction itself, anterior to and reaffirmed by all law, respected by the most lawless revolution. Furthermore if we except the case of voluntary gift or bequest there is, in this case, no other title possible. Philippe and Co. must have acquired the money, as Brown and Co. the goods, either with the consent of the other party and in exchange for an equivalent, or without their consent and without an equivalent; that is by force, or by fraud, which is a kind of force.

To qualify the orderly exercise of public power according to law as an act of force, is so repugnant to our democratic sensibilities, and our disposition to generalize is so strong, that we have an elaborate theory which assimilates the title under which the government takes the duty upon the goods to the previous title under which the seller takes the value of them. There is supposed to be here too an exchange of equivalents with the consent of both parties to the exchange. What the government, on the one hand, supplies, is the benefits of government, the complex conditions of security to person and property which enable Brown and Co. to import watches and

keep them on sale. The commercial value of an article is the price which it will bring, and to this value the government has as distinctly contributed as the manufacturers, for in the absence of all government watches could not be made and sold at all. On their side Brown and Co. pay the stipulated price for the value contributed, purchasing protection from the government as they purchase watches from the manufacturers. But this again is only an item in a general account, an incident in a far larger transaction. We are all of us supposed to have found out by actual trial, our own or our forefathers', of what is called the state of nature, that the full possession of our natural rights to do what we please and have what we want is an irksome and dangerous dignity because exposed to the encroachments of other men in full possession of theirs, a condition in which life becomes a scene of incessant reprisals and society is dissolved into an intolerable chaos of conflicting elements until some stronger man or set of men arises and enslaves the rest. For the better preservation therefore of certain most important rights we have all joined together in ceding the remainder to the State, which is made the common depositary of all the rights ceded that it may become thereby the common guardian of all the rights reserved. So created and according to the stipulations of the original compact the State is pledged to furnish protection to the subject and the subject to pay tribute and render service to the State. All transactions between the two are henceforth the result of a negotiation and the fulfillment of a contract, an exchange of equivalents, the discharge by each of two parties of a debt incurred to the other. This is the doctrine of the *contrat social*, struck out in the first enthusiasms of the French Revolution when the theorists were all busy looking up a *modus vivendi* for an omnipotent State and an emancipated people. It has so profoundly affected all political thinking ever since, that it is worth pointing out for the hundredth time that there are no facts in it.

1st. The State is not the creation of a compact but the product of an immemorial evolution; and has grown not through successive accretions of rights ceded to the sovereign, but in precisely the opposite direction through successive distributions of rights conquered by the subjects, the partition having

reached its widest area and finest subdivision in the latest product of all, the republic of our day where all rights have finally passed to the people and are administered in its name by agents of its appointing. Now in this more than secular redistribution one of the notable facts is the enormous increase of the power by which the rights are maintained, the power of government. Every seeming capitulation, the accession of every new body of constituents to the sovereignty, has converted a source of obstruction and hostility into an added source of strength until to-day the force available for the purposes of the State is nothing less than the material power of the whole population fed and multiplied beyond calculation, by all the resources of modern civilization. It is idle to suppose that the sovereignty has grown more conciliatory and tractable by being popularized, that the consciousness of its rights has dwindled with the growth of its power, that it is ready to stoop even to the forms of negotiation in taking what it claims according to law. It is in fact more absolute and imperious as it is more irresistible than in any despotism the world ever saw. And as the power of the government has strengthened with the increase of the constituency, so has the scope of it widened to meet the increasing complexities of life. Measured by the multitude and persistence of the restraints put upon us and by the power back of them, we are in sober reality less free to do as we please than the subjects of any State in an earlier stage of evolution. So what we call our natural rights are purely ideal, an abstraction of the political philosopher, or a reminiscence of the primitive savagery, never realized in any historical community since man first became a gregarious animal. Never having held them we have never had the opportunity of ceding them or reserving them. As a matter of fact we enter into relations with the State not by negotiation and barter but by birth, inheriting only such rights as it has itself defined beforehand, and is good enough to allow to us by virtue of having been born in it. Our inheritance once entered on, we submit to its further exactions as we submit to earthquakes, or the seasons, or any other irresistible force; sitting on the jury, serving on the *posse comitatus*, or in the conscription, paying taxes on our incomes or duty on our imports, however willingly, not because

we would but because we must. So Brown and Co. have never in any way consented to the payment of the duty on their watches. They have submitted, they may approve, they may even have voted for the law requiring the duty; but acquiescence of this sort has no effect upon the character of the transaction, for the duty would have been none the less collected had they resisted or disapproved, or voted the other way. They have never had an option, and where there is no option there is no consent.

2d. What we call our freedom, and the improvement in our political condition, are wholly in this that we ourselves participate in the sovereignty to which we are subject, each of us contributing a distinct force which is not lost even if overpowered in the multitudinous reactions of the political organism, but issues along with them in the ultimate resultant, that will of the people which becomes the law we obey. This plainly is a dignity which would be worthless if it went alone, whose value is in the very fact that everybody else holds the like, all of us together making up a body politic protected by its bulk and complexity from the invasion of irregular and violent changes. The illusion, the caprice, the resentments, the rapacity of any individual or class, forces which had easy access to the legislation of the absolute monarchy or the oligarchy, here must propagate themselves through the entire structure, overcoming on the way the active resistance of the opposition, the good sense and equanimity of disinterested men everywhere, before they can take effect as the will of the people. Add that the enforcement of a law discloses for the first time its real character and so invites to interminable appeal and reconsideration. In this way out of the chaos of crude and experimental legislation which encumbers our statute-books, a body of coherent law is slowly evolving by true survival of the fittest which expresses the considerate and abiding purpose of the whole people, the great conclusions on matters of public concern in which all the constituents are at one.

It is clear that a law of this sort will wear a universality commensurate with its origin, will be as impersonal in its action and effects as in its source. Any law as I have said, even the edict of an arbitrary ruler, is necessarily a wide generalization, ad-

dressed it may be to an individual but establishing a principle and a rule of conduct applicable to all others in the same circumstances. It is this inevitable assimilation and equalization of men in the act of the sovereign which makes the most capricious despotism better than unmitigated anarchy, and which has prepared the way for what I may call the universal generalizations of democratic law. For this to the extent that it really expresses the will of all must do so equally in the interest and equally at the charge of all. It cannot exact from one class a tribute not rendered by the others or confer benefits on one withheld from the others, and remain the will of the people. Any discrimination and partiality in the statute which resolves the republican identity of sovereign and subject into the hostilities of class rule must in time disappear as an intolerable anachronism on an inconsiderate experiment conflicting with the conditions of republican legislation. Thus if, as we have seen, the people brings to the government the most formidable kind of power it brings with it at the same time the highest kind of organization, power not to be withstood, seeing that it is the whole power of the commonwealth, but power under control, exerted only in a determinate manner and only for specific ends. If we are bound and subject so is the State. It cannot withhold from any one, whether he pays his tribute or not, the protection afforded by equal laws to all alike. It may punish him—according to law—for not paying or compel him to pay, but it cannot permit any one else to molest him. Brown and Co. are no more protected in consideration of the duty on their imports than the duty is paid in consideration of the protection afforded. As they submit whether they will or no to the irresistible power of the State, so does the State to the conditions of its action. Neither party has an option in the matter; neither therefore consents to the exchange.

3d. It only remains to add that the things said to be exchanged are not equivalents, that is, there is really no exchange. Between the tribute paid by the subject and the benefits conferred by the State there is no proportion or relation of quantity whatsoever. They are facts of different orders, neither of which can be expressed in terms of the other or given for the other. Public peace and order, security from

aggressions on person and property, the opportunity to do one's work and lead one's life to the best of one's ability, these are things in the order of natural phenomena, a part of the *milieu*, modifications of the common environment of man, and no more to be kept on sale in quantities to suit the purchaser than gravitation or the weather. Nevertheless if not values in themselves they are the indispensable conditions precedent of value in all other things and no sacrifice can be too great which is necessary to their continuance; put in peril they are among the *causas vivendi* for which we should be ready to risk life itself. It is undeniably the State which provides them, and if the State has the right to put any price upon them at all it is right in putting the highest possible price; if the fourth part of the value of imported merchandise then the whole value or any multiple of the whole. This is in fact the traditional plea of the oppressor from the beginning. By a fine anticipation of the *contrat social* the State has never failed to make the benefits it confers the pretext of its exactions, to explain its spoliations as the collection of a debt due for services rendered; an argument of course which strengthens with every improvement in the character of the government and the condition of the people. The more the State gives the more it is entitled to take; the right of greatest rapacity goes to the best government. So the enormous taxation of the United States since the war of the rebellion has been boldly ordered and patiently borne in the universal conviction that no price is too great to pay for the blessings of good government. But the truth is that the blessings of government like the bounties of nature or providence are without money and without price; they can only be given away and not sold. Or rather as I said before they result inevitably from the very existence of the State and the necessities of its organic action.

The political title therefore under which the State takes the tax upon the property of its subjects is other than the commercial title under which the property is acquired and exchanged; and only mischievous consequences in the practical order can follow the confounding of the two.

II. The sovereign rights of the State of whatever kind are the correlative of its functions; so far from being acquired by

the discharge of them that they are indispensable *à priori* to their exercise. Its specific functions are to give expression in the law and effect through the executive to the common purpose of the people united by common necessities and common dangers; in its name and behalf to overcome the intractable and reclaim the waste forces of nature, to repel the aggression of foreign powers, to punish and put down the malefactor; in general, to maintain throughout the realm the conditions of security and order essential to the well-being of all. If these things are proper and necessary, if the State has any sufficient reason of being, in other words if the people has the right to combine and arm in self-defense, then has the State *ipso facto* the right to all the material necessary for the creation of State power. Whatever service of person or tribute of money is required for its rightful purposes belongs to it under an original, and indisputable title, and is to be taken not by negotiation and according to contract but by force and according to law.

But this clearly is a title which carries its own limitation with it and the limitation is as essential to its integrity as the extension up to the limit. The right to the means necessary for a given end is without force and meaning or is exclusive of all right to what is not a means and not necessary. If the State taxes the subject for any purpose other than the specific purposes for which it exists, or beyond the amount requisite for those purposes, it takes what is not its own. Moreover what are these specific purposes for which the property of the subject is taken? They are in part the protection of the property not taken. To take more than it requires is to confiscate the very property it was set to guard, to add to the enemies of the commonwealth the most formidable and insidious of all, the power created to withstand them. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Therefore whatever is not required for the legitimate expenses of the State remains the property of the subject by a title as original and indisputable as the other; a title which however it may be violated cannot be extinguished by any utterance of law however formal or any will of the people however unanimous. To take a life not required for the defence of the State is murder, to take service not required for its business is slavery, and to take property not required for its

expenses is robbery ; if the taking is knowing and intentional. The two titles are coördinate, exclusive of one another, and interdependent. As neither can be defined without a definition of the other, so neither can be subverted without subverting the other. For the State to invade the right of private property is to impair the sources of its revenue ; for the subject to dispute the right of public property is to impair the only safeguard of his own ; a double result perfectly secured by the sentimental compromise of the *contrat social*. What rightfully belongs to the State, then, is the cost of its services and not the value of them ; so much of the wealth of the nation, and no more, as it requires to meet the liabilities incurred in the exercise of its functions.

These liabilities are of two kinds. There are first the ordinary kind for the current expenses of the government, calculated in advance for the fiscal year upon the basis of previous expenditure. Like any periodically recurring disbursement they might be stated as interest on a debt capital and this capital as a claim on the whole capital of the nation, making the State on the one hand in the proportion of its debt so stated and the subjects on the other each in the proportion of his private fortune, the joint-proprietors of the national wealth, the annual product of which is distributed partly as revenue to the State for payment of its expenses, partly as the revenue of the subjects for the uses of life and the enterprises of business. The objection to this form of statement is that it is a mere fiction of finance or book-keeping but with a dangerous suggestion of socialistic communism. The simple reality without artifice is that the current expenses of the government for whatever period calculated are a periodical charge upon the wealth of the nation. Now a periodical charge upon property of any kind is properly provided for out of the product or earnings of the property.

The liabilities of the extraordinary kind are those contracted in some sudden emergency of public affairs, a pestilence, or famine, or war, which precipitates the State into expenditure beyond its immediately available resources, and are provided for by a loan bearing interest until the date fixed for payment of the principal. This is debt actually capitalized and may be

properly stated as a claim to the amount of the principal on the capital wealth of the nation. Thus according to the January statement the interest-bearing debt of the United States is something under \$13,000,000,000, and were it to mature and payment to be demanded to-morrow the government must either default or appropriate whatever amount of the capital wealth of the nation may be required to cover the deficiency of its assets. But in fact no State debt is ever so discharged or could be without ruin to the country. One of two things always happens; either the State arranges with its creditors for the postponement of the date when the principal is due, or it applies the annual surplus of its current revenue over its current expenses to the reduction of the principal. In either case the debt figures in the estimates only as a liability of the ordinary kind, an item in the current expenditure whether as interest falling due or as surplus available for reduction of the principal. Thus along with the other current expenses it is a periodical charge upon the national wealth, not to be met by ruinous conversion of capital but by appropriating a given proportion of the uninvested product of capital. We may therefore define the property of the State to be so much of the annual product or revenue of the wealth of the nation as it requires for its legitimate annual expenses.

This proportion again of the whole product of the national wealth is made up of parts in the same proportion of the revenues of all the subjects. If we suppose that the annual liabilities of the State are to the annual product of the wealth of the nation, say, in the ratio of 1 to 100, then one per centum of the annual revenue of each subject belongs to the State; no more and no less. No more, for to exceed the proportion of one per centum in any case is to increase the burden of one by lightening that of all the others; no less, for to fall short of it is to diminish the burden of one by increasing that of the others; in either case to go back on the line of political evolution to the unrighteous inequalities of class rule, to accord special privileges to one portion of the subjects and impose special sacrifices on the other. If the State in its estimates cannot exceed the sum-total required for its legitimate expenses, no more can it exceed in its taxation the uniform pro-

portion due by each subject without violating the right of private property and taking what is not its own.

For here is the very ground and reason of our separate and independent being as a State, the specific note of our system as the latest and highest product of political evolution. We rebelled from our original allegiance, in obedience certainly to many blind and hidden forces, but upon the public pretext that we would not submit to discriminating and disproportionate burdens; and the other day we suppressed another rebellion made to fasten the worst of such burdens on a subject race. From first to last and in every way in which a people can express its political consciousness we have declared that all usurpations of sovereign power and privilege by one man over other men, by one class over other classes, by one people over other peoples, are an outrage, not because an oppression of the weak, for the weak may deserve and require oppression, but because a punishment of the innocent. We have seized the sovereignty in the name of the people to put an end to all this and that hereafter in the consciousness of the State, in the eye of the law, and in the act of the executive only two classes shall be known forevermore, the law-abiding and the lawless, the subjects for whose benefit the State exists, whose rights are one and whose responsibilities are uniform, and they for whose repression it exists, whose rights are forfeited. This is the historical doctrine to which the American people is committed before all the world, which we are here to give public effect to, namely, that no man shall suffer in person or in property more than other men suffer unless he deserves to, that the only ground known to the State for the imposition of exceptional burdens is the ground of wrong doing. Were strict justice possible in this world, government would be wholly at the charge of those who make government necessary; it is the wrong-doer who should bear all the consequences of his wrongdoing. For example we were entirely right in the magnanimity which closed the war of the rebellion, but had other considerations not intervened we should have been entirely right in charging the enormous development of government which it precipitated to the rebellious population, as Germany, granting the righteousness of her cause, was right in taking in-

demnity for the past and security for the future at the close of the war with France. So the property of the individual offender rightfully belongs to the State not in the proportion of the unoffending but in that of his offense. As a matter of fact he usually escapes because he has no property to forfeit. The criminal classes of any country are not an appreciable source of public revenue and so the burden of government must fall upon the well-to-do who are not in general they who make government necessary. All the greater reason why the burden should be distributed among them impartially. No innocent subject can be rightfully afflicted with burdens which inevitably carry the implication because they are the appropriate penalty of wrong-doing.

Any system of taxation, then, must be judged, and approved or condemned, as it does or does not put the State in possession of its own, namely, a definite and uniform proportion of the revenues of its subjects. Taxation which designedly departs from this proportion for any motive whatsoever, *à fortiori* which does so for any motive other than that of providing for its necessary expenses, is spoliation, a usurpation condemned by our political theory and by that ideal of justice which it pretends to realize.

ARTICLE IX.—UNCONSCIOUS CHRISTIANITY.

IF we should compare a heathen with a Christian country in a religious point of view, we could not fail to notice this remarkable difference:—the heathen, as a whole, agreed in religious observances, agreed in their recognition and worship of deity;—the population of the Christian country not agreed; the heathen temples frequented, and the heathen worship observed by almost all;—the Christian churches attended by a minority; the majority showing respect, indeed, but looking on with comparative apathy and some incredulity.

This contrast, at first sight disparaging to the Christian land, begins to be relieved, when the moral development is recognized, which runs parallel with this apparent retrograde in religious observances. With all the apparent neglect of the churches as compared with the frequenting of the temples, it is plain that the true religious service, which is offered in the practice of righteousness, truth, and charity, in just laws, in care for the poor, in the protection of human rights, in the suppression of evils and crimes, flourishes most in those lands where we have observed the largest neglect of the formal rites of religion.

This is a singular fact, but before we can properly estimate it, we must look further.

We observe, next, the historical fact, that in proportion to the growth of intelligence there has been, in the past as in the present, and both in heathen and Christian lands, a tendency to break away from the popular notions of religion.

In the ancient heathenism of Greece and Rome, the philosophers, as a class, regarded the popular religious beliefs as a set of fables. At the same time, the generality of educated men did not attempt to destroy the prevailing religion. They regarded it, such as it was, as better than none, and beneficial as a restraining influence on those who knew no better.

In the latter part of the middle ages, when the dawn of intelligence began to rise on the barbarism of Europe, the first

result was to dissolve the unbroken unity of religious belief that had prevailed through the thousand years of ignorance, by detaching educated men, one by one, from fealty to the established dogmas. The revival of intelligence and free thought resulted, first, in a quickened moral earnestness to reform various practical abuses and wrongs, and ultimately in that reconstitution of religious beliefs, which is popularly known as the Protestant Reformation.

The Reformation, however, only introduced a transition period. Its net result was merely the substitution of one set of doctrines for another set. Instead of the supremacy of the Pope as the judge of truth, the supremacy of the individual conscience; instead of the authority of the Church, the authority of Scripture; instead of purgatory, indulgences, prayers to the saints, and the sacrifice of the mass, whatever truer doctrine was thought to be taught by the Scriptures. The ninety-five propositions, which Luther nailed on the church door of Wittemberg, illustrated unconsciously the change that was setting in. It was a substitution of one set of religious *formulae*,—better ones indeed,—for another set. The reformation halted in a reformulation. There were men who had a profounder interest than that of securing truer statements of doctrine, men who were content with the practical statements of the Gospel, and whose endeavor was simply to realize more vividly the personal influence of the Lord Jesus Christ. But the reformation halted in forms, in the substitution of a new form of theology for an old one, a new form of church-order for an old one.

This being so, it was inevitable that the process of breaking up should go on as the diffusion of free thought went on. It could not be supposed that the reformers had at one stride reached perfection. And so, as they had broken up the unity of Catholicism, their own unity was speedily disintegrated. And the point to notice here is the growth of a skeptical temper in educated men, breaking away from the popular religious notions, as the disintegration of the churches went on. The climax of this skeptical tendency among the educated was reached at the close of the last century, when the process of sectarian division was substantially complete. The attitude of

the men of culture then coming upon the stage was indicated by the fact that, at a communion season of the church in Yale College, but one undergraduate was present, of the class of 1800.

We have next to observe one very obvious cause of this breaking away from religious forms and dogmas. The Protestant churches had all been founded upon points of difference with each other, and men saw not so much the underlying unity as the prominent antagonism. No reason for the separate organization of Lutheran, and Calvinist, Baptist, Methodist, and all the others could be assigned, save in the importance imputed to some form of theological statement or church administration, for which in each case divine authority was claimed on both sides. The antagonistic attitude of the sects toward each other naturally begets a free thinking and critical attitude toward them all. Especially when, as was the case in the last century, church-zeal is chiefly devoted to keeping up church-forms; when the preaching of the Gospel is substituted by the preaching of theology, or of controversy; when there is no living Christ apparent in the church body, extending helping and healing hands to the friendless and suffering multitudes; when men like Wesley and Whitefield, coming in the very spirit of Christ to inbreathe the power of a purer life into the profane and vicious, were set upon by the dead orthodoxists that ruled the churches as heretical disorganizers.

Another fact of great significance is the subsidence of the tide of skepticism along with the subsidence of the sectarian spirit, the decline of theological acrimony and the increase of philanthropy in the churches. Joel Barlow wrote, in 1809, that Thomas Paine represented the religious position of three-fourths of the men of letters in the preceding age, and nearly all of them in that age. That was soon after sectarian theology had completed its development, and just as philanthropical Christianity was beginning to develop in its place. The three-quarters of a century that have passed have been marked by the decline of sectarian antagonisms and of theological antipathies, and the growth of Christian unity in and through philanthropy. The same period is not less marked also by a changed attitude on the part of educated men toward the

churches. Thomas Paine's peculiar form of skepticism is now current chiefly among uneducated men, but the newest fashion of skepticism has a greatly-diminished following among people of culture, as compared with the skepticism of seventy-five or a hundred years ago. This showing of history, the spread of a skeptical culture as sectarian theology without philanthropy flourished, and the decline of the one as the other declined, requires no further statement in explanation of the fact. It not only shows us the direction of hope for the future. It helps us to a correct estimate of the fact first noticed, that while unity in religion is characteristic of heathen lands, disunity in religion prevails in Christian lands, whose moral development is so much higher.

But now, in order to a correct estimate of this fact, in order not to misunderstand this apparent disunity, and the widespread neglect of the formal rites of religion in Christian lands, there is still another fact to be observed. The practical recognition of the law of Christ is far, far wider than either the membership or the attendance of churches dedicated to his name. Imperfectly as his teachings are realized in practice, they are the generally accepted ideal of right. Multitudes who would say *no*, if asked, Are you a Christian? conform to his teachings of our duty to God and man as faithfully as the average member of a church. Other multitudes, who are rarely seen inside of a church, are governed to a considerable extent by the ideas of duty which Christ has diffused far beyond the church circle. Multitudes, who are strangers to the Christ of formal theology, recognize the Christ of the Gospels as the great Friend and Brother of man, and his Golden Rule and Law of neighborly benevolence as of divine authority.

It is with multitudes to-day, as it was with one of those whom Jesus healed, of whom we read that the man who was healed knew not who it was that healed him, for Jesus had slipped out of the crowd. Many who stand outside of church lines, and protest against the church theology, and do not regard themselves as Christians, in the current sense of the word, are unconscious of the fact that Christ is the actual source of that moral principle which is the strength and beauty of their life. The light in conscience which they follow is the reflected

ray of the light which he brought into the world. And when we take a broad view of Christendom, we discern, under all the superficial dissent from the schemes of divinity that the churches maintain, an underlying unity of moral sentiment among the unchurched as well as church members. And that fundamental unity of moral sentiment plainly subsists in the Christ of the Gospels; recognizes him as the authoritative exponent of divine grace and truth; accepts, amid all failures in practice, his ideas of human duty, and divine providence, and the life to come; and is carrying on a work of moral renovation in the suppression of the evils to which he is hostile.

This general unity of moral sentiment in Christian lands, despite religious dissensions, is the true criterion of the present situation. Religion is worthless except as expressing itself in the maintenance of righteousness, and truth, and charity. Christ reckons all who seek this as on his side, for this was his interest. "He that is not against us," said he as he cast out devils, "is on our part." The dissent that inspires the multitudes outside the churches, is not dissent from Christ, so much as dissent from dogma and ritual that claim his authority, although he announced no dogma, established no ritual. Much as there is of Christly living in the churches, it is still only a minority who show any marked philanthropical interest beyond what is common in the community. On the one hand, moreover, the average morality of church members is not conspicuously above the average standard among respectable men and women. On the other hand, the conspicuous difference between the church and the world is still manifested in some form of creed or of rite; as by the dogma of the Calvinist, that human nature, as such, is odious and abominable to God; or by the pretensions of the high churchman, that there is no true church of Christ but his, and no true ministry of Christ, but under the priestly robes of his sect; or by the intolerance of the close-communicant, who repels from the Lord's table all who have not gone under the water of a baptismal bath. Multitudes consent, as President Lincoln did, to Christ's law of love to God and man, who refuse to submit their intelligence to what they deem unchristian ideas of God presented in the popular theology, and seek to preserve their self-respect and

candor by testifying outside of the churches that accept such ideas. It is a fact nevertheless, though they do not seem to know it, that the churches are all the while receiving such as they, on the ground of life and spirit, rather than of form and dogma. The cherished creeds, however, create an impression to the contrary. But it can hardly be doubted that there are multitudes, who will not so much as attend the worship offered in churches that are organized on points of disagreement in theology and ritual, and who seem to take sides in no way with one religious *ism* against another, whose life is regulated by a general moral purpose in harmony with that of Christ, although lacking the moral power that is found in personal fellowship with him.

And so it is a false issue that is raised by the melancholy show of statistics concerning the large number who neglect the churches, and the small number who join the professed membership. The theological pessimism which declares the condition of the world hopeless, till Christ shall come in visible glory to right all things, fails to see the plainest fact, that it is not the Christ, but the Antichrist, in the churches, that repels men, the paganism that still survives in theology, and the various other forms of the falsity of professed Christians to their Master's ideal. It fails to see that despite the rubbish, very slowly being cleared away, that blocks up the church doors, the moral heart of society beats ever in wider response to Christ's teaching; that a practical, as distinct from an ecclesiastical Christianity, is ever spreading, and Christian principles leavening the community with a more effective power in repressing the evils and casting out the devils in the world. The theological pessimism which regards the world as a wreck and the church as the ark, and raises the cry that orthodoxy is in danger when any one touches its idols, is blind to the fact, that were Christ to come as once he came, in the fullness of divine compassion for the needs of men, among those who would be quickest drawn to him there would be now, as then, the multitudes outside of the religious organizations of the day, in which they have found little sympathy or provision for their peculiar needs. In short, we should see a fulfillment of those words of his, which our study of the situation may

help us better to understand: "*Other sheep I have, which are not of this fold; them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice, and they shall become one flock, one shepherd.*"

Every day, as the last words of friendship are said over the clay of some one who never claimed the name of a Christian, we shall hear his Christian traits and principles—his unconscious but practical Christianity—recognized by preachers of rigid creeds in the sympathetic tribute of a man to true human worth. This unconscious but practical Christianity ought to find recognition elsewhere than at the open grave. It is for the churches to inquire what there is in their theology, and what in their attitude to each other, that creates needless antagonisms in minds which revere the Christ of the Gospels;—what they can do to give a better opportunity of expression to the moral unity in the fundamental truths of Christ, which, already reaching far beyond church lines, is waiting for its time of manifestation.

This time will come. "They shall become one flock, one shepherd." There will be different *folds*; there will be no such thing as one world-wide organization; but the unity of the different folds in one *flock* will be manifest because One will be manifest as the shepherd of all; because all hear his voice alone. Whether this is to be in our day, or whether the settled summer of Christianity has yet to wait longer for the ending of its changeful spring, the tendency is clear enough to make the issue certain, and to give encouragement to those who have grown melancholy over church arithmetic. Many a church is accomplishing a silent work recorded in no earthly statistics, and measurable by no report of professed conversions. The circle which the sun illuminates, and in which men walk by his light, is considerably larger than the circle in which his orb is seen. Below the horizon of conscious recognition as Christ may be, yet, in the high moral latitudes of Christendom, there is a far-spreading Christian twilight, in which multitudes, who have owned no formal bonds to him, walk parallel and not crosswise to those moral lines which he drew for "the way everlasting." Many such, we are constrained by the realities of character to reckon as unconscious followers, perhaps afar off, yet followers of the Redeemer of men. The evident bent

of their principle and endeavor to Christ's side against the world's evil, prompts our moral instinct to judge them as those who, when the misleading shadows shall have melted in the eternal day, will devoutly recognize the Divine shepherd of humanity, and hear *his* voice, though they heard the voice of no Calvin, or Wesley, or other speaker in his name.

Wherefore let us take heart. The coyness or deafness, which meets the call of the church, is by no means to be interpreted as wholly a rejection of the Master, obscured as he is to many by dogmas, or misrepresented by various falsities to his ideal. Meagre accessions to church membership may be signs of a declining ecclesiastical interest, rather than of that moral interest, which with Christ was supreme; a disinclination to churches as they are, rather than to Christ as he is; a failure of theological and sectarian Christianity, rather than of ethical and practical Christianity. There is some discussion in the public journals whether there is a gain or a falling off in church-going, but none at all whether there is a growth of interest in the good works which Christ commanded, or a development of that moral sentiment in behalf of truth and righteousness, which lies at the foundation of every life that is essentially rather than nominally Christianized. The simple fact, to be noted for encouragement—and for correction too—is, that the spirit of Christianity has spread faster and farther than some of its present traditional forms.

ARTICLE X.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

ROBERTSON'S LIFE OF JOHN BRIGHT.*—"John Bright, in the flesh is undoubtedly an Englishman, and physically, a capital specimen of the breed ; but in the spirit John Bright is essentially an American." Such was the opinion of the Tory mind in England twenty years ago ; and the book here named goes far to show, that though meant for a sneer, the aforesaid remark was not far from the truth. Of how well Mr. Bright was able to sustain the allegation of being "in spirit essentially an American," let the following sentences, from a speech in Parliament at the outbreak of our civil war in 1861, bear testimony :

"I cannot see how the state of affairs in America, with regard to the United States Government, could have been different from what it is at this moment. We had a heptarchy in this country, and it was thought to be a good thing to get rid of it, and have a united nation. If the thirty-three or thirty-four States of the American Union can break off whenever they like, I can see nothing but disaster and confusion throughout the whole of that continent. I say that the war, be it successful or not, be it Christian or not, be it wise or not, is a war to sustain the government and to sustain the authority of a great nation ; and that the people of England, if they are true to their own sympathies, to their own history, to their own great act of 1834, to which reference has been made, will have no sympathy with those who wish to build up a great empire on the perpetual bondage of millions of their fellow men."—Page 394.

Personally, publicly, politically, John Bright has always been the champion of the "masses" in preference to the "classes," and though this has earned him the spite of those who count every popular orator a "demagogue," his most honorable character and career have constantly offset the obloquy of his opponents.

The time has not come for the full record of his life ; but to those who desire a clear and connected account of his public career thus far, the volume here compiled will be of practical service. The compiler is at the sources of information ; and, with great minuteness, he details the movements, conflicts, speeches, and successes of Mr. Bright, first in the abolition of the corn laws, and, subsequently, in those reforms that in recent years have advanced the well-being of the British people.

* *Life and Times of the Right Hon. John Bright.* By WILLIAM ROBERTSON, author of "Old and New Rochdale." London, Paris, and New York: Cassell & Company. Limited.

The following extracts from a speech delivered at Rochdale, gives Mr. Bright's own account of how he was led, by his friend Mr. Cobden, more fully into the work of the Anti-Corn-Law League. It of interest to all who are aware of the fine blending of a high morality with a deep sympathy in all the distinguished orator's efforts:

"In the year 1841 I was at Leamington, and spent several months there. It was near the middle of September, there fell upon me one of the heaviest blows that can visit any man. I found myself there with none living of my house but a motherless child. Mr. Cobden called upon me the day after that event, so terrible to me, and so prostrating. He said, after some conversation, 'Don't allow this grief, great as it is, to weigh you down too much; there are at this moment in thousands of homes in this country wives and children who are dying of hunger, of hunger made by the law. If you will come along with me we will never rest till we have got rid of the Corn Law.' We saw the colossal injustice which cast its shadow over every part of the nation, and we thought we saw the true remedy and the relief, and that if we united our efforts, as you know we did, with the efforts of hundreds and thousands of good men in various parts of the country, we should be able to bring that remedy home, and to afford that relief to the starving people of this country."—Page 108.

There is a fine piece of political rhetoric, worthy the study of those who would move men by effective speech, on page 562 of this volume. It shows that the profoundest wisdom may be made popular by noble men bent on noble ends. After showing that the man who warns the dwellers on the slope of an Etna or a Vesuvius is not responsible for the eruption which the smoke and lava betoken, the orator says:

"I merely warn men of their danger. It is not I who am stimulating men to the violent pursuit of their acknowledged constitutional rights. We are merely about our lawful business; and you are the citizens of a country that calls itself free, yet you are citizens to whom is denied the greatest and the first blessing of the constitution under which you live. If the truth must be told, the Tory party is the turbulent party of this nation."

The general teaching of John Bright's life is that, in the best sense, the wise reformer is the true conservative; and for this one lesson this book is to be welcomed.

MEYER'S COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.*—
The circulation of Meyer's Commentaries among ministers and

* *Critical and Exegetical Hand-Book to the Epistle to the Romans.* By H. A. W. MEYER. Translated from the 5th edition by Rev. J. C. Moore and Rev. E. Johnson. The translation revised and edited by Rev. W. P. Dickson, D.D. With a preface and supplementary notes to the American edition, by Timothy Dwight, Professor, etc., in Yale College. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1884.

theological students is an event of happy augury. His grammatical thoroughness is a great relief from the slipshod style of interpretation which confounds text with inference, and makes an Apostle say what it is conceived that he might have said with profit to the reader or pleasure to the sect to which the commentator belongs. Meyer's independence of traditional dogmas relative to Biblical impeccability is of the more value, as regards his influence, from his sincere and firm faith in the doctrines of the evangelical system. No one can ascribe his deviation from old views of the harmonists and dogmatists, out of a desire to get rid of unwelcome doctrines. In the volume before us we have the new suggestions of Meyer's German editor, Professor Weiss, whose eminence in this department has been fairly earned, and whose peculiar merits make his editorial additions of great interest. Weiss does not surpass Meyer in philological skill and accuracy; but he has some qualities in which he is not excelled, even if he is equalled, by his predecessors. The American edition of the Commentary on the Romans is greatly enriched by the additional notes of Professor Dwight. These are subjoined to each chapter. They refer to points of special importance, and, generally, of special difficulty. Professor Dwight brings to his task the mature judgment which has been reached by many years of diligent study of the New Testament. He has had the inestimable advantage of conducting the studies of inquisitive classes of pupils, and of thus looking at the points of difficulty from all sides. Like Meyer and Weiss, he thinks and writes in a truly scientific spirit which aims to ascertain what the Apostle really intended to say,—be the doctrinal corollaries what they may. The combination of scholarship and common sense in Professor Dwight's expositions renders them both lucid and trustworthy. There is no hesitation in expressing opinions, and there is the courage to differ from other commentators where there appear to be reasons for dissent. As an example of the style of these comments of Professor Dwight, we subjoin an extract from his remarks on the aorist in Rom. v. 12—"for that all sinned:"—"The view adopted by Hodge himself [Dr. Charles Hodge], with others of similar theological opinions, gives to the verb the meaning 'were accounted as sinners;' that is, all men *were regarded and treated as sinners* on account of Adam's offence, although they, in no actual sense, participated in it. He was their representative, and they are subjected to penal

evils because their representative sinned. This explanation is not only exposed to the objection that it contravenes our ordinary ideas of justice—an objection which, if not absolutely fatal, at least throws a strong presumption against it, and impels us to search for some more reasonable account of the meaning—but is also inconsistent with the universal sense of the verb [Gen. xliii. 9, xliv. 32; I Kings i. 21, the only passages which are even claimed as exceptions, not being properly applicable to the case in hand], and is directly contradicted by what is said in vv. 18, 19. Dr. Shedd who favors the view of actual participation, says of this mode of interpreting the words: 'The clause is introduced to justify the infliction of death upon all men. But it makes an infliction more inexplicable, rather than less so, to say that it is visited upon those who did not commit the sin that caused the death, but were fictitiously and gratuitously regarded as if they had.' (Com. on Rom., p. 125.)

The reader may be referred to the commentaries of these two writers, opposing each other, for a satisfactory refutation of the views of both. We are led, accordingly, by the failure of the literal explanation to ask for another. And here we notice that Paul repeatedly uses the aorist tense in a semi-figurative or figurative sense, in cases analogous to the present. In the next chapter, vv. 4, 6, 8, he says that he and his Christian readers were buried with Christ, that their old man was crucified with Him, that they died with him. Gal. ii. 20, he declares that he had been crucified with Christ. In passages like these he does not mean that the Roman believer, who became a Christian, perhaps many years after the death of Jesus, was actually put on the cross with Him and participated in His dying. He means, simply, that by reason of his becoming a believer, and whenever he does so, any person is, *ipso facto*, so closely united with Jesus that it is *as if* he had been actually placed on His cross. In a similar sense, the posterity of Adam sinned in his sin."

PROFESSOR H. B. SMITH'S SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.*
—Professor Karr has done a good work in preparing for the press, from manuscripts unfinished and, in part, fragmentary, very valuable writings of one of the foremost of American philosophers and theologians. The small volumes which he has

* *System of Christian Theology.* By HENRY B. SMITH, D.D., LL.D. Edited by W. S. KARR, D.D., Professor, etc. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Co. 1884.

previously issued were stored with important thoughts, expressed in the terse and compact style for which Professor Smith was distinguished. The present, more copious work, is the edifice to which those volumes formed the vestibule. If the larger structure, from one point of view, is in a degree disappointing, it is owing to the imperfection of the materials, or their imperfect condition. The reader cannot avoid the regret that the honored author did not live to elaborate and complete, with his own hand, the building upon which he had expended so much thought and time. We are thankful, however, for the work as it stands,—a work which is indebted for its issue to the industry and skill of the editor. Professor Smith's theme is Redemption. This he rightly makes the subject of Christian Theology. In the First Division, he considers "the Antecedents of Redemption,"—God and the Trinity; Cosmology, or Creation, Decrees, Providence, and the Theodicy; Anthropology, the doctrine of Man and of Sin. The Second Division relates to the Person and the Work of Christ. In the Third Division, the Kingdom of Redemption, are comprised Justification, Regeneration, etc., together with Eschatology. Everywhere we find quickening suggestions and acute discussions. The ample learning of the author is used for the service of the reader and not for ornament. Occasionally we meet with passages which, we are sure, Professor Smith would not have left in their present form. For example, after arguing against Dr. N. W. Taylor's position respecting the non-prevention of sin, he proceeds to positive statements of his own; and (p. 155) he says: "If God should prevent sin by omnipotence or exclude it wholly, this might diminish the capabilities of holiness (and of course of happiness also) in the system." This is precisely Dr. Taylor's doctrine and proposition. If Dr. Taylor, therefore, is opposed on this topic it must be through a misconception. On one subject, we are somewhat surprised at a remark by the editor in a foot-note. He says (p. 317) of Professor Smith: "It is a question whether he did not intend to make some final statements which would bring out more distinctly the proper federal headship of Adam on the *basis* of the natural headship." We always understood Professor Smith to be a strenuous opposer of the theory which is here referred to. Federal headship on the basis of natural headship is the view of the Princeton theologians. This view Professor Smith never manifested, as far as we have known, any disposition to favor.

CLARKE'S "THE IDEAS OF THE APOSTLE PAUL."—This volume has many claims to attention and respect. Its author is a man of ripe experience as a minister. He is religious in his tone and spirit. He is a scholar of excellent attainments. He is well acquainted with the theological literature of the day. He is a careful student of the New Testament. Scattered along its pages are many thoughts which are adapted to interest and to profit readers of theological opinions diverse from his own. Illustrations of religious truth, gathered from wide reading, are unostentatiously introduced. It is an honest book. Nor are we disposed to magnify the differences of interpretation between the writer and those who are commonly termed orthodox. Yet these differences are important. Ideas are attributed to Paul which we do not think that he cherished. That the Apostle held and asserted the preëxistence of Christ and his divinity, we hold to be the inevitable conclusion of a sound and fair exegesis. So, the "reconciliation" of which the Apostle speaks is a change in the relation of God to men. Dr. Clarke's interpretation of the pertinent passages is contrary to the judgment of such exegetes as Meyer and Weiss, and contrary, in our judgment, to the real tenor and intent of the Apostle's argument.

PLOETZ'S EPITOME OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY.*—Dr. Ploetz's work consists of full, methodized notes extending over the whole field of history. After a statement of the principal divisions of universal history, there follow compendious accounts both of the eastern and the western peoples which figure in the ancient period. Mediæval history, beginning with the emigration of the northern tribes and extending to the discovery of America by Columbus, is next in order. Modern history embraces four sections, the first terminating at the peace of Westphalia in 1648; the second covering the second half of the 17th century and the 18th century to the French Revolution; the third including the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars; the fourth comprising the interval from 1815 to the present. The American editor has introduced important improvements,—principally in the history of England and America, which has been entirely rewritten. The pages are besprinkled with dates; the notes are well stored with valuable references to authorities. In its contents the work

* *Epitome of Ancient, Mediæval and Modern History.* By CARL PLOETZ. Translated with extensive additions by WILLIAM TILLINGHAST. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1884.

is abreast with the latest investigations. The narrative is objective and impartial. There is little expression of opinion in matters respecting which there is religious or political disagreement.

It is not a fault of this book that it is eminently unreadable; for it was not designed to be read continuously. It is a mass of notes to serve as a basis of lectures and as a book of reference. The copious index is thus an extremely useful addition. We can cordially commend this volume as likely to be of great service to teachers of history in schools of a higher grade.

POLITICS.*—This book is intended to be a philosophical treatise on the science of politics, treating of the structure and development of the State as an organism for the concentration and distribution of the political power of the nation. It enters not at all into any ethical questions, for the nation per se has no moral character. The book treats of the origin of the nation, the organs which it uses, the force of the nation and how it is developed and applied. One chapter is devoted to the early impulses to unity in the British colonies in America. The authors treat also of the conditions and tendency of normal political growth and of the tendency of power in the United States, in which an interesting statement is given of the arguments of the secessionists and their opponents previous to the war of the rebellion. Covering so much ground as it does, the treatise is necessarily condensed, and this book will not take the place of Dr. Mulford's elaborate work "The Nation." The writers seem to have made good use of the labors of their predecessors in the same field of research, differing from them, when need be, and strengthening their own positions by the authority of previous writers in some cases.

The subject is treated entirely in the abstract, and this is not relieved by much grace of style.

A CATHOLIC DICTIONARY.†—This work has the sanction of a triple imprimatur. Prefixed is the approval of E. S. Keogh, "Cen-

* *Politics*: An introduction to the study of comparative constitutional law. By WILLIAM W. CRANE and BERNARD MOSES, Ph.D., Professor of History and Political Economy in the University of California. G. P. Putnam's Sons: New York and London. 1884.

† *A Catholic Dictionary, containing some account of the Doctrine, Discipline, Rites, Ceremonies, Councils, and Religious Orders of the Catholic Church*. By WILLIAM E. ADDIS, and THOMAS ARNOLD, M.A. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1884.

sor Deputatus," Archbishop Manning, and Archbishop McCloskey. It is, therefore, an orthodox book according to Roman Catholic standards. We are told in the Preface that besides corrections, there are other "alterations" in the American Edition. We regret that these "alterations" are not so marked in the text that the reader may see their nature and extent. The work, while not going profoundly into the subjects involved, is intelligently written, is instructive and interesting. It is a very convenient hand-book; in point of candor, it is up to the level of the average books comprised in Protestant theology. The article on Galileo explains pretty fully and freely the facts of the case, but argues that there was no *ex-cathedra* decision against the motion of the earth. In the article on "The Inquisition" it is asserted that no Catholic, since the encyclicals and allocutions of Pius IX., can take the ground that punishments ought not to be inflicted—that is, penalties involving force and what is called "persecution"—on heretics and revolters. This is, surely, a lamentable fact, and Catholics have no occasion to thank Pius IX. for this hateful doctrine, which men like Fleury, condemned.

BALZAC.*—The author of this modest little volume makes no pretension of having given anything like a full exhibition of the life and genius of the extraordinary man whose name appears as its title. To do this would be impossible in a thin duodecimo, for in any broad view of the history of the modern novel no figure stands out more prominent than that of Balzac. He is not only—for good or ill—the prince of modern French novelists, but the father of all who have since distinguished themselves in realistic fiction. The events of his own life, too, were crowded with incident, and are almost as full of interest as those in the career of any one of the personages who owe to him their creation. The author of this "study" of Balzac, as it might appropriately be called, seems thoroughly at home in the literature of his subject, and has at command a style which is easy, flowing, and never heavy. The book is arranged in six chapters. In the first it briefly sketches the early life of Balzac. In the second there is a concise and intelligible account of the gigantic work which he undertook and of course left incomplete—the *human comedy*—which was no less than an attempt to illustrate every conceivable passion in the human heart by some one of the innumerable char-

* *Balzac*. By EDGAR EVERTSON SALTUS. 12mo, pp. 199. Boston; Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

acters whom he introduces in his novels. This is followed by the story of his connection with the stage, and his mad *Chase for gold* in the closing years of his life; and the volume closes with a valuable chapter on the bibliography of his works.

MAGAZINE OF ART. — The May number contains a copy of the painting "Home, Sweet Home," by P. Morris, A.R.A., as a frontispiece.—Syon House, by Eustace Balfour, with three engravings.—"A penny plain, and two-pence colored," by Robert Louis Stevenson, with fifteen engravings.—"A Silent Colloquy," from the picture by Paul Stade.—A Greek Dressing Case, by Jane E. Harrison, with two engravings.—Pictures at Leeds, with five engravings.—The "Royal Academy" of China painting, by Cosmo Monkhouse, with six engravings.—The Lower Thames, by Aaron Watson, with six engravings.—The Lace School at Burano, by F. Mabel Robinson.—The Sword, by David Hannay, with eight engravings.—"By the Fire-side," from the picture by J. N. Melis.—The chronicle of art.—American art notes.—Yearly subscription, \$3.50. Single numbers, 35 cents. Cassell & Co. 739 Broadway.

THE ART AMATEUR concludes its fifth year with the May number. Notable features are the frontispiece, "Morning Prayer," from C. S. Pearce's Salon picture; the profusely illustrated article on the National Academy Exhibition, and the first of a series of articles on "The Modern Home," treating of the vestibule and hall. Louis Leloir and George Fuller, artists recently deceased, receive appreciative biographical notice. The work of Solon, a famous French ceramic artist, is described and illustrated. Other articles of interest are on spurious old faience, the drawings of the old masters, the Pastel Exhibition, and "How we Lost the Castellani Collection." The supplement sheets include designs for monograms, jewelry, wood-carving, etched and hammered brass, and china paintings, (pansies, roses and rhododendron for vase and tiles); a pomegranate design from South Kensington for an embroidered screen, and a child's head in color from a drawing by P. A. Wille. With the May number *The Art Amateur* is to be introduced in England, after the manner of *Harper's* and the *Century*. Price, \$4.00 per year; single numbers, 35 cents. Montague Marks, Publisher, 23 Union Square, New York.

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No. CLXXXI.

JULY, 1884.

—CIVIL SERVICE REFORM.

accomplished, but much more remains to be done by Service Reformers. President Hayes (soon as Secretary of the Interior), gave them his assistance. President Garfield would have done so if his life had been spared. President Hayes gave him courage for the better in his course and confidence after the New York election of Novem-

ber. There are signs of a great awakening in the public mind for administrative reform. Undoubtedly the success of the Civil Service in Great Britain will lead to this revival. In the fall of 1880, the Civil Service Association of New York City started up for itself, with George William Curtis as its first President and P. Wheeler as Chairman of its Executive Committee. This committee set to work in good earnest to have its report laid before Congress. They were successful. No man in the country was better

competent to perform this difficult task. No man had studied the subject in all its details more diligently, or mastered it more thoroughly or discussed it at greater length. One of these bills provided for open competitive examinations for admission to certain branches of the subordinate Civil Service, and the other prohibited political assessments. Both were introduced into the Senate on the 10th day of January, 1881. In February, Mr. Eaton and Mr. Wheeler, the one being a Republican and the other a Democrat, were sent on to Washington to see if they could find anybody there who would hear what they had to say about these bills. There were two gentlemen in Congress, both Democrats, who had become interested in the reform of the Civil Service, and who looked with compassion and sympathy upon the strangers from New York. They were Senator Pendleton of Ohio, and Representative Willis of Kentucky. The two bills had been referred to a select committee of the Senate, of which Mr. Pendleton, though not formally the chairman, appears to have been the active member. Eaton and Wheeler had a hearing before this committee. When they came back to New York to make report of what they had seen and done, it was as if a couple of missionaries had just returned from the heathen. They brought good news. At least they thought so. They had been listened to with patience and courtesy. That of itself was encouraging. But more than this, Senator Pendleton had concluded to put aside a bill of his own, to adopt in its place that one of the reformers that provided for competitive examinations, and to report it back to the Senate with an earnest recommendation for its passage. This was done on the 16th of February, and this bill was afterwards known as the "Pendleton bill." But nothing further was heard of it that winter. Congress was fast drawing to a close, and on the 4th of March, President Hayes was to retire and President Garfield to be inaugurated. The Congressional Record of that session covers 2472 closely printed pages, but no speech or utterance of any kind about Civil Service Reform, either *pro* or *con*, can be found in this vast mass of Congressional verbiage. So deaf to the voice of public opinion and so blind to the signs of the times, were the men who composed the Forty-Sixth Congress.

The next two years brought about a wonderful change. On the 16th of January, 1883, the Pendleton bill, in an amended form, having passed both houses of Congress, was approved by President Arthur. He appointed as Civil Service Commissioners, to aid him in carrying out the new statute, Dorman B. Eaton of New York, John M. Gregory, of Illinois, and Leroy D. Thoman, of Ohio. In February last, the President transmitted to Congress the first annual report of this Commission. It affords an opportunity to observe the practical operation of the new merit system of making appointments, as contrasted with the old spoils system. The first thing that we notice is the extremely limited application of the new statute. None of the post-masters, of whom the number is no less than 48,434, are affected by it in respect to their tenure of office or their salaries. Nor does it touch the mode of appointing any of the officers of the government, the appointment of whom is confirmed by the Senate. Senatorial patronage therefore, so far as regards the power of confirmation, is as yet undisturbed. Persons employed as laborers or workmen are also expressly excepted from the operation of the act.

There are only three branches of the service that have thus far been subjected to the new system of appointment. The first embraces 5,652 clerkships and other places in the executive departments at Washington, with salaries not exceeding \$1800 and not less than \$900 per annum. The second embraces 2,573 places, with salaries varying from \$900 to \$1800 or over, in those customs districts, where the number of such places in each, are "all together as many as fifty." There are only eleven such districts, to wit: Boston, Portland, Burlington, New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Orleans, Detroit, Port Huron, Chicago and San Francisco. Thirdly, the reformed system applies to 5,699 clerks and other employees in those post offices, where the whole number of such clerks and employees in each, "together amount to as many as fifty." There are twenty-three such post-offices and they are as follows: Boston, Providence, New York City, Brooklyn, Albany, Rochester, Buffalo, Newark, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Washington, New Orleans, Louisville, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Indianapolis, Chicago, St. Louis, Milwaukee,

Kansas City, and San Francisco. Add together the number of places as above stated, in the departments at Washington and in the customs service and postal service, and you have an aggregate of 13,924. According to the Report of the Commission, there has been a subsequent increase, so as to carry the number above 14,000. Stated then in round numbers, there are 14,000 clerks and other employees of the Government, who have been brought under the protection of the civil service act, and who hold their places independently of politics, politicians or political influences. This fact shows a good beginning. The authors of the Pendleton bill never expected from it as its immediate result any thing more than such a beginning. They were practical men and not such visionary theorists as they were often represented to be. They might easily have projected a measure of reform that would have been far more sweeping and radical. But they were dealing with the subject before them from a practical point of view, and they rejected all such radical propositions and suggestions as chimerical. They saw plainly that it would be impracticable to induce Congressmen to surrender all their patronage at a single stroke. They said to themselves: "This is a reform that may be accomplished gradually. We can not do every thing all at once. We will first make an experiment, and the American people shall see how it works. We will select and set off by themselves a few sections or branches of the Civil Service. We will cut them off from all connection with the spoils system, and from the partisan and machine politics of the day, and we will put them under the operation of the merit system." And this is what has been done by the civil service act.

Some of the other features of the reformed system in actual practice can only be touched upon in the fewest words possible. According to the Report of the Commission, the whole number of applicants examined was 3,542. The number of those who were successful, having been graded above the minimum of sixty-five (the figure for the maximum of complete proficiency being 100) was 2,044. Of these, the number appointed to the service during the period of six months from July 16, 1883 (until which date the old methods of appointment were

continued) to January 16th, 1884, was 516. Of these, sixty-five per cent. were educated in the common schools alone. This interesting fact sufficiently disposes of the objection that the new system would create an aristocracy or bureaucracy of college graduates. It has been well said, that this is especially a people's reform, that it deposes bosses as the dictators of appointments in the public service, and opens the doors wide to all the people.

Again, the Reformers have never regarded competitive examinations as a perfect and final test of fitness. Accordingly, the civil service act and the rules promulgated under it, provide for a probationary service of six months, before any absolute appointment can be made. It is also to be noted that the act is so framed that the reformed system may be extended to other parts of the executive service, whenever the President shall so direct, without the necessity of additional legislation.

It is a prevailing error, that the reform under review aims at a life tenure or some other kind of permanent tenure of office. The civil service act and rules only prohibit removals for refusal to contribute to any political fund or to render any political service. They steer carefully clear of all the vexed questions of tenure. This reform is inconsistent of course with the doctrine of rotation in office, which is an element of the spoils system. But it is plain that the temptation to make arbitrary removals in order to create vacancies is gone, the moment it is seen that the places thus vacated can no longer be filled on partisan grounds, or with political or personal favorites, without reference to their merits.

Section ten of the civil service act may be referred to as an illustration of the destructive effect of the reformed system upon Congressional patronage. It provides that no recommendation from a Congressman except as to the character or residence of the applicant shall be received or considered. To prevent misapprehension, it may also be noted, that the Commission under the power given it in the act, excepts from examination a few persons such as confidential clerks and secretaries, cashiers, interpreters, stenographers, and others.

The civil service act was drawn with wisdom and foresight so as to avoid constitutional questions and difficulties. It does

not take away any power of appointment vested in the President or other executive officers. But this power is one of choice. It is "a right of selection for appointment among several." Congress may regulate it. Accordingly, when a vacancy occurs, it is filled by a selection by the appointing officer from the four names certified to him by the Commission, as among those graded highest in the list of those who have passed the examination successfully and have thus become eligible. The act is not mandatory upon the President. It does not require him, but only authorizes him to appoint the Commissioners. And they are required "to aid the President, as he shall request, in preparing suitable rules to carry this act into effect." The whole thing, as has well been said, presupposes a friendly President, the whole aim of the examinations being to bring to his notice the qualifications of those who seek to enter the service.

Five sections of the civil service act are directed against the evils of political assessments. Congressmen as well as executive officers and employees are prohibited from soliciting or receiving them. No person is allowed to solicit or receive them in the public offices or in the navy yards or arsenals. No officer or employee mentioned in the act shall discharge or promote or in any manner change the official rank or compensation of any other officer or employee, for giving or withholding a contribution for a political purpose. The violation of any of these provisions is made a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and the offence, if the offender be in the service, is good cause for his removal. Averaged at the sum of one thousand dollars, the salaries of the 14,000 to whom the act applies, would amount to fourteen millions of dollars. An assessment or tax of two per cent. on this sum would yield a fund for electioneering purposes of two hundred and eighty thousand dollars. Hereafter, no part of this fund can be collected by intimidation and extortion as heretofore. Still, the provisions against assessments are not so searching and comprehensive, as the bill that was framed in New York and introduced into the Senate as already stated, in January, 1881, which bill however did not pass the House of Representatives. Mention is made in the Report of the Commission, of viola-

tions of the act by citizens of two States, "in the form of surreptitiously sending or carrying circulars into the departments at Washington, by which contributions were solicited from those in the public service in aid of the political funds of those States." As the act now reads, it will be difficult to procure or sustain a conviction for sending such circulars by mail. That point was covered in the bill referred to, in terms so explicit as to leave no room for construction.

Unfortunately, the civil service act provides that appointments shall be apportioned among the several States, according to population. This provision was inserted in the Senate, as an amendment to the Pendleton bill. It interpolates an inconsistency into a system based solely on merit. It is an extension to the States of the old doctrine of the spoils system in respect to individuals, that every one has a right to an office. It is a penalty upon superior intelligence, and a premium on comparative ignorance.

One other amendment deserves notice. The original Pendleton bill adopted the existing statutory classification of the clerks in the executive departments at Washington, and provided for a similar arrangement into classes of the clerks and other employees in the customs offices and post-offices to which it should apply. It then provided that original entrance into the service so classified should be at the lowest grade, and that promotions should be made from the lower grades to the higher on the basis of merit and competition. This was all plain and simple. It was just and proper that new comers should begin at the bottom, and work their way up. The Senate struck out the provision in reference to promotion and entrance at the lowest grade. This amendment was made on the motion of Senator Brown of Georgia, with the avowed purpose of giving Democrats from outside an equal chance for entrance to the higher grades with those Republicans who should be promoted from lower grades, it being assumed that the lower grades were filled with Republicans. The amendment was a concession to the spoils system. It materially impaired the significance and value of the classification. It gave rise to many apprehensions on the part of the friends of reform, which however have hardly been realized. It seems that in actual practice, ninety-

eight per cent. of the entrances to the service under the act, have been at the lower grades. Then again, competitive examinations for promotion are not so essential as is often supposed. There is no such necessity or occasion for them, as in the case of original entrance to the service. There are no such examinations for promotion in the British postal service, and not ten per cent. of the other promotions in the British Civil Service are subjected to them. As a general rule, those candidates should be promoted who have made the best record of merit in the service below.

The Civil Service Reformers have become a political power. They have fought their battles and achieved their victories before the courts, at the polls and in the halls of legislation. In 1881, discovery was made of an act of Congress passed in 1876, leveled against executive officers and employees of the Government, appointed without the confirmation of the Senate. The act made it a misdemeanor for them to request or receive from other officers or employees "any money or property or other thing of value, for political purposes." It so happened that a man named Curtis had violated this statute. He was a special agent of the treasury department at Washington, and while holding this position, he became the treasurer of the Republican State Committee of New York, and as such, in the canvass that preceded the election of 1881, he received from other employees of the Federal Government the assessments imposed upon them by the circular note of the State Committee, directing the payments to be made to him. When the Reformers came to consider the question of the prosecution of Curtis, there were many doubts and misgivings. There were no funds in hand for undertaking so formidable an enterprise, and there were other practical difficulties. Some of them were overcome, and as to the rest, it was concluded to face them boldly and take the chances as to the result. The first indictment against Curtis, found in March, 1882, was quashed on the ground of a misnomer. In May he was indicted again, under the correct name of Newton M. Curtis, and on this indictment he was tried and convicted in the United States Circuit Court, sitting in New York City. He was sentenced to pay a fine of one thousand dollars, which fine was paid, after an affirmance of the

conviction and of the constitutionality of the act under which it was had, by the full bench of the Circuit Court, and by the Supreme Court of the United States. This result was vastly more than the defeat and punishment of an individual. It was a victory over the political machine of which he happened to be only the operator. It was a triumph over an established system, and upon a point touching the pretended constitutional rights of office-holders, hitherto regarded by its votaries as sacred and impregnable. It gave great strength to the Reformers in the estimation of the public. They had flooded the country with their pamphlets and stuffed the newspapers with their articles. But there were multitudes, too indifferent or too busy to read them, who were nevertheless greatly affected by the intelligence of the conviction of Curtis, and who then for the first time began to see that there might after all be something of practical consequence in this movement for reform.

It has been the good fortune of the Reformers, indeed it is to some extent the secret of their success, that they have had the press on their side. Take, if you please, half a dozen large independent journals, representing diverse interests and circulating among different classes of readers, such as *Harpers' Weekly*, *The New York Times*, *The New York Herald*, and *The Evening Post*. Bring them together on the approach of an important election. Wheel them into line and make them move in harmony, and if your cause is a just and righteous one, you have an engine of political warfare as powerful and effective as any that has been invented. It was such an engine as this that the Reformers had to help them in the canvass of 1882, and it swept every thing before it. Day after day and week after week it discharged its volleys, "hot and heavy," of solid argument and of telling facts, of scathing invective and of poignant wit, against the abuses and scandals of the spoils system, against the supercilious indifference towards reform of the dominant party in Congress and the deliberate violation of the promises and pledges of conventions and platforms, and against the organized system of robbery and black-mail involved in the levying of political assessments, as practiced by Honorable Jay A. Hubbell, "of Bedouin ancestry," chairman and treasurer of the Republican Congressional Executive Committee.

The result is well known. The State of New York, which in 1880 gave Garfield a majority over Hancock of 21,033, in 1882 gave Cleveland a majority over Folger of 192,854. The elections in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and other States showed similar results. The effect upon Congress of this revolution of public opinion is admirably described in the Address delivered at Newport in August, 1883, at the annual meeting of the National Civil Service Reform League, by George William Curtis, upon whose presidency and leadership, the Reformers have numberless reasons to congratulate themselves. "When we met here a year ago," said Mr. Curtis, "Congress was still in session. The Pendleton bill had been reported to the Senate, but no action had been taken. The House of Representatives, with ribald sneers at the project of reform, had contemptuously granted the President three-fifths of the pittance which he had 'urgently' asked to enable him to continue efforts of reform which had been begun. The record of the proceedings upon this subject in the House of Representatives last summer is one of the most disgraceful passages in the history of Congress." * * * * "The Congress which had adjourned in August laughing at reform, heard the thunder of the elections in November and re-assembled in December. If members had been draped in sheets and had carried candles, they could not have borne a more penitential aspect." The Pendleton bill underwent an active debate in the Senate, and passed that body on the 27th of December. The House passed it as it came to it from the Senate, without the least alteration. Its action was summary and precipitate. Mr. Curtis speaks of it as follows: "The House which was so eager to make the bill a law that it would not tolerate debate and loudly cheered the proposal of an immediate vote, was the same house that five months before had derisively and angrily refused to give a paltry sum and to aid a single experiment of reform. Men who could not laugh loud enough at the ridiculous whim of transacting the public business on business principles, now tumbled over each other in their breathless haste to make that whim the national policy."

Considerable progress has been made in the extension of the reformed system to the States and municipalities. Civil ser-

vice acts were passed by the legislature of New York in May, 1883, and an excellent commission is now on duty there, consisting of John Jay, Augustus Schoonmaker and Henry A. Richmond.

The point towards which the Reformers have recently been especially directing their efforts, is the repeal of the legislation which prescribes a term of office of four years for a large portion of the officers who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The first statute in the series was passed in 1820. It was explicitly condemned by Jefferson, Madison, Webster, and Calhoun. "The law itself," to quote again from the Address of Mr. Curtis, "vacates the office, and gives the President the means of rewarding a favorite, without exercising the power of removal. It thus enables him to displace a satisfactory officer without the responsibility or odium of dismissing him." As these lines are being written, the prospect of the desired repeal at the present session of Congress is not encouraging. On the 21st of April, the House of Representatives refused by a vote of 146 to 99 to suspend the rules, so as to allow the bill to repeal to be taken up and passed. Greater discouragements than this, however, have been encountered and overcome. The present agitation will not cease until the Civil Service is taken out of politics, the same as the Army and Navy. Competitive examinations and the rest of the new machinery are only the means to an end. They have only become necessary by reason of the immense increase and enlargement of the Civil Service, so that it is simply impossible for the Executive to determine, by the ordinary methods of inquiry and recommendation, which of the applicants are the most fit and suitable for appointment. The end which the reformers seek is not an innovation, but a restoration—the restoration in place of the spoils system, of the merit system and its principles, as practiced under Washington, Adams, Jefferson and Madison. They want nothing more, and they will be content with nothing less.

ARTICLE II.—TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

II. THE CUSTOMS TARIFF.

THE State in the form to which political evolution has finally carried it is the consensus and enrollment of all the people, partly for the transaction of business in which all are equally concerned but principally for security from dangers to which all are equally exposed. If it has any right to exist at all it has *ipso facto* the right to the means necessary for the ends of its existence, and among the rest to so much of the national wealth as it requires for the protection of the remainder and of the persons of its subjects.

As the expenses of the State are all practically current expenses provided for by continuous or periodical taxation, what rightfully belongs to it is a definite proportion of the whole product or revenue of the wealth of the nation; for the capital required to produce the wealth of future years cannot belong to the State for the expenses of the current year. This proportion of the whole again is made up of parts in the same proportion of the several revenues of all the subjects; for the State can have no rightful claim upon the property of any one beyond the uniform rate for all. On the one hand the budget which calls for a sum-total greater than the legitimate expenses of the State, and on the other the taxation which in the end takes from any subject more than his proportion, is appropriation of the very property which the State is set to protect.

With this recapitulation we may return to the case with which we began. Brown & Co. have imported a certain number of watches upon which, delivered at their house in New York, they have paid \$1000 to the manufacturers and a fourth of this in duties to the government. To bring out more clearly the full effect of the tax let us suppose that they have invested all their available means, say \$1,000,000, in foreign watches, of which sum they will have paid \$800,000 to the manufacturers and \$200,000 to the government. It is evident that this latter sum as much as the other is a portion of their capital and if the

rate of taxation at the same time is uniform everywhere the government will have taken one-fifth part of the whole capital wealth of the country. Now there are several contingencies in which this may be supposed to have actually occurred. For example, it may have been concluded that communism is the true political gospel, that the State as everybody's trustee and agent is rightful proprietor of all property, and the people may have resolved by a constitutional majority to begin the experiment by conveying to its agent a fifth part of its wealth to be administered in its behalf. Or again, it may have been concluded and resolved that the best provision for the expenses of the State is a permanent endowment to that amount, the annual revenue from which will release the people from all future burdens of taxation as the police relieves it from service on the *posse comitatus*, a standing army from military service, or the constitution of certain courts from service on the jury. Or again, to meet some exceptional emergency, the State may have contracted a loan which has now matured and payment on which is demanded, so that caught, if one may say so, between the devil of default and the deep sea of liquidation it meets its engagements by appropriating to that purpose the requisite portion of the national wealth. In all these cases the confiscation once effected the account is closed; its force is exhausted when the money is taken and the necessity provided for. The State put in possession of a fifth part of the national wealth, whether as administrator in behalf of the people, or as permanently endowed for transacting its business and protecting its rights, or as furnished with the means of paying off its debt capital, has no further claim until a new necessity of the same kind arises and another portion of the national wealth is appropriated to meet it. But as it happens there are no traces of any of these necessities in the fiscal position of the United States. The doctrine of communism is a mere speculation of certain peculiar theorists, the magnificent national endowment in the shape of public lands has been nearly dispersed under the homestead law and in land-grants, and as to its capital debt the anxiety of the creditors is not that it will not be paid at maturity but that it will. In a word it is under no pressure of instant and final liquidation whatsoever, but is tranquilly pro-

viding for its current expenses, in which all claims upon it have been merged, by continuous taxation. So when Brown & Co. pay a fifth part of their capital in import duties they are not only paying an exceptional and disproportionate tax, but a tax which does not close the account and release them from further taxation; on the contrary, every time their capital comes back in the shape of a new importation they pay the fifth part of it over again. How can they possibly continue business under burdens like these?

The answer is that the duty paid to the government is as much a part of the cost of the watches as the price paid to the manufacturers, and is at once charged along with all the other elements of the cost upon sale to the customers. If Brown & Co. are provided with the requisite capital to advance to the government and are sure of a sale at remunerative prices, the amount of the duty is a matter of perfect indifference to them; all they have to fear is that the increased cost of their goods may increase the difficulty of finding purchasers and so diminish the volume of their business; otherwise they wholly escape the effects of what looks like exorbitant and ruinous taxation. They are in fact what is called middle men, mere transfer agents whose business is to put goods on the market, and the capital they advance to the manufacturer, the carrier, the underwriter, the government, to all in short whose charges have added to the cost, is immediately reimbursed to them upon sale, that is, is circulating capital which distributes the burdens put upon it to the capital in which circulation ends, the fixed capital of final investments. He who last buys the watch not for sale but to keep and use, foots the whole bill, pays all the successive charges upon it from the manufacturers to the merchants, and among the rest the duty charged by the government. Brown & Co. are in effect unaccredited agents who collect for the government the duty distributed among and ultimately paid by the consumers.*

* Capital, according to the standard definition, is distinguished from Land or Labor as wealth accumulated to assist in the further production of wealth; which to the uninitiated sounds much like a distinction without a difference, since land and labor are not only wealth in that they may be exchanged for their equivalents but are two of the three factors which assist in producing more wealth. Capital, so defined, is

Now this function might be exercised by all other middle men whether dealing in foreign or domestic products; they could all as easily collect the duty for the government as first cost for the manufacturer, freight for the carrier, insurance for the underwriter, or interest and profit for themselves. If it were in the power of the government to surprise and detain the goods in the hands of any middle men anywhere on the way from the producer to the consumer, and to ascertain their cost at the moment of detention it would have no difficulty in levying a duty upon them as in the case of the imported watches. In this way the entire expenses of the State for the current year might be charged upon the circulating capital employed in putting the year's product on the market and so distributed among the consumers, who are the whole population. But this is not all. When one buys a watch he does not usually draw on any part of his capital to pay for it. The living wealth he holds, invested in real estate or securities or in his business is continually reproducing itself in rent, interest, or profits, and he is no more likely to stop the reproduction and turn it into dead wealth by buying watches with it than the laborer is to impair *his* productive capital by maiming himself or ruining his health. Either will do it in an emergency or under strong either circulating capital consisting of the food and other things required to support the laborer and which are quickly consumed, or fixed capital consisting of machines, factories and other things which assist labor and are consumed slowly. It seems to be therefore a part of labor, which is the discovery Mr. Henry George makes after defining it as that form of productive wealth which is *not* land or labor.

I venture to use the word according to its etymology and popular acceptance as any source or fountain-head of revenue, whether land, labor or accumulated savings; and revenue as any return or income of capital, whether rent, wages or profits. The generic term is wealth, whose two species are capital and revenue in their several varieties. By circulating capital I mean simply capital in circulation, wealth of any kind held for exchange with other kinds; and by fixed capital, as I have said, the wealth in which the circulation ends. Real estate, slaves, machines, railways, to the dealers in those articles are as much circulating capital as food or clothes; they all become fixed capital when taken out of the circulation for occupancy, use or consumption. Of course the same wealth gets back into circulation again sooner or later, but in a different form and other relations. Practically the solution of continuity is complete and this I take to be the basis of the real distinction between the two things.

temptation, but in ordinary circumstances he will pay for his watch out of his wages or his income. The daily wants, conveniences and luxuries of life, in general the whole consumption of the country, are ultimately provided for out of the earnings of capital and not out of capital itself. We may therefore define the direct taxation of the circulating capital of any country as an indirect income-tax; and admitting for the moment that the State is justified in renouncing, as all States do, the direct appropriation of what rightfully belongs to it, namely a uniform proportion of every man's income, there is probably no more satisfactory source of public revenue than a tax on circulating capital.

But it is to be observed that of the whole volume of this capital a large portion is practically inaccessible to taxation; it is not in the power of the government to stop the goods and ascertain their value anywhere on the way from the producer to the consumer. For example, the most of the hay grown in the United States is consumed on the farms where it grows, in which case producer and consumer are one; there is no middle man, no advance or re-imbusement of capital, no measurement and valuation of the product. Of the surplus if any, nearly the whole is sold in the immediate neighborhood, in which case if there is no middle man there is measurement and valuation of the thing sold; but it would be clearly indefinitely easier to tax the whole income of every farmer *en bloc* than the several products sold separately from his farm. Produce of this sort requiring no process of manufacture to fit it for the market is absorbed so promptly and in such endless detail that it escapes all possibility of assessment. This is true too of manufactured commodities produced in small quantities for neighborhood consumption. The capital advanced all over the land to the village artisan, the joiner, the tailor, the miller, like that advanced to the farmers around the village, flows in quantities too minute, through circuits too short and complicated to admit of computation. It is only the surplus products natural or manufactured left over by local consumption, and gathered from a broad territory in great quantities at a central point for wide re-distribution thence, that are accessible to the government.

Now concentration of this sort takes place on the largest and most conspicuous scale when the varied surplus of one country is brought together to supply the wants of another. Thus the entire exportation from the United States to Europe must be collected at a few sea-ports and subjected there to exact measurement and valuation before being shipped. So far as accessibility is concerned there is no part of the circulating capital of any country more clearly indicated for taxation than the capital advanced by the exporter, and in the United States none probably would better bear the burden. Our position to-day is so peculiar and commanding that the ordinary expenses of the State might be entirely charged to the capital employed in exporting our surplus cotton and food products. But a tax on circulating capital, at whatever point in the circulation levied, is paid by the consumer, who in this case is an alien, so that it is in our power to shift the whole cost of government to the subjects of other States. The objection is that it is not they who make government with us necessary or for whose benefit it exists; a tax paid by them, unless a war-measure, is spoliation, the appropriation by the State of property not its own. But this very consideration which excludes from taxation the capital advanced by the exporter of domestic produce, selects for taxation the capital advanced by the importer of foreign produce, for imports into the United States are for consumption in the United States and the duties upon them are paid by residents of the United States. Nothing can be more artless than the notion which actually survives in some quarters that duties on foreign goods are a means for shifting our burdens to foreign shoulders, paying our State expenses out of foreign pockets. It is the consumer who pays, whoever he is. If we want the foreigner to pay the costs of our government we should levy duty on our exports; if like honest men we want to pay them ourselves we may levy duty on our imports.

Here then are clear and intelligible motives for taxation; first, property in a form eminently accessible to the government, seeing that it is concentrated at the points where the great channels of commerce intersect the national frontier, and is delivered there under exact measurement and valuation in the accompanying invoices and bills of lading; second, prop-

erty which distributes the charges upon it including the import duty to all the subjects of the State by whom the duty is levied and to no one else. Accordingly all civilized States have retained the duty and we may be sure will continue it until indirect taxation of all kinds is abandoned. The ideal of the free trader is an impracticable dream as things are. He will never strike off what he calls the shackles and fetters of trade until he has persuaded the State to find its revenue in direct taxation of the product of the national wealth. Meanwhile the only question in order is whether in taxing the capital employed in the importation of foreign merchandise, the State is controlled exclusively by the two considerations which justify the tax, namely, the accessibility and the distributing power of the property on which it is laid.

The customs tariff of the United States in its original form was one of a group of measures adopted on the spur of the moment to save the commonwealth from extreme and instant peril. It was in effect, like the call for volunteers or for subscribers to the national loan, an appeal to the patriotism and self-sacrifice of the people, and with its companion act, the internal revenue tariff, was drafted, with the single intent of bringing into the treasury the largest possible tribute in the smallest possible space of time. It would be unreasonable to consult the taxation of 1860-'64 for anything beyond the supreme necessity and emotion of the hour. There was in fact no time, as up till that moment there had been no preparation by previous experience, for scientific calculation of the most productive and equitable sources of revenue. All considerations as to the relative accessibility and distributing power of different forms of property gave way to the apparent necessity of drawing at once from property in any form that was at all accessible the utmost tribute that it would bear. No doubt even as a war measure, a desperate provision for a desperate emergency, the whole fiscal system of that time, including both the contraction of the public debt and the corresponding taxation, is open to technical criticism, but it is forever absolved with all its errors by the simple motive of its inspiration and the triumphant vindication of results. The question of motives enters only with the continuance of the customs tariff

after the emergency had passed, and all the other measures adapted to meet it had been abandoned. Why are we here to-day in a time of profound peace and an overflowing treasury paying upon our imports substantially the same duties we paid during the war of the rebellion? Who or what is it we are taxed to save as we were taxed then to save the commonwealth? What considerations have determined the State to leave upon a particular form of property burdens long since removed from forms which the other day were equally burdened?

The war duties upon imports have been maintained since the close of the war for the distinct and specific purpose of augmenting the cost of the goods and thereby obstructing their sale in the American market. This evidently is so far from being a legitimate and permissible state motive that it is not a state motive at all, for it is the business of the State as protector of the property of its subjects to protect it from arbitrary and artificial charges; and its interest to maintain the natural price and so promote the sale of commodities which it taxes, inasmuch as the larger the sale the greater is the available source of its revenue. They who are interested in the artificial price and the obstructed sale are neither the people nor the agent of the people; they are the producers of commodities of the same kinds as the kinds taxed. The Swiss watch is handicapped with a duty equal to one-fourth of its real value, that the untaxed American watch may have easier sale in a better market; in general the open arena accessible to the whole world of commerce in which prices adjust themselves to real values according to the laws of world-wide demand and supply is closed to the foreign producer that the producer at home may advance his prices beyond real values yet retain his customers. It goes without saying that a close market of this kind becomes at once and inevitably a rendezvous for all the blind avidities and rapacities of commerce. Every producer exerts himself to maintain or procure the highest possible duty on the foreign article both to diminish competition and to increase his prices, coalitions are formed of all producers of the same and of affiliated products to influence legislation, and the simple motive of providing for public expenses by equable taxation of the na-

tional wealth disappears in the chaos of conflicting personal and class interests which dictate the tariff.

This perversion of the functions of the State as the agent of all to the exclusive benefit of a few is disguised under the taking euphemism of protection to American industry, or more exactly American manufactures; a capital instance of that delusive generalization or "realization of abstractions," common enough in metaphysics and theology, but nowhere more mischievous than in the domain of the historical and political sciences. For twenty years the intelligence of the people has been paralyzed or perverted by a phrase, as the political energies of all Europe were for ages by the doctrine of the divine right of the sovereign. The implication is that the industries in question are American in derivation and right, as the kingship was divine, that the whole people in some way participates in them and is responsible for them as for American liberty or American law; that they are a national concern to be defended against all comers by the State. Stripped of the imposing abstraction the naked facts are that the industries represented in the tariff are the private enterprises of certain American citizens, or residents on American soil, which concern the rest of us and the State only so far as they may be supposed to add to the prosperity of the country, like American agriculture or American labor which do not figure in the tariff at all. The humblest of them is entitled to protection, if need be in the full measure of the power of the State; but protection from what and what kind of protection? From fraud and violence, from the common enemy for whose repression the State exists. But foreign competition is not a common enemy. There is no disturbance of public order and security, no wrong to person or property, no violence or fraud, in putting a Swiss watch on the American market. On the contrary the presence of the Swiss watch at its real value is a factor for determining the real value of the American watch; the free admission of the world's products along with our own is the only way of finding out what our own are worth and should be "protected" by the State in the interest of the people, for the whole people is concerned in buying what it requires, whether of home or foreign origin, at its real value. But this is precisely what the producer fears, and

asks to be protected from under the alarming generalization of foreign hostility, namely an open market whose free exchanges settle the real value of his products. If he were content with or could afford to take this he would not require protection. So what he demands and has actually got is compensation for incompetence and a bounty on inferior goods.*

The remarkable thing is that the inferiority is openly avowed—under another euphemism, and made part of the plea for protection. It is said that American manufactures are as yet in their “infancy” and therefore unprepared for competition with robust foreign manufactures, which, it is further said, have acquired their adult vigor and their aptitude for infanticide by having been protected when *they* were infants. This I am persuaded is the most picturesque and pathetic abstraction in the whole range of political philosophy. Here the implication is that the American people has incurred the solemn responsibilities of paternity by having engendered a progeny of industries full of the charm and promise of childhood, but doomed to untimely extinction unless sheltered from the foreign foe, and suckled at the maternal bosom of the State. The fact again is that the American manufacturer himself is no infant whatever his manufacture may be, but as adult as anybody and one of the shrewdest of his kind, a man who like the American farmer, or miner, or merchant, or banker, has availed himself of the liberty secured to him by the State to choose among all the ventures of commerce the one which suits

* The point may be best made by an example. Let us suppose two watches, each the exact duplicate of the other, the one made in the United States at a cost of \$100, the other, owing to differences in methods and the wages of labor, in Switzerland at a cost of \$80. The latter will then sell at a profit of 25 per cent. for \$100, which is the manufacturing cost of the other, and supposing the profit to have been fairly determined in the open market, the real value of each. The import duty of 25 per cent. on the wholesale price of the Swiss watch overcomes this difference and enables the American watch to dispute the market at a profit of 25 per cent. and to command it at a profit of 24. Whichever of the two he takes the American purchaser is forced to pay 24 or 25 per cent. more than its real value. It is beside the point to plead the benefits to American industry or to the country of such protection. Were everybody else the better for it it is spoliation of the purchaser and the immorality of it simply does not admit of discussion.

him best. As he is the sole author of it so is he solely responsible for its issue, and as he is to reap all the profits so should he bear all the losses. That the enterprise is new to the country, and so under the disadvantages of inexperience, untrained labor and a preoccupied market, is perfectly well known to him in advance as a part of the general risk which he takes with his eyes open in expectation of finding his ultimate reward in it. It must be said of him therefore, that he pleads the baby act with perfect absurdity in the wrong court. His appeal should be to his friends if his own means are insufficient, or to the capital around him waiting for investment, or to the charitable public which founds lying-in hospitals and infant asylums. But he has no right to ask, and the State none to grant, a modification of the common environment for his exclusive benefit, an artificial *milieu* in which he can force upon us the products of his infant industry at prices beyond the real values of the products of industries in full maturity. That the infant sufferer is American is an appeal to our sympathies and our patriotism, but absolutely no concern of the State whatsoever; an occasion for charity perhaps, but certainly not a motive for legislation and not an excuse for spoliation of the people.

The crowning wrong is that there are no assignable bounds to the spoliation as there are no logical limits to the law which orders it, for the law, however rigorously defined, is a wide generalization of the most practical kind, establishing a principle and a precedent which may be rightfully invoked against the State in all similar cases. The principle is that it is the duty of the State to enable the American manufacturer to undersell his foreign competitor at remunerative prices. This it has effected by creating artificial values which make up for the higher cost and inferior quality of his goods. If now for any cause, and especially for any cause attributable to the action of the State, the inferiority and costliness increase, the right to increased protection follows; the poorer and dearer the goods become the higher the duty required to overcome foreign competition. Now the policy of protection itself tends to the deterioration of the protected industry, that is to the necessity of ever increasing protection. For the law of all

development is the inexorable law of survival of the fittest, and fitness for survival, in other words the superiority of any product to competing products, is acquired and ascertained only by competition itself, which the policy of protection is meant to exclude. The watch like any organism has grown by minute successive modifications in the instrument itself and in the processes of its manufacture, each of which is an improvement or an advance on all previous modifications struck out by the inventor in the struggle for life to keep up with the rising demands of the consumer. What any manufacture requires and never more than in its infancy is that universal demand which stimulates invention, and that unrestricted competition which instructs the inventor and puts him on his mettle. But what occasion is there for inventiveness and business enterprise of the normal kind, for improvement in the process and the product, for that superiority which beats the competitor out of the market, when the bare fact of American origin commands higher prices than the best work? The time, talent, and capital needed for improvement are spent to better purpose in influencing legislation, with the sure result that while the individual manufacturer may grow rich on his spoils American manufactures stand still or lose ground, an inanimate infancy passing into a manhood of decrepitude and decay. At the same time the obstructed market is a perpetual temptation to the foreigner who exerts himself to recover it by the only means left to him, the greater excellence and economy of his work. The incentives taken from the native are offered by the same hand to his rival and the improvement of foreign products goes on with the deterioration of our own as the same wind blows two ships in opposite directions.

But this transfer to the foreigner of all the incentives to improvement leaves with the native manufacturer a most powerful incentive to production. The artificial price by which he profits being created outright by act of the legislature and not gradually evolved under the natural conditions of unobstructed supply and demand takes effect suddenly, excluding foreign competition and delivering up the home market without preparation to the home producer. Thus the equable competition without violent pressure or strain anywhere between

all producers in all markets is abruptly converted into a life and death struggle of a few producers each of whose fortunes depends upon prompt preoccupation of a single market, and that an uncertain market which may be gradually recovered by the increased excellence and cheapness of the foreign product, or thrown open at any time by another act of the legislature. Over production follows and a suffocated market, a fall in prices which wipes out the artificial price created by the duty on imports, enforced idleness of capital, machinery, and labor, all reacting in acute crisis or long depression of the business interests of the whole country. Already the cry goes up all over the land that the home market is insufficient and that an outlet must be found into the foreign market. At this moment every minister and consul of the United States is under orders to "push" the sale of American products abroad. But as it is beyond the power of the State to augment prices beyond the range of its own taxation the only means it has for capturing the indispensable foreign market is a bounty on exports, a contribution from the public treasury which will remunerate the manufacturer for his loss in underselling the foreign competitor on his own ground. Of two things then, one, either it has exceeded its rights in laying the duty on imports or betrayed its trust in withholding the equally necessary bounty on exports. In fact it has practically conceded the principle by remitting the internal revenue duties on certain articles when sold abroad.

This then is the fatality of all class legislation that it immediately creates the necessity for further legislation of the same sort. You can't hold the Rhine without the Rhine provinces. The smallest perversion of the functions of the common agent of the people to the exclusive service of an individual or a class means in time the subversion of the State. If the acquisitiveness of the manufacturing class had any logic in it and the courage of conviction the protective tariff would be a *pronunciamiento*, the proclamation of a revolution.

Finally it is to be observed that exceptional privileges of any kind can be secured to one class of subjects only by exceptional burdens imposed upon some other. The artificial price by which the producer profits is created by the duty on

imports and this is paid by the consumer. But according to the fundamental principle of our polity the only motive permitted to the State for imposing exceptional burdens is wrongdoing of the subjects who bear them ; that other subjects benefit by them is an aggravation of the injury if the sufferers are unoffending. The usual argument that American manufacturers are benefited by the exclusion of foreign competition, that protection does in fact protect, is irrelevant and offensive. It may be perfectly true, but if true it only forces the previous question, what right has the State to tax the consumer of foreign products beyond the uniform rate for all ? The answer is that it has no right unless the purchase and use of foreign products is a public wrong, an injury to the people and an offense to the State ; for disproportionate taxation is of the nature of penalty, and penalties are to be inflicted only on the subject who has merited them. This is a point which it is not easy to treat with becoming gravity, but the fact is that the whole protective policy rests upon a real feeling that as there is something patriotic and praiseworthy in using the products of our own country so there is a kind of disloyalty in using those of other countries ; a latent feeling which strikes fire sometimes in the collisions of two peoples, as when the ladies of Berlin resolved the other day to import no more fashions from Paris, or when the Boston patriots threw the contaminated tea overboard. So to buy English cottons or an English ship is to enrich the English spinner or builder, and through him to add to the wealth and power of our hereditary rival and foe. The very existence of foreign States, however amicable our actual relations with them may be, is a perpetual menace to our security, and one of the principal reasons why we have to maintain and arm a State ourselves. To help them by making a market for their products is a sort of treason deserving reprobation. An expression of the enormity of the offense and of the popular feeling about it may be found in any recent budget of the United States. According to the statement for 1880 the amounts expended in various ways on account of the rebellion of 1860 were in round numbers about \$200,000,000, no part of which was drawn as penalty from the revolted States. For the same year the customs revenue was \$187,000,000,

which nearly balanced the account. So that the sin of rebellion, if it was a sin, has been most fittingly expiated, not by the rebel but by the consumer of foreign products.

Now to this it might be replied as before that the popular feeling is the realization of an empty abstraction, that it is in their industries that foreign States are a menace to us and not anybody but in their dynastic ambitions and race animosities that the political antagonisms which have arrested the civilization of the old world in the dead-lock of an armed truce and have retarded the industries by which we all benefit in a thousand ways under the weight of military preparation. But the fitting and conclusive answer is that if the use of foreign commodities is a public wrong it is not a proper source of public revenue. Importation so far as it weakens the State and helps the enemy should not be taxed; it should be prohibited, if persisted in should be punished; a principle of wide application to which we shall have to recur. The position in which the State has been betrayed is morally intolerable and impossible. It gives character to a specific act by laying the burden on the agent which in our polity are nothing if not positive; and condones the offense of its own defining in order to continue the burdens by which it profits.

To resume. The protective tariff is an anomaly in American legislation; a violent interruption and reversal of the normal evolution of our fiscal system justified only for the moment by exceptional conditions which have long since disappeared. Our duty is to get it out of the way with what promptitude possible; to dismiss at once and forever as a motive for State action the protection of any class at the expense of any other; to remove from the market every vestige of arbitrary and artificial prices as rapidly as the business situation will permit; and to put the finances of the State back into the track of the conditions of regular development toward the only result which an honest man can avow, the uniform taxation, for the common benefit, of all.

ARTICLE III.—THE GENESIS OF MODERN FREE INSTITUTIONS.

GOVERNMENT is not an accident. It has its origin in the elements of human nature. Aristotle styled man a political animal; and the profoundest investigations into the origin of the State have only confirmed the appropriateness of the term. While the individual will is free, men in masses are ruled by Providence, in accordance with clearly defined laws. Social and political organization and progress are the outcome of tendencies common to the race. Forms may vary, types may change; yet behind all the vicissitudes in the history of nations are the principles as invariable in their application as the physical and moral laws of the universe. A chain of causes and effects connects the past with the present, the present with the future. True, indeed, great men rise up, and the whole of society may seem to shake under their giant tread; but they only march ahead of their less gifted fellows, with clearer vision into the realities of their time, and hence with greater power to influence others. They may hasten or retard the development of institutions, but existing tendencies they cannot

Julius Cæsar left a deeper impress upon his age than any of his contemporaries, for he understood better than they the needs of his country's politics and shaped his course accordingly; but all the deep-souled eloquence of Demosthenes could not preserve Greek independence. A single will may direct, may in a measure direct or control; but human society is too complex an organism to be built up or destroyed by any individual.

Political institutions are the incarnations of ideas, which, implanted in the race, are developed according to circumstances. Like a living organism they have periods of growth, maturity, and decay. They have a reason of being, a mission; when this is fulfilled, they crumble and disappear and live only in memory. They are the outcome of efforts, more or less unconscious, toward the adjustment of the relations of men with

one another as members of a common body, or natural growth toward the adjustment of life with its surroundings. Institutions take shape in accordance with the tendencies and needs of the society in which they originate. The study of political institutions is important and fruitful; for thereby man has sought out the principles that underlie and condition his origin and destiny. Hence may be drawn useful lessons from the throbbing political life of to-day. This is especially the case with those institutions that had their originative impulse in the desire of a people to achieve self-government; for in the civilized portions of the world the trend of States has been towards democratic forms.

The political history of the race may be summed up as the gradual realization of the idea of freedom. Antiquity unfolded the conceptions of man and of society, developed art, literature, philosophy, law. She elevated man intellectually, aesthetically, just so far freeing him from the superstitious influence of his own nature and the influences of his surroundings. Thus she prepared the way for Christianity, which regenerated men morally and emphasized the dignity of the individual and hence cast its influence on the side of personal and political liberty. But of modern times the great political fact has been the development of democracy, and the recognition of man as the predominant element in the State. Equality of rights by which all stand on a like footing before the law; civil liberties which grants to every man not fool nor traitor the privilege of citizenship and a voice in the government; representative government means by which the individual will is exercised through delegated powers—these three elements distinguish the tendencies of modern political life from those of the past.

Could there be equality of rights in antiquity, when a few people made its captives slaves, and the bondmen outnumbered the free? Even Aristotle taught that slavery exists by nature; while Plato recognized in it a natural and just institution when slaves were of other birth than Greek. The sublime teachings of Stoicism regarding the brotherhood of men did not soften, but could not eradicate, this curse of ancient society. And many Christian centuries must pass before inequality of rights could more than begin to disappear. In the time

hs of the population of the country now
Then came feudalism, which, with all its
traditions, the glitter of armor and the
was still a cold, harsh system. Slavery
serfdom and the underling still cringed

ty known in the past. Nowhere,—not
emocracies of Greece,—was there popu-
modern sense. Large classes, including
were without the franchise and had no
local and class interests prevailed. There
in Greece, at any time; little among the
olmiest days of the republic. Thus in the
re was always a ruling class; it rested its
n blood, or on wealth, or on military pow-
he howling mob that ruled. Civil liberty,
pre-supposes and must have in order to
not dreamed of. Freedom and citizen-
that the magnanimity of the State might
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s the State? Simply a town, not a na-
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states of the earlier time had done. The
ation of its power is not, indeed, to be
t patriotism of its citizens. The career
standing alone, is short and brilliant,

as is shown by the history of Greece. But in the Roman Empire there was a balancing of authorities, a counterpoise of local and central powers, that insured permanency to both. The Empire, politically, was made up, not of nations but of cities, and over against the municipal tendencies toward disintegration was set the unifying, centralizing power of the Emperor.

With the decline of morals and the insatiate extortion of the government, however, the curial, or middle class of cities degenerated and lost heart. As an element of strength it had been to the Empire what the peasant farmer class of early Italy was to the Republic—the mainstay of the state. With its decline the last prop of the crumbling Roman polity was gone. The wild tribes of the north swept down, too little to oppose their progress. The municipal organization alone remained; the cities stood, like rocks in the torrent, destined to await the dawning of a brighter day when the living impulses of a new order of things should stimulate them again to activity and prosperity. The decaying fabric of Roman supremacy utterly disappeared. Out of cities the modern Empire had been made up, back into its original unity it was resolved.

The barbarians destroyed indeed, but nothing of the civilization of real value to humanity perished. Rather, in an effete existence were introduced new elements of strength and vigor. Among the Teutonic conquerors do we first find those principles of freedom and loyalty which, breathed into life by the hallowing spirit of Christianity and wrought into expression through centuries of turmoil, form, in the Magna Charta and the Petition of Right, the grand and enduring work of Anglo-Saxon liberties. The Germanic race, moreover, not only molded the polity of the English-speaking people but also left strong impress upon the political institutions of all Western and Southern Europe.

In the recesses of his native forests the German acknowledged no master save himself. Rulers and leaders there were, it is true, but the functions of king and general were not united in the same person, and both were chosen by the people. "Kingly power," says Tacitus, was "not unlimited nor arbitrary," and command was "by example rather than by au-

the right to punish save the priests. Brave warriors gathered about them bands of hardy followers to seek conquest and victory; but the only bond and troop was loyalty; there was no common characteristic feature of the tribal organization, independence, individual freedom.

Primitive tribes passed down into Western and they settled as masters of the soil. They gathered trusty followers, as rewards for service, which were to be held at his pleasure, or for rendering aid whenever he should desire. As the inhabitants were not destroyed; they remained in subordination, tilling for the victorious invaders. As a result from the circumstances of the case before the kingdoms thus founded were unsubstantial. The tract of land allotted to warriors by inheritance, the property of the heir being subject to conditions, the principal of which were that of reversion to the chief or sovereign if the condition should be broken. Hence arose the hierarchy with its many gradations of rank and its intricate system of fief instead of the kingdom became the basis of organization, and kingship was but an empty title, authority, attached to the line of some larger family, was distributed among lords and barons, who retained their independence. From the suzerain to the vassal, the lines of social organization were sharply drawn and as closely as the sword of arms could enforce. Disintegration and the characteristics of feudalism. The period of ignorance, of discord and oppression. The vassal, obliged to place themselves under the protection of the lord, standing as it were in vassalage in their own safety, maintained a precarious existence; the Church disseminated light amid the darkness, to harmonize conflicting elements. The Church, however, furnishes the only clue to guide through this dismal history. Yet feudalism, in the bold distribution of rights, mutual aid and mutual dis-

trust of its aristocracy, contained the germ both of free institutions and of representative institutions; civil liberty found a material development only in much later times.

In antiquity representative government also was unknown. For it presupposes nationality, a national life; but the nation, as we understand the term, is a growth of modern times. The Greek cities sometimes leagued together for mutual aid in war, but after the danger had passed away they were isolated as before. They had also associations and general assemblies for the performance of common religious rites; political matters, however, were for the most part excluded. Of such character were the colonial confederacies, which, formed mainly for purposes of common worship, could never become very close or very binding. So loose were these coalitions that Halicarnassus, although one of the principal cities of the Dorian Hexapolis, because one of its delegates at the festival of the Triopium Apollo, contrary to custom, carried off instead of dedicating to the god the tripod assigned him, was excluded from the league. At the Amphictyonic council met delegates from twelve Greek States; but at the beginning it was purely a religious body, and only by perversion of the original design was it in later times made to serve political ends. Even then the delegates could not legislate in common for the states. They had nothing to do with internal affairs; and except in regard to the observance of certain religious rites and festivals, they were very little concerned with inter-state relations. The council was not therefore a representative body.

Nor has the Achaian League in this connection special significance. It presents a very perfect type of federation, but it lacked the characteristic features of representative government in that its congress was a primary and not a representative assembly. Similar in nature were the leagues of early Italy, which illustrate only a kind of delegation. In the Roman provincial system, indeed, may be found a trace of the representative principle; but it is in the conditions accompanying the growth, maturity, and decline of feudalism that we must look for the origin of modern free institutions. Among the despotic empires of the Orient the personal will of the ruler never suffered any institution, representing the will of the people, to exist.

the feudal system was a necessary result of the transplant of the Germanic peoples, with their principles of freedom and loyalty, upon a conquered soil. None the less was monarchy the inevitable outgrowth of feudalism. Even in the midst of anarchy, monarchical traditions had by no means lost force; while by escheat and by inheritance and intermarriage as well as by superiority in arms, fiefs tended to mass themselves under the hands of a lord more cunning or more bold than his neighbors. This tendency early became apparent; it was accelerated by that series of events which forms the transitional movement from mediæval to modern history, the crusades. Fired by the wild preaching of fanatics and burning with a desire to avenge the sufferings of the pilgrims at the Holy Land shrine, under the banner of the cross, raised by a designing papacy, the best blood of Europe went forth, to perish on a long and dangerous way or before the walls of the Holy Land. Estates were alienated in order to obtain funds for equipment and provision. Many of them came into the possession of the clergy. Others were purchased by wealthy members of the merchant class, who broke in upon the turbulent traditions and warlike habits of the feudal aristocracy by introducing elements of peace and thrift in connection with the holding of land. The greater lords, moreover, bought up the fiefs of their neighbors, or acquired the estates of their own vassals, thus becoming absolute owners and establishing a direct relation between themselves and their serfs. Through the diminution of the nobles and the increasing inequality in the division of land the aristocratic class as a whole was more and more weakened. At the close of the crusades the king was everywhere firmly seated on the throne; the fief had given place to the kingdom. From the nature of the case the monarchy, thus originating, was not to be absolute. Three elements, the clergy, the nobility, and the commons, the three estates, were to limit its prerogatives and modify its character. In the conflict and counter-attack of the three estates with the monarchy are to be traced, not only the development of equality of rights and civil liberties, but also the growth of that by which alone, in the commercial and political life of the present age, these can be guaranteed, which is a distinctive characteristic of modern times, representative government.

As the kingdom grew out of the massing of fiefs, there was of necessity a strong tendency toward disintegration into primitive elements. First of all, with the nobility, jealous of his power and eager to regain their former rights and independence, the king must struggle. Then, the church possessed vast estates, held by bishops, who had at heart not only the same interests as the nobility in resisting encroachments on the part of royalty, but also the furtherance of the designs of the powerful hierarchy to which they belonged. The inferior clergy, drawn from the masses, now supported the high ecclesiastics, now gave their influence to the side of the king. Thus the contest between crown and fiefs went on, the crown gradually gaining the supremacy.

In the primitive organization of the German tribe the popular assembly had been a marked feature. All public matters of importance were discussed in the meetings of the warriors and decided on by general vote. When the Germans became conquerors, this assembly was still retained. With the decline and extinction of allodial, or independent, proprietorship, however, it was reduced to a meeting of the barons together with their vassals for conference on matters of common concern. The functions of this feudal council were mainly judicial; there were also in some degree financial. According to feudal law a man must be tried by his peers, and judgment was valid only when rendered by several; while the principle that no financial burden could be imposed on the vassal without his consent was early established and jealously observed. As now a lord by successive incorporations of fiefs became king, he summoned the great landholders of his realm, temporal and ecclesiastical, to sit as a tribunal for the trial of high crimes and to discuss with him matters of special importance. This royal court and council in England, under the name of the Great Council, replaced the Anglo-Saxon Witan Agamót and survives in the House of Lords; in France, it found a direct outgrowth in the Parliament of Paris, the supreme judicial authority of the realm. Finally, when modified by the introduction of a new element, the commons, it formed the basis of the representative bodies of Europe.

Modern civilization is characterized by a marked tendency

nite upper and lower classes in a compact national society. Abrogation of special privileges and the upbuilding of the nation as a politically homogeneous body has been brought about through a series of revolutions, the first of which was enfranchisement of the mercantile class of the towns. The rise of free cities is one of the most significant facts connected with the decline of feudalism. Although none of the old cities had escaped the condition of vassalage, in southern Europe the traditions and institutions of the Roman municipal system with its local government still remained, while in the north the Teutonic boroughs kept alive the sparks of independence. The cities furnished places of refuge to wanderers, as well as to serfs who were fleeing from cruel masters. During the period of the Crusades, with the revival of commerce in the south and with the development of trade and industry in the north they rapidly increased in prosperity and influence. Long kings and nobles for the sake of money gladly granted them immunities and privileges, while the independent cities, resulting alike from their local institutions and the social necessity and political coöperation within their walls, asserted their rights at every opportunity. Leagues even for mutual defence were formed in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany.

Thus the cities came to hold the balance of power between king and the aristocracy. In Italy they entered into alliance with the Papal power, giving to it a supremacy there that has been entirely shaken off only within the present generation.

In Spain the towns were early brought into prominence through conflict with the Moors; for against the Moslem horde a noble, single-handed, could not prevail. United efforts in a stronger place of defence than the feudal castle were necessary. As early as the eleventh century charters containing liberal provisions began to be granted in Spain; later in France, England, and other countries from one cause or another cities gained recognition and confirmation of their rights from lords and kings.

The next step in the rise of the cities was their admission to the feudal court and council of the kingdom, to which reference has already been made. Kings were always involved in wars either to maintain or to increase their power. Then, too,

the increasing splendor and luxury of court life rendered necessary continually greater expenditures. For a time these drains upon the royal treasury were met by the revenues from the royal domain, or fief, and by various makeshifts. Charters of security were sold to towns and grants were obtained from them for services of defence. Loans were negotiated with rich men, principally Jews, who were somehow disposed of before the day of payment. Confiscations of property were made, whenever possible, on the slightest pretexts.

But the day came when all means previously tried to provide for the expenses of the court were found inadequate. With the crystallization into nationalities the position of the kings became more clearly defined. What so natural as to appeal to the nation for aid? Indeed, what else could be done? What plea so effective as the good of all? Here in a nutshell we have the immediate cause of the early representative assemblies of Europe. Monarchy was now a substance, no longer a shadow, of power; the nation a concrete thing, no longer a vague generalization. Yet what cared the king for the people? Very little. Surely he would not convoke an assembly of the nation to share his power if not obliged to. Equally true is it that the nation had not unity enough to institute a national body without convocation from some recognized authority.

The king, then, forced to beg for money called an assembly of the nation. How? He had a great council of barons and ecclesiastics, the origin of which we have found in feudalism. To this he invited the rich towns to come, ostensibly to aid by advice, really to give generous grants on the presentation of the needs of the realm and of the king as its protector. The old feudal assembly of peers had been the king's high court and council; the assembly of the three orders now became his bank.

But avaricious clergy, proud nobles, and thrifty townsmen were not going to give of their wealth to this new authority, the crown, for nothing. What rights indeed had they that this unscrupulous growing power was bound to recognize? What guaranties that would insure them security in case it should rise superior to them or in case its might should equal

pretensions? None whatever. In just this, however, the monarch had the advantage. According to feudal usage no burthen could be laid upon a subject without his consent; the monarch must have money, the nation alone could furnish it. "I want funds," said the king to the three orders. "Give us securities against the invasion of our rights and you shall have them," said the three orders to the monarchy. Rhetoric aside, the growth of liberties in the European States was really a matter of barter,—mere bargain and sale. It was the interest of the king to yield as little and get as much in return as possible; that of the people, to give as little and gain as much as they could. Liberty in the abstract has slight influence over men's minds. Specific immunities, specific guarantees—these are what the national assemblies bargained for in exchange for grants.

Thus the third estate, or commons, representing the free men, gained a seat in the feudal council, which by this enlargement became properly a national assembly. Owing to their union with the representatives of the towns as a body rose rapidly in influence, ere long holding the balance of power in the monarchy. The commons became the determinative element in European politics. In England they sided with the nobility, in France with the king—a coalition of elements that decided the future history of those countries. The peasant population, gradually freed from serfdom, except in Germany had no voice directly in the national assembly; they were in theory at least, represented by the nobles on whose lands they lived. Yet here we have a body of recognized standing and influence, representing, though imperfectly, the whole nation, and from the condition of things able to act as a counterpoise of the monarchy, to bargain with it, to fix limitations upon it. In this we have the origin of that group of institutions to which belonged the English Parliament, the German Diet, the Parliaments of Scotland and Sardinia, the Estates of Denmark, of Sweden and of Norway, the States General of France and of Holland, the Cortes of Aragon and Castile, and the representative bodies of the Italian States. These were all the outgrowth of like conditions, all attempts at the realization of the same ends; yet how different the vicissi-

tudes through which they passed, how different the destinies allotted to them! In England the people, favored by many circumstances, had pluck and persistency enough to force the monarchy to keep its promises. This abuse done away with, that cause of oppression removed, this wrong righted, that right recognized and its maintenance guaranteed—the sum of concessions such as these gained by the parliament from the crown in the periods of its need or weakness in time made up a well-rounded and secure and liberal constitution. In France and in other countries the people from various causes did not compel the crown to keep its faith with them, and the national assemblies after a beginning of so much promise lost ground, finally sinking into forgetfulness or lingering on in an enfeebled condition. Yet who can estimate the influence they had for good in giving even an incomplete embodiment to ideas of rights that were beginning to awaken in men's minds? They formed a basis of reality for traditions of freedom, which later ages were to see revived and enlarged upon and realized in concrete form.

Modern free institutions, then, have their roots deep in the soil of the past. The remote origin of our liberties is to be found in the freedom and loyalty of the early Germans. These gave the impulse, the outworking of which lies at the basis of all that is fairest and best in the constitutions of the civilized nations of to-day. Yet behind all political and social movements there has been another potent and deepening influence in favor of popular rights—the influence of Christianity.

Men have sought in the Bible to find support for the most diverse political theories. The divine right of kings, liberty, equality, fraternity, and even communism, have not neglected to strengthen their claims to acceptance by texts from the New Testament. But Christ came not to found a temporal kingdom; his teachings were moral and spiritual. These were to influence political society, not through precepts on the State, but by regenerating the hearts and quickening the consciences and purifying the lives of men. Stoicism had grasped at the thought of the oneness of humanity, and pagan antiquity had risen to the generalization that by natural law men are free. Rome, moreover, with harsh hand of conquest reduced the

to an outward, political unity. But Christianity taught all men are brothers. By the doctrine of sin it brought all to the same level, while by the doctrine of a Saviour it built spiritual unity through Christ. While other faiths are local, Christianity is truly catholic, and from the first emphasized its mission as the religion of mankind. It inculcated equality, love, mercy; and enforced equality before a higher power. Starting in the lowest ranks of society, its progress was gradual but firm, and ere long crowned heads bowed in submission to its decrees.

Not only did the teachings of Christianity thus promote directly the development of popular rights, but also the exponents of it made direct application of the doctrines to political facts. At a time when Europe was quaking with political convulsions, Thomas Aquinas declared that government belongs to the domain of human regulation; that therefore the right to make laws belongs to the people, and that in a good government all must have a share. St. Bonaventura preached the duty of resistance, and maintained that political power ought to be unlimited. True, indeed, the Church herself, adopting the traditions of the Roman Empire, sought supremacy in both the temporal as well as spiritual, and many utterances of her representatives had no other aim than to prepare the way for papal usurpation; yet none the less did she help to mold public opinion in favor of the rights of the people: and we must not forget that it was on the estates of the Church that the seeds of mediæval Europe first began to be set free.

The organization of the Church, moreover, was founded in the principles of freedom. At first the voice of the people was heard in all matters connected with ecclesiastical discipline and government. It was from the lower orders of society that the ranks of the priesthood were mainly recruited, and promotion in offices was through merit. By the institution of councils the Church furnished the type of a representative body, and foreshadowed the most stable form of national political organization.

Thus Christianity, while elevating men through character and life, has done more to advance the cause of civil rights than any other agency. While we grant to the Germanic race the

high honor of having been commissioned by Providence to work out in its institutions and to transmit to humanity the idea of individual liberty, to Christianity the world is indebted for giving to this principle of freedom the highest impulse to development, a rational basis, and a principle of control. Tried at the bar of the Teutonic conscience the religion of peace said to the bold, liberty-loving warrior,—“Love thy neighbor as thyself.” Christianity checked the bold spirit of independence by a regard for the rights of others; and in the two elements is laid the foundation of stable, free institutions.

CH. IV.—THE CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT AND THE CHARTER OF YALE COLLEGE.

II.

HERE remain the anonymous pamphlets, which cannot be
erred as heavy artillery. The guns came too late into
ld, and are old and rusty and were long ago condemned.
necessary to understand the situation. Two measures of
ent Clap's administration caused much irritation. One
ne formation of a college-church and congregation or re-
society in the college. This Dr. Woolsey thinks has
l wise and it agreed with the practice in Harvard and
ritish universities, and such church and congregation
been continued ever since. The other measure was un-
That was an order of the corporation, that the Rev. Mr.
one of the fellows and pastor of the first church in
Haven, appear and be examined by them, for the purpose
niring into the soundness of his faith. This order Mr.
resisted and refused to submit to, and the proceeding
andoned. The corporation has no right to remove a
er for his opinions. It has the right, for unfaithfulness
trust, "for any misdemeanor, unfaithfulness default or
city." The law deals with acts and failures or inability
not with opinions. The power has never needed to be
s never been exercised.

1753 the General Assembly resolved, that to "one princi-
d in erecting the college," it was requisite that the stu-
"should have the best instruction in divinity, and the
atterns of preaching set before them. And that the set-
of a learned, pious and orthodox professor of divinity in
llege would greatly tend to promote that good end." At
quest of the corporation President Clap performed the
of a professor of divinity until a professsor should be
ed, preaching in the college hall on Sunday, and the
ent and the students were withdrawn from attendance on
service at the first church in New Haven, under the

charge of the Rev. Mr. Noyes. In 1754 President Clap published his tract on "The Religious Constitution of Colleges," mainly or in a great measure to vindicate this formation of a separate religious society in the college. In 1755, Rev. Naphtali Daggett, afterwards president, was selectd as professor of divinity, and the next year was inducted into office. Soon after the church members in college were formed into a college church.

President Stiles says, the resolute, firm, unyielding character of President Clap "rendered the latter part of his presidency uncomfortable." Dr. Woolsey states that "a cloud came over the latter years of President Clap's collegiate life, in consequence of enmity to the government of the college without its walls, and insubordination within." "He felt alarmed lest the old land-marks should be removed. He therefore strove to guard the college from the intrusion of what he conceived to be error by making it a separate religious society, and by subjecting its fellows and instructors to a more rigorous test. This circumstance, together with a certain inflexibility of purpose and a rigor in administration . . . exposed him to much obloquy without the college, from a party who seem to have industriously fomented disorders within its walls." He resigned his office in July, 1766, and died in the January following. "President Clap's administration," says Dr. Woolsey, "was marked by a gradual growth and improvement in the college. Its number of students amounted at the close of his office to one hundred and seventy. New buildings were erected, which still subsist. [Of these were South Middle College, the best building in the colony," "*ædes hæc nitida et splendida, Aula Connecticuttensis*," being named, and the oldest chapel then with a steeple, afterwards the Atheneum.] Some additions were made to the permanent funds. The laws were remodeled. The "charter was amended and improved" (Woolsey's *Hist. Dis.* 28, 29, 30, 114; 2 Trumbull, 327, 518, 519, 522, as to the pamphlet war and Dr. Gale).

A few years after (after and not before) the act of 1745, or forty years before the act of 1792 (which would be in 1752), it is said, a movement began for the introduction of laymen into the corporation, and was almost continuous during that period.

erty slow movement! If its force may be judged from its progress, it must have been for a long time feeble. The difficulty was that while the plan finally adopted of an alliance with the State by the addition of the governor and lieutenant-governor, and six senior assistants, civilians of mature experience to the corporation, was wise, and might much earlier have been wisely adopted, that on the one hand attempts were made to introduce laymen, in violation of the charter and the rights of the college, and on the other hand there was for a long time a want of the spirit of conciliation and a disposition to rest contentedly on the chartered rights of the college. Attacks tended to produce at least passive resistance.

To prevent misapprehension it may be well to quote what the late Prof. Kingsley has said as to the state of religious opinion in the colony as late as the American Revolution: "who had separated from the Congregationalists were, at that time, but a small proportion of the population" (*Kingsley's Hist. Dis.*, Note I).

We are not much in the habit of reading pamphlets to which writers do not venture to give the voucher of their names. They may make history picturesque but often render it less authentic. In 1755 an anonymous pamphlet was published, attributed to Dr. Benjamin Gale, an eccentric and disputatious physician of Killingworth, Connecticut, unfriendly to the government of the college, and, as alleged, to the faith of the founders. It appears that it is stated in this pamphlet that at the election of President Clap as rector, in 1739, several of the trustees voted for a layman, Daniel Edwards, of the class of 1736.

If this were so the college records are the proper evidence of it, but show no trace of it.

It does not appear to be stated who the trustees were, nor of them who so voted, or from whom the information was derived, or whether it was derived from report. It is not probable that Dr. Gale had or could have any personal knowledge of the subject. The amount of it all is that sixteen years after the election, Dr. Gale says anonymously, that he has heard that at that election several votes were cast for Mr. Edwards. It is also stated that Dr. Gale was related by marriage to Jared Elliot, a Quaker, having married his daughter, and that Mr. Elliot pro-

bably gave the information. Why then does not Dr. Gale say so, or that he was so informed by a trustee? There is not the least reason on which to rest a legal argument, to suppose that Mr. Elliot informed Dr. Gale. It might suit the writer's purpose not to inquire, or he might be satisfied with the information or report he had heard. Upon the smallest motion in court would a lawyer state as evidence that his client had heard from somebody that an alleged fact was true, and that the client was nearly related by marriage to somebody who must know whether it was true or not? But it is added that the statement was not contradicted. Neither does it appear to have been confirmed. The college records do not confirm it, nor the trustees, who are supposed to have so voted, nor any of them, nor their associate trustees, nor Mr. Edwards, nor President Clap, who wrote a history of the college, covering that period. Why should the statement, if erroneous, be contradicted? Of what importance would it seem at that time, or is it? President Clap had undoubtedly been elected, and for sixteen years had been in office, his possession of which had been confirmed by an act of the General Assembly. The triennial catalogue mentions that Mr. Edwards was three years a tutor, and eight years a steward (dispensator) in college, his term in the last office terminating three years before the election referred to, and that he was a judge of the Superior Colonial Court. But it would not be fair to infer that pleasant recollections or pleasant anticipations connected with his relation to the last office he filled in college, procured several votes for him.

In the same pamphlet, the writer says, "I take it for granted," I assume, "that there is nothing in the nature of Yale College or their charter," by which he must mean the act of 1745, "which restrains the trustees," he calls the fellows trustees, "in their choice of a president to the priestly order." He also says, "the present governors of our college may be succeeded by laymen, if it shall so please that venerable body to fill up vacancies, as they shall fall; for there is nothing in the charter that determines they must be men in holy orders." These are mere assertions, anonymously made, not when the act of 1745 was passed, but ten years after its pass-

When a controversy had arisen with President Clap or his

But two years later, in 1757, another anonymous pamphlet published which has been attributed to the Rev. Wm. of Saybrook. In this he says: "The president is a minister but he does not preside there in the character of a minister. . . . The fellows and overseers of the college are members of the church. But they don't take the oversight and direction of the college upon themselves by virtue of their office as ministers but by virtue of a civil appointment and authority decreed to them by the charter of the Government. And there is no one act peculiar to their office as trustees or fellows (the words are again used synonymously), which a minister might not perform with as much propriety, etc. There is nothing in the nature of the office, which confines it to ministers; nor in the charter of the Assembly, by which the college is incorporated and invested with all its powers," that is the act of 1745. Our argument has not claimed, we do not now that any one has claimed, that that act confines the office to clergymen, or absurdly that a person becomes a president or fellow by being a minister. The offices are held under the charter of a civil government, but neither the president nor fellows are civil or public officers. Nothing is said of the power of choosing laymen or others residing out of the colony, or young men under thirty years of age. These pamphlets were first addressed to individuals, the latter being entitled "Answer to a Friend, etc.," and the subject "Mr. Noyes' Proposition Examined by the Corporation of Yale College," and the former, "Reply to a pamphlet, entitled 'The Answer of the College in the West,' " etc.

Now it is said, that these assertions, in those anonymous pamphlets, really written by two graduates of the college, that no man might be elected president or fellows by the corporation were allowed to pass in silence, by pamphlets on the other side of the controversies, which drew them forth, that is of course so far as such pamphlets have been preserved, collected, examined, and that this is convincing proof that the assertions were admitted to be true, and that they show the opinion of the alumni and the public, when the charter was granted

A pretty large conclusion from very small premises! If P. Baldwin's paper, not anonymous but by a lawyer of reputation (without its acknowledgments of traditional belief, etc.) was followed two years later by another gentleman on the same side, and no reply were made or none preserved a hundred or a hundred and twenty years, would these papers be convincing proof of the present opinion of the alumni and the public, or, to make the cases more nearly parallel, of that opinion or twelve years ago?

Suppose that these assertions of this physician and clergyman as to the law were not "denied and denounced." They were not of sufficient importance. Whether the pamphlet went to the root or the branches, the rind or the core of arguments of President Clap and his supporters is unimportant. The support of President Clap and his doctrine, that "Colleges are societies of ministers for training up persons for the work of the ministry," and that the primary design of all colleges is to educate ministers of religion, do not concern us. If he were living at this time, he might see ample cause for changing his opinions. If the opposition of views prove anything relevant, it is that President Clap in drawing the bill for the act in question and procuring it to be adopted by the corporation, presented and enacted, did not have the views and purposes of the writers. When were the corporation of Yale College or its members or officers in the habit of denying in print erroneous statements concerning it? The corporation gave a practical answer to these assertions by paying no heed to them and continuing to supply vacancies in conformity with the charter from resident ministers of the gospel of the required age. Twenty-eight of such vacancies were so supplied between 1745 and 1792. The new members concurred with the old as to their duty and did not vary from it in a single instance. Some ten years before the latter year, and at least before 1784, when the introduction of laymen into the corporation was becoming a practical subject, it is admitted that the duty of supplying vacancies as practiced by the corporation was publicly asserted.

In 1761 an attempt was made to subject the college completely to political control. A memorial, signed by three

was presented to the General Assembly, representing the disorders in the college, the arbitrary powers of the faculty, the dislike of the students to their governors, and asking the General Assembly to exercise the powers of a visitor of the college. Nothing was done. In 1763 a more determined effort was made. A memorial, the signers having increased to nine, was presented, claiming that the General Assembly were the governors of the college and entitled to the right of visitation, asking that a right of appeal should be granted from every sentence and judgment of the corporation or faculty to the governor and council, who were all annually chosen, a measure which would have been destructive of the discipline of the college and taken its control from the faculty and corporation, praying that the General Assembly would appoint a commission to inquire into the affairs of the college and either to correct abuses themselves or report the facts, with their opinions, to the General Assembly at its next session. The subject was argued before the General Assembly by William Samuel Johnson, afterwards president of Columbia College, and Jared Ingersoll, Esq., two distinguished lawyers, graduates of the college, for the memorialists, and by President Clap for the college and against the alleged right of visitation, in an argument which has received high commendation from Chancellor Kent and was highly praised by the lawyers whom we have mentioned. The application was signally defeated and the like has never since been made. (Woolsey's *Hist. Dis.*, 30, 114; E. Baldwin's *Annals*, 76.) The point to be decided was not in whom was the right of visitation, if there was such right, but was it in the General Assembly? Whether the right was in the heirs or successors of the founders or the trustees should be considered as the founders or they and their successors as the true representatives of the donors (Dartmouth College case, *supra*, Ang. and Ames on Corporations, sec. 687), whether the right was merged or vested or extinguished in the trustee or corporation by the charter, or incorporation, in all these cases, and in every case the Legislature was and is excluded from the right claimed.

In 1784 a third anonymous pamphlet was published, attributed to a young graduate, nine years out of college at a time

then present fellows and their successors the same right to fill vacancies (it being well understood what that right was claimed by them to be), as if the act had not passed, and after the usage of more than one hundred and thirty years has settled the construction of the act of 1745, the opinion is revived, and comes with the freshness of a discovery or rediscovery. But what have the pamphlets to do with the determination of the meaning and construction of that act? Nothing. Of what importance are they to the question discussed? In our judgment of none, but out of respect to the jurist who has cited them, we have carefully examined his statement of them and the citations made from them. The same may be said of the importance and effect of the suggestion made to President Stiles by Governor Trumbull, a graduate of Harvard College, of which college both the Governors Trumbull were graduates. The source of the suggestion entitled it to high respect, which it probably received. The interview with Dr. Stiles, in which the suggestion was made, was in the autumn of 1777, after his election to the office of president, but before he had signified his acceptance of the office, which he did not signify until the following spring, and he was not inaugurated until the following July, so that on the part of the college the interview had no official significance or character.

Upon the resignation of President Clap, Dr. Naphtali Daggett, the professor of Divinity, was elected president pro tempore, and remained such for eleven years, as Rector Andrew had been elected rector pro tempore and remained such for some twelve years, each holding his office by this precarious title longer than any one has that of President of the United States. The advocacy of the cause of the memorialists in the time of President Clap by distinguished lawyers, though professional and though it might not have been so intended, tended to spread to some extent dissatisfaction but without any immediate result. The grant of the annual sum of one hundred pounds in the act of 1745 was paid for ten years, and payment was then suspended, but not on account of dissatisfaction with the college. It was punctually paid, says Dr. Trumbull, "until the French wars and the heavy taxes and burdens it occasioned." (2 Trumbull, 310.) In the war, inclu-

the conquest of Canada, the colony of Connecticut took an important part. The burdens lasted beyond the war and losses were heavy. Dr. Stiles, president elect, was desirous the College should be enlarged and the difference with the dissatisfied persons composed. To such enlargement legislative grants were necessary. Some of the friends of the College were in favor of an alliance with the State and the corporation was not indisposed to it. In May, 1778, a committee of the corporation met a committee of the legislature, who proposed without altering the charter, the college should be endowed in the library, apparatus, and professorships, only that the legislature should have a voice in concurrence with the corporation in appointing professors supported by the State. This was inadmissible. It was contrary to both the original charter and the act of 1745, and required a submission of the literary and scientific qualifications of candidates for professors to a popular, political assembly annually chosen. It does not appear that either committee accorded with the suggestion of Governor Trumbull, or proposed the measure contained in it or anything similar. That suggestion made in the previous year to Dr. Stiles, in conversation, was "to engage the assembly, not the charter to be changed but four civilians to be chosen into the next vacancies in the corporation." Stiles' *History*, vol. viii., page 109. Such a measure was not likely to please either party. It was contrary to the settled construction of the charter and the act of 1745 by the corporation. It did not effect an alliance of the State with the college. It would be slow and uncertain in its operation and could not be secured and perpetuated, except by a legislative act, which would alter the charter in this respect. The words to "engage the assembly, not the charter to be changed but" etc., which are not clear, may refer to such an act and no alteration of the charter but in this particular. Legislative grants, which must be by act, could hardly be expected but on some such basis. The governor was plainly looking not at legal questions but after a compromise. "Nothing short," he thought, "would effect a radical healing and satisfaction." The words as to the measure proposed, which were not those of the governor, but of Stiles, imply that the thing was feasible, but how? There

was to be some joint action, some agreement of the corporation and general assembly. The governor's off-hand suggestion does not appear to have any particular weight, as an authority on the question considered. The projects failed. It was not time for liberal legislative grants. The revolutionary troubles were on the people and a time of exhaustion, depression, and depreciated currency succeeded the war. But the adoption of the Federal Constitution and the organization of the government under it were like the rising of the full-orbed sun on the country, and the act of 1792 was passed. Under that and the supplementary act of 1796, the college received, according to report to the legislature in 1822, \$40,629.80. Out of this sum South College was built and the rest of the money was appropriated by the former act to the support of professorships.

In all this history, what is plainer than the steady and tenacious adherence of the corporation to the construction of the charter and the act of 1745, which we have maintained, and the usage founded on it, and continued to the present time. What reason is there to doubt that the corporation had in the support of the great body of its graduates and of the General Assembly? What act or resolve is shown to the contrary?

Of the opinion of President Stiles there would seem to be no doubt. Of the act of 1792 he wrote shortly after its passage: "A noble condescension, beyond all expectation! Especially that the civilians acquiesce in being a minority in the corporation." This implies that in the corporation, as fixed by the act of 1792, the majority were not civilians but clerical. Again he says: "The corporation . . . judged that there was no prospect perhaps for a century that the civilians would feel disposed to try another demand upon the corporation to augment the number of civilians into a majority, and that before that time probably . . . the very civilians themselves would not be disposed to enterprise such a project, that on the whole the prospect was that this proportion of civilians and ministers would be lasting" (Stiles' *Diary*, vol. xiv. 279, 200). The corporation therefore understood that under the act the proportion of ministers of the gospel to civilians was eleven to eight, and that the prospect was that it would be lasting, that there would be no demand for change in this respect. That proportion has remained ever since.

King vs. Trelawney, 3 Burr, 1615, Lord Mansfield refused application for an information in the nature of *quo warranto*, which was sought on the ground that two offices of a corporation held by a person against whom it was sought, were incompatible, saying that the offices had been held together one hundred years back, and were not incompatible. Justice Wilmot agreed with him, and had no doubt. Buller J., commenting on that case, says: "There the persons who applied for the information had been acting under an usage for 100 years before, and it is a decisive answer to such applications that if the parties have been acting under an usage the court will not suffer them to object to it" (*Milward vs. Thatcher*, 2 B. & R. 88). Other authorities on the subject of usage will be found in our former Article.

Assuming as sufficiently proved that the fellows are within the unrevoked provision of the charter, that the trustees and their successors shall be ministers of the gospel, residing within the colony, and of the age, according to the amendment of the charter, of thirty years, and that this conclusion is not disturbed by old pamphlets or long buried controversies, reappearing like specters, let us look at the special case of the president. It is clear that he is not a trustee and is not a fellow. He is not a member of the corporation by that name. But as a member of the corporation he has all the rights of any other member, and in addition those of the presiding officer. He participates in all corporate acts. That he is the principal and chief officer of the corporation, does not alter in the least his rights and duties as one of the corporation. He is certainly a trustee. As a member of the corporation he does not act for his own benefit, but for the benefit of the college; together with his fellow members he manages its affairs and administers its property, not for his but for the benefit. Even the directors of a moneyed or other joint stock corporation are held to be trustees (*Robinson vs. Smith*, 3 B. & R. 222; *Cunningham vs. Pell*, 5 Id. 607; *Karnes vs. Rochester & Genesee Valley R. R. Co.*, 4 Abbott's [N. Y.] R. N. S.

It is said that the office of the rector was to teach; that of the president is to govern. What reason is there for saying or implying that the office of the rector was not to govern? The

name implies otherwise. The rector or master of every school or seminary, collegiate or otherwise, governs as well as teaches.* When President Clap was inducted into office, the moderator in behalf of the trustees "committed the care of instructing and governing the college to the rector" (Baldwin's Annals, p. 53). The charter of Dartmouth College in 1769 appointed "Eleazer Wheelock . . . the founder of said college, to be president of said Dartmouth College, and to have the immediate care of the education and government of such students as shall be admitted into said Dartmouth College for instruction and education," and authorized the trustees "to appoint so many tutors and professors to *assist the president in the education and government* of the students belonging thereto, as they the said trustees shall from time to time think needful and serviceable for the interests of Dartmouth College." The charter of Columbia College, granted in 1754, appoints Samuel Johnson "to be the first and present president of the said college . . . and [we] do will that he and the president for the time being after him . . . shall have the immediate care of the education and government of the students that shall be sent to and admitted into the said college for instruction and education." The governors of the college are authorized "to elect one or more fellow or fellows, professor or professors *to assist the president* of the said college *in the education and government* of the students." These charters are not far from being contemporaneous with the act of 1745, and do not give to the office of president the character attributed to it. The charter of William and Mary College granted in 1693, which provides for a chancellor, elected for seven years, and a rector, elected yearly, and classes the president with the professors and tutors, the actual corps of instruction; lends no countenance to the opinion. Nathaniel Eaton, the first principal of Harvard College, was called master or professor. In 1640 Mr. Henry Dunster was placed over the institution, with the title of president. In an account from the colonists, published in London in 1643, it is said: "Over the college is Master Dunster, placed as president, a learned man,

* Memor

Actæ non alio rege puertiæ

Mutatæque simul togæ.

(Horace, Odes, Book 1, ode 36.)

hath so trained up his pupils in the tongues and arts, etc." (see's Hist. of Harvard University, Appendix No. 1). Mr. [unclear] was named as president in the charter of 1650. Every president of Harvard College, it is believed, has taught down to President Elliot, whose example in this respect is not entirely unimpeachable. It only proves that the present president of Harvard does not choose and is not required to teach. The charter of Queen's College in New Jersey, granted in 1770, provides that the trustees may elect and appoint such qualified person, being a member of the Dutch Reformed Church, as they think fit to be the president of the said college, and to have the immediate care of the education and government of such students as shall be sent" to it. The distinction stated between the office of the rector and that of the president, does not appear to exist.

At the time of the passage of the act of 1723 no rector was elected. No rector became a trustee by the mere force of the act. In the interregnum, as it has been called, after the resignation of Rector Cutler, certain of the trustees acted as monthly rectors, then in 1724 Mr. Andrew, who was already a trustee, was again chosen rector *pro tempore* and served three years. "Rector Williams, who entered upon his office in 1726, did not take his seat among the trustees until 1728—. . . In the year named, one of the trustees having died, the rector resigned and by express vote was admitted to the seat," that is the vacancy (Woolsey's *Hist. Dis.*, 10, 103). Thus he succeeded to, became the successor of one of the trustees, who had previously elected him to be rector and trustee. The act of 1723, Rector Clap, as well as each of his co-trustees, is expressly declared by the act of 1745 to be a successor of the original trustees. Thus after the act of 1723 not only the permanent rectors, but the rector *pro tempore* and the monthly rectors were all previously trustees or were the successors of trustees and resident ministers of the gospel. Those who were elected but did not accept the office were also ministers. Dr. Woolsey says, that the reason of the delay of Rector Williams in taking his seat among the trustees "appears to have been that the board of trustees was already full and that the act of 1723, which was not intended to be in conflict with the original

charter or to alter it," that is, to enlarge the number of the trustees or to alter the limitation, "could not go into effect." These facts tend very strongly to show, that after that act the rector was one of the successors of the first trustees and within the provision in question, which was confessedly then in force.

The office of president did not exist at the time at which the charter was granted, nor at the first organization of the college, as did not the State of Connecticut, the Constitution of the United States, or a rector, who it was declared by statute should be a trustee. But this is aside from the question. The charter itself supposes, that there may be change in the administration of the college and the designation of the principal. By it the trustees have power "to direct, manage, order, etc., from time to time and in all times hereafter the said collegiate school . . . in such ways, orders, and manner, by such persons, rector or master and other officers, appointed by them, as shall according to their best discretion be most conducive to attain the aforesaid mentioned end thereof." The grant of the charter is to the trustees named "and their successors" to "the before named trustees, etc., together with such persons as they shall associate to themselves, not exceeding, etc." The precise question is: Is the president one of the successors of the trustees, and as such subject to the limitation in the charter within its true intent and substantial meaning? We have shown the fellows to be such successors and within such limitation. Rector Clap was such a successor, when he was "established as present president." Did he thereby cease to be such successor? There should be some evidence of this, and also that the line of succession terminated with him. Under the act of 1745 as a member of the corporation the president joins with the fellows in corporate acts; he unites with them in supplying the vacancies in their number and they supply the vacancy in his office. If they are within the provision of the charter, it is difficult to discriminate his case from theirs, unless something decidedly inconsistent with their classification together be shown.

In our former Article we have mentioned some things to be considered in determining whether the president is within the provision or not. We will mention some others. First, the

maxim, *noscitur a sociis*, which applies to both persons and things, the association being deemed to manifest, that a common character is impressed on them (*Aiken vs. Wasson*, 1 N. Y., 482, 484; *Coffin vs. Reynolds*, 37 N. Y., 640, 644; *Gray vs. Jenkins*, 3 Sandf. [N. Y.] Superior R., 409, 413; *Dusen vs. Charter Oak F. & M. Ins. Co.*, 1 Abbott's [N. Y.] R., 349). Under the act of 1745, the president is known as fellows. The words president and fellows (*socii*) mean president and his associates and nothing more. Not only are they associated with him in that act but also in the reservation made in the act of 1792, that in case of any vacancy in their office "such vacancy shall be supplied by them and their successors in the same manner as if this act had never existed," and is, in pursuance of the previous act in conjunction with the president, and also in the provision of the act of 1838, relating in order to a quorum, that "there be present a majority of those who are by election successors to the original trustees."

The president is classified with that part of the corporation which consists of ministers of the gospel, and participates in their peculiar privileges. The natural and fair inference would seem to be that he has a similar character. There is a great force in this association. With them he is for these purposes separated from that part of the corporation, which consists of civilians, and participates in duties, from which civilians are excluded. If he may be a layman, why is he is a layman is he not also excluded?

Main, the object of the founders of the charter was to establish a Protestant Christian college. To secure this object ministers of the gospel were designated to organize and manage the college, and it was provided that any increase of their number and their successors, should be ministers of the gospel. This intent extended to each of such successors. So that there should be any deviation from this arrangement, the college and the security would fail. In 1792 eight civilians were added, leaving the members of the existing corporation and their successors in the proportion of eleven to eight, or with a majority of three, as has been the case to the present time. It was supposed probably to secure sufficiently the object of the charter which has been mentioned. In all subsequent legis-

lation the like majority has been preserved. But if the president might be and were a civilian, the proportion would be changed to that of ten to nine, with the narrow or accidental majority of one, which might be lost by a vacancy, incapacity or absence from sickness or other necessary cause. The question arises, was such a majority as this intended or was it willingly accepted by the corporation? Was it at such a majority that President Stiles according to his ardent nature exulted? Or did the legislature, the president, and the corporation understand that the President being required as one of the successors of the trustees to be a minister, that the effect of the act was far otherwise? We do not intimate that the interests of the clerical and lay members are not the same. We have never heard of any collision between them. A year or two ago we were told by a member of the corporation that he had been a member for twenty-five years (it may have been a little less), and that during that time there had been no collision between them. (See also the *New Englander* for 1881, p. 100. Dr. Bacon's Article.)

Again, the times being considered and the claims or pretensions of the clergy and their place in public estimation at that time, how far is it probable that the clerical corporation, their clerical rector proposed and the legislature authorized that through the office of president a single layman might be introduced into the clerical board and as their presiding officer and the head of the corporation? Would not this have been thought unwise and incongruous and without proper object? These considerations confirm the opinion, that the president is one of the successors of the original trustees and within the provision in the charter, as to the qualifications of trustees, has not been taken out or intended to be taken out of that provision by any legislation.

But on the other hand, it is said and said truly, that the practice, which we do not intend to controvert, of the trustees or corporation, has been in repeated instances to choose persons as rector or president, who were not at the time residents of the colony or State, or ordained ministers of the gospel. Thus the Rev. Mr. Wigglesworth of Cambridge, Mass., was elected as rector in 1724, but declined the office. President Stiles

ed as president when he was temporarily resident in New
 pshire, because Newport, Rhode Island, where he was pas-
 f a church, was in the possession of the enemy (Woolsey's
Dis., 27, 33), and Drs. Day and Woolsey were elected
 dent when they were not ordained ministers of the gospel.
 inferred and not unfairly, that according to this practice a
 n may be chosen president, who is at his election a lay-
 and not a minister of the gospel.

at this is not a complete statement of the practice. Every
 n who is chosen president is by the corporation inducted
 his office and formally invested with it, and until such
 ction and investiture, the transaction of his appointment is
 completed. Every rector and president has been at the
 of his admission to office or association as a member of
 corporation, a resident minister of the gospel.

he previous residence of the president is unimportant, and
 ticular length of time, during which he has been a minister
 e gospel, is not essential to the object of the provision in
 charter. That enacts that the trustees named "together
 such others as they shall associate to themselves (not
 ding, etc., provided also that persons so nominated or
 iated from time to time to fill up said number, be minis-
 of the gospel," etc.), shall have the liberty and power con-
 d by the charter. The right granted is to "associate," the
 ation is that the person "associated" as trustee shall have
 pecified qualifications. Such has been the construction.

he question arose early as to trustees. Messrs. Woodbridge
 Buckingham, two of the trustees, with their party, in 1717
 nstrated to the General Assembly against the votes by
 n in April of that year and in the previous October the
 ees had removed the college to New Haven, and alleged
 a majority of the whole number of trustees had not voted
 he removal, and that Thomas Ruggles, who as trustee had
 oted, was not of the age of forty years when he was chosen
 ee, as required by the charter. The trustees replied that
 . Ruggles was not forty years old at the time of the nomi-
 n, he had arrived at that age at the time of their meeting
 the vote was taken; that the trustees in conformity to
 previous nomination admitting him to sit and act, had

associated him according to their charter. That if neither Ruggles nor any one absent were counted, there was a majority of those present who voted for the removal. After a hearing the upper house resolved: "That the objections against the vote of the trustees were insufficient." The lower house after a long hearing passed no resolution on the subject. Thus the remonstrants failed. (2 Trumbull, 25, 26.) This result is not decisive of the opinion of the General Assembly, as to Ruggles, as the last reason assigned by the trustees was sufficient to uphold their action, there having been a quorum and a majority of the whole number of trustees present, but it is decisive as to the opinion of the trustees at that early period as to the construction of the charter. This construction has since been followed or adopted as to the president. The course taken by the corporation in regard to Drs. Day and Woolsey and that taken by those gentlemen were undoubtedly upon careful deliberation and advice and carry a great weight of authority. The act of 1723 provides for supplying vacancies in the office of trustees, "who have been chosen and acted as trustees." It may be inferred that then only was the office considered filled. It would be to be regretted, in the changed circumstances of the country especially, if the presidency, for which the best learning and ability and executive talent are required, were restricted to those who previous to becoming president had resided in Connecticut. We think that the provision should be applied in no such narrow sense but according to substantial intent and purpose and the nature of the office. On the whole, the unbroken usage that the person selected as rector or president should at the time of his becoming rector or president be of mature years (thirty), and reside in the State of Connecticut and be a minister of the gospel! seems controlling. *King vs. Trelawney*, *supra*, *Milward vs. Thacher*, *supra*, and other authorities as to usage cited by us.

If it should be considered that the provision in the charter or the act of 1745, construed in connection with that provision as still in force, requires that the candidate for president should have the necessary qualifications at the time of nomination or election, this would not prevent the application of the provision, but only affect the mode of application. If any practi-

erty should in any case occur upon that construction, it be overcome, as by a preliminary offer to elect upon alliance with the necessary conditions, and a formal election those conditions were fulfilled.

as, as the late Professor Kingsley has said: "The college left on the basis where its founders have placed it; the and vigilance of the president and fellows, especially in the vacancies in their own body and in the several offices instruction." He never could have conceived of its having left upon the basis where the founders had placed it, if corporation might become solely a lay corporation. We not discussed the questions, what the college might have or ought to have been, or should be, but only the legal on, what it is. Our examination has led us to the con- n, that the corporation in conformity with the usage ly consists of eleven ministers of the gospel, resident in ate of Connecticut, of mature years, the successors of the ers or of the eleven first trustees; of the governor and ant governor of that State, who continue its alliance he State and the State's knowledge of its affairs, and of aduates of the college, chosen by the alumni for the term years, and directly representing them. This is the su- ory board. The immediate government and instruction the several faculties.

are satisfied with the organization. We look with ven- and gratitude on the past history of the college and hope on the future.

as been said that clergymen are not necessary to a Chris- ollege, that Christian laymen will answer. That may be. are the election of Protestant, Christian laymen and the uation by them of such men as their successors to be d? Has the religious question ever been raised as to the ers of the corporation chosen by the alumni? But this e speculation, if the constitution of the college forbid the tution. If any one shall found a college, he can try that d.

are reminded of the religious freedom secured to the colleges in Connecticut by the provision in their charters, no president or professor or other officer shall be made

ineligible for or by reason of any religious tenet he may profess, or be compelled by any by-law or otherwise to subscribe to any religious test whatsoever." This applies only to officers and not to the board of managers, and does not in least regulate their choice. The board of an Episcopal college and the board of a Methodist college may elect as an office instructor any one whom they may prefer, and for such reasons as they may judge sufficient. It is of little use to a person that his religious tenets do not make him ineligible, if he cannot get the necessary votes of the Episcopal or Methodist board. No officer or instructor in Yale College has for last sixty years been required to submit to any religious test. At least ever since the accession of Dr. Dwight to the presidency in 1795, the investigation of religious doctrine has been free. A student may be a Christian of any denomination, Jew, Mahometan, Buddhist, infidel, one who has not yet learned whether there is a God or whether he is himself a moral being with moral responsibilities, or he may have reached in youth the stupendous knowledge that there is no God. The college cannot teach all the corresponding beliefs and beliefs, even as elective studies. It must, in religion, morals and science, according to the motto on its seal, teach the truth of which from its origin the Christian religion has been held to be a part.

We are also reminded of the example of the British Constitution. Its freedom is admitted. But any one, who shall attempt to convince the people of the United States or of any State of the Union of its superiority to their own written constitution will undertake an ambitious task. Under the British Constitution Charles II. and James II. became Roman Catholic sovereigns of a Protestant country. To secure the Protestant succession, the people of England, not relying on tradition or the principles of that constitution but on positive law, through their parliament passed successive acts of settlement and statute limiting the crown to Protestants and excluding Roman Catholics. They did not trust to the spirit of the community nor did the people of Connecticut, when they confirmed and perpetuated the charter of Yale College. Laws should indeed have a moral support, and Yale College will not lack friends nor supporters in her chartered rights.

age of English history or law, that when Britain' [England, for the act of Union passed in the reign of Queen Anne], "made her government should be administered on the way they found the surest way was . . . to put the Hanoverians in." The parliament had not been previously vacant, nor assembled, without the king's writ, and that King James by his endeavor to leave the kingdom, by his violation of the fundamental law, had abdicated the throne. The example of England was followed, omitting the allegation of abdication. It resided there. (3 Macaulay's *Hist. of Eng.*, 1., 80, 81, 82; 2 Macaulay's *Hist. of Eng.*, 1.; 1 Blackstone's *Com.*, chs. 2 and 3.) We find the action and grounds of action of the English, evidently intended by its act not to give offense. William and Mary were not chosen by a momentary oversight to be Anne an Hanoverian. Is not the remedy a little better, even as a dernier resort, a little better with its "studious walks and shades?" and that the remedy is recommended but is used as an illustration only of possible law, is no provision of law.

That legal rules and restrictions may be unobserved, observation teaches us, that trusts may be neglected, funds may be misappropriated, and duties in regard to them are not there-fore abandoned. Who shall keep the keepers? We agree that those who administer the college should have sympathy and accord with its rules, its principles. The charter endeavored to provide

though we do not see its relevancy or that of other colleges of Connecticut or of the world does not stand still and that nearly two hundred years, there has been

progress in moral philosophy, biblical criticism, criminal jurisprudence, and religious toleration, as well as physical sciences (although in criminal jurisprudence the law-reforms of the English Commonwealth are said to have anticipated many of those of the later times of this century), and that the textbooks adopted at the beginning of that period would be inappropriate at the present time in the present state of knowledge and society.

Dr. Wm. Ames was a non-conformist of distinction, educated at Christ College, Cambridge, who went to Holland and was twelve years a professor in the University of Franeker in that country. We are not aware that his *Cases of Conscience* was a text-book in Yale College in the ordinary sense of the word. At the meeting in 1701 to organize the collegiate school under the charter, the trustees among other things ordered that the rector "shall take effectual care that said students be weekly (at such seasons as he shall see cause to appoint) caused memoriter to recite the Assembly's catechism in Latin, and Dr. Ames's Theological Theses, of which, as also Ames's *Cases of Conscience*, he shall make or cause to be made from time to time such explanations as may, through the blessing of God, be most conducive to their establishment in the principles of the Christian, Protestant religion" (1 Trumb. 475). The other books were to be studied and recited; Ames's *Cases of Conscience* was only to be explained by the rector or by his direction. How the order in this respect was carried out appears from the college laws of 1720 and 1726, which prescribe, "And students . . . on Sabbath morning shall attend the explanation of Ames's *Cases of Conscience*." The rector was to explain, in such manner as might be most conducive to the establishment of the students in the principles of the Christian, Protestant religion. The book is not a creed. It is to be presumed that the rector taught nothing after the passage of the act, contrary to the toleration act of 1708, "copied from the celebrated toleration act of William and Mary." It is admitted that the work would not be a good text-book now, that few of the graduates have read it, and it may be added, or wish to read it, and that is important, that it is not written in classical Latin.

tracing the progress of enlightenment to the present said that "it was found more than a hundred years ago very irksome to require the president, etc., to assent to the Westminster Catechism and Confession of Faith. The Saybrook Platform was substituted for them in 1778." In 1780 the trustees excused Rector Cutler from all further duties as rector of Yale College, the trustees voted "That no persons as shall hereafter be elected to the office of president or in the college, shall before they are accepted by the trustees declare their assent to the confession of faith owned and assented to by the elders and messengers of the churches in the colony of Connecticut, assembled at Saybrook, September 9, 1708, [the Saybrook Platform] and confirmed by act of the General Assembly of the corporation resolved, "That the Assembly's Catechism and confession of faith received and established by the churches of this colony [the Saybrook Platform], (which is a summary of the Westminster confession) contains a just and true summary of the most important doctrines of the Christian religion, and that the true sense of the sacred Scriptures is contained and summed up in these compositions." "That no person who shall hereafter be chosen president, fellow, professor, or tutor, in the college, shall before he enters upon the execution of his office, publicly give his consent to the Westminster Catechism and confession of faith [the Saybrook Platform], and avow it as a just summary of the Christian religion as believed, and renounce all doctrines or principles contrary thereto." (2 Trumb., xxxiv., 317, 319). The difference between the Westminster confession and the Saybrook platform was settled with President Clap and his associates by the elders and messengers of the churches, at Saybrook in 1780, and "that the confession of faith, owned and assented to by the elders and messengers assembled at Boston, in 1678, and, May 12th, 1680, being the second session of the General Assembly, be recommended" to the General Assembly "for their testimony thereunto as the FAITH of the churches."* The recommendation was adopted" (1 Trumb. 319). "This requires more patience than we like to ask or exer-

*This, Dr. Trumbull says, was the Savoy confession.

enter into the ecclesiastical matters, into which we have been unwillingly led. Did Yale College by the act of 1745 become a secular college?

President Clap in his argument on the right of visitation says, "his most excellent majesty, who by the act of union was obliged to consent to the Westminster confession of faith received in the Church of Scotland, as being agreeable to the word of God, and containing the sum and substance of the doctrine of the reformed churches." (2 Trumb. 332). Similar to the confession of faith of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. The important step was taken when any religious test was not merely by subscription, but by declaration, was abolished by the corporation.

We are not anxious to defend the Puritans of New England. It is unnecessary. They must be judged according to the times, as the Rev. Phillips Brooks says or suggests of the fathers of the church.* As has also been said, the foundation stones of a building are not the most nicely polished ones. The Puritans founded Harvard College or University and Yale College, grammar schools, and common schools. Their work in education remains, which shows some solidity in the foundation.

* See sermon on All Saints' Day. Sermons published 1878, pp. 120.

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ARTICLE V.—MILTON'S ANGELS.

an article on the *Plan of Paradise Lost*, published in periodical, March, 1883, the writer had occasion to speak of certain characteristics of Milton's supernatural beings. A systematic account of these beings did not come within the scope of that paper, but the interest of the subject may perhaps make its separate treatment from a new standpoint not unwelcome. Other writers have considered Milton's angels only as products of literary art; I wish to examine them as products of thought, giving attention to the inner meaning rather than to the outward form. Convinced that there has already been too much unintelligent criticism, I venture upon a far more difficult and in some respects perilous task of interpretation. With little to say about the soundness or the variety of the poet's methods and opinions, I shall content myself with inquiring what they are.

A glance at the first drafts of *Paradise Lost*, when the subject was still under consideration for dramatic treatment, will show among the *dramatis personæ* a large preponderance of what are known as allegorical characters, such as Conscience, Truth, Ignorance, Justice, Faith, Hope, and Wisdom. There is a noticeable tendency, as the work progresses, towards a substitution of what may be called real for allegorical characters—translation of the abstract into the concrete. The substitution is not complete even in the finished epic, as we see in the presence of such characters as Sin, Death, Chaos, and Night. Hence have arisen the criticisms of Addison, Landor and others denouncing the mixture of allegory and plain fact.

The original abstractions, however, do not disappear from the stage, but remain under the forms and names of the pagan gods of western Asia and southern Europe. The spirits who fight and contend in battle are the virtues and vices that wage perpetual war in man's moral nature and by sympathy cause disorder and ruin even in the external world. The gods of the epic then had their origin in ideas. Men did not grossly worship

the rudely carved or moulded masses of wood, stone, and metal, but they offered devotion to an idea which the image merely brought to mind. Mars was honored by every nation that delighted in war for its own sake; Minerva was revered wherever philosophy was made the chief end of life. The ceremonies with which at special times the divinity was worshipped were mere external signs of the inward life of the people. Starting with this spiritual conception of the gods of old—gods still at the present day, though not openly acknowledged—Milton was able to give his descriptions, a verisimilitude which perhaps could have been gained in no other way, and at the same time to proceed with that confidence and positiveness which come only from the consciousness of stating an unassailable truth.

With a little careful thought it is possible in most cases to determine with certainty what moral quality each of Milton's characters is intended to represent. The form, stature, attire, words and actions of each are always consistent with its central nature. Each is also associated with some force, agent, or phenomenon in the material world which suggests and illustrates it. Besides, the gods of the Orient and those of the Occident were essentially the same, so that while the poet commonly prefers the Biblical names and descriptions, his spirits may be said to do reappear in the lines of Homer and Virgil. This fact often gives us the advantage of two sets of examples to fix the precise nature of each spirit. Even when a spirit is merely named, and that but once, we have usually the means of finding the reasons for its introduction. Let us examine some of the results which a course of study under the guidance of the principles has given.

To avoid the confusion which would come from an attempt to carry on all the parts of the subject together, I propose to practice first the moral qualities which the spirits represent, then the external forms in which they appear, and afterward the relation of Milton's characters to Homer's and Virgil's. The moral part may be regarded as the essential nature of the character which the external form is intended to manifest and illustrate to human sense; while the identification of his characters with those of the epic writers of old, gives Milton a literary authority which cannot be spoken against.

the good and the evil spirits, then, represent respectively virtues and the vices in the moral constitution of the world. On one side are arrayed right principles, noble aspirations, and pure affections; on the other, wrong ambitions, headstrong passions, and debasing lusts. It is certain, to begin with, the seven spirits who rise singly after Satan and Beelzebub in the burning lake, are intended to personate the Seven Deadly Sins so much celebrated in early English poetry. There is clear reason for bringing them out in the order in which they come,—Murder, Lust, Pride, Envy, Covetousness, Gluttony, and Idleness. Murder and Lust are the first recorded vices resulting from the Fall of Man; hence Moloch and Chemosh are the first to respond to Satan's call. There is no difficulty in recognizing the spirit of Murder or War in the grim features and the blood-stained form of Moloch. The instruments of martial music (the poet calls it "noise") and the tears of parents for slain sons are inseparably associated with him. He is worshiped in Rabbath (Contention). Nor are we left in doubt as to the identity of Chemosh in "the flowery dale of Moab clad with vines," revelling in obscenity and scandal, in his nocturnal rites and lustful orgies. Astarte is crowned with a crescent moon, whose horns are the symbol of haughtiness, and she is the tutelary divinity of Tyre and Sidon, cities repeatedly denounced in prophecy for their excessive Pride. Astarte is followed by Thammuz, as Pride is followed by Envy. Thammuz is wounded by the prosperity of others, just as the snows of Lebanon melt away and stain with the color of blood the fallen Adonis under the beneficent heat of the summer sun. After Envy, and closely related, comes Covetousness, typified by Aspidochelone, the god of fertility and thrift, whose temple was in Babylon (Theft). After the spirit of Covetousness has secured the bounties and luxuries of this life, the "sottish" Ahaz (Possessor) turns to the worship of Rimmon (Pomegranate), a god of agriculture and the fit representative of Gluttony. It was precisely at the point of transition from the worship of Covetousness to the worship of Gluttony that the rich fool of the parable was arrested by the hand of death (Luke xii. 15-20). Rimmon is accompanied by the Egyptian gods of brutish form, which signify that Gluttony is akin to all sorts of Bestiality.

Belial, the spirit of Idleness, which is called the sin of Sodom and her daughters (Ezek. xvi. 59), fitly comes last of the seven chief devils. When Belial takes possession of the magistracy in church or State, the filthiness of Sodom is sure to follow.

Satan is the embodiment of Ambition, which is the expression in a single word of "the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience." There is a hint of its wandering, unsettled nature in the very word. Among men we have seen aspiring sometimes to military glory, sometimes to wealth and sometimes to regal power, and descending to the lowest arts to gain its end. Hence Satan may act in the spirit of Moloch, of Mammon, or of Belial, and is fitly called the head of the whole body of demons. He is the principle of evil in general and the adversary of all good. Before the truth-telling Uriel he represents Hypocrisy; before the wise Gabriel Folly; before the faithful Abdiel, Skepticism; before the righteous Michael, the lifeless Letter of the Law. In the colloquy with Gabriel his acts and words are in every respect those ascribed in Proverbs to the fool, scorner, and wicked person, while Gabriel opposes him with the words and acts of the wise and faithful man who is contrasted with the fool. The breaking up of the colloquy is exceedingly significant. It is decided by the appearance of the heavenly balance in which are two weights,—“the sequel each of parting and of fighting.” The two weights are nothing else than the two consecutive proverbs: “Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him,” and “Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit.” To answer the fool that is, to continue the dispute, would be an act of useless folly on the part of the censor; to cease answering, that is, to part, would leave the fool to his folly; but there would then remain only one fool instead of two, as in the other case. The latter, namely parting, is therefore to the eye of Wisdom the weightier, making its scale of the balance descend, and Gabriel brings the dispute to a close.

Michael, the select Scriptural antagonist of Satan, is the impersonation of Justice or Righteousness. In one of the original drafts of *Paradise Lost* we find one of the characters set down as “Michael or Moses,” a hint that the two are some-

very nearly akin, if not identical, in meaning. Lawgiver, and the divine Law is the very embodiment of Justice. When Michael contends with Satan about the Law of Moses (Jude 9), the dispute is over the law which is the embodiment of Justice. There was such a dispute when Satan tempted the children in the wilderness and quoted Scripture to gain the victory. There was many a dispute like it afterwards, when the Pharisees and Sadducees attempted to condemn Christ with the Law and were by him confounded with its spirit. In the same cases Christ represented Michael defending the Law against its enemy. This, too, is the meaning of the dispute between Michael and Satan in the Heavenly War; and throughout the poem every act of the martial angel is consistent with the general idea of Justice.

Beelzebub on the part of the apostates and Gabriel on the part of the saints are spirits of Wisdom; the first is the spirit of Wisdom in the children of this world, the second is the spirit of Wisdom in the children of light. Both spirits are distinguished by their moderation and self-restraint; and fitly therefore in the Heavenly strife is Gabriel opposed to the furious Moloch. Michael is associated with Strength; Beelzebub by his "mighty" arms is fit to bear the weight of mightiest men. Michael is associated by having joined with himself Uzziel (Satan) as his second in command.

Michael in his station at the sun, whence he views the world, is the angel of Truth, and furnishes Gabriel with the information necessary to the fulfillment of his charge. As he is, he cannot discern the hypocrisy in the zealous-seeming Satan any more than the wise men of the East could of themselves discover the deceit of the Pharisees and Herod. In battle he defeats Adrammelech, who stands for Ignorance and is a truly formidable antagonist. Michael's mission to dispel the ignorance of men and with the light of Truth to dispel their superstitions is one of the most important of his duties in Christianity.

Raphael, the sensitive and sympathetic spirit of Love, is in Heaven the stolid and cruel Asmadai who represents Indolence. In accordance with his nature, Raphael is known as "the sociable saviour."

is selected by Heaven to bear to earth a message of pity and warning. Like the Beloved in the Song of Songs, when coming into the Garden, he takes his way, himself a dispensation of "heavenly fragrance," "through groves of myrrh and flowing odors, cassia, nard, and balm." He hears in the evening of that blissful day in Paradise Adam's avowal of love for Eve and the inquiry about love among the angels in Heaven. His question innocently drawn at a venture touched the innermost nature of Raphael and caused that smile "which glowed celestial rosy-red, love's proper hue" to mantle the angel's countenance at leave-taking.

Of the remaining spirits Azazel, the ensign-bearer, represents Fame, proud, fickle as the winds, brief as a meteor flash; Mammon is the spirit of Worldliness; Mulciber of Art and Industry, commendable when holding the place of a servant in Heaven, but destined to overthrow when assuming to be himself a god and making his works an end instead of a means; Ithuriel is Memory, and the spear in his hand is the Divine command to Adam and Eve; Zephon is Conscience: both Conscience and the Word of God are declared to be searchers of the heart of man (Prov. xx. 27; Heb. iv. 12). Abdiel is Faith, and a blow from his sword staggers the skeptical Satan, of whom the Scriptural metaphor removes the mountain into the sea (pp. 193-198). Nisroch is Selfishness; Zophiel the Modesty which blushes and is offended at the sight of whatever is shameful.

The three days of war in Heaven symbolize three distinct phases of the conflict between good and evil in the history of the world and in the life of man. On the first day, as has been hinted, the contest is over the Law, the Spirit of which dwells in Michael while the Letter is usurped by Satan. The perfect order and discipline in the loyal army, the equipment of the least member of it with the force of all the elements, and the possession by each legion of the fighting strength of the whole army are not merely rhetorical flights but profoundly significant truths. The perfect consistency and completeness of the Law, the fact that the smallest jot or tittle has a greater validity than the course of nature, and that one commandment cannot be broken without violating the whole Law are some of the Scriptural principles embodied. The ar-

a inviolable panoply spoken of in the letters . vi. 10-18), while the spears, arrows, and precepts of the Divine Word. It will be remembered that in the Song of Songs (iv. 4) the neck of the Bride is a tower "builded for an armory." This is a figure setting forth that the Divine precepts are the true church in opposition to the dictates of the flesh, and violence disguised under the show of piety. We are thus led to see that this conflict between the spirit and the letter of the law is essentially the same as when he speaks elsewhere of the grasp of falsehood.

Now the day the battle-ground is shifted by the Lord from the intellect to the affections. In the council of Nisroch, the spirit of Selfishness, had been in pain suffered from wounds and exertion, and sought an easier mode of warfare. Satan then proposed the war of the flesh, when stripped of its allegorical dress, the conflict of fleshly lusts against the Divine Spirit. The presence of these lusts in the heart soon renders it callous as Paul expresses it—and thus secures Nisroch's painlessness. The presence of these same lusts, as in the experience of Lot in Sodom, is exceedingly contrary to the pure sensibilities of the good. Hence the modest Zophiel, turning his back to the enemy, and warning his friends to shield themselves against the coming attack. Hence, too, the confusion into which the idle Belial rises in the other council, and the wit that brings confusion upon the good. The satanic host now is laughter propelled by lust. The saints throw away their weapons as worse than useless to offer spiritual truth to the world—to cast pearls before swine. They hurl their devilish engines and upon the devisers of evil in the same manner upon earth the laughter of drunkards is overwhelmed by wide-spread sorrow excited either by retributive justice, or as the consequence of self-indulgence. "The end of that is." The good suffer somewhat in this last

encounter, but, unlike their adversaries, are not impeded in their movements by any armor. So too when heavy calamities fall upon the earth, the righteous, unwedded to worldly pleasures and riches, escape with scarcely a sigh, while the pleasure-loving, bound to their material possessions, release themselves with many a groan.

The third is a "sacred" day upon which, under the visible captaincy of the Messiah, the saints are finally victorious. The Divine Leader is arrayed in the majesty and terror of the day of judgment. He rides on the clouds (cherubs), and his chariot moves with the sound of a whirlwind reminding those who have sown the seed that the time for reaping has now come. He calls his faithful warriors, approves their fidelity, unites them with his attendant angels, and makes them one host. He proposes to test the physical strength of his enemies, just as at the day, when he comes to judge men, he will try their works, their creeds. The thunder which he hurls is the Divine laughter at the folly of creatures made reasonable, and is essentially that of wisdom: "I also will laugh at your calamity; I will mock when your fear cometh." It is in exact harmony with what has recently been designated as "the laughter of the soul at itself."

A more minute interpretation of the points in this description would be fitting, if we were annotating Milton's text, but enough has been given to establish our proposition as to the allegorical significance of the angels of *Paradise Lost*. Let us now inquire, in the next place, how the poet represents these beings to the natural sense. What are those "corporal forms" (v. 574) in which he expresses spiritual things?

Hints of external form for the angels, though somewhat indefinite, are not rare in the Scriptures. Satan is not only "the spirit that works in the children of disobedience"; he is also "the prince of the power of the air." What meaning Milton took from this and other expressions of a similar kind is apparent in a hundred lines of the second book (528-600) which contain a classification of the demons on the basis of their physical nature. In this passage, while the subdivisions are variously marked, the word "part" is used with great exactness to distinguish the main classes. The first use of

to introduce the spirits of *Water* who hurry on wings as clouds or run fleetly over the land

The second "part" includes spirits of *Fire*, estrial, heat-producing and light-giving.* The embraces spirits of *Air*, whether gentle as in *æ*, or violent as in tempest ("*velut agmine* var against whatever stands erect. The Winds, Boreas, Eurus, Notus, and Zephyrus, take up arch" (through the air as in flight and along marching) to search for rest every vale and world of darkness.

ay be understood the broad and important distinction between Cherubim and Seraphim. The quality of foundation of the distinction. The Seraphim arniah light as original sources; the Cherubim bright or dark, but their brightness is always als of heat and light are Seraphim; those of re Cherubim. Uriel, regent of the sun, is a l, regent of the moon and the air is a Cherub. e same rule Raphael and Abdiel are Seraphim, and Azazel, Zephon and Zophiel are Cherubim. Satan is at one time enclosed with "a globe of and at another "with flaming Cherubim and there is the same difference between the scenes un in a clear sky encircled with his dazzling me luminary at another time surrounded with nds.

inferred from this, the activity of the spirits to that of the elements in nature. In the first telling of the formation of the devils from a into a perfect phalanx serves almost equally al description of sunrise in a deeply clouded re, doubtful glimpse of dawn at the discovery fulness, the meteor-gleam at the unfurling of sign, the orient colors of the waving banners, to content myself with giving merely the results extended and careful comparison of the games n with those of the *Iliad* and the *Æneid* and with its, physical, aesthetic, and intellectual described in ie fables of ancient Greece.

the rays of light in the bristling spears, the dazzling arms, half-eclipsed, new-risen sun, and finally the blaze of brightness signaling the birth of new enterprise, form a succession of scenes like those attending the growth of the faintest glimmer of morning into perfect day. In the fourth book, the capture of Satan in Paradise and his expulsion therefrom is described under figures implying the generation of a nimbus cloud which blots the clear sky, interferes with the moonlight, threatens disorder and ruin, but is dissipated at the coming day. In the tenth book, the transformation of the devils into serpents like those sprung from the blood of Gorgon (the storm cloud) is suggested by the condensation of clouds into rain, fallen and winding about in brooks and rivers.

The sixth book affords further illustrations. The prophecy of Ezekiel (xxxviii. 9) tells of enemies of God's people to come out of the North, like a storm and like a cloud, to overspread and lay waste the land of the faithful. To this central image Milton most carefully conforms in describing the celestial war to human sense.

The engagement of the first day is founded upon the idea of a storm—a struggle between the adverse powers of heat and cold. There is a premonition of it during the previous night, when "in a flame of zeal severe" Abdiel "opposed the current of rebellious fury. The army of apostates on its march, "hastening with furious expedition," was like a wind from the North. In contrast with this disorderly haste moved the faithful host,—

"In silence their bright legions to the sound
Of instrumental harmony that breathed
Heroic ardour to adventurous deeds."

A preliminary single combat took place between the zealous flaming Abdiel and the skeptical ruler of the North, haughty and cold, fresh from his icy mountain palace. When general battle was joined,

"Storming fury rose
And clamour such as heard in Heaven till now
Was never."

While many of the citable expressions might be used metaphorically in describing an earthly battle, we have the authority, that of Milton himself, for saying that they are

to be so understood. On the other hand, when corporeal objects are mentioned, they must be etherealized to reach the truth. The spears, darts, swords, shields and helmets, used by the contending hosts, are nothing grosser than beams of light, rays of heat, flashes of flame, and masses of cloud. Spirits of cold, as well as spirits of heat may hurl fiery darts, for intense cold produces the same sensation as intense heat (ii. 595).

Some of the individual powers who are active in the conflict are easily recognized as embodiments of elemental phenomena. Calm and Bluster, Heat and Cold, Light and Darkness, meet and contend in the persons of Gabriel and Moloch, Raphael and Asmadai, Uriel and Adrammelech. The spirits of Heat and Light are victorious in the first encounter, and the defeated forces withdraw to reorganize during the night for another struggle. Nisroch rises in the council "with cloudy aspect;" or, in other words, the North Wind changes countenance and proposes a different mode of warfare for which preparation is at once made.

The second stage of the struggle spoken of by Ezekiel is reached. The enemies of the saints next come "like a cloud." They dig down through the heavenly mould and bring instruments of offence from "the Deep." They prepare to counterfeit the thunderbolts of the Almighty. They approach the field of battle on the next morning with less haste, but threateningly, like a cloud laden with hail. The coming is heralded by Zophiel, a loyal scout, the Iris of *Paradise Lost*, the spirit of the Morning Red. He is the swiftest of Cherubim, flies in mid-air, announces the coming of the enemy as a thick cloud and admonishes his friends to bear their shields,

"Even or high; for this day will pour down,
If I conjecture aught, no drizzling shower,
But rattling storm of arrows barbed with fire."

The enemy approaches "gross and huge," "with heavy pace," and with "shadowing squadrons deep." The rattling hailstones begin to fall, benumbing whomever they touch. But the angry heat of the loyal host soon puts an end to the storm of hail, and the struggle goes on, under the ever deepening cloud-masses, to the end of the day and through the night, until at day-break of the third day the Messiah appears with thunder-

bolts, and a rainbow, and the clear sky, and the sunlight—at his command. Order is restored throughout the Empyrean; the horizon wall is broken only where the defeated rebels are retreating, and the scattered rear of the fleeing host is disappearing like a frightened flock of goats.

Enough has now been said to show the blunder of the method who, following Dr. Johnson, down to the present time, have laughed at

"Those comic-dreadful wars
Where, armed with gross and inconclusive steel,
Immortals smite immortals mortal-wise,
And fill all Heaven with folly."*

Whether this exposition of his method will cause a greater admiration of Milton is an entirely distinct question. The present age, if I read it aright, has little taste for allegory, and there may even be a feeling of disappointment at the discovery that Milton's descriptions are not light products of fancy with no deeper meaning than lies on the surface. My present purpose, however, is not to commend Milton to men of this generation; it is only to reach a firm basis from which to judge his work; though it must be evident from what is to follow that if allegory can be charged as a fault against Milton the charge will lie equally against Homer and Virgil, his models in epic poetry.

In Milton, for example, the victory of Gabriel over Moloch is clearly intended to teach the superiority of Wisdom to brute Force, or of self-restraint to fury; but precisely the same moral is taught in Homer by the victories of Pallas over Menelaus. Besides, Pallas had among the Grecian heroes at Troy several special favorites, Diomed and Ulysses: Milton's Gabriel, the wisest of the angels, is copied chiefly from the former; while Beelzebub, the wisest of the devils, is copied from the latter. Gabriel has a subordinate in Uzziel (Strength of God), and Diomed's second in command is Sthenelus (Strength). The strength of Beelzebub is shown in his "Atlantean shoulders," and the strength of Ulysses also in his broad shoulders. The moral of both poets is that wisdom is strong (Prov. viii. 14), and moreover that it is better than strength (Eccl. ix. 16).

* Sidney Lanier in the *N. Y. Independent*.

The nature of true Peace and Love is shown in Raphael, of false Peace and Love in Belial; but Homer has set forth the same in his Mercury and Juno. The difference is that Homer has distinguished by his two characters between Peace and Love, naming the former Mercury and the latter Juno; while Milton has united Peace and Love, but has divided the pure from the impure characteristics in each, giving the former to Raphael and the latter to Belial. When Raphael, attired like Juno on her mission of reconciliation to the distracted household of Oceanus (*Il.* xiv. 178-189), is coming from Heaven, the earth appears to him among the stars as Delos or Samos to a pilot among the Cyclades. Juno regarded Samos with special favor as the place where she was worshiped as the goddess of marriage and birth, while she looked upon Delos with abhorrence as the place that had given shelter to her rival Latona (Death). To Raphael the primitive earth might appear either a Samos or a Delos, a place of either favor or abhorrence, as it would prove a harbor of life or of death.

Mammon, "the god of this world," is the ancient Jupiter who overthrew his father Saturn (Time), and who is the patron deity of old men like Nestor—conquerors of Time in outliving the natural age of man. The relation to old men will give a reason for the bent form of Mammon; and his identity with Jupiter will account for almost every sentiment of his speech in the council. Moloch is Mars with the same blustering and furious temper. Satan is Apollo, manifesting the characteristics of that god and of the men whom he inspires, chiefly Hector, but also Paris, Sarpedon, and others. Michael, the spirit of retributive Justice, is governed by the same impulses as the swift-footed Achilles (Pitiless), the son of the sea-deity Thetis (Law). The first day's battle in Heaven closely resembles the contest of the Greeks and the Trojans over the dead body of Patroclus; and the meeting of Michael and Satan has many striking points of likeness to that of Achilles and Hector, one of the most important being that Satan, like Hector, fights in armor belonging rightfully to his adversary.

The characters with English names follow the same law of resemblance. Sin in her attractive beauty has the characteristics of Venus; in her power over the heart those of Hecate,

the goddess of witchcraft; in her deceitfulness those of the Palladium of Troy, which, strange as it may seem, is the representative of falsehood. Death is like Neptune, the dark-haired ruler of the seas. He has the same god-like, terrific stride that shakes the earth, the same trident, the same speed with horses, the same power to quiet turbulent waves—human society being the waters over which he rules. Chaos is the same as Saturn, or Pluto, timid, irresolute, guarding with jealous care the secrets and riches of his anarchy, and swallowing up almost instantaneously the children which he begets. Meleager for good reasons has a Latin name; but reversing the process we easily identify him with the Baal of the east, who in the contest of his prophets with the prophet of the true God also fell "From morn to noon, from noon to dewy eve of summer's day." (1 Kings xviii. 26, 29).

Occasionally, or indeed frequently, a resemblance to Homer or an allusion to mythology has attracted the attention of commentators; but no one, not even Patrick Hume, seems to have suspected how far the resemblance is carried, or how different from mere chance and whim has been its determining motive. Most of the points of likeness do not lie on the surface, but they are easily discovered when we know the underlying law that regulates them. It is in virtue of the existence of the same moral quality—ambition, wisdom, hate, love, or truth—in Milton's characters and in Homer's that they act and speak alike. Beelzebub never expresses the sentiments of Mars, nor Moloch those of Minerva. If we were to find these opposite spirits using the same expressions in speech, we should infer that it came from accident. When the identity of Moloch with Mars has once been discovered, the field of classical investigation in his case becomes very limited. It is useless to look anywhere except at the words and acts of the war-god and of the men whom he inspires. And so of all the rest. Hence it is evident that the spirits cannot exchange places in the poem, that Zephon and Ithuriel or Nisroch and Azazel cannot perform each other's tasks. The nature of the spirits in Homeric and Miltonic, is simple; their activity manifests itself in but one direction. However true it is that one of the

overpower and dominate a man, yet one man has the ability of legions of spirits.

The more important point of likeness between Homer's *gods* and Milton's angels remains to be noticed. It consists in the fact that both kinds may become tutelary divinities of persons and places and therefore have a representative function. Jupiter was the special deity of Elis, Juno of Argos, Athena of Athens, Apollo of Lycia, and Venus of Cyprus. In Milton's angels have a like office assigned to them by the prophet Daniel. The closing part of the first book of *Paradise Lost* cannot be fully understood unless the representative function of some of the angels is kept in mind. Those who are summoned to the council in Pandemonium "by place or by the worthiest," have such an office, and gather, like members of a legislative body, to consult for the common welfare. But in the case before us they are wholly subordinated to the greater powers who retain their own colossal dimensions in the council. The representative spirits, summoned "from every band and squared regiment," find the council hall too small for their admittance in their natural size and for the privilege of going within they submit to a reduction to "less than smallest dwarfs." Unique as the scene is intended, like every other in the poem, to set forth a lesson in human history. It proceeds upon the idea that since the spirit of Antichrist is the same, his operations are the same in Hell as in this world. The volcanic mountain, the city near by with its busy industries, the sluice from the neighbouring lake, and lastly, the capital "city and proud seat of empire," strongly suggest to us Mount Vesuvius, the Campania, the sluice from Lake Avernus and imperial Rome. The council-hall itself is modeled upon the Roman Pantheon, in name and in architecture. The thousand demigods in the "secret conclave" represent to the Puritan poet the evil emperors and proud tyrannies that had their seats at Rome (Rev. 17. 2). The spirits summoned from without represent the nations, tribes, and municipalities of Europe. The ambition of the emperors and then of the popes, reaching out over the nations of Christendom, reduced to insignificance the authority and dignity of their rulers. The comparison of the repre-

sentative spirits to *apes* (the "Pygmæan race beyond the Indian mount")* is the satire of a patriot who always despised submission to a foreign potentate and all imitation of the antics of a corrupt hierarchy. During the Dark Ages there arose in Europe a belief in a class of spirits known as fairies, whose diminutive size compared with the heroic stature of the gods of old well sets forth the difference between the real and the nominal power of civil governments under the supremacy of Rome. The representatives of national dignity, intent upon their trifling pleasures and unconscious of their littleness are compared to the fairies dancing under the eye of the peasant who views them with mingled joy and fear—joy that the tyranny of his home rulers is broken, and fear lest the foreign tyranny is about to be something worse, or at least more degrading.

A natural question arises here, Did Milton, then, reject entirely the doctrine of Angels as real beings in the economy of the spirit world? Much as he has to say about spirits in *Paradise Lost*, the facts here brought to view might indicate that the angels have no substantial, independent existence and are not believed by the poet to have any. It looks as though the characters of the poem were mere forms of thought, the creation not of God but of man. In the examination of Milton's prose writings, however, we find this theory failing. In the *Christian Doctrine* the angels are treated as independent essences, living before the creation of man and acting first upon him instead of being originated by him. We must not imagine, either, that they are one thing in prose and another in verse. Whether in prose or verse, the prominent aim of Milton was truth. The invocation of the Holy Spirit at the

*I am perfectly aware that I differ from every one else in my interpretation of this phrase. The "Pygmæan race" is, I believe, universally regarded as the same as the "faery elves," while the "Indian mount" is supposed to be the Himalaya range. To this notion I oppose the following considerations: first, the unnaturalness of the language if the poet intends merely to repeat or explain his first expression; second, the individualized character of the name "Indian mount" which could hardly be applied to the Himalaya range; third, the fact that Mount Ophir in the Aurea Chersonesus was believed to be the Ophir from which the ships of Solomon brought *apes* and peacocks; fourth, the popular fancy that the bodies of *apes* were inhabited by devils.

ning of his greatest poem would be unintelligible, if it not preface a reverent expression of divinely revealed truth. We are, then, shut up, apparently, to the conclusion that Milton intends to treat what we know as abstractions, the virtues and the vices of our moral constitution, as actual, independent beings in the invisible world. The world of spirits, as it is evident, is on the same plan as the world of spirit which we may become acquainted with by the study of our higher, immortal nature.

ARTICLE VI.—TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES

[Recently discovered and published, etc. Edited with a translation, introduction and notes by Roswell D. Hitchcock and Francis Brown, Professors in Union Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.]

THE recent publication of this document has awakened some interest, more because it claims to be a discovery of an early known, but long lost book, than because of anything new or important in its contents. It is said to have been found in the library of a monastery in Constantinople, occupying five of the one hundred and twenty parchment leaves which constitute the volume. The manuscript bears the signature of "Leon, notary and sinner," who completed the transcription in the month of June, A. D. 1056.

Is this a copy of a book known and in use at that time? or is it taken from a manuscript or book of an earlier date? In either case the genuineness of the document cannot be claimed; and if it was not originally written or dictated by the Apostles, it was not uncommon in the early centuries to resort to this kind of fiction, and books were made by unknown authors, which were ascribed to persons who were known and honored in the church, but no longer living to disclaim the authorship. Examples; in this lately found volume is the Epistle of Barnabas. To give it currency and authority in the early church, it was said to have been written by that Barnabas who was the companion of Paul. Later critics ascribe it to a Gnostic teacher, who wrote in some respects perhaps in the spirit of Barnabas, and so the false tradition arose that it was written by the friend and fellow-laborer of the Apostle. (*Hippolytus and his Age*, vol. i., p. 53, 2d ed.; *Neander, Hist. Ch.*, vol. i., p. 406.) There is also the so-called second Epistle of Clement, not recognized as genuine, but falsely attributed to that man. Even the first Epistle seems to have been corrupted by some person of hierarchic aspirations. (*Mosheim Ecc. Hist.*, vol. i., p. 75; *Neander*, vol. ii., p. 408, Bohn ed.) There

also in this volume twelve epistles of Ignatius. This poor "saint," concerning whom there is so much romance in regard to his martyrdom and his manuscripts, is the reputed author of sixteen epistles, not including one to the Virgin Mary. He was so near the apostolic age, that after his death many epistles were written in his name, filled with sentiments inconsistent with the times and circumstances in which he lived. The authors of these forgeries are unknown, but to give them authority they were ascribed to Ignatius. Many eminent critics have been inclined to doubt the genuineness of any of them as now known. A late critic has reduced their number to three; but these appear to be heavily loaded with interpolations of the fourth and fifth centuries. (*Hippolytus and his Age*, vol. i. p. 82.) The only remaining document in this volume is the "Teaching of the Apostles," which is evidently a copy of some parts of manuscripts well known in ecclesiastical literature since the beginning of the fourth century. This is therefore no newly discovered manuscript, no new truth is brought to light, and the entire volume might have remained eight hundred years longer in its musty obscurity without inflicting any loss to the church or the world. The so-called "Teaching of the Apostles" may be found in substance in the *Coptic Apostolic Canons*, and in the seventh book of the Apostolic Constitutions, with only such differences as might be expected to occur from transcription, translation, addition and customs of local churches in which different copies of the same work were used.

Du Pin, speaking of the Apostolic Constitutions, says: "It is very difficult to determine the time when they first appeared. The author is wholly unknown. All that can be said or conjectured is that the Constitutions attributed to the Apostles, belong to the third, or rather to the fourth century, and that from time to time they have been expurgated, changed and augmented according to the customs of different times and countries. (*Auteur's Ecc.*, vol. i., p. 31, ed. 1690.) Du Pin also says: "The book entitled the doctrine or teachings of the Apostles might be the same as the original Constitutions." He names three writers who believed the book mentioned by Eusebius and Athanasius was the same as the *Apostles' Canons*

or Constitutions. Such was the opinion of Nicephorus, Patriarch of Constantinople, who lived in the eighth century; of Zonaras in the twelfth century, and of Matthew Blastares who lived in the fourteenth century. The suggestion is made that there were probably two parts of the Constitutions, one large, as now known (which included the Teachings), the other an abridgment which was used to teach the discipline and faith of the church to catechumens. (Vol. i., p. 100.)

Bunsen has written largely on the Apostolic Constitutions their character, origin, and importance. He thinks the additional customs, ordinances, or injunctions which were incorporated in them, "treated first on the teaching and reception of the catechumens, secondly on worship and rites, thirdly on the government and whole constitutional discipline of the church." "These books were specially intended for catechumens as a preparation for baptism, as Athanasius says expressly of the Apostolic Constitutions themselves." "The writers of the earlier part of the fourth century, such as Eusebius and Athanasius call the book in question the *Doctrine* or the *Traditions* of the Apostles. It is in itself the most natural supposition that this Doctrine of the Apostles is no other than the Constitutions or Ordinances of the Apostles, for otherwise they should know nothing of a book so highly respected and so much read." (*Hippolytus and his Age*, vol. ii., pp. 403, 404.)

Vansleb in his "L'Histoire de l'Eglise d'Alexandrie" 1677, speaking of the Canons of the Coptic Church says: "Ils ont encore d'autres Canons, qu'ils appellent des Apôtres, lesquels, les Melchites, et les Nestoriens ont traduits en langue Arabe, et reduits en un volume." This volume is divided into two parts, in one of which, judging from the table of contents, is found the so-called "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles." This work is called, in Coptic and Arabic, "The Canon of our Holy Fathers the Apostles." (Vid. preface to translation of *Coptic Apostolic Canons*, by H. Tattam, 1848, London.)

Preliminary to the utterance of the so-called Teachings and Canons, the Apostles are represented as assembled together and acting under the command of our Lord Jesus Christ, they should "make known these words in all the world." They were therefore pleased that John should speak first." T

now in turn the other Apostles, giving by this fictitious reputation a plausible reason for calling the Canons, the things or precepts of the twelve Apostles.

To facilitate a comparison of the "Teachings" with extracts from the Canons and Constitutions, a translation is here given. *Antiochian Canons*, Bk. I., translated by C. C. J. Bunsen. *Hippolytus and his Age*, vol. II.)

TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES.

TEACHING OF THE LORD THROUGH THE TWELVE APOSTLES TO THE NATIONS.

There are two ways, one of life and one of death, and the difference is great between the two. Now the way of life is this: first, thou shalt love God who created thee; second, thy neighbor as thyself; and whatsoever thou shalt do to another, thou shalt have befall thee, do thou to another. Of these is the teaching is this: bless them that curse you and pray for your enemies; and fast for them that persecute you; for what favor shall you love them that love you? Not even the heathen the same? You, love them that hate you, and you shall not have an enemy. Turn from carnal and worldly things. If one give thee a blow on the right cheek, turn to him the other also, and thou wilt be perfect. Let no man constrain thee to go one way, go with him two. If one take thy cloak, give him also thy shirt. If one take from thee what thou hast, demand it not back, for thou canst thou. To every one that asketh thee give, and demand not back, for to all the Father will give of his own graces. Blessed is he that giveth according

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TWO WAYS.

John said: There are two ways, one is the way of life, and the other is the way of death, and there is much difference in these two ways. But the way of life is, thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart who created thee, for this is the first commandment. But the second is, thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

Matthew said: Every thing that thou wouldst not should be done to thee, that do not thou also to another. [Cop. Canons, Bk. I.] Bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you. Love your enemies; for what thank is it if ye love those that love you, for even the Gentiles do the same. But do ye love those that hate you, and ye shall have no enemy. Abstain from fleshly and worldly lusts. If any one give thee a stroke on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. If any one compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. And he that will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also. And from him that taketh thy goods, require them not again. Give to him that

to the commandment, for he is guiltless. Woe to him that taketh : for if one that is in need taketh, he shall be guiltless ; but he that is not in need shall give account wherefore he took and whereunto ; and being in durance shall be questioned touching what he did, and he shall not go out thence until he give back the last farthing. Concerning this too it hath been said : let thy alms sweat in thy hands till thou know to whom to give.

II.—And the second commandment of the teaching is : thou shalt not kill ; thou shalt not commit adultery ; thou shalt not seduce boys : thou shalt not be a fornicator ; thou shalt not steal ; thou shalt not use magic art ; thou shalt not practice sorcery ; thou shalt not kill a child in the womb ; nor slay it after it is brought forth. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods ; thou shalt not forswear thee ; thou shalt not bear false witness ; thou shalt not be a slanderer ; thou shalt not bear malice. Thou shalt not be double-minded, nor double-tongued, for a snare of death is the double tongue. Thy speech shall not be lying nor vain, but filled with doing. Thou shalt not be avaricious, nor grasping, nor a hypocrite, nor malicious, nor arrogant. Thou shalt not take evil counsel against thy neighbor. Thou shalt not hate any man, but some thou shalt reprove, for some thou shalt pray, and some thou shalt love above thy life.

III.—My child flee from all wickedness and from everything like it. Be not prone to anger, for anger leadeth to murder ; nor envious, nor quarrelsome, nor passionate, for

asketh thee, and from him would borrow of thee do not thy hand. It is reasonable to to all out of thine own labors. [Const., Bk. VII.]

Peter said : Thou shalt not thou shalt not commit adultery ; thou shalt not commit fornication ; thou shalt not pollute a young man ; thou shalt not steal ; thou shalt not be a sorcerer ; thou shalt not use divination ; thou shalt not cause a woman to miscarry, neither if she has brought forth a child shalt thou kill it ; thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's things ; thou shalt not bear false witness ; thou shalt not speak evil of any man ; neither shalt thou think evil ; thou shalt not be double-minded, neither shalt thou be double-tongued. For a double-tongue is a snare of death ; thy speech shall not be vain, neither tending to a lie ; thou shalt not be covetous, neither rapacious, nor a hypocrite, nor of an evil heart, nor proud ; thou shalt not speak an evil word against thy neighbor ; thou shalt not hate any man, but thou shalt reprove some, and shalt show mercy upon others ; thou shalt love thyself for some, and shalt love others for thy own soul.

Andrew said : My son, flee from all evil and hate all evil. Be not angry, because anger leads to murder, for anger is an evil deed. Be not emulous, neither be con-

of all these are murders begotten. My child, be not lustful, for lust leadeth to fornication; nor foul-mouthed, nor supercilious, for all these are adulteries begotten. My child, be not an observer of omens, for it leadeth to idolatry; nor practise enchantments; nor be an astrologer; nor a purifier; nor wish to see these things, for of these is begotten idolatry. My child, be not a liar, for lying leads to theft; nor a miser; nor vain-glorious, for of all these are begotten thefts. My child, be not a murmurer, for it leads to calumny; nor self-willed; nor evil-minded; for of all these are calumnies begotten. But be meek, for the meek shall inherit the earth. Be long-suffering, and merciful, and guileless, and gentle, and good, ever reverencing the words which thou hast heard. Thou shalt not exalt thyself, nor suffer thy soul to be over-bold. Thy soul shall not cleave to the high, but with the righteous and the lowly shalt thou dwell. The happenings that befall thee accept as good, knowing that without God nothing occurs.

IV.—My child, thou shalt night and day remember him who speaks to thee the word of God; thou shalt honor him as the Lord, for whence the word of the Lord is spoken, there the Lord is. And thou shalt daily seek the countenances of the saints that thou mayest be refreshed by their discourses.

tious, nor quarrelsome, for murder proceeds from these.

Philip said: My son, be not of unlawful desires, because desire leads to fornication.

Simon said: My son, be not the utterer of an evil expression nor of obscenity, neither be thou haughty, for of these things come adulteries.

James said: My son, be not a diviner, for divination leadeth to idolatry; neither be thou an enchanter, nor an astrologer, nor a magician, nor an idolater; neither teach them nor hear them, for from these things proceeds idolatry.

Nathaniel said: My son, be not a liar, because a falsehood leadeth to blasphemy. Neither be thou a lover of silver nor a lover of vain glory, for from these thefts arise. My son, be not a murmurer, because repining leadeth a man to blasphemy. Be thou not harsh, nor a thinker of evil, for of all these things contentions are begotten. But be thou meek, for the meek shall inherit the earth. Be thou sincere, gentle, good; trembling at the word of God, which thou hast heard. Do not exalt thyself neither shalt thou give thy heart to pride, but thou shalt increase more and more with the just and humble. Every evil which cometh upon thee receive as good, knowing that nothing shall come upon thee but from God.

Thomas said: My son, he who declareth to thee the word of God, thou shalt love him as the apple of thine eyes, and remember him by night and day; thou shalt honor him as of the Lord; for in that place in which the word of power is, there is the Lord; and thou shalt seek his face daily, him, and those

Thou shalt not desire variance, but shalt pacify them that are at strife; thou shalt judge justly, shalt not regard the person in reproving for transgressions. Thou shalt not be of two minds, whether it shall be or not. Be not one who holds the hands open to receive but clinched toward giving; if aught thou hast, by thy hands thou shalt make atonement for thy sins. Thou shalt not hesitate to give, nor giving shalt thou murmur, for thou shalt know who is the good giver-back of the recompense. Thou shalt not turn thy face away from the needy, but shalt share all things with thy brother, and shalt not say they are thine own; for if you are partners in what is imperishable, how much rather in things perishable? Thou shalt not take thy hand off thy son or off thy daughter, but from youth shalt inculcate the fear of God. Thou shalt not in thy bitterness give commands to thy slave or hand-maid who hope in the same God, lest perchance they should not fear God who is over both; for he cometh not to call men according to persons, but to call those whom the spirit hath made ready. And you, slaves, shall be subject to your masters as to God's image, in modesty and fear. Thou shalt hate all hypocrisy and whatever is not pleasing to the Lord. Thou shalt not forsake the Lord's commandments, but shalt observe what thou hast received, neither adding nor taking away. In the congregation thou shalt confess thy transgressions, and shalt not come forward to thy prayer with a bad conscience. This is the way of life.

who remain of the saints, that thou mayest rest thee on their words.

Cephas said: Thou shalt not cause schisms; thou shalt reconcile in peace those who contend with one another. Judge in righteousness without acceptation of persons. Doubt not in thy prayer, thinking whether what thou hast asked of Him will be or not. Let it not, indeed, be, that when thou receivest thou stretchest out thine hand, but when thou shouldst give thou drawest thy hand to thee. But if thou hast at hand, thou shalt give for the redemption of thy sins. Thou shalt not doubt, thou shalt give; neither when thou hast given shalt thou murmur, knowing there is a reward of God. Thou shalt not turn away from the needy, but shalt communicate with the needy in all things; thou shalt not say these things are mine alone. If ye communicate with one another in those things which are incorruptible, how much rather should ye not do it in those things which are corruptible? [Cop. Canons, Bk. I.]

Thou shalt not take off thine hand from thy son or from thy daughter, but shall teach them the fear of God from their youth. . . . Thou shalt not command thy man servant, or thy maid servant, who trust in the same God, with bitterness of soul, lest they groan against thee, and wrath be upon thee from God. . . . And ye, servants, be subject to your masters, as to the representatives of God with attention and fear. Thou shalt hate all hypocrisy; and whatsoever is pleasing to the Lord, that shalt thou do. By no means forsake the commands of the Lord; thou shalt observe what things thou hast received from Him, neither adding to them

nor taking away from them. Thou shalt confess thy sins unto the Lord thy God. Thou shalt not proceed to thy prayer in the day of thy wickedness, before thou hast laid aside thy bitterness. This is the way of life. [Ap. Const., Bk. VII., c. 12, 13, 14.]

V.—But this is the way of death; first of all, it is evil and full of curse; murders, adulteries, lusts, fornications, thefts, idolatries, magic arts, sorceries, robberies, false testimonies, hypocrisies, duplicity, guile, arrogance, depravity, willfulness, avarice, foul speech, envy, over-boldness, loftiness, boastfulness; persecutors of the good, hating truth, loving falsehood, knowing not the reward of righteousness, not cleaving to what is good nor to just judgment, intent not upon good but upon evil; to whom meekness and patience are foreign; loving vanities, seeking recompense, not compassionating the poor, not caring for him who is in distress, not knowing him that made them; murderers of children, defacers of God's image, turning away from the needy, oppressing the afflicted; advocates of the rich, arbitrary judges of the poor, offenders in every way; may you be saved, children, from all these.

But the way of death is known by its wicked practices: for therein is the ignorance of God, and the introduction of many evils, . . . whereby come murders, adulteries, fornications, perjuries, unlawful lusts, thefts, idolatries, magic arts, witchcrafts, rapines, false-witnesses, hypocrisies, double-heartedness, deceit, pride, malice, insolence, covetousness, obscene talk, jealousy, confidence, haughtiness, arrogance, impudence, persecution of the good, enmity to truth, love of lies, ignorance of righteousness. For they who do such things do not adhere to goodness, or to righteous judgment: they watch not for good, but for evil; from whom meekness and patience are far off, who love vain things, pursuing after reward, having no pity on the poor, not laboring for him that is in misery, nor knowing Him that made them; murderers of infants, destroyers of the workmanship of God, that turn away from the needy, adding affliction to the afflicted, the flatterers of the rich, the despisers of the poor, full of sin. May you, children, be delivered from all these. [Ap. Const., Bk. VII., c. 18.]

VI.—See that none lead thee astray from this way of teaching, for he teaches thee without God. For if thou canst bear the whole yoke of the Lord thou shalt be perfect; but if thou canst not, what

See that no man seduce thee from piety, for if thou dost not turn out of the right way, thou shalt not be ungodly. Now concerning the several sorts of food, the Lord says to thee, ye shall eat

thou canst that do. And as to food, bear what thou canst, but strictly abstain from what is offered to idols, for it is worship of dead gods.

VII.—And concerning baptism, thus baptize: having first declared all these things, baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, in running water. But if thou have not living water, baptize in other water; and if thou canst not in cold, then in warm. But if thou have neither, pour on the head water thrice in the name of Father and Son and Holy Spirit. Before baptism let the baptizer and the baptized fast, and any others who can; but thou shalt bid the baptized to fast one or two days before.

VIII.—And let not your fast be with the hypocrites, for they fast on the second day of the week and the fifth, but do you fast on the fourth and on the friday. Nor pray after the manner of the hypocrites, but as the Lord has enjoined in his gospel thus pray: Our Father in heaven, hallowed be thy name: thy kingdom come; thy will be done as in heaven so on earth; our daily bread give us to-day; and forgive us our debt as we forgive our debtors; and bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one; for thine is power, and glory forever. Thrice a-day pray thus.

the good things of the earth. do ye abstain from things offered to idols, for they offer them to the honor of demons. [Ap. Const. VII., c. 19, 20, 21.]

Now concerning baptism, shalt so baptize as the Lord commanded us; go ye, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. But before baptism, let him that is to be baptized fast. [C. 22.]

Let the water be drawn into a font, or flow into it. And let them thus, if they have no scarcity of water, if there be a scarcity, let them draw the water which shall be sufficient into the font. . . . Let him that receiveth baptism say: "I believe in the only true God, the Father Almighty, and in His only begotten Son Jesus Christ, our Lord and Savior, and in the Holy Spirit the quickener." And he who baptizeth it shall lay his hand on the head of him who receiveth, dipping him three times, confessing these things each time. [Cop. Can., Bk. II.]

But let not your fasts be with the hypocrites; for they fast on the second and fifth days of the week. But do you either fast the first five days, or on the fourth day of the week, and on the day of preparation. Now when ye pray, be not ye as the hypocrites; but as the Lord has appointed us in the Gospel, so pray ye; Our Father which art in heaven, hallowed be thy name; thy kingdom come; thy will be done, as in heaven so on earth; give us this day our daily bread; and forgive us our debt as we forgive our debtors; and bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil, for thine is the kingdom.

dom for ever. Amen. Pray thus thrice in a day. [Ap. Const., Bk. VII., c. 24.]

-And concerning the eucharist give thanks. First as to the bread: We give thee thanks, our Father, for the holy vine of David thy servant, which thou hast made known to us through Jesus, thy Son; to thee be glory forever. Then concerning the broken bread: We give thee thanks, our Father, for the knowledge which thou hast made known to us through Jesus thy servant; to thee be glory forever. As this broken bread was scattered over the hills, and having been gathered became one so may our congregation be gathered from the ends of the earth into thy kingdom; for thine is glory and power forever through Jesus Christ. And when we eat or drink of your eucharist give thanks, ye who have been baptized in the name of the Lord, for of this the Lord saith: Give not what is holy to the

Now concerning the eucharistical thanksgiving say thus: We thank thee our Father for that life which thou hast made known to us by Jesus thy Son. Do thou, O Lord Almighty, so gather together thy church from the ends of the earth into thy kingdom as this [corn] was once scattered, and is now become one loaf. We also, our Father, thank thee for the precious blood of Jesus Christ which was shed for us. For through Him glory is to be given to thee for ever. Let no one eat of these things that is not initiated; but those only who have been baptized into the death of the Lord. [Ap. Const., Bk. VII., c. 25.]

-And when you are filled give thanks thus: We give thee thanks, our Father, for thy holy name which thou hast caused to dwell in our hearts, and for the knowledge, faith and immortality which thou hast made known to us through thy servant; to thee be glory forever. Thou, Almighty Master, make all things for thy name's sake. Both food and drink thou hast given to men for enjoyment, that they might give thanks to thee, and on us thou hast bestowed thy food and drink and life everlasting through thy servant. We all we thank thee that thou art powerful; to thee be glory forever. Remember, Lord, thy con-

After the participation, give thanks in this manner: We thank thee, O God and Father of Jesus our Savior, for thy holy name which thou hast made to inhabit among us; and that knowledge, faith, love, and immortality which thou hast given us through thy Son Jesus. Thou, O Almighty Lord, hast created the world and the things that are therein, by Him; and hast planted a law in our souls, and beforehand didst prepare things for the convenience of men. Thou, O God, who art powerful, who didst send upon earth Jesus thy Christ to live with men, do thou even now, through Him, be mindful of this thy holy

gregation to deliver it from all evil, and to make it perfect in thy love, and gather it from the four winds, sanctified into thy kingdom which thou hast prepared for it; for thine is power and glory forever. May grace come and this world pass away. Hosanna to the son of David. If one is holy, let him come; if not, let him repent. Maranatha, Amen. But permit the prophets to give thanks as much as they will.

XI.—Whoever cometh and teacheth you all this aforesaid, receive him. But if the teacher himself, turning aside, teach other doctrine unto destruction, give not ear to him; but if unto the promotion of righteousness and knowledge of the Lord, receive him as the Lord. And with regard to apostles and prophets, do with them according to the ordinance of the Gospel. Let every apostle who cometh to you be received as the Lord. He shall not overstay one day, though, if need be, the next; but if he remain three days he is a false prophet. And let not the apostle, on departing, take aught save bread till he come to a stopping place; and if he ask money he is a false prophet; and the prophet that speaketh in the spirit you shall not question nor judge, for every offence shall be forgiven, but this offence shall not be forgiven. Not every one that speaketh in the spirit is a prophet, unless he have the ways of the Lord. By their ways then shall the false prophet and the prophet be known. And no prophet who in the spirit appointeth a feast eateth thereof, unless he be a false prophet; and any prophet who teacheth the truth, if what he

church, and deliver it from all evil, and perfect it in thy love, and gather us all together in thy kingdom which thou hast prepared. Let this thy kingdom come. Hosanna to the son of David. If any one be holy, let him come; but if any one be not holy, let him become such by repentance. Permit also to your presbyters to give thanks. [Ap. Const., Bk. VII., c. 26.]

Whosoever comes to you and gives thanks in this manner receive him as a disciple of Christ. If he preach another doctrine, different from that which Christ has delivered to you, such a one you must not permit to give thanks. [Ap. Const., Bk. VII., c. 27.]

hath he do not, is a false prophet. But no prophet approved, working for the world's mys- of the church, but not teach- to do what things he doeth, be judged by you, for with he hath judgment; for so too the prophets of old. And he saith, in the spirit, give me keys or other things, you shall hearken to him; but if for oth- in straits he say give let no one he him.

I.—Let every one that cometh in the name of the Lord be re- ceived, and then by testing you know him, for you shall have understanding right and left. If that cometh be a wayfarer, help as much as you may: he shall tarry with you save two or three days if need be. But if he will abide among you, being an alien, let him labor and eat; but if he have no trade provide ac- cording to your judgment, that no man may live as a Christian among you. If he will not act thus, he is a chaff-stalk in Christ. Beware of

But whosoever comes to you, let him be first examined and then received, for ye have understanding and are able to know the right hand from the left, and to distinguish false teachers from true. But when a teacher comes to you supply him with what he wants with all readiness. And even when a false teacher comes, you shall give him for his necessity. [Ap. Const., Bk. VII, c. 28.]

II.—Every true prophet that will abide with you is worthy of maintenance. Similarly a true teacher also, like the workman, is worthy of his sustenance. Every fruit, therefore, of the wine-press and the threshing-floor and of the oxen and sheep thou shalt take and give to the prophets, for they are high-priests. But if you have no prophets, give to the poor. If you make a baking, take the first-fruit and give according to the commandment. In like manner, when opening a jar of wine or oil, take the first-fruit and give to the

Every true prophet or teacher that comes to you is worthy of his maintenance, as being a laborer in the word of righteousness. All the first-fruits of the wine-press, the threshing-floor, the oxen, and the sheep, thou shalt give to the priests. Thou shalt give the tenth of thy increase to the orphan and to the widow, and to the poor, and to the stranger. All the first-fruits of thy hot-bread, of thy barrels of wine, or oil, shalt thou give to the priests; but those of silver, and of garments, and of all sorts of possessions to the orphan

prophets; and of money, and raiment, and of every possession take the first-fruit, as may seem right to thee, and give according to the commandment.

XIV.—Coming together on the Lord's day break bread and give thanks, confessing your transgressions that your sacrifice may be pure. And let no one who has a dispute with his fellow approach with you until they be reconciled, lest your sacrifice be profaned, for this is the sacrifice spoken of by the Lord; In every place and time bring to me a clean sacrifice, for I am a great King saith the Lord, and my name is wonderful among the nations.

XV.—Appoint for yourselves bishops and deacons worthy of the Lord, men meek and not avaricious, and true and proved, for they too perform for you the functions of prophets and teachers. Therefore despise them not, for they are the ones among you honored with the prophets and the teachers.

Reprove one another not in wrath but in peace, as you have it in the Gospel. And whoever commits offence against another, let none speak to him, nor let him be a listener among you till he repent. But all your prayers and all your acts so perform as you have it in the Gospel of our Lord.

and the widow. [Ap. Const., Bk. VII., c. 29.]

On the Lord's day assemble yourselves together without fail, giving thanks to God, and praising him for those mercies God has bestowed upon you through Jesus Christ, that your sacrifice may be unspotted and acceptable to God, who has said: In every place shall incense and a pure sacrifice be offered unto me; for I am a great King, saith the Lord, and my name is wonderful among the heathen. [Ap. Const., Bk. VII., c. 30.]

A bishop shall be ordained who has been chosen by all the people, and is blameless. When the name of this one hath been named, and they have agreed, all the people shall assemble together, and the presbyters and deacons on the Lord's day, all the bishops consenting, and the presbyters standing quietly, and they all being silent together, they shall pray in their hearts that the Holy Spirit may descend upon him. And he who is worthy out of the bishops, every one standing, putteth his hand upon him whom *they have made bishop*, praying over him. [Coptic Coll., Bk. II., c. 31.]

The bishop shall be chosen by all the people; he must be without blame, as it is written in the Apostle—epistle to Timothy. In the week in which he is to be ordained, if all the people say of him, "we choose him," he is not to be molested. And they shall choose one of the bishops and one of the pres-

VI.—Watch for your life's sake. Let not your lamps go out, nor your loins be ungirt, but be ready, for you know not the hour in which the Lord cometh. Assemble oft, discussing the things pertaining to your souls, for the whole time of your faith will not avail you unless you be perfected in the last time. In the last days false prophets and corrupters shall be multiplied, and the sheep shall be turned into wolves, and love shall be turned into hate; for as lawlessness waxeth, every man will hate one another, persecute and betray, and then will appear the world-seducer, like the son of God, and he will do signs and miracles, and the earth will be given into his hands, and he will seduce them into iniquities that have never been from the beginning. Then shall the human creation come into the firing of trial, and many shall be made to stumble and shall perish, but they that abide in their faith shall be saved from this curse. And then shall appear the signs of the truth: first the sign of an opening in the sky; then the sign of a trumpet's voice; and third a resurrection of the dead, not of all, but of them that have been said: The Lord will come with all the saints with him. And all will the world see the Lord coming upon the clouds of heaven.

byters, and they shall lay their hands upon his head and pray. [The Ethiopic Coll., c. 2.]

Do you first ordain bishops worthy of the Lord, and presbyters and deacons; meek, free from the love of money, lovers of truth, approved, holy, who are able to teach the word of piety, and do ye honor such as your fathers. Reprove ye one another, not in anger, but with kindness and peace. Observe all things that are commanded you by the Lord. [Ap. Const., Bk. VII., c. 81.]

Be watchful for your life. Let your loins be girded about, and your lights burning. For at what hour they think not the Lord will come. Watch, therefore, and pray, that ye do not sleep unto death. For your former good deeds will not profit you, if at the last part of your life you go astray from the truth. For in the last days, false prophets shall be multiplied, and such as corrupt the word; and the sheep shall be changed into wolves, and love into hatred; for through the abounding of iniquity men shall hate, and persecute, and betray one another. And then shall appear the deceiver of the world, the enemy of the truth, whom the Lord Jesus shall destroy. But they that endure to the end shall be saved. And then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven; and afterwards shall be the voice of the trumpet . . . , and in that interval shall be the revival of those that were asleep. And then shall the Lord come, and all his saints with him, with a great concussion above the clouds. [Ap. Const., Bk. VII., c. 81, 82.]

These extracts from Coptic and Ethiopic Apostolic canons and constitutions are enough to show their substantial identity with the so-called "Teaching of the twelve Apostles." It does not appear from this book whether it was transcribed from a Greek manuscript then in use in the Eastern church, or translated from a Coptic, Ethiopic or Arabic copy of *Apostolic Doctrines or Ordinances*. For the same teachings in substance have been undoubtedly in use in all these languages; each probably having peculiarities approved by the local church or churches in which they were used.

Nor is there any assurance that this version of the "Teachings" corresponds with that named by Eusebius and Athanasius. Many changes have undoubtedly been introduced. Some paragraphs appear obscure or confused, as though misapprehended by the transcriber, or copied mechanically, without adequate knowledge of their meaning.

The expression in Ch. I.: "Let thine alms sweat in thy hand," is not only singular but without significance. 'Ἰδρῶα means to sweat from toil. The corresponding expression in the Constitutions is certainly more apostolic: "It is reasonable to give to all out of thine own labors" (i. e. the sweat of thy brow). Let him labor working with his hands that he may have to give to him that needeth (Eph. iv. 28). In Ch. III. occurs the word "purifier," which is without meaning in its connection; in the Coptic the proper word is undoubtedly used "magician." In Ch. VII. the direction is "baptize in running water;" and "pour water upon the head thrice." This does not mean a running stream in which the catechumen stands "ankle deep, receiving baptism by the pouring of water on his head." There is no evidence that the Eastern church ever baptized in any other way than by immersion. Anything less than being plunged thrice in the water was not regarded as baptism; so that the modern method of a single dipping has no authority from the practice of the early church. The running water is explained in the Coptic canon as water drawn or flowing into the font, which was called living water. Baptisteries, with fonts, were constructed in or near the churches at an early day. Water was conveyed into them by various devices, and if there was a scarcity of water, a suffi-

quantity was poured into the font by hand to allow the immersion of the catechumen. The baptistery connected with the Basilica of St. John Lateran is said to have been built by Constantine the Great, and was a very elaborate and costly structure. The water flowed into the font by the mouth of a golden lamb of thirty pounds weight. Into others the water flowed through an opening in one or more of the columns which surrounded them, or by some beautiful design, as the shape of a dove or the mouth of a stag. (*Dissertazioni, Anton. Giannetti*, vol. i., pp. 113, 114. Faenza, 1785.) There is no fresco painting from the Catacombs or elsewhere of a certainly ascertained date, prior to the beginning of the fourth century, which represents the ceremony of baptism. Any one familiar with the literature of the Catacombs can accept as true only circumstantial testimony or authentic cotemporary history. In the latter part of the third century, Cyprian advocated baptism by affusion in cases of infirmity or sickness; and in the Western Church this method, occasionally adopted, increased from the seventh century, but did not become universal till the thirteenth century. In the Greek Church trine immersion continued to be and is still practiced. In Ch. IX., the cup in the Lord's Supper is placed before the bread. This may indicate a change in the apostolic order of this sacrament, occasioned by a custom in the seventh or eighth century in the Greek Church, of dipping the bread in the wine and delivering both elements in a spoon. (*Hist. Ch.*, P. Schaff, vol. ii., p. 17.)

In Ch. XV., it is said, "Now appoint for yourselves bishops." The expression in the *Ap. Constitutions* is "ordain bishops;" in the *Coptic Coll.*, "A bishop shall be ordained," and has been "chosen by all the people;" in the *Ethiopic Canon*, "A bishop shall be chosen by all the people"; and the people select a bishop and presbyter to lay hands on the head of him whom they (the people) have made bishop. The Greek word translated in the *Ap. Const.*, *ordain*, occurs twice in the New Testament and in the new version is translated *appoint*. (Acts xxii. 14; xxvi. 16.) To appoint, or ordain, or consecrate a bishop were of the same significance in the early Church. The people made the bishop, and a bishop (and some-

times a presbyter) was requested by the people to sanction what they had done by the laying on of hands. Long after a hierarchy had been established, "bishops and elders were only the superintending members of the church, its guides, but not its masters." (*Hypp. and his Age*, vol. ii., p. 131.)

The "Teaching of the twelve Apostles" carries us back to the close of the third or the beginning of the fourth century; particularly showing the simple mode of the Eastern churches in preparing young persons for baptism and communion. The ethical teaching of the first six chapters are a feeble echo of New Testament instruction, adapted to the intelligence of children and to the moral wants of the times; the liturgical and other directions regarding fasting, baptism, and the Lord's Supper, in some particulars, are confused, erroneous and unscriptural, and in other respects very simple and appropriate. Those chapters which speak of the ministry give some instruction suited to a time and country in which clerical tramps and begging ascetics were possibly too numerous; the only orders spoken of are bishops and deacons, showing perhaps that the instructions were designed in this respect for churches where only one elder or bishop was required; in city churches there were often several presbyters, from whom the people elected a presiding bishop, and the people selected a bishop to confirm their choice by the laying on of hands.

This book will be useful if it incites to a more careful study of the history of the early church, and a closer conformity to real apostolic teaching.

[NOTE.—Since the foregoing article was in type, a copy of the *Journal of Christian Philosophy* has been placed in the hands of the writer, in which are several learned and interesting articles on the same subject. If, in addition to the thorough researches of Prof. Harris in the sixth article, it were possible to procure a copy of the "Ethiopic Collection," of which the writer could find only a fragment; or of the copies of the Apostolic Canons referred to by Varrsleit in his "History of the Church of Alexandria," the identity of the "Teaching" with earlier copies in use might be clearly traced.]

CHAPTER VII.—MANUAL TRAINING FOR BOYS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.*

The old tradition of the Hohenzollern family requires that every son shall learn some handicraft. The present Crown Prince is a joiner; one of his sons, if I am not mistaken, is a carpenter; and thus every member of that house who ascends the throne of Prussia possesses, in addition to his military and literary education, a purely manual education in some mechanical art.

Manual skill in joinery is thought essential to the education of a sovereign whose bank account is kept good by the income of taxes and taxation, and the greater part of whose life is devoted to military, governmental, and ceremonial affairs, it would seem not extravagant to assume that a sovereign who does not find his daily bread in the dull routine of industrial toil should be equipped with at least the rudiments of manual training. It is only within a very few years that the question of supplying such an education to the fifty millions of sovereigns who inhabit this country has even been mooted; its practical realization, save on an experimental scale, is still in the future.

There is probably a good reason for this conservatism among educators. Half a century ago the majority of the school children were the sons of farmers or small mechanics, who lived in the country towns. They attended school only a part of the year and were obliged to work with their parents the rest. Those days the family and the home made up what the school omitted. The boy was instructed by his father in whatever mechanical knowledge he himself possessed, while the girl, by assisting her mother, some acquaintance with

The author takes pleasure in acknowledging his indebtedness to Mr. J. H. Brown, Superintendent of Schools of New Haven, to Messrs. Camp and Smith, Principals of the Dwight and Skinner Grammar Schools, to Mr. J. H. Brown, Principal of the High School, to Professor Felix Adler and Mr. Bamberger of the Workingman's School in New York, and to President Walker, of the Institute of Technology, for their courtesy in giving him information and valuable suggestions.

household duties. The common school supplied merely part of the child's education and did its work well, because it did not pretend to supply more than a part.

But the times have changed. The inhabitants of our cities, which in 1790 numbered only 3.3 per cent., and which in 1820 had risen to but 4.9 per cent., now form 22.5 per cent. of the population. The parents of a large proportion of our school children no longer live in the country, engaged in occupations in which each is his own master, but many of them live in crowded tenements in the cities and work in large factories, where they are called hands and count as merely human parts of the machines which they tend. Among this class of the population it is out of the question that the sons should get from their fathers any training whatever in the mechanical arts, while the girls must acquire but a very scanty knowledge of domestic economy from the pinched and cramped house-keeping carried on by their mothers.

It is a common experience that every advance in civilization creates a new difficulty which has to be overcome by another advance, and it is undoubtedly true that the improvements in production which result from the introduction of steam power, and of machinery, and from the massing and specialization of labor, so characteristic of our time, have produced serious defects in the training of large portions of our population. The supplementary education which children formerly received at home is put beyond the reach of a large percentage of them at the present day, and though the common schools themselves make no change in their range of studies, though in their methods they may even make great progress, yet the change of circumstances is such that the children no longer get the kind of training that they used to have, and that they need. The state, whether for good or evil, finds itself called upon to enlarge its duties, in order to supply the wants of the young which the family no longer meets. And while those new conditions of industrial life are pressing their claims for recognition, new theories of education and new methods of instruction are joining in the demand for a more physical and less abstract course of study. Thus the two interests, the pedagogic and the industrial, meet on a common footing to urge a

age in the principles and methods of our public school system.

That some kind of manual training is desirable, simply as a part of the general education of a child and not as a preparation for any particular career, is generally held by the most advanced thinkers of the day and has long been conceded by the practice of those who are able to afford it. Are not children whose parents have the requisite means constantly encouraged to engage in games and sports and the exercise of small handicrafts, which train the hand and the eye, perhaps without consciousness of effort on the part of the children? As they grow older, does not every Christmas bring its quota of carpenter's benches, printing presses, scroll saws, toy ships and models, etc., to develop the mechanical faculties of the boys, and the girls are gradually initiated into the mysteries of sewing, embroidery, etc.?

Such exercises, pursued as a pastime, are thought useful and good, how much more valuable must they be when pursued with method. The whole tendency of modern education since the days of Froebel, is to introduce more and more training of the hand and the eye as a supplement to—nay, the very groundwork of the training of the mind. It is conceded, and the claim seems reasonable, that such an education not only cultivates the skill of the members so trained, but that it aids materially in the acquisition of other knowledge; that it develops observation; that it assists especially pupils who have little capacity for book-learning, but who nevertheless have decided mechanical aptitudes, by developing their latent faculties and giving them more self-reliance and energy; and the knowledge gained of materials and processes is exceedingly useful to any one, whatever his future pursuit may be.

But if some kind of manual training is a desirable element in every education, much more necessary is it in the particular education given in the public schools. The only justification for a gratuitous public school system, supported by taxation, is that it turns out good citizens and thus benefits society. A public school which strived simply to benefit the individual would be a failure, however great that benefit might be, unless

at the same time it benefited society as a whole. A system might, for instance, be so framed as to give a boy an exaggerated and enthusiastic taste for reading; it might lead him to spend all his spare moments in pouring other people's thoughts through his own mind, but never incite him to take any interest in public affairs, or to contribute anything towards increasing the world's stock of good and useful things. A public education which turned out human beings self-centered would be plainly indefensible, however much satisfaction the individuals immediately concerned might gain from it; while that education is most valuable to society as a whole which cultivates the desire for creative work, the aptitude for coöperation, and a strict sense of what is right and wrong.

It is on account of these qualities that manual training is especially useful in a public school system. It develops a fondness for work; it leads children to create, rather than to simply assimilate; it strengthens the instinct of co-operation; it brings out, in a more concrete and distinct manner than the dry maxims of abstract ethics, the difference between right and wrong; and in doing this it incidentally gives the boys in our public schools educational elements which will be of especial use to them in the careers which they will necessarily follow. Let not this argument be misunderstood; it is not claimed that the public schools ought to make carpenters or blacksmiths or farmers out of the boys; on the contrary, they ought to preserve an absolute neutrality on the subject of the different trades and to carefully avoid being in any sense technical preparatory schools. But neither ought they to give a mental outfit out of harmony with these pursuits. If it is known that the majority of the children will necessarily engage in pursuits involving the use of their hands and their eyes as much as their brains, then the public school ought to train these organs as well as the mind; for, if it fails to do this, it is practically weakening the very means upon which the child will have to rely principally for his support. The fault cannot be considered merely a negative fault of omission; it is a positive fault, since too much attention given to one set of faculties weakens, not only relatively but absolutely, the other faculties. I am aware that some eminent educators do not take this view. A

gnished authority recently said in one of our educational
als:

The critics of our educational system are never done with
g us that its results are to make the rising generation dis-
satisfied with its lot, as if this were a defect rather than the
best glory of an educational system. Man is immortal and
has an infinite destiny; this is the burden of religious teaching.
Consequence of this Christian civilization strives towards
perfection; it subdues nature and makes natural forces toil for it
to procure food and shelter for the body. It continually
drags the drone out of his vocation and says to him: I do not
value your mere bodily toil at any price; I have a machine that
does such work better than the like of you can, and at less
cost than you call starvation wages. Up, therefore, and acquire
directive intelligence, so that you can direct and manage this
machine and other machines, for presently we shall need no
mere hand labor but require all to be intelligent and
directive."*

Whether Professor Harris's view of Christian civilization is
correct or not, it certainly does not accord with the practice of
the earliest Christians. The father of the founder of Chris-
tianity was a carpenter; Paul was not ashamed of the trade of
tent-maker; and Peter did not seem to consider himself de-
graded by going back to his fishing, even after he had acquired
considerable prominence as a public exhorter. Peter did not
exercise as much "directive intelligence" as he might
have done, for, instead of organizing a syndicate for control-
ling the fishing on the Lake of Galilee and making up for its
losses by a liberal insurance on his old boats, he was so impru-
dent as to personally encounter the perils of the waves, and did
hesitate, on one occasion, to jump into the water with his
disciples on and help haul in the seine.

The fact is that, though Christian civilization may strive
towards heaven, the boys and girls who study in our schools
must live on the earth, and success in life on the earth is
obtained much more by an ability and a willingness to grapple
with the physical, concrete facts of our environment than by
an attempt to soar above them through the magic of "direct-

* Prof. W. T. Harris, in "Education" for May-June, 1888.

ive intelligence." We already have as much "directive intelligence" as we can stand; the number of speculators, organizers of schemes for making money out of government contracts, and other people who live by their wits, is quite large enough, and their careers are quite brilliant enough to excite the emulation of our boys. There is no lack of incentive in this direction: let us rather look for the antidote.

But perhaps this is not the kind of directive intelligence that Professor Harris has in mind. Perhaps he means the intelligence necessary to run a machine. If this is what he advocates, it may not be amiss to ask, if he has ever visited a cotton mill. Has he ever seen the large heads and stunted frames and pinched faces of the children who are exercising their "directive intelligence" in tending the spinning frames? Has he ever seen the worn and haggard women, old before twenty, tending the looms? If so, has he ever asked himself, whether the tending of a machine is or is not a more elevating occupation than the use of a tool? The fact is that the benefits of most machines are conferred, not on those who tend them, but upon the consumer of their product, and it is precisely on account of the ever-increasing number of people who are destined to be mere machine tenders and nothing else, that a manual education, which will give them other powers, and an intelligence, not directive but creative, is desired. Some machines, to be sure, require high intelligence, but those are precisely the ones that also require high manual skill. In short, if we try to elevate the lives of the children by shutting them off from manual training, we either condemn them to perform the most deadening kinds of mechanical work and prevent them from executing that which gives scope to thought and originality, or we drive them into the ranks of those who live by their wits.

I do not say that boys should not be educated "out of their sphere," because the phrase is misleading. But those who resent it as being something very horrible evidently do not understand what statisticians call the "law of great numbers." I cannot, for instance, predict that A., B., or C. will, during the year 1884, forget to address a letter which he throws in the letter box, but I can tell within very narrow limits how many undirected letters will be mailed in the post-offices of the

ted States. In the same way, I cannot say that an individual boy is destined to be a day laborer, or a mechanic, or a bank president, or a poet, or a statesman, but I can say that of a million the great majority will become day laborers and mechanics, and a very small minority will become bank presidents, poets, and statesmen. This is a fact gained by observation. No one has the right to say that any human being has a sphere beyond which he ought not to step. But, on the other hand, no educator has the right to ignore the fact that the great mass of mankind are confined to a certain path in life by a law as relentless as that which keeps the planets in their orbits. There may be deviations to one side or the other of that path; great social and economic catastrophes may even change its course. But at any given time and place its general direction is fixed; we have to walk in it whether they like it or not, and it is no business to them to make them dissatisfied with what is inevitable.

But the educational consideration is not the only one involved in this question. There is an economic side of the matter, which is of even greater importance, though it does not seem to have been as fully appreciated by those who have contributed to the discussion. It goes without saying that the boys who leave our public schools are very much influenced in their choice of an occupation, as far as they are able to exercise such a choice, by the ideas and aptitudes that they have imbibed at school; for, though their general path is fixed, they often choose what part of the path they will travel. If the instruction is such as to give a particular prestige to the study of books and to belittle the training of the hands, they will certainly enter upon life with a bias for occupations which exercise chiefly the brain. If their education lends dignity and credit to occupations involving manual dexterity, and if they have acquired a slight acquaintance with tools, they will be more ready and more willing to adopt a mechanical career. Now we can hardly realize the responsibility that rests upon the managers of our public schools, unless we consider the immense body of human beings whose lives may be shaped more or less by their theories. The number of children enrolled in the public schools of the United States in 1881 was 9,860,333.

The great majority of these were in the lower grades. In New Haven less than five per cent. of the children who enter the public schools graduate from the high school; and President Thompson, of Rose Polytechnic Institute, states that some years ago he found the number of pupils in the high schools of Massachusetts to be less than four per cent. of the whole number.* It has been estimated by Superintendent Hinsdale that of 108 pupils who enter the primary department in Cleveland, sixty complete the primary course, twenty the grammar school, four go as far as the second year of the high school, and one graduates from the high school. The average age of pupils withdrawing from the public schools of St. Louis is $13\frac{1}{2}$ years.† Thus, though a large number of pupils probably fall off on account of sickness or death, it may be fairly assumed that a majority leave the schools, because they are obliged to do something towards earning their own living. Over a million children between the ages of 10 and 15 years were engaged in some kind of lucrative work in 1880.

These children, in most cases, are obliged to do whatever offers itself first. They have, as a rule, no particular aptitudes beyond those that they have acquired at school, consequently they naturally go into occupations in which their school education is of most value, that is to say, those which do not require manual skill but simply an elementary education; they become factory hands, office boys, etc., while the more fortunate ones who can stay longer at school become clerks, book-keepers, salesmen, etc. The consequence is that those occupations are glutted and wages in them low, while the market for skilled mechanics is often barely supplied and wages comparatively high, in spite of the large annual immigration from Europe.

It cannot, of course, be claimed that the public schools are alone responsible for this state of things. Social forces without doubt act very powerfully. Most people prefer an occupation which is clean and quiet, which involves no great muscular exertion, and which enables them to wear good clothes, to one which is sooty and unpleasant and hard. But, if a given cause

* High School Index, February 9, 1884, page 89.

† Professor C. M. Woodward in "Education" for Jan.-Feb., 1884.

is to produce a certain effect, and if in any place we find the cause and the effect present, it is only fair to assume the effect is due, in part, at least, to the cause, even though other causes may also have contributed to produce it; and although but a small proportion of the pupils of the public schools may be influenced in their choice of a pursuit by the thing of the schools, yet the number of persons in the aggregate who are influenced thereby is very large.

It must be remembered that the public schools have a power hence a responsibility that private and self-sustaining schools do not have. The law of supply and demand reacts on the private schools immediately, and if there ceases to be demand for the particular kind of education that they furnish, it shows itself speedily in their receipts, and a change is made to meet the new demand. But the pupils who attend the public schools have, as a rule, no choice; they must take that education or none, and the managers have, therefore, no such check of the usefulness of their work. If, then, these schools have the power of influencing the careers of their graduates, they have assumed, they have the power of influencing the rates of wages in large departments of industry, and they have power upon which there is no self-acting check, upon which there is no restraint excepting the wisdom and insight of the managers. The fact is that in our public school system we have a species of what would be called in Europe "state socialism"—a socialism of which its administrators are, perhaps, themselves not fully conscious, and the exercise of which for that reason, all the more beset with dangers. And the more the teachers of our schools coöperate and hold conventions and contribute to periodicals and become acquainted with each other's methods, the greater, in short, the tendency towards uniformity in the public school systems of different countries, the greater, of course, the results of any false policy they may agree upon. Hence it is necessary to regard fully all the effects, even remote, of the system and to detect the economic as well as the pedagogic evils that may be hidden in it.

For that very reason, however, one must be especially cautious in making suggestions for practical execution in the

schools and especially slow about adopting new theories, for it is certainly better to put up with an existing system, which, though it may have its faults, has yet served us well for many a decade, than to rush into new experiments, of whose dangers we are not yet fully aware. Let us, therefore, instead of endeavoring to suggest any specific change in our common school system, first look at some of the experiments which have tried to carry out, on a small scale, the general principles here advocated.

The most important of the pioneers of manual instruction is the Free Workingman's School, on Fifty-fourth street, New York. This is a private charity, but it aims to cover in its curriculum the years covered by the ordinary grammar schools and to give its pupils essentially the same education. It draws its pupils, too, from the same classes from which the grammar schools are mainly recruited. Thus, whatever results are reached in this school in New York will apply equally to grammar schools in other large cities. The principles and theories on which this institution is conducted have been ably presented by Prof. Felix Adler in the *Princeton Review*, but its practical methods are, we believe, not so widely known.

The school was opened in 1879. Its course is intended to cover eight years, but thus far only five classes have been organized; three-eighths of the scheme exist, therefore, as yet only on paper.

In the plan followed there, industrial or manual education begins with the very first year, that is to say, with children seven or eight years of age. The material they work upon is at first only clay, and their exercises are very simple; they are employed chiefly in cutting small slabs of clay into geometrical forms with even edges, and in carving out upon the surface other geometrical forms. From these they are led to learn concretely and by actual trial a great many of the fundamental principles of Geometry. The clay work occupies two hours a week for the first two years. As the children's hands become stronger and more skillful, they take up a harder material and practice on pasteboard. In their clay studies they learned only the principles of plane Geometry; in their pasteboard studies they are obliged to construct solids, and, having constructed

em, to analyze them and study their properties. This is a lesson in drawing as well as cutting, for they are obliged first to draw the objects and afterwards to reproduce them from their own drawings. After this the children are promoted to wood and again are obliged, while using the chisel and saw in the production of geometrical forms, to ascertain the mathematical truths which those forms illustrate. They are then led to perform more difficult manipulations, such as using a lathe in making handles for their tools, making wheels and carts, and all pieces of furniture, and a variety of articles.

In the latter years of the course, which have not as yet been entered upon, it is expected to initiate the scholars into the properties of iron, to teach them how to make various things of metal, and even how to draw and construct from their own drawing a complete model steam engine.

These exercises represent only the mechanical side of manual education; the artistic side is cultivated simultaneously by free-hand drawing and modeling in clay, and all this goes on side by side with the regular studies of the common school.

At first sight one gets the impression that more is put upon the children than they can possibly master, but the principal of this school has assured me that under this system the children acquire more easily and more effectually than under the ordinary system, and that, far from being backward in their regular studies, they are actually assisted in them by the attention given to manual work. He says that a comparison between the pupils of this school and those of similar grades of the public schools shows that the former are not able to quote as many rules by memory as the latter, but that, when called upon to do anything that involves the application of the rule, they are very ready, while the latter are almost helpless.

This is, probably, the most complete experiment in this direction that has yet been made, but the ideas that it involves are rapidly being taken up by the managers of our public schools, and have been applied in a number of cases, though in a fragmentary and incomplete manner.

Instruction in carpentry, was established in the public schools of Gloucester, Mass., in the fall of 1880, the necessary funds

being supplied by private benevolence. In December, 1881, classes were organized in the Dwight School in Boston, and in New Haven two of the grammar schools (the Dwight and Skinner Schools) started similar classes last fall. The methods followed in these three cities seem to be essentially the same; a description of what is being done in New Haven will, therefore, serve equally well as a description of what is done in Boston and Gloucester.

New methods of instruction have for some time found a home in the New Haven schools, a great deal of attention being devoted, especially in the younger classes, to object teaching, and the instruction in drawing being carried to a high degree of excellence. All these innovations are steps in the direction of manual training. A further step was taken last fall, when two of the grammar schools were allowed to introduce instruction in the use of carpenters' tools. As the school board appropriated only one hundred dollars for this purpose for the two schools, the experiment could not have been tried, were it not for the private enterprise and enthusiasm of the principals of these schools, assisted by the public spirit and skill of their respective janitors, who happen to be practical mechanics and are willing to take charge of the classes at a remuneration at which it would be impossible to engage a regular teacher.

In each of these schools a portion of the basement has been set aside as a carpenter's shop and fitted up with a dozen carpenters' benches, each one equipped with a set of simple tools, chiefly hammers, saws, planes, chisels, bits, and braces. One of them has a turning lathe, which has been put in by the janitor.

The equipment is, of course, not expensive or elaborate, and the room is not sufficient to accommodate more than a small fraction of the scholars. The principals, therefore, have adopted the plan of selecting twelve of the best pupils from the higher classes. This squad of twelve works in the shop for an hour on three days of the week; a similar squad is selected to occupy the alternate days.

The exercises are intended merely to give the boys a fair knowledge of the principal carpenter's tools, the first lesson teaching them simply how to strike a square blow with a

hammer. For this purpose a board is ruled into squares, and the pupil is required to strike with a hammer in the center of each of these squares, the indentation made by the head showing whether the blow has been struck evenly and in the proper place. The next step is to learn how to drive a nail, to set a nail, and to do all kinds of fancy nailing. Little by little the pupil is taught to use a jack plane; to make an even surface on a piece of pine; to make the square edge on a board. Then he learns the use of the chalk line, then of the saw. Then he learns how to chamfer; he then begins to make mortises; and thus, little by little, he masters the principal elementary operations of the carpenter.

These classes have as yet been at work only a few months in our public schools, and yet the boys have already learned how to make picture frames, boxes, and other simple pieces of joinery with great neatness.

While the members of this select class are working in the basement, their fellows are engaged in the regular school room exercises up-stairs, so that their gain in manual skill might, at first sight, seem to be made at the expense of a loss in the studies of the school. The principals have assured me, however, that nothing of the kind has as yet been perceptible in the scholarship of the boys who work in the shop. As in most cases the best scholars are selected for this instruction (which therefore becomes a kind of premium upon scholarship), it is natural that they should be able to make up by extra study what they lose of the school room exercises. But it is the opinion of their teachers that they do not only make up what they lose but more than make it up; that is to say, that they do better in their studies for spending part of their time in manual labor. This judgment is confirmed by the statement made by the principal of the Dwight School, in Boston, at the end of the first year's experiment of manual labor in that institution. He says: "I consider that the results go far to prove that manual training is so great a relief to the iteration of the school work, that it is a positive benefit, rather than a detriment, to the course of the other studies."

This verdict agrees also with the judgment of Mr. Bamberger, of the Workingman's School, in New York. It will

be noticed, however, that the experiment tried in our public schools is very different from that which is carried on in New York, because only one set of tools is used by the children, only the larger children take part in the work, and, again, only a select few of those larger children; so that manual training is in no sense an essential element of the instruction; it is an appendage, rather than a part of the fiber, of the common school system.

But, while the experiments that have been tried in the direction of manual training fully confirm the belief in its value, founded upon general principles, they also suggest certain dangers, which must be guarded against, and certain limitations, to which such training is necessarily subject.

The greatest danger is that the instruction will be one-sided and will thus fall into the very error which we have criticised in the present methods. The experiments that have been tried in New Haven and Boston are not free from this criticism. If the pupils are instructed exclusively in the use of carpenters' tools, there can be no doubt that they will enter upon life with a bias for becoming carpenters rather than anything else, and, though the effect of this may be very small in each individual, or even in each school, the effect, if the system were carried out all over the country, would undoubtedly be quite considerable, and the complaints which are now made against the competition of prison labor would soon be heard against the inordinate production of carpenters in our public schools. In order that the instruction should be free from this great danger, it should be carried on in a number of different materials and should be so incorporated with the other instruction as not to produce in the pupils the consciousness of any special training for special vocations.

A serious limitation in any new move in this direction is the expense. The experiments that have been tried in New Haven have been carried out under especially favorable circumstances, the janitors of the schools in which manual training is given being willing to give their services for very little, and the plan being carried through by the public spirit of a few individuals. It evidently could not be introduced as a general feature of our schools without large cost. Mr. Page, of the Boston Dwight

school, estimates the cost of instructing two hundred boys in the elements of joinery, two hours a week for one year, at \$650, or \$8.25 for each pupil. If to this we add the interest on the plant required, we should have to allow an annual outlay of \$8.50 for each pupil.

On this estimate such training, if introduced into the public schools of New Haven for all boys between 10 and 16 years of age, would amount to nearly \$20,000 a year, and even then we could take no account of the outlay necessary for increased room. At present the work in carpentering is carried on in a part of the basement not otherwise used. It is probable that the general introduction of such training would necessitate additional school room; certainly, if it were introduced with anything like the completeness attained in the New York Workman's School, the necessary addition to our school accommodations would be very great indeed.

We have not been able to make an accurate calculation of just what additional room would be needed, but the clay work requires a room to itself, and so does the work in carpentering and turning, and it is very desirable that a separate room be set apart for drawing. These rooms can be made to do duty for a large number of pupils by allowing them to be occupied in rotation by different classes and thus kept in use the greater part of the day. But we should probably have to allow for every grammar school two or three additional rooms to be used exclusively for these purposes. It is not to be expected, therefore, that so radical a change will be introduced at once, and it is to be hoped that, before our public schools commit themselves irrevocably to industrial training, experience will have suggested methods by which its results may be obtained at a small expense.

There are many questions allied to this one and, in fact, intimately connected with it, that cannot be enlarged upon within the limits of this article. One is the establishment of industrial high schools, like the Manual Training School of Washington University, Saint Louis, in which the boys are prepared distinctively for the career of mechanics. The establishment of such schools as a part of the common school system has been discussed a good deal in Boston and met with much

favor there, such men as President Walker and Professors Runkle and Ordway, of the Institute of Technology, strongly advocating the plan. A discussion of this subject would take us beyond our present limits. It must be noticed, however, that if the state endeavors to establish technical schools, it undertakes a task very different from that of managing the common schools, and one of which the justification is much more difficult. It is generally agreed that the State ought to furnish such an education as will turn out good citizens, but whether it ought at the same time to turn out good carpenters and good machinists, is another question.

Another allied topic is the manual education of girls. This subject presents peculiar difficulties and problems of its own. The number of occupations open to women, outside of house-keeping and the care of a family, is comparatively small. Of the 18,025,627 females over ten years of age returned in the census of 1880, only 2,647,157, or about one-seventh, were put down as having some gainful occupation, and of these nearly one million were household servants, while of the males about seven-ninths were earning money. The majority of women, therefore, are occupied with household duties in homes of their own, and we must assume that the education which will be of most value to the greatest number is an education framed with reference to such duties. To introduce any training in them into a public school is, however, a matter of great difficulty. The gentlemen who have with so much devotion and enthusiasm introduced manual training for boys into the public schools of New Haven have not shrunk from establishing a parallel course for girls, and while the twelve best boys are working at their carpenters' benches in the cellar, the twelve best girls are engaged in needlework up-stairs. A class has also been formed even in cooking, but as our school buildings are not yet furnished with the appliances of a first-class restaurant, these studies have necessarily been conducted by the girls in their own homes, and the school has acted simply in the capacity of an examining board. The examination then takes the form of a lunch served up to the school board and the friends of new methods in education by the young ladies of the school.

While education in these branches is useful, the range which

an occupy is necessarily limited, and the difficulties connected with its practical instruction are numerous. It is certainly very desirable that the girls who visit the public school should acquire a fondness and an aptitude for household duties. This matter is of vital social importance, the health and well-being of those who may become their husbands and of the children that they may bring into the world being dependent on such knowledge to a degree that is, perhaps, not commonly appreciated by those who suffer most from its absence; the practical introduction of the necessary training involves many difficulties to be discussed in this place. When the problem of supplying the boys with the needed forms of manual training has been satisfactorily solved, our educators will be better prepared to attack the equally important problem of making good housewives of the girls.

ARTICLE VIII.—THE CONTEST AS IT IS TO-DAY.

IN actual warfare maps are as necessary as bullets and battalions. Generals have their military charts, drawn with all possible detail and accuracy, on which are marked the position of the troops opposed to them and the situation of their own forces. The people also have their outline maps of the war by which they obtain a clearer conception of the conflict that is going on. So in the moral warfare which the Christian hosts are waging with the hosts of sin and error, something of this sort might be useful in presenting the contest as it is to-day, so that it could be the more easily grasped and the better apprehended. We propose therefore in the present Article to give a map of the moral battle-field—not a military chart, which our captains might use to guide their movements, but an outline simply of the present religious situation which may serve, perhaps, to give to those of us who are not captains of the Lord's hosts, but only soldiers, some general idea of the forces opposed to us and of what we are doing to subdue or capture them.

In the Iliad of the Bible is represented, as in a mighty drama, the great contest in which we are engaged to-day. As we read it we seem borne to some celestial height from whence we look down through rolling mists on the battle that is passing. Supernal and infernal powers engage in the struggle, and the movements of human action are dimly seen amid the glory and the terror of the supernatural agencies which surround them. The world above participates in the events below. The temple of God is opened in heaven; seals are broken, trumpets are sounded, and vials poured out which rule the changes of the conflict. The world beneath moves upward upon the scene of action. From the bottomless pit ascend pestilential vapors; evil creeping things come forth; the atmosphere is charged with the elements of tempest and death. The powers of darkness emerge and join issue with the armies of heaven. The Old Serpent is on one side, as the

omb, the Head and Redeemer of mankind, is on the other. What is the meaning of this wild scene? As with mingled awe and elevation of mind we view these ever active, ever changing forms of good and evil, we apprehend somewhat the nature and scope of the contest. We perceive that the contest is between the kingdom of light and darkness, and that the whole earth is the battle-field whereon they have engaged. We perceive also that the issue of the struggle is victory to the heavenly hosts and the human race. But we cannot understand the mingled forms of good and ill, or discern any plan in the confusion around us.

So do we look out upon the world to-day. We behold the same battle-field and the same contest—the same to-day as yesterday and to-morrow—and can detect no general plan in the movements of human action, and can perceive but little order in the religious situation. The confusions of the times, the rolling mists of conflict, seem to us as great to-day as ever. There is a tremendous agitation of the world everywhere under the impact of new and mighty forces, material, intellectual, moral, and political, thrown into its life. Old forms are disintegrating under the pressure of this cold, critical, glacial age. The fabric of human polity is threatened by the political interference of cultured circles, as well as by socialists, communists, nihilists—precursors perhaps of that Lawless One who will be revealed when the upheaval of human government has reached its crisis. In the world of religious thought there is the same disturbance and disintegration. It is impossible to disguise the fact that a large number of thoughtful men in our midst are doubting or denying the special teachings and claims of the gospel, and that the resistance to Christianity presented at this time in Christian countries is more subtle and serious than ever. Meanwhile the speculation, if not the unbelief, of the age is disturbing the Church and distracting the counsels of its leaders. Old faiths must be set in new lights, and the foundations of our holy revelation must be explored, and not undermined. Thus it has come to pass that some of our wisest fear that our theological system is breaking up and the settlement of ages endangered.

We do not ourselves share altogether in these gloomy fore-

bodings, and may as well say here as anywhere that the contest as it is to-day is neither with Dornerism nor with the New Theology. The main purpose of these seems to be to commend Christianity to every man's conscience in the sight of God. And this places them, and those who advocate them, somewhere on the Christian side. For it must be ours as Christians to be on the side of reason and conscience, where the saints of all ages ever have been found. Let the brethren of the New Departure alone then. Let them return to what they call a more ethical, Biblical, and catholic conception of Christianity. Let them face, as they say, the new issues, meet the new providential demands, and push their forces within the range of modern denials. But the whole army need not alter its front of battle to follow them, or heed their cry for a change of base. There is too much crying aloud on both sides of the camp during the present crisis, one for a change of base, the other to "hold the fort," or all is imperiled. This serves to show however the increasing uncertainty and confusion of the times, and the increasing danger which they offer to the Christian cause.

Amid this disturbance and confusion we apprehend that the forces of evil are advancing upon us in three main divisions, which we shall be old-fashioned enough to call the World, the Flesh, and the Devil.

Christianity is invading the world. The hosts of truth no longer shut up within their ancient strongholds are deploying their forces on the open battle-field and advancing to possess the earth. The progress of the gospel in heathen lands is the most hopeful sign on the religious horizon. But the World is also invading Christianity. It moves on us with all the momentum of its vast mass and with all the strength of its powerful organization. The civil powers—kings, and princes, and municipalities and constitutional majorities—are on its side; Paganism, Papacy, Mormonism, and priestcraft everywhere, lend it their aid; the secular press is its ally, and the wealth of the earth is under its control. It advances upon us with all the energy of its evil principles and bad customs; with all its cares and riches and pleasures and glories; with all its culture and progress and advanced civilization; with all its oppor-

ties for self-indulgence and luxurious living. Never before was its power so great and its temptations so dazzling manifold as at the present hour. The World!—this is the great power of the kingdom of darkness that is now opposed to the kingdom of Light. It is not materialism in thought so much as materialism in life—without God in the world—that opposes Christianity to-day. This is the main obstacle which workers are encountering in their labors. This is the main danger we have to fear for the churches and ourselves. Like a malarial fever, like a pestilential vapor from the pit, it saps the strength of Christian life among us and decimates our numbers. The Church is doubtless losing a larger proportion of its strength and numbers under this new and more subtle attack of the World than it did when confronted with the secular persecuting power.

We hardly know what the Christian hosts are doing to resist this mighty array of evil, headed up by Mammon, and feel sometimes that we are helpless before it except as our help comes from our heavenly allies. We are doing something indeed to check the spirit of mammon in our midst by multiplying the number of our beneficences. While the contest brings us within the sphere of this evil influence we had better take frequent doses of the medicine of liberality, increase our contributions and give until the spirit of gain is mortified within us. For the rest we can perhaps do no more than antagonize the world instead of patronize it, and cry aloud more earnestly that the world passes away and the lust thereof, but he that does the will of God abides forever.

The second grand division of the hosts of evil is marching under the banner of the Flesh. Here is found opposing Christianity that sensuous, sensual fleshiness of fallen human nature; that gross animalism of mankind—its lust and passion and its more delicate forms of self-indulgence in luxury and personal ornament, as well as all kinds of outbreaching sin. This is the centre of the great army of the powers of darkness. Upon it rest the other divisions—its two mighty and active wings are worldliness and infidelity. Here is where we encounter the great, dead weight of indifference or insensibility to eternal things which like the force of inertia overcomes our efforts to

lift men to the life that is hid with Christ in God. Nor is this division of the powers of darkness passive. The corruption and depravity of the flesh not only passively resists but actively opposes the spirit. It moves on us through the encroachments of self-indulgence upon piety, through the development of luxurious habits, through the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes, and the love of personal adornment, but above all through the love of strong drink. We cannot dwell upon the mighty opposition which this terrible centre of Satan's army headed up by Alcohol presents to the progress of Christ's kingdom, nor speak at length of what is being done to resist it. In this quarter of the battle-field we have perhaps the clearest tokens of progress. The Christian forces are seen to be in motion; social and moral reforms are being pressed; the churches are becoming working churches, and new arms of service have been organized, notably the Young Men's Christian Association and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union. The recent movement to enlist the children of our common schools on the side of good morals by the introduction of text-books in moral science is also noteworthy. If we are to succeed in this great struggle we must be willing to use and develop these new arms of service, make the most of our Christian women and young men, and never overlook the children. We shall draw near the day of decisive victory when we concentrate our best efforts upon the latter and look after them with that continued attention we now give to those of riper years.

We have now glanced at the right wing and centre of the hosts of darkness. Come we then to the left wing of the enemy, which we have called the Devil, partly because we should make large account of the personal influence of that Old Serpent, the Adversary, and partly because we have intended here to speak about infidelity and presume the prince of this world regards this as the weak side of his battle array and therefore takes it under his special leadership. For the World and the Flesh may be left largely to themselves to cope with our infirmities, whereas the legions of error are confronted directly by the Word of God, and therefore need the assistance of satanic cunning and perversion. At least we

now that in the beginning the Devil appeared on this wing of the battle opposing the Word, saying, "Ye shall not surely die," which is warrant enough for placing him here, as we must place him somewhere. So then to what we have to say about the contest as it is to-day with infidelity.

The holy truth of revelation has three vital points—the Divine Existence, the Divine Incarnation, and the Divine Authority of the Scriptures,—for these are essential to the system. Against the first and last of these, which form the two wings of Christian doctrine, the dark champions of error are now waging their hottest assaults.

The truth of the Divine Existence is attacked to-day by a modern atheism which loudly declares that modern science by its discovery of the principle of the conservation of energy,* affords no occasion whatever to believe in God, and by an agnostic atheism which agrees with the former that there is no scientific occasion for God, although it allows there may be some occasion to believe in an Absolute, which however can never be known. Such atheism as this, boldly advocated by many popular in scientific circles, has never been tolerated before. The ancient skepticism, like that of Lucretius, denied supernatural government of the world and a future life, but it still believed in the Gods who dwelt in the regions of eternal peace from which descended the divine peace into the minds of men. The infidelity of the eighteenth century did not throw away belief in the living God. The atheism of Von Helmholtz called forth the indignant protest of Voltaire and the passionate remonstrance of Rousseau. But the scientific atheists of the nineteenth century believe neither in God nor in themselves, neither in their conscience nor their intuitions.

The conservation of energy as a universal principle is still unproved. Each of the three hypotheses that have been put forth to explain the force of gravitation involves a constant expenditure of force. Le Sage's theory of the continual bombardment of ultra mundane corpuscles requires that the impact shall be greater than the rebound, else the heavenly bodies will not be driven, i. e. attracted, together. The hypothesis of the generation or absorption of fluid requires not only constant expenditure of work in emitting fluid under pressure, but actual creation and destruction of matter. That of waves requires some agent in a remote part of the universe capable of generating the waves.—*Encyc. Brit.*, 1890, vol. III.—Attraction.

God, they have no scientific place for, man is only the temporary development of material forces, conscience the reflex of experience and fashion, reason man's mode of looking at things so long as he lasts. Such collapse of faith as this, which buries not only God but personality and science itself in the primordial mists of blind materialism, need not be greatly feared and may be safely left to work its own destruction. For it cannot long be forgotten that science is the product of human thinking, and if we do not assign for man and his thinking some ground of authority more permanent than that they are the temporary product of material force science itself must sink and disappear. Archimedes could not move the world from its base with his lever because he could not find any place on which to stand. So neither will the atheistic materialism of the present day move the doctrine of the Divine Existence from its foundation while it finds no authority for its own scientific denials to stand upon save the thoughtless mist of nebulous matter. Let no one apprehend that the scientific atheists of the day with all their burnished microscopes can long withstand the hosts of truth. It is not the men who see but those who think that rule and govern the thought of the world. And those who think are massing themselves against the new materialistic philosophy, as men of thought have ever done against the old ones of the past, and it already begins to "wax old as doth a garment." Meanwhile we are doing well to stick to the argument from design as John Stuart Mill advised us, and as we are doing to the evident discomfort of the enemy. Mr. Huxley betrays irritation in speaking of those "who cannot understand the eye except by supposing that it was made to see with." Like the Frenchmen whom Goethe ridiculed, he thinks perhaps that the eye is explained by the division and analysis of its parts, and the universe by its dissection into star dust. But others well feel that work done like that which has made the eye was thoughtfully done, and that this great cosmos, whose wonderful order and perfection the eye reveals, whether it were framed or evolved, had an intelligent Architect or Evolver. We are doing better perhaps by opposing the science of man to the science of matter. Best of all we are pressing the truth of the immanence of God in

world of matter and in the human mind home upon the science and intuitions of men, for this is the scriptural method of warfare.

There is little danger to the right wing of Christian doctrine in these attacks upon it from the extreme left wing of infidelity, or from pantheism either. Pantheism equally with materialism denies the fundamental dicta of man's conscience and intuitions. There is no ledge for the foot in it or any other system of error, upon the slope towards material atheism. If foes are at the bottom of the abyss or are sliding thither, the Christian hosts may calmly face their desperate and vain efforts to storm the heights of the truth of the divine existence. Can they as calmly face the concessions of some of our leaders who affirm that the Bible sanctions the development theory, saying: "First the blade, then the ear, after that full corn in the ear," and declare that the doctrines of Huxley and Darwin have come to stay? These concessions do not affect the theistic arguments for the Divine Existence, but do they strengthen the Christian doctrines of the Divine Incarnation and the Divine Authority of the Scriptures? It is against these, and especially the latter bulwark of Christianity, that the assaults of material evolution are practically directed. What becomes of the teaching and therefore the authority of the Bible if it be true that all forms of life on the globe, man included, have developed from one or a few forms by natural selection? The Christian is to be pitied who dreads more to be thought unscientific than unscriptural. And those Christians who really believe that the development theory has now been proved so far at least as to be a working hypothesis, should seriously consider what the Scriptures teach regarding man and his moral history. Our real champions exposing the scientific frivolity of the present day which has no difficulty in the evolution of man from some primeval ape. They are pressing the truth that it is impossible to demonstrate the natural evolution of organic life from inorganic matter, and that we can only explain this by a creative act; but if there has been one creative act in the origin of life, there may be another in the origin of man. They are showing likewise that the real facts which have been found in

the investigation of primitive man, show him to be man in the fullest sense of the term; that the gulf between him and the other species is as wide and impassable to-day as ever; and that we can only explain the introduction of man with the law of conscience which transcends all the laws of nature as the Scriptures do, especially in their account of the creation of woman, by saying that he was formed by a fresh creative fiat of the Almighty and is a part of the supernatural which lies at the foundation of the Bible.

It is becoming clear at least to the enemies of Scripture that the Bible stands or falls with the doctrine of a first man made man by the fiat of God. For if made by natural selection through the reproduction of brute beasts without conscience, without intuitions, then the Scriptures are in fatal error, not simply with regard to man's advent on the globe, but in all their doctrines concerning his original and present spiritual condition, the method of his recovery and his future destiny—that is their entire system of spiritual teaching, for which they were confessedly given, is at fault. Hence it is that they have shown of late such intense interest in glacial eras and stone arrow-heads and the Preadamites. And we may welcome their assiduity, for all the facts which now leap to light, even the skulls that were buried in the so-called gravel beds of the Pliocene, show with increasing clearness that man in the beginning was man in the fullest sense of the word, that his origin is recent and supernatural and that his history is in accordance with the scriptural record. And it also begins to grow clear to the Christian hosts that here upon the arena of the doctrine concerning man, the battle is being fought which shall overthrow the present atheistic culture and bury it in the drifts where it is now fighting and digging, as well as establish triumphantly the authority of the Scriptures. For it is the special weakness and danger of the agnostics of the present day that they do not know themselves as well as do not know God.

The Divine Authority of Scripture has little to fear from the present biblical criticism. The investigations of Baur into the origin of the New Testament and the history of the apostolic age, as well as the attacks of the mystical school he founded, have resulted in a triumphant victory for the genu-

ness of the New Testament and the reality of the persons whom it presents for our contemplation. And the investigations of Robertson Smith and others into the genuineness of the historical and priestly writings of the Old Testament will not be the same. There is no longer any Tubingen school, and there will also be no Edinburgh school. The New Testament can take care of the Old. Meanwhile if we let these distinctnesses alone they will go on beating down one another, every man's sword against his fellow, and will melt away. The authority of Scripture is endangered more by the loose, irrelevant manner of handling it on the part of some of our leaders, than by the efforts of others to clothe it with such infallibility as shall forbid any appeal to man's conscience and reason. We must hold that the Scriptures—all of them as we have them—are the Word of God to man, and that when rightly interpreted they are complete, authoritative, final. But we must insist that the limits of religious thought do not forbid the application to Scripture of the moral laws which the Author of revelation has written on the human conscience. The living truths of Christianity must be made to speak the language that convinces the reason and conscience as read in the nature of man. This is perhaps the hardest task before us, not to make a new departure, not to return to a more biblical theology, but to endeavor to commend the truth of our holy religion to every man's conscience in the sight of God. This is to establish the Divine Authority of the Scriptures. For the gospel has essential relations to conscience—the same to-day as always. It proves its Divine Authority, and its inspiration, by finding man in the depths of his sins and his heart.

The third vital point of the Christian system is the Divine Incarnation. This is the central truth of Christianity. When our great Leader and Commander said to Peter's confession, "thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," that on this rock he would build his church, he indicated the supreme importance of this truth in active Christian warfare. It is the center of our battle-array. Here we are piercing the ranks of error and invading the world. To this there is now opposed simply the denial of the supernatural. The rationalistic theories of Paulus have had their day, the mystical theories of

Strauss have gone down beneath the proof of the historic Christ. There remains only the denial of Renan and others, based upon the assumed impossibility of the supernatural. Here however we encounter the strongest opposition, for belief in the supernatural is undoubtedly the great stumbling block to the spirit of the age, and have to meet the combined forces of infidelity. However much they may differ on other matters, all ranks of unbelief are agreed in declaring the supernatural is impossible. For this unproved assertion, put forward as though it were a self-evident truth, lies at the bases of the more important modern philosophical systems, and is regarded as an axiom by the materialists and rationalists, and skeptics of the present day. But here we should not give an inch. We should hold that nothing is so firmly established as the supernatural because the very life of faith we live, and which we are so perfectly conscious of living, is essentially supernatural. It is fatal to assume as some of our leaders have done, that miracles merely belong to the outworks of Christianity, and even though these fall the essential truths remain. On the contrary, as Christlieb says, "If we banish the supernatural from the Bible there is nothing left but its covers."

This modern negation of the supernatural is met by the whole line of Christian truth. It is shown to be frivolous by the philosophical necessity for postulating the metaphysical with the physical. It is shown to be in vain by the scientific necessity for assuming creative acts in the formation of organic life and the introduction of man with the law of conscience upon the arena of the world as well as by indubitable evidences that the universal laws, or developments, of nature are broken by startling exceptions at certain points within the sphere of life itself. Thus, for example, water alone among all forms of matter on the globe expands while a fluid after reaching a certain temperature under the abstraction of heat. At 4° Cent. from the point of solidification it reaches its maximum density and expands as it cools till it becomes ice. Were this wonderful behavior of water observed but once, it would be as plain a miracle as the rising of an axe to the surface of a river; yet notwithstanding it occurs repeatedly it is no less a wonder—a sign and witness of the presence of the supernatural in the

kingdom of nature, for upon this break in the development of nature depends the very existence of nature itself as found on the globe. The water, therefore, in another wonderful sense, "bears witness on earth" to the supernatural and the Divine Sonship of Jesus Christ.*

But this denial of the supernatural is met most effectively by the unanswerable argument of the supernatural character and life of Christ. The last veil of skepticism concerning the historic Christ, through the searching criticism of the last few years, has been withdrawn. The person of Jesus, together with his matchless life, his unapproachable character, and his divine claims stand forth to-day in whitest light upon the page of history. In vain does Renan magnify Jesus as the best and greatest of the sons of men, while he rejects his supernatural claims. Either Christ was the Divine Son of the living God which should come into the world, or else he was the worst of the deceiving and self-deceived impostors of our race. This is the alternative and the unchanging issue. The Christian hosts are pressing this alternative with decisive results wherever conscience and thinking are in fashion. Let us continue to press forward this centre of our battle array. For Christ is not only the Divine answer to the modern denial of the supernatural but is also the substance of Christianity itself. Whoever truly believes in him will believe in God and in the authority of the Scriptures. Let us press him also as the Divine answer to all human questionings, especially that deepest, most vital question which conscience puts to every heart, "Who shall

* Water is not the only break in the laws of nature. The muscular fibres of the heart are of the transversely striped variety. All muscular fibres of this class save those of the heart are under the control of the will, and are therefore called voluntary muscular fibres. But the striped fibres of the heart are involuntary—the will exercises no control whatever over their contractility. It is by virtue of this singular and unique exception to the laws of physiological development that the heart is both enabled to perform its functions and preserved from ceasing them altogether under those minor casualties and disturbances to which animal life is constantly exposed. Thus this exception within the sphere of man's very existence, plainly points towards One who is the fountain of life, and shows that the uniformity of the development of nature's laws on which the assumption of the impossibility of the supernatural depends is not absolute.

save me from sin and death?" Then shall the hosts of infidelity, paganism, and sin be broken, and the world confess: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God."

This day of victory may still be distant. Not all at once, as we may see in the Apocalypse, do things melt into the peace of the kingdom of God. Vials yet may have to be poured out and judgments descend and the winepress be trodden and the kings of the earth join their armies with the forces of death and hell to battle against the Lamb that was slain and the armies of heaven. But toward the consummation of the kingdom of God the Christian hosts and the purposes of heaven are steadily going. Signs of the coming day are on the horizon. Skepticism has reached the bottom of the abyss and there must come presently a favorable reaction. Knowledge is growing, charity is growing, and faith and hope abide. The several divisions of the Christian army, long separated from one another and cooped up within their respective strongholds, are uniting their forces on the open battle-field, and preparing for a combined assault upon the enemy all along the line. The Church is in motion. It is looking out upon the world and is gathering enthusiasm from the prospect of its possession. The battle-plain is widening. The hosts of truth are marching towards the ends of the earth where angels hold the corners. Soon will come the last struggle and the final victory when there shall be heard great voices in heaven and earth saying, "The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ, and He shall reign forever and ever."

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

CREATION.*—The intent of this book is admirable, and the spirit in which the intent is carried out is both reasonable and devout. The attempt to reconcile the narrative of creation as given in Gen. i–ii. 3, with the cosmogonic theories which have grown up through the development of modern physics and geology, has been frequently made by distinguished students of science and theology. Few of these attempts, however, have been more worthy of respectful attention, and even of the hope that they might prove successful, than this one of Professor Guyot. The author tells us in the preface that the outlines of his scheme “flashed upon” his mind as long ago as 1840. The scheme itself had already become somewhat widely known through reports of lectures, articles in review of these lectures, but especially through the celebrated *Manual of Geology* of Professor J. D. Dana, who, according to Professor Guyot’s statement, has “endorsed” his view “almost in full.”

No one but a trained geologist is competent thoroughly to criticize the positions of the author so far as they rest upon grounds of pure physical science; and such criticism, if it is to be adverse, must probably be expected from those scientific observers that have little confidence in any scheme for a detailed reconciliation of Genesis and geology. It is our opinion, as that of a layman and one unskilled, that the whole geologic period offers itself quite as well to be broken up into grand divisions other than those made by Professor Guyot, and that the trend of geologic science is away from this somewhat arbitrary manner of breaking up the continuity of that period. But however this may be, the considerations which are to be urged against the views of the author are mainly derived from another science, with which he was not so familiar as with geology. Indeed, it cannot be too often or too strongly urged that the “reconciliation” of the conclusions of modern natural science with the biblical narrative always involves dealing with this other science, and that this other science must have its rights respected, or the proposed reconcilia-

* *Creation, or the Biblical Cosmogony in the light of Modern Science.* By ARNOLD GUYOT, LL.D. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1884.

tion is not a *reconciliation* at all. We speak, of course, of the science of biblical interpretation. Biblical interpretation is older, by far, than geology, and it is no less truly scientific in its own way than is geology. Now a frequent, an almost daily experience proves that skill and knowledge in the physical sciences by no means necessarily involves skill and knowledge in the science of interpretation. Are we not constantly being reminded of the fact that a man may have considerable scientific knowledge about terminal moraines and little or no such knowledge about the origin, history, and diction of the New Testament books; or that he may be familiar with the character and order of the geologic strata and be quite incompetent to consider the fact of literary strata in the Pentateuch?

It is, then, chiefly with Professor Guyot's method of interpretation that we find difficulty. For example, in Chapter VI. (p. 33), he tells us that "the primitive state of matter when first created" is described in the words, "And the earth was without form and void." According to Professor Guyot, the word "*erets*" does not mean in this passage "our terrestrial globe"; it means rather "the primordial cosmic material out of which God's Spirit . . . was going to organize . . . the universe and the earth." Genesis tells us, then, of an *erets* (earth which does not mean "earth") out of which God is going to organize an *erets* (earth which does mean "earth"). But there is absolutely no proof whatever that the Hebrews had the idea of a primordial cosmic gas, much less that they ever used the word *erets* to designate such an idea. The meaning of this word is perfectly well fixed in Hebrew; the word does not offer itself as an indefinite term under which one may cover whatever meaning one wishes. The same thing may be said of the word *maïm*. In order to carry out the author's scheme of reconciliation, it is necessary to assume that this word may mean a subtle, etherial fluid, a gaseous atmosphere, and is "descriptive of the state of cosmic matter comprised in the word earth" (p. 36). But, in face of such an unauthorized assumption, it is only necessary to say that Biblical interpretation, as a science, knows no such meaning for the word *maïm*. The word always means "water" or "waters"—only this, and nothing more. In proof that the words *erets* and *maïm* can have the meanings which are demanded by his scheme, the author has only the necessities of the scheme itself to urge.

What, further, shall be said of Professor Guyot's translation of

the word "deep" as signifying the indefinite expansion in space of the primordial gaseous fluid? This word (*tehom*) also has a well-fixed and definite meaning. It means "a mass of raging waters." It occurs more than a score of times in the Old Testament. The "deep" which closed Jonah round about was surely not an indefinite expanse of gaseous fluid (Jon. ii. 5). When, after the deluge of Noah, the fountains of the "deep" were stopped (Gen. viii. 2), we are not to understand that the supply of such gaseous fluid was diminished or restricted. We have been previously told (vii. 11) that part of this deluge resulted from breaking up the fountains of the "deep"; surely the "deep" is not here a primitive gaseous fluid of indefinite expanse.

It is not necessary to follow into their details the working of the scheme of the lamented and devout author of this volume, in order to see that the reconciliation which it proposes between Genesis and geology is obtained at the price of a fair and scientific exegesis. All interpretations which depend upon reading the cosmogonic ideas of modern science into the ancient inspired record can have only the same doubtful success. In fact, not one of the really difficult points in the reconciliation of the narrative of Genesis i.-ii. 3, and geologic science can be said to be cleared up by the scheme of Professor Guyot. The brief space of six days for the entire period of creation, the production of all kinds of plant life before the existence of sunlight, the separation of plant life from animal life, the creation of the heavenly bodies only on the fourth day,—all these difficult points remain, as before, unreconciled. The apparent agreement of the Biblical narrative even with the geologic scheme of the author is purchased, at every one of these points, by setting aside the claims of hermeneutical science.

No matter, therefore, how high our regard may be for the pious intent, the scientific attainments, and the fair, charitable spirit of the author, fidelity to the cause of Biblical interpretation requires the conclusion that his attempt is a failure. And every similar attempt must end in failure. If the science of geology is ready to admit that its main positions with respect to the order and periods of creation are only tentative and hypothetical, then it can perhaps offer us some hope of accomplishing, by waiting, a final reconciliation of Genesis and geology. For the main positions of scientific exegesis in the interpretation of the Biblical narrative are now no longer tentative and hypothetical. Unless exegetes

give themselves up to the license of "reconciling" at all hazards, they are able to say with sufficient certainty what this narrative means. If, then, a fair reconciliation is ever to be effected, the science of geology must confess that it has made many important mistakes with respect to the periods and order of creation. In the meantime we insist upon the truth of the declaration of Professor Guyot with respect to the main intent of the Bible. Its chief design is "to give us light upon the great truths needed for our spiritual life. . . . Its teachings are essentially of a *spiritual, religious character*." Because we thus believe, we warn the readers of this noble little volume not to be turned away from their confidence in the Bible by the failure of its conclusions in the attempt at reconciliation. For in this way the work of its devout author would sadly miss of its admirable intention. Its readers should not refuse to listen to the one exhortation (p. 6), which is the wisest thing in the book: "Let us not, therefore, hope, much less ask, from science the knowledge it can never give; nor seek from the Bible the science which it does not intend to teach."

CURRENT DISCUSSIONS IN THEOLOGY.*—The purpose of this volume is to give an intelligible account of current theological discussions in this and other countries during the present year. It is the second volume of a series, the first of which appeared last year. At the same time, we are not to be left in ignorance of the views of the writers concerning the topics discussed. It is evidently their desire that the influence of the Seminary they represent shall be felt in critical efforts to correct false views and to point the way to what the writers suppose to be the true views. Prof. Curtiss discusses somewhat elaborately questions relating to the history of Israel. He deals with particular classes of opinion upon questions involved in this general theme, chiefly German opinions of course, and cites from works with which Americans are supposed to be relatively unfamiliar. He deals critically with their views, and upon many points gives us his own opinions, which, as always, are characterized by a certain caution, if not breadth and thoroughness, and insight and fidelity to facts. Prof. Hyde contents himself with a brief statement of the contents of the more important recent works in the different departments of New Testament study, and is less concerned to record his own

* *Current Discussions in Theology*. By the Professors of Chicago Theological Seminary. Chicago: Fleming H. Revell. 1884.

critical opinions. Prof. Scott, who fills the chair of Ecclesiastical History, has given us a valuable statement of the position of the chief theological parties in Germany, in our time, and intimates the importance, to the intelligent study of the history of Christian doctrine, of some knowledge of these parties. Prof. Fisk, without much reference, critical or otherwise, to late important works in the department of Homiletics, gives us his own views of current preaching, what it is and what it ought to be, and leaves behind the savor of his lecture room. Prof. Wilcox treats of Practical Theology, defining its nature and scope, and indicating its present work in several particulars in our own country. The most significant part of the volume, however, because proceeding from the chair of Dogmatics, is from the hand of Prof. Boardman. It may be supposed to be significant not only of his own theological attitude, but of the attitude of the Seminary, toward current theological questions. If we may judge from the spirit of the present discussion, it is certainly the attitude of a genuinely candid man. Prof. Boardman deals with only two topics, Theism and Revelation. He refers to several late works on Theism, but chiefly to the work of Prof. Harris, "The Philosophical Basis of Theism." He criticises the author's views of the Absolute, and succeeds, if in nothing else, in demonstrating the difference in the philosophical training of the two men and the difficulty in grasping ideas and estimating arguments without a clear understanding of the meaning of philosophical terms. The larger part of this portion of the volume is devoted to Revelation. Prof. Boardman here reviews and criticises Prof. Ladd's late work, "The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture." The outline of the main positions taken in this work is for the most part accurate, and bears the marks of admirable candor and of more than ordinary capacity to understand another's point of view and to state his position. In this respect it is in striking contrast with many of the recent statements by theological journals, and particularly by religious newspapers, concerning the character and scope of this important work. The writer has, however, unintentionally misstated the position of the author with respect to miracles. It is stated as Prof. Ladd's position that "even a miracle is to be believed only on the ground of its ethical value as a work of God." This statement does not cover the ground. The credibility of the alleged miracle is, according to Prof. Ladd, not determined solely by its ethical worth, but rather by its ethico-religious worth and by its relation with

the history of redemption. Nor is it true, as Prof. Boardman states, that, according to the author, it is the moral consciousness alone that tests and determines the true doctrine of inspiration. The Christian consciousness, or that ultimate knowledge which is the gift of the Spirit of Christ, is surely something more and other than a moral consciousness. After a statement of the author's views, in the main, despite the above exceptions, so appreciative and so correct, it is the more surprising that Prof. Boardman should develop the singular line of criticism that follows, and should think himself able to discover difficulties connected with the author's views which to us are simply impossible and even inconceivable. These difficulties are of his own invention. They are not at all involved in the positions which he has so well stated. Has he after all failed to grasp the central and regulative positions of the work, and is there only the semblance of a real apprehension of its character and scope? Or is it that, after having passed over into the current of the author's thought and moved on with him to the end, he returns to his own point of view and finds himself so trapped and imprisoned by his own prepossessions and methods of thinking that he unwittingly perverts, as by a mental necessity, the very views he has so faithfully and candidly stated? We will accept the latter as the true explanation. There is a wide difference between the starting-points of the two men. It is the difference between two irreconcilable views of the supernatural and its relation to history. It is the difference, not so much between two conflicting views of religion, as between two conflicting views of revelation. It is the difference between a semi-rationalistic and a semi-deistic theology on the one hand and a historic and Christian theology on the other hand, a theology that has for its point of view the whole scope of the divine revelation as disclosed by historic redemption. It is in the necessity of his position that Prof. Boardman should emphasize and honor natural theology so-called. But it involves him in a mischievously rationalistic position. It is in the necessity of his position that Prof. Ladd should emphasize and honor revelation. It puts him in the Christian point of view and gives him a clear outlook upon the whole of human history and upon prehistoric and historic redemption. It makes redemption the key-fact of revelation and history. It exalts Christ into centrality, where the Scriptures put him. That any man should deny or question the christo-centric point of revelation, of history, or of theology, shows what poor

head Biblical religion may make against a semi-rationalistic theology which is philosophically untenable. It shows what poor use a Christian teacher may make of the Book which he professes to recognize as the infallibly inspired and final appeal in all his theological opinions.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNKNOWABLE.*—This book is designed to separate Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable from his general system of evolution, and to refute the former while leaving the latter to stand as "a law of things" and not "only a law of appearances." Its author sums up his conclusions in about the following terms (p. 211 f.): Every argument that is used, or that can be used, in proof of the existence of the objective Unknowable is based on the very knowledge which the argument purports to prove impossible (Chap. II.). A number of problems which Mr. Spencer supposes peculiar to Ontology and considers insoluble, the author finds to be capable of solution by Phenomenology (Chaps. III.–VI.). Actual nature does not exclude realities from its sphere (Chap. VII.). The unknowableness deduced by Mr. Spencer is the unknowableness of something neither in existence nor capable of existence (Chap. VIII.). Spencer's deduction of the unknowableness of things outside of consciousness from the conception of life, Mr. Lacy considers meaningless and erroneous (Chap. IX.). Absolute knowledge is possible and can be accounted for (Chapter X.). The author justly declares that Spencer's "reconciliation" is a "high" (he might have said a pompous and meaningless) abstraction; but he himself believes that "Science and the Religion of to-day shall pass into something more worthy than either, which shall take their place" (p. 235).

Mr. Lacy has studied this doctrine of Spencer with painstaking care, and his refutations of its details are tolerably successful in consideration of the fact that he so largely looks upon metaphysical problems in Spencer's way, and almost—it might be said—with borrowed eyes. The "Synthetic Philosophy" he considers "as perhaps the noblest speculative product of a single mind" (p. 4). Yet he does not hesitate to criticise it with commendable thoroughness. This estimate of the "Synthetic Philosophy," in

* *An Examination of the Philosophy of the Unknowable as Expounded by Herbert Spencer.* By WILLIAM M. LACY. Philadelphia: Benjamin F. Lacy, 121 Seventh St. 1883.

connection with many other tokens, would seem to indicate that the author is not familiar with the masters in modern philosophy; especially that he, like the one master whom he so admiringly but sharply criticises, little knows or appreciates the critical method and results of Kant, or the process of thought in the solution of metaphysical problems since the time of Kant. We are quite willing to have Mr. Spencer's theory of the Unknowable so thoroughly refuted by one avowedly an admirer of the "Synthetic Philosophy." For ourselves, we are looking to see this entire system of philosophy speedily disintegrate and deliver over its elements, so far as they have any stable quality, to a new and different process of philosophical integration.

LOCKE'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.*—This fifth number in the "Philosophic Series" by President McCosh begins the second or historical part of the series; "in this part the same questions (that is, as those discussed in the first or didactic part) are treated historically." In his "General Introduction" the author treats of "divers aspects of first principles"; in the following sections are brief, chatty lives of Locke and of Berkeley, and a similar discussion of the principal opinions of these philosophers as seen from the author's point of view. As the program on the cover of the book informs us: "The systems of the philosophers . . . are stated and examined, and the truth and error in each of them carefully pointed out." In particular: "It is shown that Locke held by a body of truth, and that he has often been misunderstood; but that he has not by his experience theory laid a sure foundation of knowledge." The very indefinite expectation excited by this promise may be said to be fairly well fulfilled. We will only add our wish that the author would be more precise in his scholarship than to translate the words of Descartes—"Lorsque je dis que quelque idée est née avec nous, ou qu'elle est naturellement empreinte en nos âmes, je n'entends pas qu'elle se présente toujours à notre pensée, car ainsi il n'y en aurait aucune; mais j'entends seulement que nous avons en nous-mêmes la faculté de la produire"—as follows: "While I say that some idea is born with us, or that it is naturally imprinted on our souls, I do not understand that it presents itself always to our thought, for there is no thought it does so, but I understand that we have in ourselves the faculty to produce it" (pp. 5 and 43).

* *Locke's Theory of Knowledge, with a Notice of Berkeley.* By JAMES MCCOSH, D.D., LL.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.*—The author of this work is a Belgian, who has been for twenty years Professor of Political Economy at the University of Liege. He has published several works on topics of Political Economy which have attracted attention, and gained for him reputation. We hardly think this work will add to his fame. He goes over the principal subjects which belong to Political Economy in a 12mo. volume of less than 300 pages, and there is no thorough discussion of anything. He appears not to have read the recent works on the subject, but advances arguments which have been shown to be fallacious. Sometimes he relieves the abstract discussion by a concrete example in order to bring out his idea more strongly, as when to show the folly of protection, he says, "That Frenchmen and Italians after spending nearly two millions sterling in boring a tunnel through the Alps, can place their custom-house officers at each end to destroy in a great measure by the dues they exact, the usefulness of this marvel of engineering, is an inexplicable contradiction."

The book is well printed and easily read, and the table of contents is full and exact.

MEYER'S COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLES TO THE CORINTHIANS.†—Of all the masterly commentaries of Meyer, that on the Epistles to the Corinthians is deemed by some the very best. The critical acumen and the practical Christian feeling of the author are both admirably illustrated on its pages. The Epistles themselves, from the variety as well as the character of the topics which the Apostle has occasion to take up, are an exceedingly inviting field for critical annotation. The notes of the American editor are not numerous. They are tinged with the doctrinal peculiarities which characterize his system of theology, but are not deficient in learning or clearness. The volume is a great advance on the commentaries which English and American ministers have generally been familiar with.

* *The Elements of Political Economy.* By EMILE DE LAVLEYE, translated by ALFRED W. POLLARD, B.A., St. John's College, Oxford, with an introduction and supplementary chapter by F. W. TAUSSIG, instructor in Political Economy, Harvard College. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1884.

† *Critical and Exegetical Hand-Book to the Epistles to the Corinthians.* By H. A. W. MEYER, Ph.D., &c. Clark's Edinburgh Edition. Edited by T. W. Chambers, D.D. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, publishers. 1884.

WALKER'S HISTORY OF THE FIRST CHURCH IN HARTFORD.*—This volume deserves a more extended review than we are able at present to prepare. At a later day we expect to insert such a review from another pen. Prompted by the occurrence of the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the First Church in Hartford, Dr. Walker, its present pastor, has explored the history of this ancient Church, and has written an extremely instructive and interesting account of it from the beginning. Its successive pastors, from Thomas Hooker down to the present, are described in their characteristic traits and in their peculiar work. The narrative is enlivened by anecdotes which tradition has saved from oblivion. The progress of religion in Hartford, and, incidentally, in the community at large, in different portions of this long period, is faithfully exhibited. The work is marked by candor and truthfulness. Faults of men, where there were faults, are not hidden, but the tone is gentle and charitable, and there is a just appreciation of merit even where it was shaded by imperfection. As the work approaches our own epoch, we are introduced to persons and events of which we have had some personal knowledge. We have been struck with the tact and, at the same time, with the frankness, with which facts are related. The portraits and other illustrations add much to the attractiveness of the volume. It is of much value to the historical student who would study our history in its sources. To New Englanders, both clerical and lay, it may be commended as full of matter which cannot fail to interest them. It is a worthy and substantial contribution to the ecclesiastical annals of the new world.

HAGENBACH'S THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA.†—The "Encyclopædia" is one of the branches of theology which we owe to the Germans. It is a preliminary survey of the field of theological study, with a guide to the literature. Among the works of this class, Hagenbach's is, on the whole, the best. The American work on the basis of it has been prepared by competent hands. It is enlarged by matter pertaining to English and American theology, a topic on which German books are apt to be meager. The lists of books are carefully and judiciously prepared. The index, if not so full as we would like to have it, is sufficient for most practical uses.

* *History of the First Church in Hartford, 1633-1883.* By GEORGE LEON WALKER. Illustrated. Hartford: Brown & Gross. 1884.

† *Theological Encyclopædia and Methodology.* On the basis of Hagenbach. By GEORGE R. CROOKS, D.D., and JOHN F. HURST, D.D. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walker & Stone. 1884.

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NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CLXXXII.

SEPTEMBER, 1884.

ARTICLE I.—JONATHAN EDWARDS AND THE HALF-WAY COVENANT.

THE month of June, 1750, saw the people of Northampton in a state of intense excitement, with which the people of the surrounding country to a considerable extent sympathized. The chief outward expression of this excitement was the dismissal from his pastorate, of twenty-three years, of Jonathan Edwards.

This dismissal had been demanded by a vote of “above two hundred against twenty” of the church members, and was ecclesiastically effected by the result of a pretty evenly divided council of nine churches, on the 22d of June, 1750.

This result had been prefaced by a controversy between pastor and people of such sharpness and conspicuity, had so enlisted the sympathies, on one side or the other, of observers near and far, and was in itself so melancholy an affair, that it was instinctively felt to be an event of historic importance in New England generally; a conviction which a clearer knowledge of the principles involved only serves to confirm.

Two causes conspired to bring about the controversy between Mr. Edwards and his Northampton congregation resulting in their overwhelming rejection of his pastoral ministrations.

One was the endeavor on his part—whether wise or unwise in method it is not here important to enquire—to lead his church to an investigation of the behavior of a number of the young people of his congregation who were accused of reading and circulating licentious books, and of other bad conduct.

The other was a more fundamental question relating to the *conditions of entitlement to Sacramental privileges*, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, respecting which the church and the pastor had come to stand in positions of resolved antagonism.

It is to the second only of these two conspiring occasions of controversy that attention will here be directed; but this one was at the time the one of most importance, and is now the only one of other than antiquarian interest.

To set the Northampton affair of June, 1750, in its proper surroundings, and to estimate accurately Jonathan Edwards's relations to the Half-way Covenant system, both as it was generally practiced in New England and as it was somewhat peculiarly administered in the Northampton church in his day, it will be needful to trace out a short pathway of preliminary historical survey.

One of the strongest convictions of the founders of the New England colonies was the necessity of a really Christian membership in the churches they established. They had seen in the old countries, both in England and on the continent, what they regarded as the disastrous results of a membership of the church and an admission to sacramental privileges, of persons confessedly or at least plainly not experimentally Christian. To guard against this danger, which they thought inherent in the State system of churches which they had known in England and Europe generally, they accepted and set on working the way of Congregational churches of New England. These churches they affirmed (see Hooker's *Survey*, Cotton's *Keys, Holiness of Church Members*, etc.,) ought to be composed of "*Visible Saints*"; or as John Cotton puts it (*Way of the Churches*, chap. 3, sect. 3, p. 56):

“Wee receive none as Members into the Church but such as (according to the Judgment of Charitable Christians) may be Conceived to be received of God into Fellowship with Christ, the head of the Church.”

At the same time, however, the founders of these churches held with strenuous tenacity to the doctrine of the Abrahamic Covenant as extended to the Christian Church; and to the belief that all baptized persons were therefore in a real sense church-members, subject to its discipline as well as partial partakers of its privileges. This membership was not indeed in all respects complete without something further. It could not “*orderly*” be “continued and confirmed” without some act of personal repentance and faith in after years.

This view of the reality of a qualified church membership by infant baptism was a very positive one with the founders. It was a view which carried many things along with it. An individual's church membership by his childhood's baptism was the valid ground of great privileges and great accountabilities.

For example, the Boston church in March, 1653, being then under the charge of Rev. John Wilson its first pastor, called before it a boy of sixteen years who had in infancy been “baptized into the fellowship of the covenant,” and publicly “admonished” him for “choosing evil company and frequenting a house of ill report”—probably a tavern or tippling establishment.

Four years later, in June, 1657, the same church, having now joined Rev. John Norton with Mr. Wilson in its ministry, summoned another young man of twenty-one years before it who was “born and baptized in its fellowship,” and for a graver offense publicly excommunicated him.

But not many years went by before the churches found themselves embarrassed in working their system in accordance with both their fundamental principles.

The children grew up, married, and had children whom they in turn wanted to have baptized; but the parents had never met with any personal religious experience, had never come to the Lord's Supper, had only that connection with the church which their infantile baptism had given them. What was to be done?

Could a child be baptized on the strength of his grandfather's church-membership? Thomas Hooker and John Dav-

enport (*Survey*, Part III., Chap. II., and *Power of Congregational Churches*, pp. 47, 48,) argued he could not. John Cotton, in answer to a question proposed by him by the Dorchester church in 1634, seems to think he could. But the general sense of the churches settled down upon the principle that the title to baptism in an infant child rested upon the status of his immediate parents, or, in some cases, his adopted parents. But New England was rapidly becoming filled with parents who though themselves baptized were not communicants; did not profess experimental piety, but did want to have their children have the benefit, whatever it was, of Christian baptism.

What could be done for such parents? Was their connection with the church by their own baptism in infancy substantial enough in itself, and in the absence of anything further, *and in lack of supposed fitness for the Communion table*, to justify the baptism of their children? Were they so far "visible saints" by the fact of their childhood baptism, that grown to manhood, they could ask baptism for their offspring as being also children of the Covenant?

It was a great question. There is no space in this article to go into the minor aspects of its discussion. It must suffice here to say that, after being mooted in correspondence and agitated in local communities and churches, Connecticut in 1656 formulated a series of Twenty-one Questions concerning church membership and the relation of children to the church, and invited the legislatures of Massachusetts, Plymouth, and New Haven to call a Ministerial Assembly to consider them. Such an assembly met in Boston in June, 1657—though New Haven declined to send representatives and Plymouth apparently made no response—and answered the twenty-one questions formulated by Connecticut.

The answer given to the tenth question is the chiefly significant one:

"It is the duty of those children [who confederate in their parents] when grown up to years of discretion, though not yet fit for the *Lord's Supper*, to own the Covenant they made with their parents by entering thereinto in their own persons. . . . And in case they understand the *Grounds of Religion*, are not scandalous, and solemnly own the *Covenant* in their own persons, wherein they give up both themselves and their children to the Lord, and desire baptism for them, we (with due

reverence for any godly learned that may dissent) see not sufficient cause to deny baptism unto their children."

Thus endorsed by a Ministerial Assembly, the Half-way Covenant system was immediately set on working. The church at Windsor, Conn., for example, began its practice as soon as its pastor got home from the Assembly.

But the system still encountering opposition in many quarters, a Synod of Churches was called in Boston in 1662, which though composed of Massachusetts churches only, had "above seventy members," and adopted by a vote of more than seven to one the principle declared in the answer to the tenth question of the Ministerial Assembly five years before. The language of the Synod on this point is as follows:

"Church-members who were admitted in minority, understanding the doctrine of faith, and publickly professing their assent thereto; not scandalous in life, and solemnly owning the Covenant before the Church, wherein they give up themselves and children to the Lord, and subject themselves to the government of Christ in the Church, their children are to be baptized."

So ratified a second time, by synodical as well as ministerial authority, the system spread and shortly became universal. The church became thus a practically divided body; a part having the full-membership privilege of Communion, the other part not supposed pious enough for that, but sufficiently so to have their children baptized.

It is just at this point that the Northampton church comes into connection with this half-way covenant system. The Synod met in 1662. The Northampton church was gathered the year previously. In 1668 the church, under the lead of Rev. Eleazer Mather, its first pastor, declared: "29. 10. '68, this church having perused the Result of the late Synod of the year '62, . . . see not cause by any light from God's word to withhold our consent and approbation." And two months later (Feb. 2, 1669) it put on record this very explicit statement of its position:

"Inasmuch as there are divers resident amongst vs baptized in their infancy . . . it is voted and agreed by this Church, that such amongst vs being settled inhabitants that giue us ground to hope in charity there may be some good thing in them towards the Lord, tho but in the lowest degree and understanding, and believing the Doctrine of faith; Pub-

lickly, seriously and freely Professing their assent thereunto, not scandalous in life, sollemly taking hold of the Covenant wherein they giue vpp themselves and their children to the Lord and his Church, subjecting themselves with feare and humblenesse of mind to the gouernment of Christ therein, sincerly engageing to rest contented with that share and portion of privilege belonging to them that are only in a state of Education in Christ's house, dureing the time of theire continuance in that estate, and not essay the breaking in vppon the priuiledges of the Lord's Supper and voting. . . . such persons, upon their desire, due order observed may themselves be enterteyned into a state of membership, and haue their children Baptized. . . ."

At the same date the church adopted as the thirty-eighth of its elaborately drawn-out Articles of Faith the following:

"The Lord's Supper as to the subject thereof is not of equall extent with Baptism, therefore ought not to be administered to all the members of the ch., but to those amongst them only as are indued with such a measure of diuine knowledg, spiritual affections, and lively exercise of Repentance, faith, loue and new obedience, as they may feed on Christ spiritually in the eating of his flesh and drinking of his blood for their spiritual nourishment and furtherance of their comfort and growth in grace."

So matters stood through the pastorate of Rev. Eleazer Mather, and for many years on into that of his eminent successor Rev. Solomon Stoddard.

Mr. Stoddard was ordained pastor of the Northampton church "by Mr. John Strong, Ruling Elder of that Church, and Mr. John Whiting, Pastour to the Second Church in Hartford," Sept. 11, 1672.

Mr. Stoddard was a man of great abilities and, through most of his ministry certainly, sincere piety. His character as a man and his power as a leader of other men were recognized and revered through New England. Few if any men of his period were so blessed with revivals in their ministry as was he. In times of comparative barrenness in most places the church at Northampton was signally refreshed by spiritual influences. In 1679, 1683, 1690, 1712, and 1718, powerful and beneficent awakenings accompanied his ministry. His preaching was pungent, searching, earnest. And his views—unless those which our present topic leads us to consider be regarded as exceptions—were thoroughly orthodox and evangelical.

Two months after Mr. Stoddard's settlement at Northampton he put on record, Nov. 5, 1672, as was quite customary,

the different forms of covenant to be used in admitting members to the differing privileges in the church.

One of them is entitled "A fform of words expressing the summe of the Covenant to be used in Admission of Members into a state of Education," *i. e.*, to the half-way covenant membership. The other is "A fform of words to be used to admit members into full communion."

This was, as has been said, common usage in New England. A form for those admitted to full communion, and another for those not admitted to the Lord's Supper, were used side by side generally. Many have come down to us.

And the records of the Northampton church show they were so used there as late certainly as 1706. A list of persons "in full communion" at that date, in Mr. Stoddard's handwriting, remains on the church records.

But somewhere at an uncertain date previous to this time, Mr. Stoddard's personal views as to the propriety of this distinction of the church into the two classes of full-communion members and half-way-covenant members had changed. . He came to believe that the standard for the half-way membership was the sufficient standard for any membership and for all church privileges.

Perhaps the first expression of these views of which Mr. Stoddard stands the representative, and for the long after opposing of which his successor Edwards was repudiated by the Northampton people, is to be found in a pamphlet which Mr. Stoddard published in the year 1700. In that pamphlet—*Doctrine of Instituted Churches*, p. 19—Mr. Stoddard says:

"They [the Apostles] made no distinction of the Adult members of the church into Communicants and non-Communicants. . . . It is utterly unreasonable to deny the Adult members of the church the Lord's Supper, and yet not lay them under censure."

And again, pp. 21-22:

"Here it may be enquired whether such persons as have a good conversation and a competent knowledge, may come to the Lord's Supper with a good Conscience, in case they know themselves to be in a Natural Condition? *Ans.* They may and ought to come, tho' they know themselves to be in a Natural Condition; this Ordinance is instituted for all the Adult Members of the Church who are not scandalous, and therefore must be attended by them; as no man may neglect prayer or read-

ing the Word, because he cannot do it in Faith, so he may not neglect the Lord's Supper. The Lord's Supper is Instituted to be a means of Regeneration."

The declarations of this pamphlet Mr. Stoddard followed up by a sermon to his own people on the subject, printed in 1707, arguing the doctrine *That Sanctification is not a necessary qualification to partaking in the Lord's Supper*, and that *The Lord's Supper is a converting ordinance*. To this sermon Increase Mather, of Boston, replied in a dissertation, wherein the "Strange Doctrine" of Mr. Stoddard was "examined and confuted."

Mr. Stoddard rejoined in an "Appeal to the Learned," published in 1709, a part of the title of his tractate being: "A Vindication of the rights of visible saints to the Lord's Supper, though they be destitute of a saving work of God's spirit in their hearts."

Mr. Stoddard's view of course broke down and obliterated the line of distinction between those who had only "owned the covenant" and those who, according to the general New England usage and the very express rules of the Northampton church itself, had been admitted to complete membership.

Mr. Stoddard continued in the Northampton pastorate twenty-nine years after the first public proclamation of his views on this subject, and twenty years after his reply to Mather's allegation of "Strange Doctrine" against him; time enough as it proved for his views on this subject of the converting character of the Lord's Supper and the uselessness of any distinction between the half-way covenant and the full communion membership, thoroughly to penetrate and take possession of his congregation.

As it proved also, the same view, based largely on the great authority of Mr. Stoddard's name, extended soon to some other churches in the vicinity, and at a considerably subsequent period was adopted by many New England churches. But at the time of the difficulties in connection with Mr. Edwards's pastorate there appears to be no evidence of the extension of the view or the practice beyond the near proximity of Mr. Stoddard's home. Nor was the practice, however logically deducible from the half-way covenant principle, its necessary

practical consequence. It cannot be said ever to have obtained general footing in the churches, and at the period with which we are dealing it is quite proper to speak of it as the Northampton peculiarity; originating with the Northampton pastor and extending by reason of his influence to a few churches around.

Mr. Stoddard's last entry in the church record book, in a very trembling hand, inscribes the fact that on the "22 Febr. 1729 Mr. Jonathan Edwards was ordained A Pastour of the Church in Northampton." This was two years before Mr. Stoddard's death.

The successor thus put in office was grandson of the old pastor, entered upon a church fully leavened with the old pastor's views, and as distinctly appears adopted and carried out the practice of them without hesitation many years himself. Indeed, through all the period of the great revival in Northampton in 1734 and 1735, and of which Mr. Edwards wrote his account in the *Faithful Narrative* published in England in 1736, he himself records (*Christian History*, June 18, 1743):

"But it must be noted that it is not the Custom here, as it is in many other Churches in this Country, to make a credible Relation of their inward Experiences the Ground of Admission to the Lord's Supper."

Nor did any change characterize Mr. Edwards's course through the revival period of 1741-43.

Gradually, however, scruples on the subject arose in the pastor's mind. The doubtfulness of the propriety of admitting "members into the church who made no pretense to real Godliness" Mr. Edwards says (*Dwight's Edwards*, p. 311), "gradually increased" upon him till he came to the conclusion that he "could not with an easy conscience, be active in admitting any more members in our former manner, without better satisfaction."

It is a significant token, however, of the dead spiritual condition of things after what is called the "great awakening" in New England from 1735 to 1743, that Mr. Edwards had to wait "several years" after arriving at the fore-mentioned conclusion before any one applied for membership in the church on whom the new test could be used. At last the opportunity came. In December, 1748, a young man applied, and in Feb-

ruary, 1749, a young woman. Mr. Edwards stated to them both his new views concerning the qualifications of communicants, *i. e.* a personal experience of religion. Both declined. The young man, because he could not come up to the standard; the young woman, because, though ready herself to testify to such religious experience, "she was afraid by what she had heard, that there would be a tumult, if she came into the church in that way."

But the tumult came, nevertheless. The announcement of the pastor's stand on the position that personal piety was a necessary prerequisite to complete membership in the church, and to sacramental privileges, threw the town in an uproar.

The church and the pastor entered on a futile and harrassing series of attempts to find a common standing ground. The church voted overwhelmingly that it would not hear the pastor's arguments on the matter. The pastor wrote and published his tractate—almost volume—on the "*Qualifications requisite to a Complete standing and full Communion in the visible Christian Church*;" a masterpiece of virile, subtle, comprehensive argument; but respecting which the pastor complained that only "twenty copies" were ever brought to Northampton, and those not read.

Two Councils were summoned on the case; the second after a distressing controversy between the pastor and the church as to allowing him to go outside of the county for a part of the members of it.

This second Council on the 22d of June, 1750, dismissed Mr. Edwards from his twenty-three years pastorate with the admonition "to take proper notice of the heavy frown of Divine Providence in suffering them [himself and his church] to be reduced to such a state as to render a separation necessary." But what is of special interest at this point, and what gives pertinence to this historic survey, is the exceedingly contradictory aspects in which Jonathan Edwards's attitude toward the half-way covenant system, as manifested in this passage of his history, has been presented.

In a general way, and as a sort of current belief, it is popularly said that Mr. Edwards's position on the subject, and his writings upon it gave the death-blow to the half-way covenant practice.

While, on the other hand, Dr. Fiske of Newburyport, in his Centennial Discourse, published in the *Contributions to the Ecclesiastical History of Essex Co.*, says (p. 281), "For aught that appears to the contrary in his published writings, he [Jonathan Edwards] could consistently have approved and administered that form of it [the half-way covenant] then generally current among the churches, and very likely did so." And the very accomplished author of *Congregationalism in Literature*, Rev. Dr. Dexter, from whom it is customarily unsafe to differ on a point of history, takes the same view, and adduces as evidence of it (p. 487) that fact that in March, 1742, Mr. Edwards administered to his "Congregation in general that were above fourteen years of age," a most solemn covenant, long enough to occupy "four closely printed octavo pages . . . one specification of which bound them to examine themselves strictly, 'especially before the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper.'" But this is not proof of the point in question. Not to speak of the absence of evidence that the covenant so administered was or was regarded as in any sense a church covenant, this all-important consideration remains, Mr. Edwards's opinion or action in 1742 is not conclusive as to his position in 1748 and 1750.

There is ample evidence that Mr. Edwards through all his earlier ministry accepted and practiced not only the general form of the half-way covenant system current in New England, but also the peculiar Stoddardian form existent in the Northampton Church, originated by his grandfather; the form which admitted avowedly unregenerate people to the Lord's Supper as a converting ordinance, and allowed the children of baptized persons, not only to present their children for baptism but to come themselves to the Lord's Table. That system in its full and local development, Mr. Edwards through most of his Northampton ministry, and the entire revival portion of it, received and administered.

But Mr. Edwards's views, it has been seen, underwent a change. The only question in issue is whether the change extended to the general half-way covenant scheme of the New England churches, or only to the special Stoddardian enlargement of it in the Northampton Church.

The main thing which has confused this point and made Mr. Edwards's position in a degree obscure, is the fact that the issue raised at Northampton was, naturally, first and obviously, the one in which the practice of that church had differed from the general New England usage, viz : the qualification for participation in the second sacrament. This was the point at which the Northampton people first felt the wound of the pastor's altered views, and about which controversy raged. The battle was undoubtedly fought on this ground. The Council in its 22d of June finding, speaks only of a "diametrically opposite" judgment of pastor and people on the "qualifications necessary to full communion," and does not refer to any diversity of judgment respecting the qualifications necessary in order to the right of a parent to present his child for baptism. This was but natural, for the strife was hottest in this as in most conflicts at the most advanced points.

But that great man whom the Council dismissed so ignominiously from his pastorate, was not accustomed to do things by halves, or to stop short of the full logical result of his accepted principles. He did not do so in this case. In his treatise on *Qualifications for full Communion*, already spoken of, written with marvelous rapidity in the early part of 1749 and printed in August of that year, ten months before his dismissal from his pastorate, Mr. Edwards distinctly takes up the Baptismal question and affirms (under a subordinate head of his discourse it is true, in answer to objection XIX.) that the "way of proceeding [the way in current use in the churches] greatly tends to establish the negligence of parents, and to confirm the stupidity and security of wicked children."

And he goes on to argue :

"If baptism were denied to all children, whose parents did not *profess godliness*, and in a judgment of rational charity appear *real saints*, it would tend to excite pious heads of families to more thorough care and pains in the religious education of their children. . . . that they might be converted in youth, before they enter into the married state ; and so if they have children the entail of the covenant be secured. . . . Whereas the contrary practice has a natural tendency to quiet the minds of persons both in their own and their children's unregeneracy. Yea may it not be suspected that the way of baptizing the children of such as never make any proper profession of godliness, is an expedient originally invented for that very end, to give ease to ancestors with

respect to their posterity, in times of general declension and degeneracy?"

There are six pages of argument on this baptismal point of the question—this secondary and scarce-considered issue in the general tumult and smoke of the strife over the more immediately visible and pressing question of qualification for the Supper; but they show specifically that Mr. Edwards had already before his dismissal broken with the whole half-way covenant system, and not simply with the Stoddardian development of it. This thorough breach with the whole scheme is manifest also, and in passages more extended, in Mr. Edwards's reply to the pamphlet of Rev. Solomon Williams, published two years after his dismissal from Northampton. Two sentences however must suffice:

"Mr. Williams knows that through the whole of my book I suppose this practice of baptizing the children of such as are here spoken of [parents not real Christians] is *wrong*." "The baptism of infants is the seal of the promises made to the seed of the righteous; and on these principles some rational account can be given of infant baptism; but no account can be given of it on Mr. Williams' scheme [that is the general half-covenant way], no warrant can be found for it in Scripture."

Doubtless the fact that the main stress of the Northampton struggle was over the Sacramental Table side of the controversy, availed at the time as it has since availed occasionally to obscure Mr. Edwards's position on the Baptismal question.

And indeed there was not much immediate effect produced on the practice of the churches by his arguments. The half-way covenant system of baptism was in general use, and so it long continued to be. Opposed by Dr. Bellamy in a popular and vigorous series of pamphlets, some of them in dialogue form, from about 1760 onward some years; and later by cogent arguments by Chandler Robbins of Plymouth, Dr. Hopkins of Newport, and Cyprian Strong of Chatham, it had also its vigorous defenders; and it was not till the commencement of the revival period of the New England Churches between 1790 and 1800, that any considerable breaches were made on the practice, or on the judgment of the churches respecting it. And as late as 1792 so eminent a minister as Dr. Joseph Lathrop of Springfield, published two discourses in which he not only defends the half-way covenant system

still in common use, but uses language whose only possible significance (p. 20) is a justification of the Stoddardian doctrine of the right of every "serious person" to the Lord's Supper.

The system died hard. It continued in many quarters till well into the present century. Chief Justice Williams of Connecticut, who died in Hartford in 1861, and his wife, both "owned the Covenant" in their younger years, and only made such a confession of their faith as is now usual in the churches in 1834, in the days of Dr. Hawes. There is a still living member of the Church of Windsor, Connecticut, who was baptized on the strength of his half-way covenant parents' church membership in 1822. In Cambridge, Mass., the system held out to 1828, in Marlborough till 1834.

But though surviving long after him there is a real sense in which Jonathan Edwards may be said to have been the great and successful antagonist of the half-way covenant. The principles so cogently argued by him in his tractate of 1749, the year before his Northampton dismissal, though directed mainly against the Stoddardian practice of his own church, sweep the whole field. The treatise leaves no logical standing ground for the one practice without the other. That essay has been a reservoir out of which all subsequent writers have consciously or unconsciously derived very much of their argument for the churches' present usage in opposition to what went before. Reading it to-day one is amazed at its acuteness, its cogency and its comprehensiveness. Struck out in the heat of a church quarrel, when all his own personal interests were involved, it has all the clearness, coolness, and resistlessness of a mathematical demonstration. It goes far, of itself, to justify (according as a man may feel disposed toward its author) the statement of Dr. O. W. Holmes that Edwards was "a man with a brain as nicely adjusted for certain mechanical processes as Babbage's calculating machine," or the more sympathetic eulogium of Sir James Mackintosh, that the Northampton pastor "was the greatest of the sons of men."

ARTICLE II.—JONATHAN EDWARDS AS A MAN; AND
THE MINISTERS OF THE LAST CENTURY.

[Read at Northampton, before the Connecticut Valley Congregational Club, June 9, 1884.]

AFTER long ages of observation and experience it would be very difficult for any one to define the conditions on which God raises up the few leading intellects of our race. So various, not to say diverse are these conditions; so fresh and original is each new production, that He seems perpetually to baffle our research and keep the secret to Himself. If, in any given instance, we attempt to trace the wonderful result to peculiar mental and moral characteristics in the parents, meeting and blending in the child, we are apt to be confronted with the stubborn fact, that other children of the same parentage, are, in no special way, distinguished above their fellows.

Indeed, it often happens, that the man who comes upon the theatre of human action, with this kingly order of mind, and leaves his name as a heritage to all future generations, rises out of some obscure household, which except for him would never have attracted public notice, or have been kept in after remembrance. So Moses and David appeared upon the earth, and took their places in the records of the early world. So Socrates, Luther, Shakespeare, and others of this lofty name, came forward in their several generations, to act their conspicuous parts.

If we search for the cause of such transcendant greatness in special outward facilities for culture, in books, in schools, in travel, in intercourse with learned men, we shall find, as a common truth, that just when and where these facilities are the greatest,—just when society has accumulated to the highest degree all helps to learning and intellectual culture,—libraries, richly endowed universities, accomplished teachers—costly apparatus, just then, somehow, the man we are looking for is not forthcoming. He has perhaps already come and gone, and we shall not in that particular nation or province see his like

again. One would show himself of a sanguine temperament who should expect the England of to-day with all its treasure-houses of learning, to reproduce a Shakespeare, or a Lord Bacon.

Or if we turn to outward nature, to happy influences of sun and sky—to a nice balancing of heat and cold—to favoring aspects of hills, mountains, and streams—to genial winds and beautiful landscapes, it will often occur, that this princely child whose character we are studying, enjoyed no rare opportunities of this kind, or, if he did the question will still arise, why, if these influences were fitted to nourish greatness in him, they were not equally fitted to nourish it in all his early playmates and companions. That brilliant French writer Rénan, in his life of Christ, thought he could discover in the sights and sounds and favoring aspects of nature around the ancient Nazareth, all the elements out of which to construct that marvelous Child Jesus, ignoring the fact that for thousands of years, before and since, children have been born and reared amid these self-same sights, and sounds, and influences, but only one of them is known on earth as Immanuel, the Wonderful, the Counsellor, the Prince of Peace.

Whatever method therefore we pursue, whatever considerations we urge to determine why it is that a few men of the race tower so loftily above the average, the real causes will probably still remain unknown, or will resolve themselves into the infinite wisdom and resources of God, the great first cause.

Nevertheless an intense interest always gathers about the early life of a truly great man. "The child is father of the man," and we eagerly search the records to find the first intimations of that superiority which afterwards becomes so impressive. And in this search we are often sorely disappointed, for all human life is of necessity set round with the customary and the commonplace, and it is only a very discerning eye that can detect at this early period the sure signs of coming greatness. When the time arrives that this lofty reach of intellect is fully recognized, then it is found that the incidents and memorials of the early age have largely perished, and can never be recalled. If loving kindred and friends had but known whereto this child was to grow how carefully would

these incidents of childhood have been garnered up and kept for future use !

By general consent Jonathan Edwards stands as one of the world's great thinkers, a masterly originator in the realm of ideas. And when we say "by general consent," we are aware that few men comparatively of this living generation have any intimate knowledge of his writings, or the scope and method of his great works. But the verdict of the foremost minds in the old world still more than in the new, assigns him this lofty place. The great divines, philosophers, and scholars of England and Scotland, living in a land of universities and libraries, were the first to discover the towering height of Edwards's genius. It was to them little less than a miracle, to hear a voice like his coming to them across the waters, and out of the depths of this new and half-wilderness land. They knew better than the men on our own shores, the actual reach of philosophic thought, among old and cultivated nations, and they unhesitatingly pronounced Jonathan Edwards one of the leading thinkers of the world. Our own people would hardly have dared to give him the lofty rank assigned him by such men as Sir James Mackintosh, Dr. Thomas Chalmers and many others.

To acknowledge however the masterly greatness of Edwards in the world of thought, it is not necessary that we should accept his opinions in full. No finite intellect is able to grasp all truth. Minds vastly inferior to that of Edwards may come in at a later stage and find out deficiencies and mistakes in his work. No man has ever yet been able to free himself from all the prejudices and philosophic tendencies of the particular age in which his lot is cast and plant himself upon the broad platform of the fixed and everlasting.

The greatness of Edwards is seen in that he instinctively took up some of the highest themes that can occupy the human mind ;—took them up as one self-moved and born for the purpose,—took them up in a manner original to himself and not as a copyist. He held these themes before his own mind and before the minds of others with a most wonderful force and tenacity. Other thinkers might come in afterwards to modify his system and improve upon his methods. But he was the pioneer breaking through the tangled forests where men had

not gone before. Other travelers might follow who would find ways to improve and straighten the path which he had made, but they never could take away his glory as an originator and discoverer.

The fame of Plato to-day is not that he reached the heights of unchangeable truth. Many of his conclusions cannot for one moment stand the test of a Christian age and a Christian philosophy. But his greatness will remain fixed long as the world stands. He towers aloft, among the chiefest men of the race, because he marched with such a kingly step into this realm of thought. As to Edwards's ancestry, parentage, and early education, the story, though capable of large expansion, may be told, in general, in few words.

His earliest American ancestor was William Edwards, who was in Hartford only four or five years after its first English settlement. He there married Mrs. Spencer, widow of Mr. William Spencer, who had been a prominent man in the Massachusetts Bay before his coming to Hartford. By this marriage he had a single child, Richard Edwards, born in 1647. His wife had three children by her previous marriage. This Richard Edwards grew to be one of the substantial and most influential men in Hartford. He was employed in many matters of public trust and responsibility. He was twice married, had twelve children, and died in 1718 at the age of 70. His oldest child was Timothy, born in 1669, who was fitted for college, and was graduated at Harvard in 1691, a scholar of a very high grade. Yale College did not come into existence until nine years after Timothy Edwards had finished his college course.

Three years after graduation he married Esther Stoddard, of Northampton, and with his young wife went directly to Windsor, east side of the river, afterwards East Windsor, but then known as Windsor Farme, and there continued his ministerial labors sixty-three years. There Jonathan Edwards was born, Oct. 5, 1703, about half a mile south of East Windsor Hill. He was fitted for college in his father's house, as were many other boys, and was graduated at Yale in 1720. It may not be generally known that it was only by a singular course of events that Jonathan Edwards ever came to be minister at Northampton. Three years and more before his coming hither he

had received and accepted a call to a parish in Connecticut, and was about ready to be settled, when a sudden turn of affairs caused delay and finally broke up the plan altogether. The facts in this case are the following :

Edwards, as we have said, was graduated at Yale in 1720, just as the college, after long wanderings to find a home, had settled down in New Haven. He finished his college course close upon his seventeenth birthday. One of Jonathan Edwards's classmates at Yale was his uncle, Daniel Edwards, two or three years older than himself, son of Richard Edwards, of Hartford. In that day of early marriages and large households it not infrequently happened that nephews and nieces were older than uncles and aunts. Jonathan Edwards's oldest sisters, Esther and Elizabeth, were older than the youngest children of their grandfather Richard; but Jonathan, falling midway in the family, was a little younger than his uncle Daniel.

After graduation, Edwards remained about the college at New Haven for two years, pursuing various studies, some miscellaneous, and some looking toward the ministry. In 1772, at the age of nineteen, he was invited to supply a Presbyterian pulpit in New York. He remained there from August, 1722, to April, 1723. This was the day of small things, even in New York. The place where he preached was in a small building on William street, between Liberty and Wall streets. The congregation to which he preached was a section of the First Presbyterian Church, separating itself for a time from the main body because of dissatisfaction with the pastor.

The main body itself, from which this fragment had been separated was only six years old, having been organized in 1716, and this was the beginning of Presbyterianism in New York. The Dutch Church was there earlier, but the dominant church order there at that time was the Episcopal, which stoutly opposed any new-comers, and this earliest Presbyterian Church building was erected by the help of contributions from Scotland and Connecticut.

While thus occupied in New York he received a letter from Bolton, Conn., a town about fifteen miles east of Hartford. The glory of New England in that day was largely in her old

hill-towns, manned by sturdy and intelligent farmers. The gods of the valleys had not then prevailed over the gods of the hills. To one familiar with the town of Bolton, with its high hills and its rough, rocky surface, it may seem strange that this letter, inviting Jonathan Edwards to make this the place of his future labors, should have been very pleasing to his father, mother, and sisters, at East Windsor. He would be only a few miles away from them, and they might hope for frequent interchange of visits. He himself also seemed pleased with this prospective arrangement, though his pleasure in part was derived from the gratification it would give his father and mother. He wrote back to Bolton a very cheerful letter of encouragement. The congregation in New York would have gladly retained him, but he turned from all that New York had to show of greatness, present and prospective, to this plain farming population on the Connecticut hills.

The correspondence and records pertaining to this transaction, though long known to many persons, may be found in a little volume recently published in Hartford, prepared by John Alden Stoughton, Esq., and entitled "*Windsor Farmes.*" On the 28th of October, 1723, at a town-meeting in Bolton, all the terms and conditions on which the settlement should take place were definitely fixed, and on the 11th of November, 1723, Edwards signified his acceptance in the following explicit language :

" Upon the terms that are here recorded I do consent to be the settled pastor of the town of Bolton. JONATHAN EDWARDS."

And so it stands written upon the town books of Bolton unto this day.

Just as these matters were transpiring Edwards was elected a tutor at Yale, and a few months later his uncle Daniel was elected to the same office. Yale was then passing through a peculiar crisis in her history. The head of the college, Rector Timothy Cutler, only three years in office, with one of the tutors, had declared for Episcopacy. This fact sent a kind of consternation through the little State. It looked as though the college, which had been nursed by Puritan care through the infancy of its existence, might be lost to the men that orig-

inated it. It was urged upon Jonathan and Daniel Edwards that it was their duty to accept their offices and try and save the college.

Let it be remembered that Edwards was only twenty years of age when he was thus chosen tutor. That responsibilities of this kind should be laid upon him and that such confidence should be reposed in him show that his fellow men had already fully recognized him as a young man of very superior abilities and character.

The church of Bolton waited two years after this call to Mr. Edwards, and as he still felt it his duty to remain at his post at New Haven, the Bolton people settled Rev. Thomas White, who remained with them nearly forty years, to his death.

And so it happened that Jonathan Edwards was left free for the Northampton people to call in 1726 and settle in 1727.

Had Mr. Edwards gone to Bolton, in all probability it would have been an arrangement for life, for that then was the order of the day.

Mr. Stoughton, in the book just referred to, has ventured playfully to hint that it was Sarah Pierrepont, of New Haven, that perhaps turned the scale in favor of his going back to the college rather than to the Bolton parsonage. But Jonathan Edwards, even as a young man, was not flighty and fanciful when questions of duty were up for consideration. Besides, Sarah Pierrepont was, at that time, a child of only thirteen years. It is true that Edwards had already looked admiringly if not lovingly upon her. It was in this very year of the Bolton call, 1723, that he wrote that poetic passage which has been so often quoted, and of which we will give a few sentences :

“They say there is a young lady in New Haven who is beloved of that Great Being who made and rules the world, and that there are certain seasons in which this Great Being, in some way or other, comes to her and fills her mind with exceeding sweet delight, and that she hardly cares for anything but to meditate upon him. * * * She is of a wonderful sweetness, calmness, and universal benevolence of mind, especially after this great God has manifested himself to her mind. She will sometimes go about from place to place singing sweetly, and seems to be always full of joy and pleasure, and no one knows for what. She loves to be alone, walking in the fields and groves, and seems to have some one invisible always conversing with her.”

This was the young girl, of bright, angelic face, who afterwards became the wife of the Northampton minister, but that Edwards, after accepting the call to Bolton, was turned aside and drawn back to New Haven because of her, may be a pleasant play of fancy but can hardly stand in the world of fact.

It is natural enough to let our imagination play about the question what Jonathan Edwards would have been and would have done had he been settled in Bolton rather than in Northampton. It is safe to conclude that his own personal history, and the history of Northampton, would in some important respects have been different. But no place would have been likely to hide Mr. Edwards from the great world of thought and of thinkers. As his life was actually shaped, it will be noticed that he made himself most widely known to the world, not by what happened at Northampton, but by what he did in the obscure settlement in Stockbridge. He loved that half-forest solitude because it gave him liberty to "commune with his own heart and be still." When the call came, in 1758, that summoned him away from Stockbridge to the presidency of Princeton College, as a matter of duty he rose up and obeyed that call. But the tears would almost start from his eyes at the very thought of leaving these still retreats so favorable to meditation and devotion. We may therefore safely conclude, had he gone to Bolton, that his light would not have been hid under a bushel.

There is a tradition connected with the early ministry of Northampton, which probably had something to do in shaping the ministerial life of the venerable Solomon Stoddard, and that of his illustrious grandson that followed.

The substance of what the writer is about to relate was told him some thirty years ago by Rev. Thomas Williams, who died a few years since in Providence, R. I., at the age of ninety-seven. Mr. Williams was graduated at Yale College in the year 1800, and a few years later was associated with Dr. Nathan Strong of Hartford as assistant editor in the preparation of some of the volumes of the Connecticut *Evangelical Magazine*. About this time he was visiting at the house of Rev. Dr. Joseph Lathrop of West Springfield, and was invited

to go with him to one of the neighboring towns to attend the meeting of the Hampshire association of ministers. Dr. Lathrop was a man then well advanced in years, having already been in the ministry of West Springfield a half-century or more. He began his ministry in 1756, and died in 1820. As will be noticed by these dates he was settled at West Springfield only six years after Mr. Edwards left Northampton. The story of that long and exciting struggle by which the Northampton pastor had been separated from his people was then fresh in the minds of men, and would be especially familiar to a man like Dr. Lathrop, a prominent minister in that vicinity.

Dr. Wm. B. Sprague, who compiled the *Annals of the American Pulpit*, it will be remembered, was settled as colleague with Dr. Lathrop. In his article on Jonathan Edwards, he says :

"The only individual with whom I ever conversed who had intelligent recollections of Edwards was my venerable colleague at West Springfield. He told me that shortly after his settlement, and while he was yet a boarder in the family of Mrs. Hopkins, Mr. Edwards' sister, Mr. Edwards came to pay her a visit. On the very day that he came, and I believe on his way thither he heard of the death of his daughter Mrs. Burr of Newark. When the time for evening prayers in the family came, Mr. Lathrop asked Mr. Edwards to conduct the service, but he declined, giving as a reason, that his feelings were so intense as to forbid his utterance. He made the same request of him in the morning and he complied with it, and Dr. Lathrop told me that his prayer, in respect to copiousness, appropriateness, tenderness, and sublimity surpassed anything that he ever heard from mortal lips. He said he was accustomed to look upon him even then as belonging to some superior race of beings."

These facts will help to show what opportunities Dr. Lathrop had had to make himself acquainted with the facts which he related to Mr. Williams. As the two ministers, the one in the freshness of youth and the other in the ripeness of age were riding along together to attend that meeting, Dr. Lathrop told the story of the Northampton difficulties as it was known and understood by him. But in order to appreciate the story we must go back and state a few items preliminary.

When Mr. Stoddard was called to Northampton in the year 1669, he was a young man of happy fortunes. The stars had

shined auspiciously upon his birth and his youth. His father, Anthony Stoddard, was a wealthy and prosperous merchant of Boston, and he was the eldest son. His mother was a daughter of Emmanuel Downing of Salem, and *her* mother was Lucy Winthrop, sister of the Governor, John Winthrop. Young Stoddard had passed through Harvard College, graduating in 1662 at the age of nineteen. When the call from Northampton reached him at Boston, he was on the point of sailing to England. His goods were on board ship, and he expected to set sail the next day. He heard the call however and concluded to give heed to it. Instead of going to England and the homes of his honored and wealthy kindred there, he came to Northampton, which was then a remote frontier town. The church was but a few years old, and Rev. Eleazar Mather, its first minister, greatly beloved and honored, had just died after a brief ministry.

When Mr. Stoddard reached Northampton he found there Mr. Mather's widow with her three young children. Mrs. Mather was Esther Warham, daughter of Rev. John Warham of Windsor. She was a woman of rare excellence, and though the mother of three children was yet only twenty-five years old. Mr. Stoddard was a year older. Under the circumstances nothing was more suitable, than that he, in due time, should be united in marriage with Mrs. Mather, and that she should be the minister's wife at Northampton for long years to come, as she had been for a few years in the past. As the wife of Mr. Stoddard she became the mother of twelve additional children, and was illustrious among the early New England matrons not so much for the number as the high quality of her household. Her first-born child in this new marriage relation was Esther Stoddard, the wife of Rev. Timothy Edwards of East Windsor and the mother of Jonathan Edwards.

And now we reach the particular point of Dr. Lathrop's story. As Mr. Stoddard went forward with the work of his ministry, both as preacher and pastor, his wife became convinced, that, with all his graces of character and manner, he had really no experimental acquaintance with the gospel. New England then was only a very few years away from Old

England, and just as a young man in England, after graduating at one of the Universities would choose the Church as his profession and enter upon his work with no questions asked as to his personal piety and spiritual enlightenment, so was it not unfrequently in New England in those first years of our history. Mrs. Mather was a woman of a genuine Christian experience, and her first husband, one of that famous band of Mathers, who for three generations did so much for the religious history of New England, walked with her in full Christian sympathy and companionship. But with Mr. Stoddard the case was different. Though he was, in himself, a noble specimen of youthful manhood, yet he did not seem to know Christ and the gospel plan of salvation by that inner light so indispensable to the Christian preacher. For a time "she kept all these things in her heart."

Months and perhaps years thus passed away, for the tradition we are relating was somewhat indefinite as to times and seasons. At length Mr. Stoddard was led to notice that on a certain day of each week, in the afternoon, his wife was wont to go out as to some appointment. After this had continued for a time his curiosity was excited, and he asked her what it was that called her away with such an unvarying regularity every week. She told him frankly that she with some other good women of the place, met to pray for his conversion—that they felt he was as yet in the condition described by the apostle,—“For the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned.”

This set Mr. Stoddard upon a course of most serious and earnest thinking. Not long after as the tradition runs, one Sabbath as he was at the table administering the Lord's Supper, he had a new and wonderful revelation of the gospel scheme. He caught such a full and glorious view of Christ and his great love for men as shown in his redemptive work, that he was almost overpowered with emotion, and with difficulty went forward with the communion service. By reason of this peculiar experience of his he was led to think, that the place where the soul was likely to receive spiritual light and understanding was at the Lord's table,—that there, in a special

manner, Christ would be present to reveal himself, in all his fullness of love to the souls of men.

Hence, as years passed on, grew up the custom under Mr. Stoddard's ministry, of inviting all people of reasonable age, and not scandalous and disreputable in life to come to the Lord's table and be enrolled as members of the church. This practice was not fully established until the beginning of the last century, midway in Mr. Stoddard's ministry. But when Mr. Edwards came here in 1727, it had been the standing usage so long as to be a fixed institution. Mr. Edwards found here a church of some 700 or 800 members. It is difficult to tell exactly how large the church was for those early New England generations handed down to us no such statistical records as we now keep. If we knew exactly what the population of the town was at that period we could tell approximately how large the church was. Dr. Sereno E. Dwight, in his *Life of Edwards*, says of the church in Edwards' day: "It was and had been very large, embracing almost all the married adults of the congregation as well as a considerable proportion of the youths of both sexes."

Many persons are wont to confound this practice of Mr. Stoddard with the half-way covenant scheme of church-membership, and to speak of Mr. Stoddard as if he were the author and source of the half-way covenant plan. This however is not historically correct. The Half-way Covenant as it is popularly called was sanctioned and established by the Synod which met in Boston, March 10, 1662, seven years before Mr. Stoddard was called to Northampton. For several years previous to 1662 the whole subject matter had been under earnest and wide-spread discussion. The system, introduced by Mr. Stoddard at Northampton, differs essentially, even radically from the half-way plan of membership. The object of this scheme was to make provision whereby baptized persons of orderly lives, might by publicly owning the covenant, as it was called, be so far members of the church, that their children in turn might be baptized; but they must not come to the Lord's table until they were able to show a true inward Christian experience; whereas the very gist of Mr. Stoddard's usage was to bring all these baptized persons, and indeed all persons not openly

immoral directly to the Lord's table, as to a converting ordinance.

It was inevitable in a world like ours that a church gathered and organized after this manner should hold within itself large admixtures of merely earthly elements. With Mr. Edwards' ideas as to what a church should be, a body so constituted must have been repugnant to him from the first. But he greatly loved and honored his grandfather whose name then was in patriarchal honor far and wide among the New England churches. How grand and noble a man Mr. Stoddard was may be learned by a few words of Rev. William Williams, of Hatfield, who preached his funeral sermon. "On many accounts was he desirable to us. In his person which was comely and grave and commanded reverence from all who saw him, as if the God of nature had suited his very aspect to the work assigned him. His conversation was also grave but delightful, and very profitable, accompanied with a very sweet affability, and a freedom from moroseness, in which there was often pleasantness, but never any lightness or vanity to be observed."

After Mr. Edwards was settled as Mr. Stoddard's colleague, while his grandfather lived he treated this whole matter of the order and constitution of the church with a gentle reserve. In 1729 Mr. Stoddard died after a sixty years ministry, and Mr. Edwards was left alone in charge of this ancient church. Even then he was only twenty-six years old, notwithstanding all he had passed through and all the responsibilities which had been laid upon him.

As sole pastor, and as the years passed on, he could not well refrain from expressing his dissatisfaction with this style of church organization, and all criticism from him in this line would naturally give offence to very many persons whose names were enrolled upon the church list. This was the beginning of sorrows. Other things followed, until his ministry at Northampton came to an untimely end June 22, 1750.

President Woolsey in his Historical Discourse given at the meeting of the Edwards family in Stockbridge, September, 1870, speaking of the family and outward condition from which Jonathan Edwards came, says: "In this simple, somewhat retired settlement of farmers [East Windsor], Timothy Edwards

preached the word and broke the bread for sixty-three years. He died in the same year with his son, while his wife Esther Stoddard, survived him until she reached the age of ninety-nine. They had ten daughters, seven of whom were married and left posterity. Jonathan came after four of them. They were well educated for their opportunities, and we find the brother reciting his Latin to his elder sisters. One may, not without reason, ascribe to this numerous band of sisters a decided influence on the manners and character of the brother. May it not be said too, that the feminine element was infused, from the first, into his nature more largely than it entered many or most of the New England ministers. With his masculine intellect he had a gentleness and perhaps a receptivity of spirit which does not always belong to his sex. His face itself, if I mistake not, indicates that in him the leading male and female traits were blended."

As President Woolsey closed this sentence he turned and pointed to the pictures of Edwards and his wife hanging on the wall behind him, copies of the paintings executed by the celebrated artist Smibert.

This suggestion of President Woolsey is worthy a moment's attention. Whoever has carefully studied the face of Jonathan Edwards, as it exists for us, in his best pictures, cannot but have noticed that with his high forehead and strong intellectual cast of countenance, his features are all softened and rounded into the beauty of the face of a woman. The lines are the wavy lines of grace, rather than the angular lines of strength. We know, from the testimonies of his contemporaries, that the face of Edwards was irradiated at times with a marvelous light and beauty, such as made Dr. Joseph Hall, of Sutton, say, when Edwards was a guest in his house, and led his family devotions, that his face shone as it had been the face of an angel.

What we see thus in the very features of Edwards, we may, in like manner see in the form and action of his mind. Hardly ever was there a thinker who could forge such chains of inexorable logic, link after link, to reach some mighty philosophical or theological demonstration. Even when he was standing up to preach before the children of the forest in the wilds of

Stockbridge, he would construct an argument for example to show these untaught savages that the Bible was the book of God given to them for their instruction and guidance, his arguments all the while so simple that little children could follow him through every step of the way, and yet so strong and conclusive that learned philosophers could hardly desire any larger or better style of reasoning to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures.

This was one feature of his mental action. On the other hand we have from time to time those outbursts of poetry in prose, of which we have already given an example, as when he says: "This I know not how to express otherwise than by a calm, sweet abstraction of soul from all the concerns of this world, and sometimes a kind of vision, or fixed ideas and imagination of being alone in the mountains, or some solitary wilderness far from all mankind sweetly conversing with Christ, and rapt and swallowed up in God. The sense I had of divine things would often, of a sudden, kindle up, as it were, a sweet burning in my heart, an ardor of soul that I know not how to express." Illustrations like these, which abound especially in Edwards' earlier writings serve to show that the masculine and feminine qualities were as truly conjoined in his mind as in his face.

Hon. Gideon H. Hollister, in his History of Connecticut, has a striking passage in which he speaks of these feminine influences surrounding and encompassing the early life of Edwards.

"He enjoyed," says Mr. Hollister, "the rare advantage, never understood and felt except by those who have been fortunate enough to experience it, of all the softening and hallowed influences which refined female society sheds like an atmosphere of light around the mind and soul of boyhood. Had that fond mother and those loving sisters been fully aware of the glorious gifts that were even then beginning to glow in the eyes of their darling; had they been able to see in its full blaze the immortal beauty borrowed from the regions of spiritualized thought and hallowed affections, that was one day to encircle that forehead as with a wreath from the bowers of paradise, they could hardly have unfolded his moral and intellectual character with more discreet care."

These words of Mr. Hollister look only to those soft, gentle, formative influences coming in upon him from his immediate surroundings, but the suggestion of President Woolsey looks

to something far more deep and subtle. When we remember how queenly a woman his mother, Esther Stoddard, was, physically, mentally, spiritually; when we remember that Jonathan Edwards stood, as an only son, nearly midway among his ten sisters, it is not unnatural for us to conclude that his superlative greatness was due, in some measure, to the fact that he wonderfully combined in himself the masculine and feminine elements.

In concluding these remarks there is one consideration that should not escape our notice. Edwards was really cut off at last in the midst of his years. He died at the age of fifty-four, and for such intellectual work as that which opened naturally to his intellect and taste, the next fifteen or twenty years would have been the golden period of his life. In healthy manhood the mind does not reach the full measure of its power when the physical strength is at its highest.

Socrates was seventy years old and in the full tide of his great influence when he was compelled to drink the fatal hemlock. Plato was still surrounded by his pupils in the quiet walks of the Academy when his death occurred at the age of seventy-eight.

Remarkable as were the intellectual developments of Edwards in his early life there was nothing sickly or premature about them. The greatness of his youth was only proportionate to the greatness of his manhood. His paper on the Habits of Spiders, written before he was thirteen years old, was a very remarkable production for a boy, but no more remarkable than those which were issuing from his pen at the age of fifty. He came of a sturdy and long-lived race, and except for that fatal experiment of inoculation for the small-pox, in March, 1758, he would naturally have continued till a ripe old age. His father died at 89, his mother at 99. His grandfather Stoddard died at 85, and his grandmother Stoddard at 92. Of his sisters, Esther lived to be 72; Mary, 75; Martha, 77; Eunice, 83; Ann, 91.

It was during the years just preceding his death that his great works, those that secured him his world-wide fame, had been produced, and it is certainly natural to believe, if life and health had been continued, that other works, in the same gen-

eral ranges of thought but with still higher ranges of power, would have been forthcoming. One might as well have undertaken to chain the ocean as to stop the activities of his mind. He who had already written the "History of Redemption," "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will," "Nature of True Virtue," and "God's last end in His Creation," was not likely to lay down his pen at fifty-four and retire into a state of mental idleness. His removal to the college at Princeton, while it would have made his hours for quiet writing less, would have brought him more into connection with the world of thought and of letters, and in this way have furnished a new stimulus to his mind. It is idle, however, to conjecture what Edwards might have done had he lived to the age which from his ancestral associations seemed naturally appointed unto him. He died in March, 1758, in his fifty-fifth year. His venerable father died two months before him, and his beloved wife followed him the same year, in the month of September.

ARTICLE III.—CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS IN SPELLING REFORM.

NOTHING could so demonstrate the vastness and difficulty of the work of reforming the existing English orthography as the fact that with the enlistment of so much intellectual force, learning, zeal, and authoritative leadership, such little apparent advance has been made. Everything, however, it should be remembered, of value to man costs—costs sacrifice, labor, time. If the grand goal can be assuredly reached at last—if an orthography can be brought to the ideal standard of a single character for every articulate element—the cost must be reckoned as trivial, whatever it is likely to be. We propose to set forth in brief phrase the leading conditions of success, not merely to indicate in some degree the present stage of the movement with the probabilities of the final results, but rather to turn more distinct attention on several portions of the work still remaining to be done, which, while indispensable to the consummation of the undertaking, have as yet failed to receive the needful consideration. Even although it should appear to any that the points to be presented have been, one or other of them, more or less thoroughly elaborated, our labor may not prove altogether in vain or impertinent. For there are two more general and fundamental conditions of success in such a movement as this which proposes to revolutionize the life-work of a people now vast and widely scattered, that of themselves sufficiently justify our effort;—the necessity of union, and, in order to this, the necessity of wide and continuous discussion. These two conditions, it may be observed, underlie the several more specific conditions which we propose to consider.

I. A SETTLED PHONOLOGY.

A prime fundamental condition of success in the proposed reform is of course the satisfactory determination of the alphabetic sounds in the English language. The magnitude of this work appears at once when it is considered that the people

speaking the language are scattered throughout all parts of the globe, being found on every continent and on the islands of every sea; that their articulation has been subject to all the diversified manifold influences of climate, pursuit, and condition, that can modify human speech; that even the same elemental sounds in their different combinations strike different ears so differently that it is often difficult if not impossible to identify the element in question; that, moreover, the methods and standards to be adopted and applied in the determination of the character of the particular elements, whether through the ear or the eye, or the articulating organ itself, have been a matter of discussion and disagreement. Yet it is precisely here, in reaching a very satisfactory result in the determination of our phonology, although, as we shall see, not a final result, that the movement towards a reform has effected its greatest work and given its best encouragement to expect final success. A glance at the history of the science of English phonology will justify this remark, and a trace of this history just now seems on other grounds most opportune.

The first treatise on English phonology deserving consideration as having any scientific value, is the great work of Dr. James Rush—the *Philosophy of the Human Voice*—the first edition of which appeared in 1827. His enumeration of the alphabetic elements embraced twelve tonic sounds, fourteen subtonics, and nine atonics, aggregating thirty-five. His tonic or vowel system included two diphthongal sounds *ou* and *ī* in *pine*, and reckoned as distinct the sounds represented by *e* in *fete* and in *met*, and those represented by the *i* in *pit* and in *pique*. The use of the single character to represent the long *ī* might perhaps justify enumerating it as a distinct alphabetic element; but there seems no warrant for enumerating *ou* more than *oi*. It is undoubtedly true that a slight difference is made in enunciating the long *e* in *fete* and the short *e* in *met*, as also in enunciating the long *ī* in *pique* and the short *i* in *pin*; but phoneticians have wisely settled into the rejection of such slight degrees of variations in the proposed spelling reform. Dr. Rush's vowel system is thus reduced to eight. His subtonic or phthongal consonant enumeration embraces the initial *w* and *y*; and the atonic or aphthongal consonants include *h*

and *wh* as cognates respectively of initial *y* and *w*, and *sh* as cognate of *zh* or *z* in *azure*. But the great contribution which Dr. Rush made to the science of speech was his demonstration that in every syllabic utterance the voice passes through a determinate interval of musical pitch. This principle he elaborated in marvelous detail as it determines the movements of the voice in the utterance of thought and feeling.

In 1843 the writer of the present article published an essay on English Phonology in the *Biblical Repository*—a quarterly publication subsequently united with the *Bibliotheca Sacra*—in which, starting from the great discoveries of Dr. Rush, he proceeded to recognize another most important principle in phonological science, viz: that into the utterance of every pluriliteral syllable a sound enters which is not denoted by the letters themselves that constitute the syllable as written, but which yet essentially modifies the effect of the utterance on the ear. Thus in uttering the syllable *man*, besides the sound, denoted by the letters *m*, *a*, and *n*, there is a sound given forth between that of the *m* and the *a*, and also between the *a* and the *n*—a sound given out while the articulating organs are passing from the *m* position to that of the *a*, and from that to the *n*. In many syllables as in *pit*, *cap*, this intervening sound which later phoneticians have named the *glide*, makes up most of the utterance; and in all syllables of two or more elements, excepting diphthongs, constitutes more or less of the body of the utterance. It followed from this that the syllable, not the letter, is the proper elemental unit in speech, as the molecule, not the atom, is the proper elemental unit in material bodies. In this essay the writer also proposed and formally applied the principle of organic position as the true principle in the discrimination and the enumeration of the alphabetic elements—the physiological principle, or that of the articulating organ as distinguished from the visible and the audible—or that of the eye and that of the ear. Dr. Rush was evidently governed by this principle; but he did not formally recognize it nor consistently adhere to it. Guided by this principle of organic position the author of the *Repository* article sharply distinguished the alphabetic elements into the two classes of vowels and consonants, each class including both phthongal and aphthongal

elements as subdivisions, making the vowel an element formed without obstruction through necessary contact of the articulating organs and individually determined by the length of the vocal wave in the open tube, thus connecting each vowel with a determinate pitch—this pitch-relation being suggested as a just inference from the mode of vowel formation. The inference has received formal demonstration from the labors of Helmholtz, Koenig, and others, who have succeeded in identifying with each vowel sound its own number of vibrations, as musicians with each degree of pitch. He was led thus to modify the alphabetic system of Dr. Rush, rejecting from the consonant class the initial *w* and *y* which take the proper organic position of the vowels denoted by these letters; and by placing the *h* and *wh* in the vowel class, but representing them as apophthongs or only breathed sounds. He formulated his alphabetic system, arranging the elements in order as indicated by the organs concerned in their formation—placing the *ū* in *but* farthest back and the *e* in *mete* farthest forward in the vowel system and the consonants according to the relative place of their formation in the mouth.

In 1856 Dr. Ernst Brücke, Professor of Physiology in Vienna, published his “Elements of the Physiology and Classification of the Sounds of Language.” A Summary of this work was given in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for April, 1866, by Professor Packard of Yale College, “with a view to indicate the starting point for the theory of the spoken sounds of language.” Dr. Brücke’s method is the same as that of the *Repository* Article just referred to—the organic or physiological; and in accordance with that Article he recognizes the syllable as the proper elemental unit in word-formation; he makes substantially the same enumeration of alphabetic elements with the same grounds of distinction and classification; he arranges the elements in the same order, placing the *ū* in *but* at one end and the *ī* in *pit* at the other end of the vowel scale. With a more detailed description of the position and movement of the organs in the formation of the elements and with the wider comprehension of view demanded by a general phonology, Dr. Brücke yet adds nothing of special importance to the science of English phonology beyond what had already been brought out

by the American authors just named, while yet he strikingly confirms the correctness of their method and the results of its application. The unacknowledged coincidence in principles and results with those writers that had preceded him by so many years is a point of considerable interest as is also the fact that a distinguished American scholar should a quarter of a century after the publication of the second American treatise mentioned have felt himself prompted to remand American students to Germany for the beginnings of phonological life.

In his Lectures on the Science of Language, delivered in 1868, the distinguished philologist Max Müller presented an elaborate theory of the alphabet, professedly adopting the physiological principle. It is sufficient for our purpose to say here, that he regards the *h* and the *wh* as both single elements, being modifications of the *spiritus asper* and as belonging to the unchecked or vowel class. Another equally distinguished philologist, Professor W. D. Whitney, has also treated the subject with characteristic originality and thoroughness. As he was chairman of the committee of the American Philological Society on Spelling Reform, appointed in 1875, which reported in 1876 and 1877, we have in these reports the final results of his studies, and thus we have the authoritative presentation of the subject from the proper philological side.

In England for over forty years a movement for a phonetic reform in the English language has been in progress under the leadership of Mr. Isaac Pitman, who for some years was associated with Mr. A. J. Ellis in publishing the *Phonetic Journal*. The alphabet as proposed in this movement embraces twelve vowels, twenty-four consonants, or thirty-six simple elements besides four diphthongs. It presents *ch* and *j* as simple and *w* and *y* as initial elements; it distinguishes as different elements the vowel in *ell* and *ale*; those in *ill* and *eel*; those in *not* and *ought*; and those in *foot* and *food*. This may be designated as the presentation of the practical side.

It is not necessary for our purpose here to notice particularly the labors of Merkel, Ellis, Bell, Haldeman, and other phonologists who have cultivated the science with much zeal and learning. On comparing the results thus variously reached we notice at once that the phonology of our language has made

most significant progress in the last half century. Before the great work of Dr. Rush it had nothing of a scientific character ; it is now definitely founded on an unquestionable scientific basis ; and the results reached are most encouraging to the hope that that degree of certitude and harmony may be readily attained which must be regarded as an indispensable condition of final success in whatever is practicable in the English spelling reform. The few points of disagreement may easily be settled by the application of the so-called physiological principle of alphabetic distinction and enumeration, more exactly defined as the principle of organic position, which seems now to be fully and finally established. This principle was thus stated in the article referred to in the *Biblical Repository* for 1843 : " Each element having its definite organic formation, there must be so many different elements as there are different positions assumed by the organs in speech. If, in the same element, there is no change of position in the organs, we know it to be simple or monophthongal. If in uttering it the organs change, we conclude that it is diphthongal." The enumerations of the simple vowel elements by Dr. Rush, by the *Repository* article, and by the American Philological Association are the same, except that the Philological Association does not distinguish the long and short sounds represented by *e* in *met* and *they*, and those represented by *i* in *pick* and *pique*. In rejecting the distinction of quantity in these cases, as in the case of the *a* in *fat* and *fare*, of the *o* in *not* and *nor*, and of the *u* in *but* and *burn*, the Association evinces practical wisdom for the uses of spelling reform. The vowel diphthongs are the same in the enumerations mentioned : *i*, *oi*, *ou*, *yu*. The *Repository* article held the initial *w* and *y* to be proper vowel elements, there being no necessary occlusion of the breath by the articulating organs in forming them ; the organic position is certainly the same as that of the *oo* and *i* in *pit* respectively. Any supposed contradiction of this by the report of the ear is to be attributed to the effect of the " glide " element. The reform alphabet would be spared two signs, if this identification of the initial *w* with the vowel *oo* and of *y* with short *i* were allowed. The physiological principle also demands that *wh* in *what* be regarded as a simple apthongal *oo*, as does the *Repository* article,

and, as already stated, Max Müller, with Mr. Ellis, and other phonologists. The organic position is the same. To utter an *h* before the *oo* element (*h-w-a-t*) is well nigh impossible to an ordinary English speaker. The argument from Anglo-Saxon usage in writing *hwaet* is inconclusive; for it would analogically represent a single aspirated *w* in this way, just as it wrote *burhg*, *sorhg*, where the digraph *hg* must be regarded as denoting a simple aspirated guttural element. The Anglo-Saxon like the Greek placed the representation of the aspirate first in such cases, while modern English, like the Latin, puts it after; as *ῥόμβος*, Lat. *rhombus*, Eng. *rhomb*.

The consonantal systems are nearly in accord. The one question that remains is whether the *ch* in *church* and the *j* in *joy* are simple or diphthongal. Dr. Rush, the *Repository* article, and Dr. Brücke pronounce it diphthongal. Max Müller, the American Philological Association, and the English Phoneticians treat it as simple. The physiological principle seems to settle the question beyond all doubt. The organs, in the utterance, begin clearly with the *t* position; they end with the *sh* position. Very strangely talks Max Müller: "*ch* may be said to consist of half *t* and half *sh*; but half *t* and half *sh* give only one whole consonant!" The argument refutes itself; alleging two distinct alphabetic organic positions, it establishes the diphthongal character of the utterance.

II. A SETTLED PRONUNCIATION.

Phonology constitutes but a single department of Orthoepy. Principles of Syllabication and of Accentuation enter with alphabetic elements into words. All these constituents enter into words organically, in the sense that they act and react upon each other, so that even the phonology of the language cannot be fully and accurately comprehended except in the light of its relations to syllabication and accentuation. In other words, the orthoepy of a language is an organic composite; and to ground the orthography surely and accurately it must rest on a determined pronunciation. The written character is a representation of the spoken element; and it would seem preposterous to attempt constructing a perfect orthography, or

reforming a vicious spelling before the spoken word, the pronunciation, is intelligently settled. As the orthoepy in the case of a living language must be ever changing, although it be under more or less determinate laws, the new construction or reform of the phonology must intelligently provide for this normal change and adapt itself so far as may be to it. Spelling reform has a work here which seems to have been greatly overlooked. Making the phonology the all-in-all and trusting its claim that with a certain alphabetic system which it has devised, "the English language can be spelled according to its sounds," it is pretty sure to fail. Its phonology, even if perfected, cannot be otherwise than an imperfect representation of the language even in its present form ; and its professed fixedness must succumb before the ever-changing pronunciation. Fixed characters cannot represent the ever-fluctuating.

English orthoepy is irregular, anomalous, as truly as its orthography. A reformed pronunciation is as truly needed as a reformed spelling. In truth, English orthoepy as yet lacks thorough scientific treatment ; its regulative principles need to be ascertained and applied in scientific method. It is a work that must precede a scientific orthography, as the represented must be known before the representative can be determined. Certainly a mistaken pronunciation if represented in a reformed orthography is likely to bring in most deplorable corruptions into our language.

It is our object at present to indicate the conditions of success in the spelling reform movement only in the general way. We can accordingly illustrate only in a few obvious instances the necessity of settling the orthoepy before attempting to carry out a reform of the orthography, remarking by the way, that if this reform proceed gradually the orthography may be determined to some extent step by step with the progressive determination of the orthoepy. We have already referred to the fact that in the syllable, which is the formative unit of the word, if consisting of more than two letters, there necessarily enters the "glide" element, which of course cannot be and need not be represented in written language. But proceeding without recognition of this principle of syllabication, Max Müller and other spelling reformers insert a false constituent in those large

classes of syllables which have no proper vowel alphabetic element, or contain what Worcester vaguely calls the *obscure vowel* sounds. They write in their reformed orthography, *imposibel*, *writen*, *litel*, *pipel* (people). These are most serious corruptions of our speech. No good speaker pronounces as these spellings indicate. So far as followed this kind of reform would lead all English speaking in the eccentric ways of the Scotch judge who on principle gave emphatic utterance to those unaccented syllables containing Worcester's "obscure vowel elements," charging his jury, it is said, in this style: "And so, gentlemen, having shown you that the pannel's argument is utterly impossi-*bill*, I shall now proceed for to show you that it is extremely improbabil*l*." From this neglect first to determine the pronunciation, the reform movement threatens to corrupt the language still more seriously by its suppression of one of the elements when duplicated in such words as *commit*, *efficient*, *spelling*, *supplanted*, *better*, *utter*, *differ*, *occur*, *applies*, *dropping*, *current*—the list of selections might be increased indefinitely—which words they spell *komit*, *efishent*, *speleng*, *suplanted*, *beter*, *uter*, *difer*, *okur*, *aplis*, *droping*, *curent*. Every lover of pure English, especially every lover of an accurate pronunciation, will set himself in opposition to a reform which is likely to bring in such abuses. How many and how serious these may prove to be can be known only after the general principles and facts of our orthoepy are ascertained and established. The distinguished linguistic scholars who have taken a lead in the reform seem not to have sufficiently considered this important matter so seriously influencing the reception which their work is to meet. It may be thought, indeed, and without disparagement to their eminent learning and ability, that this department lies outside of their particular province, and that therefore we should not look to them to do up the needful ear-work of the reform, their labors being more characteristically turned upon the visible characters in language. Certainly when they find such linguistic scholars as Max Müller giving the same sound to the letter *a* in the final syllables of *idea*, *captain*, *village*, *final*, and the champion in spelling reform of the American Philological Association recognizing no difference of vowel element in the final syllables of *friar*, *speaker*, *nadir*, *actor*, *sul-*

phur, *zephyr*, lovers of good and pure English will hesitate to accept a reform which blunders thus grossly in our orthoepy. Sound principle, thus, and actual experience unite in enforcing the necessity of fixing the orthoepy before a new orthography, however perfect in itself, can be accepted.

III. A SETTLED PHONOTYPY.

Phonotypy is to orthography what phonology is to orthoepy—a department of it, yet most significant to the success of spelling reform. It embraces three subordinate departments in each of which, work very important and somewhat difficult and moreover requiring different classes of laborers, is to be accomplished before reform can make much progress. First, there is the number and shape of the characters that can best be used in manuscript; then of those that can be best used and read in print; and lastly of those that can best be produced by the type-founder. A zealous reformer forcibly presents those conditions of success in a criticism on one leading attempt in introducing the proposed reform: “The new print was un-English in appearance and difficult to read; the script quite unsuited for business use or for correspondence with non-phonetic persons; while the compositors of friendly papers were so heavily taxed by new and cut letters that the publishers could not afford to give the help to spelling reform which they really desired to bestow.” There have been divers schemes of phonotypy proposed, some very ingenious and elaborate. But it is safe here to say without further criticism that the necessities of the case have not yet been met. To retain the old forms as far as possible so as not to separate the new orthography from the old, thereby rendering useless the great mass of our literature now in print, more than is absolutely necessary; to consult facility in use by pen-men and by compositors; to meet too the demands of the reader that they be such as can be readily seized by the eye and easily distinguished; to contrive, moreover, that they be such as to form, with such shade lines and such hair lines, that they can be put into types easily handled by the printer and inexpensively cut into the matrices of the type-founder; that, still farther, they be, whether in script or type, of such form in

themselves and when combined in whatever way that the æsthetic eye shall not be offended ;—these are requisites which all will appreciate. The writer, the printer, the type-founder must be consulted and the respective demands of each must be met or the best phonetic system in itself will be liable to fail. The author will not use it; the printer, now the autocrat in orthography, will shun it; and the type-founder will reject it. In this department of reform work, art more than science is requisite; artistic taste and mechanical skill are needful.

IV. STUDY OF THE SOURCES OF ANOMALOUS SPELLING.

Language is a growth. It is ever changing because it is the expression of a life—of a true life if a common life. The stronger the life, the richer in its constituents and its forms, the more inconstant will its outward expression be. The irregularities which have come into the shaping and developing form of the English tongue have each a cause. Not only the correction of those irregularities but the prevention of them in time to come clearly dictate the importance of carefully ascertaining the nature of those causes and the mode of their operation. It has been asserted most erroneously and, it may be added, most unfortunately for the success of the proposed reform, for such inconsiderate and unwarranted assertions repel confidence and provoke opposition, that our present orthographic method is “a mere jumble of fortuitous combinations of letters, ‘without rhyme or reason;’” that it is “effete and corrupt, a mass of anomalies, the growth of ignorance and chance, equally repugnant to good taste and to common sense.” Nothing could be further from the truth than these wild representations. The simple facts are, that the English language was once phonetic and that the irregularities as a general rule have been the result of the best and wisest application of the means at hand at the time for representing to the reader the constituent sounds of the word intended by the author or compositor. A considerable number of the anomalies most complained of were introduced by reformers; a few may be attributed to caprice or accident or sluggishness, or the poverty of printing material. But the mass of the assailed anom-

alies have come in under the rule of good sense and rational principle. They are the normal development of the language outgrowing its germinant or infantile capacity in environments more or less untoward. The English language in very truth is anomalous because it is rich—rich in its capacities, rich in its acquisitions. The introduction from time to time of digraphs, the adaptations of the orthographic characters to the changes ever going on in the orthoepy, the graceful recognitions of the existence and respective character of the languages with which it was brought into sympathetic contact, are some leading particulars which attest the truth of the statement that our present orthography is as a whole the outcome of a rational growth. Different principles have necessarily in this long and rich history come in to rule its development. These principles, just and rational in themselves have, in the necessities of things earthly, at times come into conflict, and consequently there have arisen exceptions. This is the fate of all languages having a history. Principles of euphony have thus conflicted at times with principles of inflection; principles of rhythm with principles of arrangement; principles of rhetoric with principles of grammatical construction; and exceptions—so-called anomalies—result, expressing the triumph of the victor principle in the strife. An alphabetic system, still further, which may have been perfect in itself at the start, must be found insufficient in the progress of things to meet the demands of the advancing language, and orthographical expedients to supply the defects will be a necessary device. One will be surprised, as he studies the history of the English tongue, to observe with what excellent judgment these expedients for the most part have been supplied. The wanton condemnation of the language, to which we have referred, is offensive to the lover of his vernacular and destroys his confidence in men that freely allow themselves in it as fit leaders of reform. To heal a disease the skillful physician will seek to know its cause and source. It savors of quackery to dwell upon aches and pains and deformities in order to justify doubtful and desperate remedies. A careful study of the history of our language, spoken, written, and printed, will beyond a doubt prove most helpful in its suggestions for the correction and improvement of our

noble tongue. The labors of Mr. A. J. Ellis in this direction, worthy of especial mention for their magnitude and thoroughness, with those of other patient investigators, are most promising of valuable help and guidance in this work, which the spelling reform cannot afford to overlook.

V. AUTHORITATIVE INTRODUCTION.

It is abundantly evident from the experience of the past that some expedient needs yet to be devised for effecting the introduction of the new orthography, when it shall have been fully perfected in all its apartments of phonology, orthoepy, and phonotypy and in its sagacious provisions for the future development of the language. There has been great zeal with profound conviction, great industry, great learning, but as yet little or no sensible result. Individual enterprise has persisted through nearly half a century in making its weekly appeals to its readers now counted by scores of thousands; learned societies with their able committees representing the highest learning of the age have resolved and argued and entreated; the all-powerful press, from the great quarterlies down through the bi-monthlies and monthlies to the weekly and daily newspapers, secular and religious, has confronted the universal English-reading and English-speaking people with the grand simplicities and economies and beauties of the renovated language; but the great mass of the language-makers lie stupid, unmoved, with irresponsive mind and heart and tongue. One of the ablest and most widely circulated bi-monthlies still with admirable fortitude and perseverance and consistency, spells *tho*, pitilessly docking off from this venerable form the old Gothic guttural *ugh* (how Indian-like and savage, notwithstanding its classic correspondent *œ*!) for silent, meaningless, altogether linguistically dead, it must needs be amputated; here and there, the busy world hardly knows where, the new alphabet may be filosifizing after its own fashion, but the heady, healthy English mind stolidly refuses to suffer a mutilated *hed* or *hellh*,—stubbornly refuses to take the very first of the steps towards the new life which the best linguistic surgery and hygiene are commending to it. Assuredly the sad fact demonstrates the necessity of some altogether new assertion of patriotism and

linguistic ability in order to start the new reform. Individual genius, like ancient Orm or recent Webster, does not succeed in this age of universal culture. Government aid has been suggested, applications to Parliament and to Congress; but the Dominion and the rising English people of the Indies, East and West, will assert and uphold each their own autonomy here. Linguistic science has striven hard but seemingly in vain. Reform in order to succeed seems called upon to devise some way of authoritative introduction to the hesitating speech. If it reject resort to some dynamite which shall force along the social convulsion that Max Müller speaks of as possibly necessary, what expedient can it adopt, unless it be that which enwraps the very seed-corn of all rational speech—concert;—concert in its widest and most universal forms, in all existing and in *pro re nata* associations; concert of linguistic scholars, of scientists in every branch of literary and cultured men, of authors and teachers, of schools and colleges and universities, of printers, type-founders, publishers; at home in the old hive of English speech, in all the swarming colonies of English-speaking people. It would seem as if only such a vast desperate effort of the entire English life, acting as by one universal convulsive birth-throe, could bring forth the new life out of the dead indifference that prevails in the one only creative source of a people's speech.

VI. REFORMATION OR REVOLUTION; GRADUALISM OR CATACLYSM.

Under the general conviction of the anomalous character of our English orthography and the desirableness of a restoration so far as possible to the standard of a perfect tongue, movements for reform have been started in manifold places and in manifold ways, partly proposing a partial reform that shall embrace only the grosser anomalies, partly proposing a thorough radical reform in the adoption and universal application of the principle of one written character for each articulated element. Not only is there occasioned in this unconcerted action, loss of union where union is essential, but strength and time are wasted. It would seem as if the time had come for a full discussion of the question whether for the English speech

a thorough orthographic reform is practicable. The question here proposed is, not whether the English-speaking people can ever be induced to make the change; it is whether the language itself can reasonably admit the adoption of the ideal standard and apply it throughout. The English language, it must be borne in mind, is as truly a written as a spoken language; its orthography is as vital an element in it as its orthoepy, and has its claims for recognition which cannot reasonably be refused. Each of these constituents has its own essential laws. They may, not unnaturally, be expected at times to come into conflict. The question arises: is it possible to reconcile these conflicts so as to make a perfectly thorough spelling reform practicable? The one office and function of language is to convey the thought and feeling—preëminently and controllingly the thought—of one mind to other minds. It performs this function as truly and as legitimately through the eye as through the ear. To ignore the independent sphere of either mode of address is to ignore a part of the very life of the language. In fact the English reader is addressed in the communications of mind with mind at the present day, to a much larger extent than the English hearer; the language works far more for the eye than for the ear. A few words comparatively suffice for the uses of oral discourse; literature, the literature of art and of science, of friendship and of commerce, swells our vocabularies into ponderous folios of crowded matter. Great stress, perhaps too much, has been laid on the importance for historical and etymological purposes of conserving our orthography, on the one side; but these uses have been most unwarrantably and inconsiderately disparaged on the other. Who can deny that the mind of the reader is assisted in the interpretation of *thorough*, of *facility*, of *jet d'eau* and *appui*, by such spellings, more than by such forms as *thuro*, *fasility*, *jado*, and *apwe*? Illustrations of like tenor might be drawn from all the manifold sources from which our vocabulary has drawn its words. But our design is not to discuss those points. The one thing of importance to us now is that these two constituents enter into our language and will sometimes come into conflict. Can it be confidently assumed that the phonetic principle can always be allowed to prevail? This is a point

demanding careful consideration; no conclusion should be taken up rashly. Success dictates careful exploration here as elsewhere.

So in orthoepy itself principles must ever be coming into conflict, possibly precluding uniform adherence to any assumed standard. The questions recur as those to be settled before reform can be adopted: is the adoption of the ideal phonetic standard practicable throughout; if not, how far?

Then again the demand will be made: will the language itself admit such a thorough revolution—a language so old, so broadly rooted, so broadly branched, so bent, so gnarled, so clipped and rent, in the long course of its immensely diversified and complicated history, so open to adverse influences and so pliant to all? You may train the yielding sapling to your ideal as to place and form of branch and spray and leaf; but the old oak torn and twisted by the winds and storms of a thousand years, starved and stinted or unequally supplied with food in soil and heat and moisture—what can you do with that in restoring to your ideal of symmetry and grace? How far can you go without striking with your murderous steel the life itself? Can you iron out the deep corrugations of its trunk; can you lift or lower any one of its ponderous limbs, or recreate one decayed or shattered branch? Thorough orthographic reform means a new language. Is reform ready for this? Is the language itself capable of this work of self-recreation?

But if a thorough revolution in the language be rejected, what shall be the measure and mode of the gradualism to be adopted? Shall the reform sweep through whole particular classes of anomalies, as by leaving off all needless letters, or shall it begin with a few selected words with silent letters or with whole groups of such words? Shall it reduce to uniformity all words with sounds now represented by different characters, or begin with the grosser anomalies?

The recommendations of the Philological Society of England and the American Philological Association, as well as those of other leading reformers seem inclined to a selective, even a capricious or arbitrary gradualism embracing at the start some two dozen changes in single words and classes of

words. But there seems to be no intelligent determination of where and how far the reform shall be applied, except as it appears in the indicated cases. The selections seem to be of the most vague and accidental character and to have been made without any principle or method. The changes proposed are numerous enough and broad enough to be cataclysmic; but how many such cataclysms are to follow and at what intervals? Again and again have lists of words to be reformed been set forth from phonetic sources—each succeeding list more numerous than the preceding—what are to be the coming changes? When is the end to be? It is utterly improbable that the characteristic common sense of the English-speaking people will ever be brought to accept such an indefinite and such an indefinitely lasting scheme of amending its speech. They would infinitely prefer the docking of the whole uncouth, uncomely tail away to this long protracted agony of piecemeal mutilation. There would be an utter chaos in spelling and writing. Spelling books, pronouncing books, and all teaching of spelling if not of reading would be banished from our schools; printing offices would print and authors would write as each should please, or as should seem right in his own eyes, for all orthographic rule would have perished. One word in reformed attire, and its neighbor unreformed, one part of a word reformed while another part is left anomalous, would be perpetually charging unreason on the whole movement of reform. Gradual reform proceeding within the limits of an unflinching life, may be suffered; but going so far as to mutilate living members, cutting the language to the quick, and threatening to go on with these painful excisions and twistings through indefinite periods of time, all rational orthography lying stranded and bleeding meanwhile—this can hardly be expected. Yet the questions press, how much, how far, and what shall be reformed. They need to be considerably weighed and rationally adjudicated before even the beginnings of reform shall be accepted.

THE FUTURE OF ENGLISH ORTHOGRAPHY.

The outlook for reform at present is far from encouraging. For over forty years the *Fonetik Journal* has labored with earnest zeal and much self-sacrifice, and yet it does not appear that the great reform has reached a single word or made the least sensible impression on the knotty old oak of English spelling. Corrections of the grossest vices in orthography are resisted by the great English-speaking people with a most wonderful unanimity of opposition or indifference. The aspect of things might well prompt from the earnest and learned advocate of reform, Max Müller, the despairing cry that he has "little doubt that it will be put off for many generations and that a real reform will probably not be carried except concurrently with a violent social convulsion." It is consoling to think that we can wait. English speech will live if spelling reform should die. The evils of our faulty alphabet are not beyond endurance. Spelling exercises will still prove, if rightly conducted, a good intellectual discipline, as they have in the generations past. If the great mass of our old spellers should be rejected, and text-books should be substituted that are constructed on true principles of phonology, in scientific methods that shall by mere force of the wisely planned exercises themselves impregnate the young mind with the principles that govern in orthography, and in the origin and growth of words, under the silent sway of reason and rule even when conflict and consequent exception come in, the lessons in English spelling will not be misspent time. Then it may well be asked, what great calamity would befall us if the English language should come to be recognized as one that preëminently addresses the eye rather than the ear; and that, as the voices of speakers float away like the wind and are lost in the vacant air, no phonotype yet availing to conserve them, while the tracings of the writer abide indelibly in original or in faithful copy—what great calamity if the ear should yield up its sovereignty to the eye and the written rather than the spoken element become the dominant?

"Every body admits," says Max Müller, "the practical advantages of phonetic spelling; but after that, all exclaim

that a reform of spelling is impossible." "Whether it is impossible or not," he leaves to "men of the world to decide." Alas for reform, men of the world are likely to act as if they had decided that it is impossible. But if it be impossible, English will still live, and the people will prosper using it. Nay, "men of the world" have decided that English, the very English which learned reformers pronounce "effete," is destined to be the language of the world. With all its ugliness and weakness, it commands the respect and deference of the nations and the communities emerging from their barbarism are springing up with eager desire to participate in its beauty and grandeur and wealth of blessing.

It should be remembered, also, that there is a rectification of evils in our orthography lying within the limits of the sound and healthy life of the language, that is accordingly possible and hopeful. With the awakened sense of the vices existing and a corresponding desire to correct them, beginnings can be hopefully made here and there by any true genius in language which the attentive and docile people shall readily take up and carry through. The alphabetic sounds and characters—the phonology and the phonotypy—must of course remain unchanged; but reforms in pronunciation and in answering orthography may be started with probably successful results, provided the changes proposed do not strike against established principles in the language. There are cases of words the spelling of which can be justified by no principle. These anomalies may be corrected. There are others sustained by no principle, but only by inconsiderate usage which yet violate some settled rule; words of this class may be reformed. And so elsewhere reforms may be freely proposed; the genius of the language may approve and adopt them. Many of the diseases or the defects at least, the strong life of the language may heal or supply. In this way a reform to an indefinite extent may be carried on.

The thorough rectification of all that is now esteemed faulty in our orthography, may, however, be the strong purpose of many, who may think it not only desirable but also possible, to bring our language up to the ideal phonetic standard. We have endeavored to set forth to some degree the conditions indispen-

sable to success. The phonology must be perfected; the pronunciation be examined and healed of its vices; the phonotypy, in all its departments of print, script, and punch, be reformed by careful labor of artist and mechanic joined in coöperation with the scholar; the ætiology of linguistic disease be submitted to careful investigation and study; the modes and degrees of reformation be determined and every step in advance be in clear sight of goal and path. Above all, union is indispensable—union on a scale so large and comprehensive that the entire diversified life of the people speaking the language shall be enlisted in the work with fair representative authority, so that the reform shall be not the isolated, sporadic leaps of individuals and local communities and seasons, but the strong, steady, conspiring and persistent work of the whole vast body of the English-speaking people.

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ARTICLE IV.—QUALITIES OF MATTER AS RELATED TO PERCEPTION.

WHEN I look at an object, say for the sake of simplicity a piece of iron, what do I see? Simply a piece of iron; not its qualities, nor its properties; not its form, nor the light reflected from it, nor the sensation which it occasions in my mind, nor the impression which it makes on my sense-organs. The popular word "see" cannot be twisted to mean any of these things without ambiguity and confusion. It may be said to include them all, but it is as the word "bread" may be said to include oxygen and hydrogen and potassium and phosphorus. No one means such things in actually using the word. Thus when Sir W. Hamilton said that every man sees a different sun, he unwarrantably twisted a popular word into a scientific meaning, giving the effect of an untrue statement. We all see the same sun; but we each have a different sensation occasioned by it, and we each perceive in it whatever we are enabled to perceive by the nature and condition of our eyes and our glasses, the state of our brains and our minds.

But when I see a piece of iron, what do I perceive? This cannot be answered so briefly; the word perceive, besides its popular meaning in the phrase "to perceive an argument, or a truth," has at least two distinctly scientific uses. One is, to perceive by the senses; to express this it would be well if usage permitted us to use the word "to sense," and to say, "I sense the color of the bit of iron." But we are obliged to use the word perceive both of this immediate, direct, incomplete knowledge through one sense, and also for the compounded, acquired knowledge, in which association, memory, judgment, etc., all play their part. When I see a piece of iron I perceive, in the first sense, only what the rays of light can convey to me, that is, nothing but color. In order to perceive color I must see a colored surface, and this involves some knowledge of space. Next, I perceive this colored patch as having form, that is, as bounded by definite outline separating it from other

extension, by the muscular movements of the eye, following around its boundary line. But even this cannot properly be called a direct perception, and the perceptions of solidity and distance certainly cannot be so called, but must be called indirect or acquired. And associated with these are a host of other perceptions. I have seen so many pieces of iron before, have felt, handled, weighed, pounded, heated, melted, burned, filed, drilled, magnetized, dissolved, so many pieces of iron that a vast number of perceptions, derived from the many sensations which it has occasioned in me, are connected together, associated, so that when I see a piece of iron all or many of these sensations are revived, the facts I have learned about iron are suggested, and I perceive it, not as my eyes see it, but with the whole mind, know it as I have learned it in my experience.

An object, then, may have many capabilities of occasioning sensations in us. These are called its qualities. Here the question arises, Are qualities one thing and objects another; are the qualities something which the object may have or not have, and which may exist either with or without an object, a substance or substratum? Mr. Mill replies that there is nothing in matter but qualities; that they do not belong to or inhere in anything; that an object is only a permanent possibility of sensations, and there is no substance or substratum. Berkeley is generally understood to have held the same view; whether he really did so we will not stop to enquire. Hume distinctly denied the existence of a substance or real thing to which qualities belong. Kant, Spencer, etc., maintain that there is such a real existence, a noumenon, but that it is unknowable by us. Other philosophers have in general held that there is a real being in which the qualities of an object inhere, or to which they belong, and perhaps the commonest way of expressing this has been, that we have an intuitive idea of substance, so that when we perceive a quality we irresistibly and intuitively know that it inheres in a substance. Neither view seems to be of much real value as an explanation. On the one hand, if we speak of an object as having qualities, we must mean that these qualities belong to something, inhere in a substratum. The two terms are correlative; we cannot sep-

arable from the body, in what estate soever it is." "These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz: extension, figure, motion or rest, and number." "Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, that is, by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colors, sounds, tastes, etc.; these I call secondary qualities." We may neglect what he says of a possible third class of qualities, such as the "power of fire to produce a new color or consistency in wax, or clay," since it is very plain that the reason why the fire softens the wax, hardens the clay, but produces a sensation of heat in my hand, is to be found in the nature of the wax, the clay, and the hand, not of the fire. We only mention it to show the lack of clearness in his thinking.

However interesting or instructive this division may be, the reason here assigned for it is fallacious. We can no more conceive matter without secondary qualities than without primary qualities. We can indeed imagine the sky to be green and the grass blue, but we must conceive every object to have some color when exposed to the light, counting white and black as colors; capable of emitting some sound if struck in the air; having some chemical reactions similar to those which affect our senses of smell and taste. It must have some degree of hardness and softness, heat and cold, elasticity or inelasticity. Locke indeed declares that the secondary qualities are subjective, and have no real existence in the object. "Let not the eyes see light or colors, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colors, tastes, odors, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and cease." This has been repeated and harped upon by the empirical school of writers ever since, and in part it is very true. There is indeed no sensation of color, sweetness, sound, without an eye, a tongue, an ear, to respond to the object; but no one ever said there was; and moreover, every one knows that a brain and a mind are as necessary to sensation as a sense-organ, and that in reality the sensation is not in the organ, any more than it is in the object. There is no normal

sensation without an object, a sense-organ, a brain, and a mind. But the power of occasioning sensation is just as much in the object, though there be no sense-organ within range of its influence. The roar of the ocean is not a sensation if no one hears it, but the vibrations of the air are just the same. Sweetness does not exist in the sugar as sweetness, but as a combination of atoms of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen, which when dissolved on the tongue occasions a sensation to which we give the name, sweetness. Color does not exist in the dye as color, but as a power of absorbing certain rays of light and reflecting others. In this sense it may be said that color and sweetness do exist in the object; the popular modes of speech are justifiable, after all. Locke himself, in fact, plainly stated the matter in this way, a fact which has been overlooked by many of his followers: "The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them, whether any one's senses perceive them or no; and therefore they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies." We shall return to this point again, but first we wish to refer briefly to a more elaborate scheme.

Sir W. Hamilton's division of the qualities of matter is three-fold — into primary, secundo-primary, and secondary. The primary qualities in this division are those which determine the possibility of matter absolutely; such as solidity, size, figure, number, absolute incompressibility. The secundo-primary are those which determine the possibility of the material universe as actually constituted, such as weight, hardness, fluidity, elasticity, mobility. The secondary are those which determine the possibility of our relations as sentient existences to that universe, such as color, sound, flavor, savor, heat, and those which cause titillation, sneezing, shuddering, setting the teeth on edge, etc. Now this is a very ingenious and interesting division. But we shall attempt to show that these primary qualities are in part the very essence of matter itself, not qualities, and in part mere secundo-primary qualities; and that the secundo-primary and secondary qualities are not in fact differently related to perception, however they may be related to the "possibility of the universe."

Hamilton says that the primary qualities may all be derived

from the property of filling space, or solidity, of which there are two kinds, geometrical solidity, or the necessity of trinal extension, and physical solidity, or what may be called ultimate incompressibility. He also says "the primary are less properly denominated qualities, and deserve the name only as we conceive them to distinguish body from not body, corporeal from incorporeal substance. They are thus merely the attributes of body as body." Now physical solidity, in its relation to perception, is no more difficult to understand than any other sensible quality. When we experience sensations of resistance to our muscular exertions, we learn all that we can know about this quality, among other things, that what resists is a real thing, has being. But when we are told, as we are by Hamilton himself, that this being is constituted by absolute incompressibility or impenetrability, the statement is far more doubtful and difficult to comprehend. Impenetrability, in the usual sense, means that matter occupies space, to the exclusion of all other matter. Many facts, however, tend to limit this definition, or at least alter the usual conception of this quality. Bodies apparently solid absorb liquids and gases, and liquids dissolve solids without corresponding increase of bulk; a pint of water and a pint of alcohol do not make a quart, neither do a pint of sulphuric acid and one of water; gases are mutually penetrable, and diffuse themselves in each other as in vacua; the ether required by the undulatory theory of light must be matter, if it is anything, yet it is held to pervade all other bodies. Now if impenetrability be said to be a quality of the ultimate atoms of matter, this involves a total change of the idea of the quality. If the atoms be small, solid, space-occupying, indivisible lumps of matter, they of course exclude one another from the same space. But those who hold this theory of atoms also hold that the atoms are so sparse, so scattered in space, even in the most solid bodies, that they offer no practical resistance to other bodies by filling space, but only by active motion. The most recent theories of atoms, however, make them to be either vortices of force rotating in various directions, or points of force without any space-relations at all. Though these theories offer us only a choice of inconceivabilities, they have a bearing on the doctrine of impenetrability.

For if this quality is affirmed of masses of matter it cannot be said to be established, and if it applies to atoms it is only an imagination, for the atoms themselves are quite possibly no better, and on some theories are purely metaphysical existences.

Absolute incompressibility is the other term used by Hamilton to denote physical solidity, or the quality of filling space on its physical side. Sir Isaac Newton is said to have indulged in a speculation that all the matter in the universe might be condensed into a cubic inch. But one of his own laws of matter says that action and reaction are equal. If, then, one-half of the universe could exert all its force to compress the other half, the results would be equal on both sides, and no condensation would result; but if a single cubic inch of matter were compressed by all the force besides in the universe, the reaction called out would still be equal to the force employed. Now, how far compression may be carried, and whether there is any limit to it except the limitation of power indicated above, is a question for induction and scientific proof, and the quality thus proved comes under the head of what is necessary for the universe as actually constituted and known to us, and hence is a secundo-primary quality. Indeed, Hamilton himself goes on to derive all the secundo-primary qualities from resistance or pressure, and says they "are all forms of a relative resistance to displacement." This use of terms here shows that he does not mean by this ultimate incompressibility any physical attribute, but mere being, which we admit to be given in connection with true perception, but which is more like substance than attribute, substratum than quality.

In describing and enumerating the secundo-primary qualities of matter, Hamilton deduces them from resistance or pressure, yet adheres to the popular names, and draws up a long list of pairs of opposite qualities. This is a fertile source of confusion and error in all such discussions, and facilitates the habit of looking upon the qualities of matter as occult somethings which may be either joined to or separated from another occult something called a substance. It is just as confusing to speak of roughness and smoothness as qualities of matter which have power to occasion sensations of roughness and smoothness in us, as it is to speak of sweetness as a quality of sugar; and a brief

definition or caution in one corner will not remove the impression. Rough and smooth are properly only varieties of form, just as much as triangular, or spherical; a rough body has protuberances more angular, a smooth one less so, or surfaces approximately continuous. The microscope proves this, and shows too that if our organs of touch were as fine as an insect's we should find roughness on what now seem to us very smooth surfaces. So, hard and soft, firm and fluid, tough and brittle, rigid and flexible, are only varieties of solidity, molecular condition, which means cohesion. So, heavy and light depend on mass, that is, on the quantity of matter contained in the object, and its consequent relation with the mass of the earth by gravity. Even the primary qualities present similar difficulties. Number is not a quality of matter, nor is divisibility synonymous with it. Bodies must be known, if known at all, under the category of number, as either one or many, but this is a logical necessity of thought, not a quality of matter. That matter is divisible we learn by experience; that it is not infinitely divisible is generally thought to be proved by chemistry, for the ultimate atoms of matter can probably not be divided without annihilation. Each atom, indeed, must have an upper and an under side, etc., and so be metaphysically divisible, but this has nothing to do with perception, or the sensible qualities of matter. Hamilton's elaborate division, then, seems to be no better adapted to the discussion of perception than the simpler, unreasoned one of Locke. Such methods are well enough, perhaps inevitable, in an attempt at a complete classification of the qualities of matter, and such a classification is interesting. But as related to perception the qualities of matter should be otherwise described and deduced.

Accordingly we get no further help from Mr. Herbert Spencer, who seems to have adopted the classification of Hamilton with changed names. He calls the three classes "body as presenting dynamical, statico-dynamical, and statical, attributes." This terminology seems infelicitous. So far as perception is concerned, all the attributes of body which appear to the senses at all are and must be dynamical, for this must mean exerting force or influence; and all are and must be statical, that is, the peculiarity or power or motion which affects the

sense-organ must be continuously existing, ready to occasion sensation when the proper conditions are combined. Another remark of Mr. Spencer's, however, comes much nearer what we believe to be the true doctrine on this subject: "The so-called secondary attributes are manifestations of certain forces which pervade the universe, and which, when they act upon bodies, call forth from them certain reactions." "They are neither objective nor subjective, but are triple products of the subject, the object, and the environing activities." (Psychology, II., 144.) We object to this that it seems to imply that Mr. Spencer understands by force a metaphysical or unknowable something, which may join itself to matter and act upon or through it, much as a man may pick up a stone and throw it or not throw it. But such a view would be as crude as the medieval notion that a stone is made up of substance and a quality called lapidity, or, in English, stone-ity; or that bread is made up of a substance and a quality or bunch of qualities called paneity. For we know nothing about force except in connection with matter, and hence cannot conceive of them as separated. The origin of force is always conceived of as spiritual or unknowable; but force itself is manifested only through matter, and it is inconceivable that we should either receive or exert force except through or by our physical organism, in connection with other matter. Indeed, there are some now who declare that the essence of matter is force, that each atom is a center of force, and this is what constitutes its material reality. Whether this be conceivable or intelligible or not, it seems to them to explain the paradoxes of force and matter, that force seems to be transferable from body to body, that it is indestructible, that it is constant in amount throughout the universe, and that it may assume several equivalent forms. The mystery is not really made any less dark by this supposition, it is merely transferred to the metaphysical world; for such an atom or center of force would certainly be a metaphysical, not a physical, unit. That force has been impressed upon all matter, so that motion is its universal attribute, would be a more defensible, or at least less mysterious proposition, and many facts seem to indicate such a conclusion. For example, take Newton's first law of motion, called that of inertia.

This law consists of two parts, of which the first is often overlooked. First, a body in motion will continue in motion in a straight line until deflected or stopped by the attraction of some other body: second, a body at rest will continue at rest until set in motion by the impulse or attraction of some other body. But, in fact, all matter is in motion, and there is no such thing as rest in the universe, unless the word be used relatively, with reference to a comparatively very limited system of things. An object on the moon may be at rest in relation to the moon's surface, but is revolving around its center, around the earth, the sun, etc. Again, heat is now said to be a mode of molecular motion; but the theory of heat also says that all bodies have some degree of heat, that is, some amount of molecular motion. Even impenetrability is said by Lotze to be an activity, a dynamic, not a static, attribute, in Mr. Spencer's terms, but an action, a repulsion, of the atoms, similar to the pressure of gases, which is held to be the beating of an infinite number of blows by the confined atoms against their prison walls in rhythmical motion. Professor Bowne, who in general follows Lotze pretty closely, insists that being is action, thus combining Hamilton's metaphysical solidity with Lotze's impenetrability. "Action is a dynamic consequence of being, and is coexistent with it. Neither can be thought without the other, and neither was before the other. Being did not first exist and then act; neither did it act before it existed; but both being and action are given in indissoluble unity. Being has its existence only in its action, and the action is possible only through the being." (*Metaphysics*, 53.) He also points out that, contrary to the usual view, it is the qualities that are changeless, while the substance changes its manifestations. "Red may give place to black, but red cannot change to black. We say that things change their color, but never that one color becomes another. Common-sense, therefore, has always put change in things, and never in qualities. The latter never change, but are exchanged." (*Id.*, 65.) These conclusions have a strong tendency to assimilate all the qualities of matter to each other, reducing them all to modes of motion.

Locke's use of the term "power" in his definition, seems at first sight to afford a remarkable confirmation of the same

view. But it probably really shows far less insight than might be supposed; for he seems to have understood it of the process of sensation itself, as though the object had "power" to impress itself directly on the mind, which he compared to a sheet of white paper. Most of his own followers, even, have long ago abandoned this easy explanation, and now admit that the process of sensation, changing the action of the object into feeling, is a mysterious one, in which the activity of the mind or brain is the agent. "The latest results of scientific inquiry, whether in the region of objective psychology or molecular physics, leave the gulf between matter and mind quite as wide as it was judged to be in the time of Descartes." (Fiske, *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii., 445.) The state of science in Locke's day was so defective that he could not possibly understand the way in which the molecular motion of the object, as displayed by modern science, is supposed to affect the sense-organ; nor the series of further activities in the nerve and brain, before the mind can interpret these vibrations into a sensation. To him the process probably seemed a simple one, like pressing a seal on wax, or type on white paper. We now know that it is complex and difficult to trace in the material part, and entirely inexplicable and mysterious in the psychical part.

Another aid toward a better theory of the relations between matter and mind may be found in the remark of Hamilton that his primary qualities are not properly qualities at all, but are that which distinguishes body from not body, and also his division of them into those which depend on space mathematically or metaphysically, and those which depend on space physically. Now, we hold that so far as the primary qualities can be said to affect the senses at all, they are to be placed in the same rank with the secundo-primary and secondary, and so far as they do not do so they may be included under the term space. For example, beginning with a secondary quality, what is color in the object? The colored object, by some molecular peculiarity, has the power of reflecting some rays of light and absorbing others; and this peculiarity is in all probability an atomic vibration which is rhythmical with some of the light-vibrations and discordant with others, whereby some are stopped and others reflected. It is not a lifeless combination

of two lifeless things, one a quality and one a substance, but an activity. So, the sweetness of sugar is not an occult quality attached to a mysterious substance, but a peculiar combination of elements, and their combination probably consists in a continuous vibration of the atoms, synchronously or in some fixed rhythmical relation, holding them together all ready for a new combination in the organ of taste. Thus, when we feel a body as heavy, pressing down on the hand, the sensation results from an activity of the body, pulling itself toward the center of the earth. Whether this activity can be reduced to molecular motion, or similarity of molecular state, is unknown, and gravity remains perhaps the most mysterious of all the forms of force, though its law of action was discovered earlier than that of any other. It was fortunate for Newton, said Laplace, that the relation of gravity is not a complex one. So, too, of resistance; this is a manifestation of what is commonly called impenetrability. Two solid bodies, as my hand and a piece of iron, cannot occupy the same space at the same time, and the iron maintains itself against my efforts, occasioning a sensation called resistance. But this maintenance of itself is an activity, not a dead, passive, lifeless state. "This resistance," says Lotze, "cannot belong to empty space, nor can the mere quality of filling space impart this power to matter. Rather, the source of it must lie in the qualitative nature of the real thing." (Dictate, *Naturphilosophie*, §29.) Both physicists and metaphysicians are almost all agreed that there is here either a molecular activity or a spiritual self-assertion of some kind. The former may be said to be almost conceivable; at least, if we imagine matter to be composed of atoms which are not in complete contact but held together by mutual attraction and vibrating within certain limits (and this is now the commonest view), we can get some hint of how the outline of body is determined by the vibrations of its molecules, and its resistance to pressure is a result of the same activity. Besides, this is the only theory of the constitution of matter which offers any explanation of the phenomena of the expansion of bodies by heat. Form, as an objective fact, is only the existence of each part of a body in one place rather than another; the molecules can only vibrate where they are, not elsewhere,

and each one in a definite direction from the others, and where it is there it must occasion sensation, and we see it or feel it where it is. Hence, following the outline from point to point, either with the eye or the hand, we learn the form of the object.

But note that we have now made a transition to a new kind of relation, a space-relation; and this is something not sensible, but intelligible. We do not perceive space-relations by the senses nor in sensation, but by the intellect in connection with any perception of matter. If a sensation is occasioned by we know not what, we have no such knowledge of space in connection with it; as in smell, taste, or ordinary hearing. But this is not perception proper; and where perception proper does occur, and the external occasion of sensation is recognized, it is always under space-relations. We conclude, then, that all the sensible qualities of bodies are reducible to various forms of force, operating on our sense-organs, whether they be classified in the first, second, or third classes, each one under its own relations and conditions; but that there are other qualities or relations, not given by sense, but intelligible, knowable by the intellect alone, which may be called being or real existence, and space or metaphysical extension. Or it may be said that the mind, in true perception, operates under the category of being, and under the form of space. Sir W. Hamilton says that space is known *a priori*, extension *a posteriori*; a valuable distinction in terms, but which it would be hopeless to attempt to introduce into the ordinary language of philosophy. It would be well if extension could be used as the name of space as empirically known, occupied by body or contained between different bodies or parts of bodies, and the term space used only of the abstractly known possibility in the universe through which these extension-relations exist. Yet we cannot hope to see the terms so used, especially since many modern writers purposely confound the two, and attempt to reduce all space to extension. Bain, and Mill, and their followers, declare that space is a generalization from space-relations. Now we may admit that infinite or indefinite extension is such a product, known empirically or *a posteriori*, without prejudicing the great metaphysical question of space. When we

begin to learn our relations to the world around us, we first learn the space-relations (extension-relations) of the things we can reach and those near by us; next the trees, houses, animals, objects we see from day to day; then the mountains, rivers, cities, seas, the globe we live on; the moon, too, is comparatively easily reached by this space-construction, its distance being quite conceivable and comparable with those we have already learned. Thence we ascend to the planets and the fixed stars, where, for any clear understanding, we must use a different unit of extension, and compare no longer by miles but by diameters of the earth and of her orbit. Our knowledge of extension (space) is thus built up, a product of experience and science. This fact is usually overlooked by the *a priori* school of philosophers.

But the experience-philosophers in turn overlook the far more important point that not a single distance can be compared or estimated, not a single step taken in all this process, this so-called induction, which does not involve the very space which they say is a generalization. Now whatever this knowledge or feeling of space be called, *a priori* concept, intuition, or anything else, of space, its relation to perception remains the same, that there can be no true perception of the external world without it. If I see together a tall man and a short one, I cannot know in what the difference between them consists, unless I have at the time of comparing them, in and with the act of comparison, and as a sort of category which I apply in this act, in my mind if not in words, some conception of what bigness, size, is. So, if the points of a pair of compasses be placed upon my skin, not too near together, so that the two sensations are exactly alike in everything except in place, I could not know that this is the particular in which they differ, if I had not, in and with my double sensation, some conception, perhaps not previously existing, but now existing, of what difference in place is, and this depends on space. Or, if I look at a colored object and feel around it with my eyes, following its outline, I perceive the different lines and points of the object as different in place; that is, I know the object in relation to space, not as having physical solidity, but as having mathematical solidity or extension. That is to say, space is

known directly by the intellect; not by the sense, but by a direct and inexplicable act of the mind in connection with perception.

The case is nearly parallel with that of causation. On this the errors of both schools of philosophy have, however, been more generally recognized. The experience-philosophers are obliged to discharge causation of all its real meaning, and reduce it to mere invariable sequence, before they can account for it on their theory. Science may prove invariable sequence throughout the universe, observation may detect it in the most unexpected places, our knowledge of it may be generalized, abstracted, combined in any way, without in the least affecting the great question of the metaphysical principle of causation. On the other hand, the *a priori* philosophers are obliged to admit that causation is never perceived by the senses, that it is intelligible, not sensible. When one ball strikes another we cannot see any force passing from one to the other, any causation going on, but we know that motion or force in the one is the cause of motion in the other, and we cannot help knowing it, and to say there is nothing in it but sequence, because our senses cannot detect anything else, is trifling. We hold that the true doctrine of space in perception is very similar. To say that there is no space but extension, because we can generalize extension, learn it, demonstrate several things about it, etc., is trifling. Moreover, that idealism, which since Kant has been so common, declaring that space is only a form of the mind, which it imposes upon external objects, and which has no reality as a condition of material existence apart from perception, only shirks the problem, does not really attempt its solution. For that space is a mere form or necessity of thought, not a form or necessity of things, is gratuitous assertion. But that space is a form and necessity of things themselves, material existence in its real nature, is an assertion supported by irresistible conviction and by physical and metaphysical arguments. But a discussion of space would take us beyond our subject, and require too much space.

We conclude, then, that matter is capable of various kinds of action, which actions must be, of course, in relation with other bodies. For example, our piece of iron has molecular vibra-

tions which may be increased in rapidity or amplitude by contact with burning coals, and may in turn impart the same action to my hand or any other object. It has atomic vibrations, and these may be so changed by contact with oxygen or sulphur as to combine with those substances, so that the iron is no longer recognizable by the senses. It has attractive force or gravity, especially toward the center of the earth, and this may increase or diminish according to its distance from the earth's surface. It may have magnetic vibrations or arrangements of atoms, which may cause similar phenomena in other bits of iron. It can stop some of the vibrations of light and reflect others, probably because some are synchronous or rhythmical with its own vibrations. These are examples of a range of activity whose limits are unknown. Such of these actions as can affect other objects must also affect our bodies, and as our bodies contain various organs, ranging in kind and delicacy from a pair of scales for measuring gravity to a photographic plate for recording light-vibrations, we can be affected in various ways by the motions of matter. And since we can interpret these motions into sensation, and by comparing these sensations develop out of them perception and thought, the activity of objects towards us seems at first sight different from their activity toward other things, but is not really so. What it is which thus vibrates, moves, affects other matter, we do not presume to decide, nor have we space at present to enter upon the inquiry. Undoubtedly motion implies something which moves, and action implies something which acts, just as much as quality implies substance; but the distinction between action and actor, or motion and thing moved, is not an artificial, logic-made one, but a practical, every-day one, involved in all our mental life, as well as appearing in the great metaphysical truth of causation. If a formula of perception were required of us we should say: Matter affects our sense-organs by various activities, which we interpret into a knowledge of what we call its qualities or phenomena; but it is intelligible by our intellect as real being, and under the relations of space and cause; yet space and cause are not objects of sense.

ARTICLE V.—THE FIRST CHURCH OF HARTFORD,
CONNECTICUT.

History of the First Church in Hartford, 1633–1883. By
GEORGE LEON WALKER. Illustrated. Hartford: Brown
& Gross, 1884.

AMONG the early New England churches, this stands as the eleventh in the order of existence on these American shores. The first is the mother church at Plymouth which dates its English existence back to the earliest years of the seventeenth century, and so is now drawing on toward its 300th anniversary. On our own New England shores it antedates all other church organizations by nine years. The next is the Salem church organized in July, 1629. The summer of 1630 added three more,—first,—the Church of Dorchester, formed in Plymouth, England, March 20th of that year, reaching New England, May 30, and remaining at Dorchester till 1635–6, when it removed to Windsor, Conn. There on the 30th of March, 1880, it celebrated its 250th anniversary. The other two were the Church of Charlestown, which soon by removal became the First Church of Boston, and the Church at Watertown. These two, last named, were organized July 30, 1630. In the year 1631 there was no addition to the list. But the year 1632 added five, viz: the Churches of Roxbury, Lynn, Duxbury, Marshfield, and Charlestown, the last organized to take the place of the one formed two years before, which had removed to Boston.

The only church organized in New England in the year 1633 was this First Church of Hartford, whose beginnings were at Cambridge, then Newtown, in the Massachusetts Bay. On the 4th day of September, 1633, there was a notable arrival at the port of Boston. On that day a ship from England, the Griffin, came into the harbor, bearing, among many other passengers, John Cotton, John Haynes, Thomas Hooker, and Samuel Stone. John Cotton and Thomas Hooker are generally recognized as the two ablest divines of the first New England gener-

ation. Mr. Cotton was immediately appropriated by the first Church in Boston as colleague with Mr. John Wilson, while a company of people that had gathered at Newtown, many of whom were old friends of Mr. Hooker, had been anxiously awaiting his coming, in order that they might be gathered into church estate under his ministry.

Palfrey, in the first volume of his *History of New England*, p. 367, thus records the coming in of these eminent men to New England.

“Several parties of colonists now arrived in Boston, in one of which came John Haynes an opulent landholder of the County of Essex and three famous divines, Thomas Hooker, Samuel Stone, and John Cotton. They were men of eminent capacity and sterling character, fit to be concerned in the founding of a State. In all its generations of worth and refinement Boston has never seen an assembly more illustrious for generous qualities or for manly culture than when the magistrates of the young colony welcomed Cotton and his fellow voyagers at Winthrop’s table.”

A month later, October 11, 1633, the eleventh Church of New England was organized at Newtown and Mr. Thomas Hooker and Mr. Samuel Stone, who had been fast friends in the old world and had come over as chosen companions were associated as teacher and pastor. Mr. John Haynes, the eminent layman of the party, was soon made governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony as he was afterwards of the Connecticut Colony.

Of the eleven churches thus enumerated, six in the early years of the present century became Unitarian, and five, the Church of Windsor, Conn., the Church of Charlestown, Mass., the First Church of Lynn, Mass., the First Church of Marshfield, Mass., and the First Church of Hartford, having removed thither from Newtown in the early summer of 1636, remained steadfast in the ancient faith.

A Congregational Church, having its governing forces within and not in some outside hierarchy, is a little round world by itself. Two hundred and fifty years ago, after a thousand years of popish and prelatical rule, such an institution was a thing exceedingly unique and peculiar, in the earth. A very frail organization it might have seemed to be at the outset, ready to be blown away by the first tempest of adversity. But time has

shown it to be endowed with strong powers of resistance and a wonderful tenacity of life. While European thrones have crumbled and haughty dynasties have passed away, the Congregational churches, above named, planted by the early New England fathers, all of them still abide.

When the chief founders of the First Church of Hartford were fleeing out of their native land because the persecuting sword was behind them, the haughty House of Stuart was on the throne of England, and the Bourbon Kings of France were passing on in their long and stately succession. This Church was not yet twenty years old when Charles I. and his companion tyrant Laud were brought to the executioner's block, and it was not sixty years old when the House of Stuart was ignominiously driven out of the kingdom. This Church in its continued existence has kept watch of that long game of "in and out" at which the French Kings have been compelled to play, while the interludes have been diversified with Bonapartist upheavals and episodes, until at length, all parties on both sides, are retired to private life and the French Republic rises on the ruin of their plans and hopes. Surely a throne cannot stand as a fit emblem of stability.

In a sermon preached before the American Education Society in May, 1855, by Professor W. G. T. Shedd, D.D., there is a passage which finds a fitting place in this connection.

"We may be * * * confident that the Church of Christ in this country has irrefragably evinced the inherent and persistent power of vital Christianity to organize its own simple forms, and supply its own few outward wants. Visible churches die out of localities far less under the Voluntary System, than under the Establishment. Go among the hills, where a sparse population wrings a bare livelihood from the thin and sterile soil, and you find 'a feeble Church,' as it is called, but a Church that never ceases to be among the hills, because it draws what life it has from free-will and not from ancestral revenues. But how many a Church, whose material, moneyed, foundation dates back to the days of the Plantagenets and the Tudors has disappeared from the sum of national life and vital influences, and exists, now, only as an investment in the funds or the national debt, because the invisible Church, in the outset, was not laden with its proper responsibility, and as a penalty in the end, ceased to exist altogether as a moral force in the nation."

Of the eleven churches which we have enumerated above, no one of them, we think, can claim to hold within itself a

larger volume of important history than this First Church of Hartford. Though the Pilgrim Church of Plymouth, in some respects, must always stand foremost in the thought and affection of the Sons of New England, and though it did originally more truly than any other represent the germinal American ideas both in Church and State, yet the current of its public history as a Church has run along a comparatively narrow channel.

The first Church at Salem, as the mother Church of the Massachusetts Bay, by the simplicity of its origin, and all the interesting circumstances attending its organization, is one which the historical student loves to study.

The first Church of Boston has held a prominent position through all the years of its history. The four Johns, following in succession in its ministry from the outset, John Wilson, John Cotton, John Norton and John Davenport, were enough to give it an early celebrity. But in a town like Boston, other churches of the same order were springing up from time to time, as years passed on to divide with it the ecclesiastical honors and dignities of the place.

We repeat therefore that the First Church of Hartford, looked at through the two hundred and fifty years of its existence, seems to us to present a volume of history as interesting and important as can be shown by any one of the early New England churches. It was fortunate as the quarter millennial anniversary of this ancient church came round, that it found a man in the pastoral office, so imbued with the historic spirit and so impressed with the greatness of the history with which he had to deal, that his enthusiasm was kindled and his best powers evoked for the task before him. Beginning this study at an early date that he might gather and arrange the subject-matter for a sermon, such as should be worthy of the occasion, he found the material so abundant and so worthy of preservation, that it could not possibly be compassed in a single public discourse, however lengthy. What was meant for a sermon turned at last into this weighty volume of 500 pages, crowded from beginning to end with facts, principles, discussions, biographical and historical anecdotes, all centering about one theme and thoroughly germane to the purpose.

The ten churches which preceded this in the order of their New England existence have celebrated their 250th anniversaries with sermons, anthems, and songs of rejoicing, and with rich historical addresses. But it is quite safe to say that no one of them has surpassed this in the largeness of its preparation for the event and in the amplitude of its commemorative exercises.

It tends to give a peculiar interest to this church, that such a man as Thomas Hooker was its chief founder and early minister. The question has not unfrequently been raised, which was the greater man, Thomas Hooker or John Cotton? They were both men who had been judged to be truly eminent, as preachers and scholars, in their own land, before coming to these shores. The offices they had filled in the university, and their fame as pulpit orators attest the rank they held among their English brethren.

And yet they were different. If we have the right idea of them, Mr. Cotton was the more showy and brilliant man, and Mr. Hooker the more solid, with larger breadth of understanding. Both of them wrote books on the great ecclesiastical questions of their day, and with such ability that their Puritan brethren left behind in England inclined to sit at their feet as learners and receive instruction from them out of this far-off wilderness.

By the writings of Mr. Hooker, and by what he did after his removal from Cambridge to Hartford, it is evident that he was not altogether pleased with what was passing, both in Church and State, in the Massachusetts Bay. While he was a Puritan, and not a Separatist, using that word in its strict historical sense, he was yet a Puritan with more of a Separatist leaning and affinity than were John Cotton and Richard Mather. He would have been better contented than they with a church of the type which the old Salem Church had at its first organization in 1629. He would not have admired so much as they that stately and elaborate construction which the Synod of 1648 finished just after his death and called a Congregational Church. He seemed to have a larger confidence in man as man. The Connecticut Colony, which was formed by companies going directly from the Bay, did not adopt the severer

features of the Massachusetts system, and Mr. Hooker is believed to have had as much to do in this as any other man.

It was in the pulpit that his powers were at their best. Dr. Walker is true to all the early New England traditions when he gives him a very eminent rank as a preacher. A few passages from his estimate of him in this regard will interest our readers :

“The stories told of Hooker’s preaching are striking. One is of the presence at one of his Chelmsford lectures of some boon companions, led by a man who, for ‘ungodly diversion and merriment, said unto his companions, *Come let us go hear what that bawling Hooker will say.*’ The man had not been long in the church before the *quick and powerful word of God*, in the mouth of his faithful *Hooker*, pierced the soul of him, and he came out with an awakened and distressed soul, and by the further blessing of God upon Mr. *Hooker’s* ministry, he arrived unto a true *conversion.*”

“Another is an incident of his preaching in the ‘Great Church of *Leicester*,’ ten miles west of his humble birth-place at Marfield, and while still his parents were living there. One of the town burgesses set a company of fiddlers playing in the church-yard. But the fiddlers could neither drown the preacher nor draw away the hearers. Whereupon the burgess went to the church-door to hear what it was that so enchained the congregation. But getting once within sound of that voice, and the reach of the barbed arrows of utterance shot from the preacher’s lips, himself fell down wounded, and became indeed so penitent a convert as to be at length a sincere *professor* and *practicer* of the gospel whereof he had been a *persecutor.*”

These instances are drawn from Cotton Mather’s Life of Hooker in the *Magnalia*.

But Dr. Walker continues in a direct analysis of Hooker’s power, and from the estimate which he has thus embodied we take a few sentences from p. 123 :

“The aim is the persuasion of men. And to this purpose the preacher brings a fecundity of mind, a power of spiritual anatomy, an amplitude and variousness of illustration, and an energy of utterance, which are absolutely marvelous. Especially striking is this wonderfulness of resource in analyzing the moral phenomena antecedent to and attending on conversion. To most modern readers the proportion of consideration will seem excessive which Mr. Hooker gives to the experiences of the soul in mere ‘preparation’ for conversion. He has volumes on these antecedent exercises of the spirit before it gets to the point of trust in Christ. He laid himself open, even while he lived, to the remark of the shrewd Rev. Nathaniel Ward, of Ipswich, Mass. : ‘Mr. Hooker, you make as good Christians before men are in Christ as ever they are after;’

would I were but as good a Christian now as you make men while they are but preparing for Christ.' ”

An interesting and instructive anecdote connected with Mr. Hooker's preaching is related in Gov. Winthrop's Journal, as also in Mather's *Magnalia*.

When it was settled that Mr. Hooker's church was to remove to Connecticut, another church was organized in Cambridge to take its place. This occurred in February, 1636, and Mr. Thomas Shepard, a choice minister and scholar, then recently arrived from England, was ordained as its minister. Mr. Shepard's wife having died soon after reaching these shores, he, in October, 1637, was united in marriage with Joanna Hooker, eldest daughter of Thomas Hooker. So she came back from Hartford to her old home at Cambridge. This fact of itself would make it natural that her father should, from time to time, visit Cambridge. But besides this, he was often called to the Massachusetts Bay on public business. In the month of May, 1639, Gov. Winthrop makes the following record :

“ Mr. Haynes, the governour of Connecticut, and Mr. Hooker, etc., came into the bay and staid near a month.”

On the 26th of June this is his entry :

“ Mr. Hooker being to preach at Cambridge, the governour (this is his way of naming himself) and many others went to hear him, though the governour did very seldom go from his own congregation on the Lord's day. He preached in the afternoon, and having gone on with much strength of voice and intention of spirit about a quarter of an hour, he was at a stand and told the people that God had deprived him both of his strength and matter, etc., and so went forth, and about half an hour after returned again, and went on to very good purpose about two hours.”

This record shows that it was a great treat to hear Mr. Hooker preach. He had been absent from Cambridge only three years, and the old settlers about Boston must have been quite familiar with his style of pulpit address. Yet Mr. Winthrop “and many others” hastened out to Cambridge to hear him, though the proceeding was deemed a little disorderly.

The accident that befel him shows that he was without a manuscript, and so helps, incidentally, to confirm the well-known statement of Cotton Mather :

“ I suppose the first preacher that ever preached with notes in our New England was the Rev. Warham” [John Warham, of Windsor].

It is a comfort, also, for humbler men who have been in a like predicament, to know that so great a man as Thomas Hooker, long used to extemporaneous speech, could lose his thread of discourse in the presence of his audience and search in vain to find it, even though they might not be able, under such circumstances, to gather confidence and courage for a two hours' notable address afterwards.

It is time, however, that we should take a rapid and bird's-eye view of this volume as a whole. The author has attempted to embody an outline but continuous history of this First Church of Hartford from its English roots down to its outmost American branches.

In the first chapter the general condition of England, ecclesiastically, just prior to the organization of this church, is described, and the previous movements of the Pilgrims of Plymouth and the early colonies to the Massachusetts Bay are briefly but clearly stated.

In the second chapter the life of Mr. Thomas Hooker in his English home, before his departure for America at the age of forty-seven, is carefully traced.

In the third chapter there is a like review of the English life of Mr. Samuel Stone, Mr. Hooker's associate in the ministry.

The fourth chapter comprises the founding of the church at Newtown (Cambridge), and its history during the three years of its stay in that place.

The fifth embraces its history at Hartford until the death of Mr. Hooker in 1647.

Chapter sixth is entitled, “ Thomas Hooker's Writings,” and is valuable as giving the reader an easy opportunity to study the character and the action of Mr. Hooker's mind in his literary compositions. It has long been well known that Mr. John Higginson, very soon after Mr. Hooker's death in 1647, transcribed a large number (two hundred, it is said) of his sermons and sent them to England for publication. Many of them were published, as were also others of his writings which belong to his earlier life in England.

John Higginson was the oldest son of Mr. Francis Higginson, of Salem, who came over in 1629 and died the year following, leaving a wife and a large family of children. His widow, and her little ones, were kindly cared for by the magistrates of the Massachusetts Colony. John was about sixteen years old at the time of his father's death, and after being assisted in his education, he was, in 1636, made chaplain of the fort which the younger John Winthrop, afterward governor of Connecticut, had been building at the mouth of the Connecticut River. In 1641 he was called to Hartford as a teacher in the school, and at the same time he put himself under the theological instruction of Mr. Hooker. He was thus brought into near and intimate relations with him, and this connection lasted about two years. In 1643 Mr. Higginson became associate pastor with Rev. Henry Whitfield, of Guilford, Conn. It was while he was laboring in this connection that Mr. Hooker died. Whether the work of transcribing Mr. Hooker's sermons was undertaken of his own motion, or whether he was moved thereto by the suggestions and assistance of others, we know not; but the labor involved in this enterprise was of no little magnitude.

In Appendix V., Dr. J. Hammond Trumbull has given a carefully-prepared list of Mr. Hooker's published writings—those published while he was yet living, as also after his death. A glance at this list will show him to have been an author to a far greater extent than would naturally have been supposed when the outward conditions of his life are considered.

Chapters seventh and eighth are largely employed in throwing light upon a very important section of our early New England history. It was at Hartford that the first public excitement began over the question of the relation of baptized children to the church. The Puritans of the Massachusetts Bay and of the two colonies in Connecticut had just come out of the Established Church of England, where all the children were passed along through the various stages of Christian ceremony and culture, till they grew up in manhood and womanhood to a regular membership in the English Church. But one of the chief objects which the Puritans had in mind in coming to these shores was to leave behind the falsities and

corruptions of the Establishment. They founded their churches here on the principle that none could be members, in full communion, unless they could first give an account of an inward work of the Spirit on their souls eventuating in a change of heart. Soon the question began to press heavily upon them, what, upon this basis, was to become of the children, and what was to be their relation to the Church of God?

This was one of the questions that early caused disturbance in the church at Hartford, though Dr. Walker thinks that this was not the chief cause of the fierce contention that for many years rent and divided its membership. By the minute and careful manner in which the author has investigated the church troubles of those times, both in Connecticut and in the Bay, he has enlarged the boundaries of our knowledge and made the path easier for the future historian. The way in which these troubles, led on through successive steps, to the Conference or Council of 1657 and to the Synod of 1662, which enacted into a law the Half-way Covenant, is fully set forth and exhibited.

Chapter ninth is entitled, "Isaac Foster and Early Church Usages." Mr. Foster's ministry was very brief. He was settled in 1679, and died in 1682. After a short account of his origin and of his pastorate, the chapter is chiefly employed in setting forth the customs of those days, prevailing in the sanctuary and in society—the ways of assembling the congregation on the Sabbath, the style of preaching and of singing, the seating of the people, marriages, etc.

The tenth chapter is occupied with the ministry of Mr. Timothy Woodbridge. This was the first long pastorate in the history of the church. Indeed, this church never had a really long pastorate, such as have been common in our New England history. Mr. Trowbridge was settled from 1685 to 1732—forty-seven years. Dr. Nathan Strong was pastor from 1774 to 1816—forty-two years. Dr. Joel Hawes continued from 1818 to 1867—forty-nine years—though he was sole pastor only forty-four years. The other pastorates of the church have, on the average, been brief. In the Old Church of Norwich, Conn., the two consecutive ministries of Rev. Benjamin Lord and Dr. Joseph Strong lasted from 1717 to 1834—one hundred and seventeen years—and that too notwithstanding these ministries

overlapped by six years. In the First Church in Roxbury, Mass., the consecutive ministries of Rev. John Eliot and Rev. Nehemiah Walker, overlapping by two years, reached from 1632 to 1750—one hundred and eighteen years. The ministry of Mr. Solomon Stoddard, of Northampton, including three years of labor before his ordination, was sixty years. The ministry of Mr. Timothy Edwards, at South Windsor, Conn., including four years of continuous service before ordination, was sixty-three years. Dr. Stephen Williams was pastor at Longmeadow, Mass., from 1717 to 1783—sixty-six years. Rev. Laban Ainsworth was pastor at Jaffrey, N. H., from 1782 to 1858—seventy years.

It was death, however, that caused these shorter pastorates at Hartford during more than two hundred years of the church's existence, for all the pastors, up to the time of Dr. Hawes, and including him, died in office.

Chapter eleventh covers the ministry of Rev. Daniel Wadsworth, reaching from 1732 to 1747. This was a stormy and exciting period in the ecclesiastical history of New England, for it included the first three visits of Whitefield to this country, though the first of these was passed at the south, and did not reach New England. In the second and third visits he moved among the churches of New England as a violently disturbing agency, though we should now add, a beneficent agency. Harvard and Yale Colleges set themselves against him with all their force. The great majority of the ministers regarded him as only a religious fire-brand. But he had many firm and abiding friends, and among them were some of the very chiefest of the New England divines like Edwards, Bellamy, Wheelock, Hopkins, and others. In the later visits which he made to this country (for there were seven in all), he encountered far less opposition than in the earlier years. This chapter, embracing the ministry of Mr. Wadsworth, is considerably occupied with these Whitefieldian tumults and excitements.

In addition to the troubles occasioned by Mr. Whitefield's movements, Mr. Wadsworth's ministry was disturbed by questions such as were apt to arise in New England parishes in connection with the building of a new Meeting-House. This per-

plexing subject in one form or another was on the docket at Hartford from 1727 to 1740.

The title of chapter twelfth is "Edward Dorr and his times." As Rev. Daniel Wadsworth had officiated during the last days of Rev. Timothy Woodbridge and then succeeded him in the ministry, so Rev. Edward Dorr, in his turn, was for a time before Mr. Wadsworth's death his assistant, and after his death his successor. His ministry was an able one, though exercised in troublous times. The agitations about Mr. Whitefield and his work, the heavy burdens and anxieties attending the French and Indian war, the high excitements which filled the ten years preceding the opening of the Revolution, were unfavorable for the peace and prosperity of the churches. Mr. Dorr continued from 1748 to 1772, when he died at the age of forty-nine.

After an interval of nearly a year and a half, in which the Society was endeavoring to find some suitable person to take Mr. Dorr's place, choice was made of Rev. Nathan Strong, son of Rev. Nathan Strong of Coventry, and he was ordained, January 5, 1774. He was graduated at Yale in 1769, and had been tutor in the College. Chapter thirteenth is occupied with his ministry,—the most notable ministry, all things considered, which the church had enjoyed since the death of Mr. Hooker. We cannot venture to enter upon any of the details of this ministry, reaching from 1774 to 1816, but must refer the reader to the book, where the story is graphically told. There have not been many men, in all our New England history, who can show a record of more power and influence in their generation, than that of Dr. Nathan Strong of Hartford.

The ministry of Dr. Joel Hawes, which followed and covered the years from 1818 to 1867, was as notable in its way as that of Dr. Strong. It would be difficult to find two men more unlike than Dr. Strong and his successor. And yet there was a large volume of evangelical power in Dr. Hawes, and no ministry in this ancient church was ever more fruitful in spiritual growth and prosperity than his. Without the arts of oratory he was yet a powerful pulpit orator. Without the graces of learning he kept a firm hold upon one of the most cultivated audiences in New England, for a long course of years. The fourteenth chapter of the book contains the record of his long and able ministry.

Four other ministers, in these later years, have been pastors of this church, viz: Rev. Wolcott Calkins, D.D., Rev. George H. Gould, D.D., Rev. Elias H. Richardson, and Rev. George Leon Walker, D.D. All these are now living except Rev. Mr. Richardson, who ably and faithfully served the church for nearly seven years, though struggling with infirmities which finally cut short his days, at the age of fifty-five. Dr. Walker says, "He was the first of the ministers of this church to die elsewhere than in Hartford, or to be buried elsewhere than in Hartford soil."

In taking leave of this volume we have to say that the living public, as well as future generations, owe a debt to one who incorporates a piece of history of this kind as faithfully and laboriously as this is done. The history of the smallest and humblest church, for two hundred and fifty years, involves a mass of details, intensely interesting, and instructive. It addresses itself alike to the intellect and the heart.

But the church whose story is here embodied has a historical standing of a very high order. You may measure it against almost any other organization of the kind in New England, in respect to the number of eminent and cultivated persons that have been enrolled in its membership, or by reference to the whole amount of wealth which it has poured into the various streams of public beneficence, or in various other ways, and it will not suffer in the comparison. Its history was never written out and published before except in sectional and fragmentary ways. Here it is minute and continuous, and the work shows a careful exactness at almost every point.

On page sixteen we notice a slight confusion of historical dates. After speaking of the arrival of the Salem company in the summer of 1629, we read, that on the 30th day of May of this same year 1629, sailed out of Plymouth in England another vessel, bringing many godly families, among them some men to be afterward known in the annals of Connecticut, etc.

It was on the 20th of March that this ship, the "Mary and John" sailed out of Plymouth. It was in March, 1630, that it sailed. It is true in the old way of reckoning the year the time of sailing was in the very last days of the year 1629, and might be stated 1629-30. But we commonly say of the

departure from England of that Dorchester (afterwards Windsor) church, that it was March 20, 1630.

May 30th was the day of its landing on these New England shores, if the way it came on shore can be called a landing. Captain Squeb, the commander of the "Mary and John," whose very name suggests that he would be equal to such an act of meanness, set the whole company of the passengers ashore at Nantucket, with their goods and their cattle, and left them to shift for themselves.

The only church in New England entitled to keep the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of its organization, during this year 1884, is the First Church of Ipswich, Mass. Then, in the next year will follow Newbury, Hingham, and Weymouth, all in Massachusetts, and afterwards, from year to year, these occasions will occur at still more frequent intervals. It is well for the people of our own times, thus to live over the experiences of the early New England generations, and learn the valuable lessons which such a review is fitted to impart.

ARTICLE VI.—THE ANTI-CHRISTIAN USE OF THE BIBLE IN THE SUNDAY SCHOOL.

IN the March number of the *New Englander* for 1884 we called attention to "Moral Defects in Sunday School Teaching." The response of satisfaction which has come to the writer from a large number of Christian readers indicates a revolt of sentiment from the teaching which is given to our children in the Old Testament, far wider than, in the absence of any other public protest, we had supposed to exist. We find in the Old Testament lessons for the Sunday school in 1884 the same objectionable, and, as it seems to us, positively mischievous teaching, as that which we criticised in the lessons for 1883. Even from those, who do not feel prepared to say as much as will be said in this Article, come strong symptoms of dissatisfaction. The Rev. Dr. Meredith, the leader of the Boston organization of Sunday school teachers for Bible study, gave notice, at the meeting of the Massachusetts General Association last June, that there must be a change, or there would be a break. He is reported by *The Congregationalist* to have said, that he "would not teach boys and girls lessons from the Old Testament at all in the Sunday school, but would teach them about Christ, and then would teach the Old Testament later."

Until Christian people learn how to use the Old Testament in its proper subordination to the New, it will be safest not to attempt to teach what they do not understand. But when the rags of heathenish superstition which are found, not wholly stripped away from men of God in the tenth century before Christ, are exhibited to our Sunday schools as belonging to that seamless robe of Divine Truth, which was worn by our Lord Jesus Christ, it is time to interrupt the teacher: "*Understandest thou what thou readest?*" We speak strongly, but under a profound conviction of the damage which is being done by this ignorant building of wormy timber into the hull of the ship which is destined to the perilous voyage of life.

The Sunday school teaching of to-day assumes the truth of a doctrine of the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, which was first put into creed-form by Swiss theologians in the *Helvetic Consensus Formula* of 1675. That Formula was put forth as a protest against the liberal theology taught in the famous school of Saumur in France, especially upon the three points of Biblical Inspiration, Predestination, and the Imputation of Adam's sin. Dr. Schaff, in his *History of Creeds*, says of it: "It gradually lost its hold upon the Swiss churches, and was allowed to die, and to be buried without mourners. Nevertheless, the theology which it represents continues to be advocated by a respectable school of strict Calvinists in Europe, and especially in America."

With respect to Biblical Inspiration, the Swiss theologians teach, that not only all the thoughts but all the words of the Scripture, its very consonants, and even its vowels (which last, according to Gesenius's *Hebrew Grammar*, were not fully developed, as at present, till the seventh century of the Christian era), are all divinely inspired and free from error.

While no scholar to-day entertains this extravagant claim, a great many people entertain its fundamental error, and upon this the present Sunday school teaching is based, with the vicious results which we criticise.

This fundamental error is in confounding *Inspiration* with *inerrancy*, which, as Dr. Briggs has shown in his *Biblical Studies*, is not a Protestant doctrine. The great work of modern criticism is to put an end to this confusion, which, so long as it exists, hinders the inspiration of the Scriptures from being recognized for what it is. Scholars have been forced to admit that diplomatic accuracy in statements of facts cannot be honestly claimed for the Bible, at least in some particulars of chronology, history, and science. But on the other hand, it has been demonstrated, that there was a *work* of God in Israel which could only have proceeded from a *word* of God in Israel, as in no other nation;—a unique and wonderful progress, in Israel alone, from dim and rude to clear and glorious ideals of God's character and government, from moral weakness to moral power, from a political church to a spiritual, from the hope of a national and external to the hope of a world-wide

and heart-purifying salvation. What the inspiration of the Old Testament is, is thus made manifest, as the Divine Cause commensurate and congruous with the Divine effect,—*the moral power* proceeding from the Spirit of God, which wrought this progressive illumination and redemption in the pupils of the Spirit. We can concede that these pupils made blunders, without disparagement to the Teaching Spirit, while it is so clear that they made the progress, which is apparent in a contrast of Samuel and Gad with their successors, Isaiah and Jeremiah. It is the progress, which learners make from low to high attainments, which shows what their teaching is.

It cannot be too much deplored, that the Sunday school teaching, laying a foundation either for the faith or the skepticism of riper years, still holds to the literal and mechanical notion of the inspiration of the Scriptures, still fails to grasp the moral and spiritual reality of it, still perpetuates the absurdity of representing the occasional mistakes of ancient men of God as of equal authority with the Divine Teaching which ultimately corrected them, still puts child-faith into the old brick forts in face of rifled guns, instead of the Gibraltar-rock of the authority of Christ as the supreme Critic of whatever claims to be a word of God.

Even though it should seem to a hopeful mind that the old brick forts can be held against the rifled guns, yet, in view of the changes in Christian thought which have taken place since inspiration was claimed for the Hebrew vowel points, it is no longer premature to consider the alternative,—*if* they should be knocked about our ears, *what then?* A wise teaching will at least forecast such a possibility, and show the Gibraltar-rock, which in any case is impregnable.

And yet, there are many who affirm, that if we permit ourselves to question any statement that any ancient prophet made as a word of God, or the historical accuracy of any fact reported as such in the Bible, it destroys all faith, and leaves us no sure word of God at all.

This must be plainly characterized as mere nonsense. Take the Beatitudes, take the Sermon on the Mount. Is it not the height of absurdity, to maintain that one must believe that Balaam's ass spoke with a human voice, or that Samuel order

ing a war of revenge was divinely authorized, as he thought he was, to do so, before one can rest with an unfaltering trust in the word of the Lord Jesus,—“*Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God!*”

Men in a panic become irrational. The changed conception of Divine inspiration, which study of the Scriptures has necessitated, has given rise to a panic as blind in its inferences as it is praiseworthy in its impulse. We have been obliged to drop the fiction of an unerring accuracy of statement, and to grasp the truth of a Divine moral influence progressively illuminating and redeeming its pupils, as the real historical fact of inspiration. From fancying that whatever was said or done by these pupils at any time proceeded from the Spirit of God—however repugnant to what we have been taught by Christ—we are forced to regard their historical progress out of darkness into light, out of weakness into power, as the convincing sign of the work of the Spirit. From treating the Old Testament as coördinate with the New, we have come to recognize it as subordinate, the sayings of its prophets as authoritative only so far as summed up, sealed, and confirmed to us by the authority of the Son of God. Could these ancient seers revisit earth, among the many surprises awaiting them the greatest would be, to find some delusions, that were common to them with their semi-heathenish countrymen, exalted by an irrational bibliolatry to an authority as unquestioned as that of him who said: “*I am the light of the world.*”

This is the anti-christian use, which is still occasionally made of the Bible in the Sunday school;—anti-christian, because derogatory to the supreme authority of Christ as the Divine Critic of “*whatever was written afore-time* ;” anti-christian, because teaching views of God’s ways toward men which were corrected by Christ, and even by prophets long before Christ; anti-christian, because exposing Christian faith, encumbered with anti-christian notions, to unjust suspicion and rejection.

This summer, two of the thorniest subjects have been selected for our children from the second book of Samuel, the treatment of which illustrates this anti-christian use of the Bible in a way to promote the skepticism, which sooner or

later rises up against unwise teaching with the protest of abused intelligence.

The first is in the story of the death of Uzzah (ch. vi). King David was conducting the ark in a solemn procession to Jerusalem. It was transported on a cart. The oxen came near oversetting cart and all. Uzzah took hold of the ark to save it. He was struck dead on the spot. This teaches our children how God will punish those who profane sacred things. The ritual of the ark was, "*Ye shall not touch it lest ye die.*" Uzzah touched it, and died, a monument of the righteous justice of God.

Notwithstanding, everybody sympathizes with Uzzah. He acted as we would act, if we saw our church on fire. He was doing his best to prevent a great catastrophe to the holiest thing in the land. At the worst, it was a pious forgetfulness of the command, *Hands off*. "He might have known that God could take care of his own ark," remarks the Sunday school editor, in naive agreement with the Knickerbocker, who refused to help pay for a lightning-rod to the church, saying, "If the Lord wants to *dunder* down his own house, let him *dunder*."

A fair and candid review of the situation increases our difficulty in accepting what befell Uzzah as an illustration of the justice of God.

Uzzah certainly violated the ritual, "*Ye shall not touch it.*" But he was not the chief offender. King David superintended the affair. He undertook to cart the ark. This also was against the ritual, which required it to be carried on men's shoulders by poles passed through its side-rings. Had it been so carried, it would not have been exposed to the danger of being upset, from which Uzzah tried to save it. Uzzah acted in the spirit, if not in the letter, of the ritual which required the safest mode of carriage. Yet he was slain in trying to avert the consequence of King David's neglect of the ritual. The chief offender escapes. The subordinate suffers. This is often man's way, but it is not God's way of justice.

Furthermore, this took place at a time when the Mosaic ritual was extensively disregarded by the best men. Many

scholars say that the ritual did not exist at that time in the form now contained in the Bible. But whether so or not, all scholars agree that Samuel and David, and other eminent men, acted contrary to it, as though it either did not exist, or had been forgotten. This adds to the difficulty of regarding Uzzah's death as a work of Divine justice. The most excusable of all ritual irregularities in a time that was full of them is singled out for a stroke of avenging wrath.

A reasonable solution of this difficulty was suggested twenty years ago by Dean Stanley, in his *History of the Jewish Church*. He records a very ancient Jewish tradition that a thunder storm occurred during the procession. He points out that the name given to the spot—"Perez-Uzzah"—may well be understood to mean, "the Storm of Uzzah." The situation thus put before us is vivid and intelligible. The storm burst. The oxen were frightened. The ark was in danger. Uzzah did his best to keep it from upsetting. A moment after, the lightning struck him. It was a remarkable coincidence. The terror and the superstition of the times expressed itself in the remark of the historian, "*God smote him there for his error.*"

Of course no one can be positive that this took place exactly so. But the Jewish tradition, appealing to some expressions in the Psalms, points to this. Beyond question, we must choose between this reasonable solution and the one which is taught in the Sunday school—that, in an age when the Mosaic ritual was widely departed from by the teachers of the people, and in a proceeding in which King David himself had deliberately disregarded it, and in a sudden emergency of danger, which might well have excused a well-intended though irregular act, God singled out the humble individual who was piously trying to avert disaster, and blasted him as a monument of his righteous displeasure.

Whatever foreboding of mischief any one may have entertained in fears about "a new departure" in higher schools of Christian thought, there is no cause for them as yet in the Sunday school. There is here and there an admission in the "lesson helps" that Uzzah's story is a hard one, and that we cannot hope to explain it on Christian principles. The nearest

approach to truth in this dealing with it is the confession of ignorance, which puts it among the enigmas of the old dispensation.

It is time to attempt a Christian revision of the mistaken opinion of the Hebrew writer, that "*God smote Uzzah for his error.*" Men thought he did. But they did not know our God as Christ has taught us to know him. They thought that comets and storms and epidemic sicknesses were signs of the wrath of God. But Christ has revealed to us the Father. He has thus lifted the burden of terror and gloom from human hearts beset by the ills of life. The evils that befall us when we are trying to do our duty, as Uzzah was, are no sign that God is jealous and hard to please. "*If there be a willing mind,*" says Paul, "*it is accepted.*" Even our mistakes, through ignorance or forgetfulness, when the heart and spirit are right, though they may have evil consequences in the nature of things, are followed by no curse of Divine vengeance. The heathen thought so. The Hebrews of Uzzah's time thought as the heathen thought. But Christ tells us that God deals with us as with his children. It is for our faith, not our performances, that he accepts us. It is in this better knowledge of God, which has come in place of the superstitions of the ancient world, that our children are to be pointed to the reality of Divine Revelation, and their debt of gratitude to the Holy Spirit.

The other instance of the anti-christian teaching found in the Sunday school lessons for this summer, is in the story of the Census and the Pestilence. There are two versions of it (2 Sam. xxiv. and 1 Chron. xxi.). They differ so in their details as to show the impossibility of maintaining that every fact is stated without error in the Bible. The substance of the story is this: David wanted to take a census. His general, Joab, a treacherous murderer, had religious scruples against it. David insisted, and it was done; but imperfectly, so did Joab's conscience go against it. Thereupon the prophet Gad comes to David and tells him he has sinned, and may choose in which of three ways he will be punished—by famine, or war, or pestilence. David chooses the pestilence, which breaks out, rages

three days, and destroys seventy thousand men. Thereupon David offers a sacrifice, and the plague is stayed.

It is very surprising to find a wretch like Joab with a conscience in such a matter. Also, to find a sinner offered the privilege of selecting the way in which God shall punish him. Still more surprising is it to find Christian clergymen teaching children that they are to see in this event the righteous way of God in visiting punishment upon a nation for the misdeed of a ruler.

Nations suffer terribly for their rulers' sins. But not like this. Louis XIV. and Louis XV. misgoverned France, and the Reign of Terror followed. The ambition of Napoleon cost the lives of millions of his countrymen. But in this case, if David sinned at all, it must have been in some secret pride of heart. To represent this as justly punished by the ravages of a pestilence is a monstrous misrepresentation of the ways of God. David, in the height of the pestilence, exclaimed: "*These sheep, what have they done? Let thy hand be against me.*"

The census, in itself, was no sin. Moses is recorded as having taken a census previously by a Divine direction. The book of Exodus directs that at every census each man shall pay a certain tax, "*that there be no plague.*" The Jewish historian, Josephus, says that David's sin was omitting to pay this tax. So the plague followed. We now know better than Josephus, and better than the Sunday school doctors, who say that the census itself was a sin. The only sin, in connection with which a pestilence could go as a punishment, was a sin against the laws of health.

This happened in an Eastern land, where filth-diseases rage in consequence of summer heats acting on garbage, offal and other putrefying substances. It was in the wheat harvest. It was not remarkable, except in the fact of its coincidence with the census. Happening at the same time was to the people good proof of a connection in the way of cause and effect. Especially, because of the popular reluctance to have the census taken, as shown in Joab's opposition. Professor Robertson Smith remarks, that the census was somehow in contravention of public sentiment. To understand that, we must bear in

mind the wide-spread belief in ancient times that remarkable prosperity was in danger of the Divine jealousy. Men who had had a long and brilliant career, like David, were thought specially exposed to be overtaken by some great calamity. An act like a census, a display of the great resources of the king, might draw from jealous heaven some humiliating stroke. Only on such a basis can we account for the conscience that such a hardened man as Joab showed in the affair. There is abundant evidence of the prevalence of heathen ideas in Israel at that time, and this fear of what the Greeks called the divine *nemesis* was one of them. David himself seems to have been above this fear. The book of Chronicles states (xxvii. 23), that in his census he had pious regard to the Divine promise, that the people should be multiplied as the stars of heaven. This of itself disposes of the notion that his census showed a punishable pride.

But David was not altogether above the superstitions of the time. In the agony of the pestilence he succumbed to the popular interpretation of it as a punishment for what he had done. He was not able to say what a prominent religious journal says this July about the cholera panic in France: "These plagues are no longer black terrors, as they were in past centuries. We understand their cause, and can limit their spread. Great plagues are a thing of the past." It is singular that our Sunday school editors should lose all this intelligence, and know no more about the plague at Jerusalem than David did.

Allusion has been made to the variations in the two versions of the story, which show that the tradition is inaccurate in details. One account says *God moved* David to take the census; the other, *Satan provoked* him. One says it was *seven* years of famine; the other, *three*, that was offered him among the alternative punishments. One says *fifty* shekels of *silver*; the other, *six hundred shekels of gold*, that were paid for the sacrifice. The two accounts also vary in giving the sum of the census. Where there are such variations, we may well believe that there may be other departures from historical accuracy. This suggestion enables us easily to explain the surprising incident, that David was offered by the prophet

Gad the privilege of choosing how he should be punished for his alleged sin, and that he had in the pestilence his choice.

It is very plain that if David, after all was over, had made the remark, that he would rather have had the calamity, if it were to come, come as it did, in the form of a short though sharp epidemic, than of long years of famine, or the losses and humiliations of a disastrous war, such a remark would easily have been transformed into the tradition, that he had the choice offered him, and that it fell out as he chose. So the blunder of an early age is accepted by the credulity of a later age as a word from heaven.

There can be little doubt that so it was. In the distress of the plague, David is carried away by the popular superstition, which takes the filth-disease as the consequence of the census. He accepts this explanation of it from Gad his seer, and piously congratulates himself that he is "*in the hand of the Lord whose mercies are great.*" This is the bright side of the story, the submissive trustfulness in God's goodness, which lights up the shadows of ignorance out of which God's Davids were to grow. In his after conversation with the seer, he probably declared, that if he had had to choose what form the evil should take, he would have wished to choose what God chose. The report of a such a saying would very easily pass into the statement, that God bade him choose, and sent him his choice.

It is for Christian common-sense to decide in this, as in the affair of Uzzah, which is the more reasonable explanation of the pestilence and its incidents, and to show as much wisdom in its choice as David would have shown in his, if he had had it.

Summer epidemics took place in Eastern countries then, as now, from the violation of sanitary laws. God does not offer transgressors their selection of punishments now, nor did he then. Superstition in every age has misinterpreted natural evils, like famine and sickness, and there was no lack of superstition then. To this add the slight variation of David's saying, that he would have chosen the pestilence, into the report that he did choose it, and the story at once passes from its disguise of unreality into its proper and credible form as the story of a superstitious panic.

But so long as our children are taught to regard such things as a revelation of God's righteous ways toward men, so long will our Sunday schools continue to furnish bright minds as recruits to Ingersollism. So long as we attempt to prove to a man that a mud-hole which breaks a path is part of the path, he will be likely to doubt that there is a path. It is the attempt to make out the superstitions, which are embedded in the sacred history, to be part of God's Revelation, which has made men doubt that there is a Revelation. The Revelation is made manifest only by the fact, that it brought men out of their dark and false notions of God, just as the sun is made manifest by his power to disperse a morning fog. The Bible is full of inspiration, and supreme in its moral authority. But for its fullness of inspiration and authority, we must look not to the blundering pupils but to the Teaching Spirit, who educated them up to the complete disclosure of the Eternal Righteousness and Love that is made by the Christ of God. Instead of trying to make out that God's pupils in that lower class of the ancient Jewish church made no mistake, it is far more convincing evidence of their guidance by the Holy Spirit to see the progress which they alone in that ancient world made from error to truth, from superstition to intelligence, from extravagance to reason, from heathenish to Christian ideas of God and God's ways with man, from such teachings as those of Gad, that God destroyed the people because the king took a census, to the Gospel truth taught by Ezekiel, that God distributes justly to every man according to his own work: "*The soul that sinneth it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him* (xviii. 20)."

Here, then, we rest our inquiry in a statement that cannot in these times be too strongly insisted on. *The proof of a Divine Revelation in the Old Testament is to be found in the progress of the pupils of Revelation.* Forget this, and an anti-christian use of the Bible naturally follows, when the errors which Christ came to abolish are exalted to an equal authority with the truths which he inculcated.

If such stories as this of the panic caused by the plague are

not skipped (the better way, as we think, in Sunday schools), they must have a Christian point put to them. This point, as in the story of Uzzah, is in showing how the Heavenly Father, as Christ has revealed him, differs from the jealous avenger that God was supposed to be;—showing, also, how men who in their time were esteemed great lights were but poor guides to truth in comparison with the Divine Christ, the Light of the world;—showing, also, our right and our duty, even though a prophet or an angel were to teach otherwise than Christ has taught, to listen to Christ alone.

There is also another side of truth to be brought out in contrast to the superstition that we find in these two stories.

Do any of us suppose that, if all men were godly men, ocean steamers would never sink each other in a fog, lightning never hit anybody, epidemics of typhoid or cholera be things unknown? What we call the natural or physical evils of the world, like the plague at the census, or the thunderbolt that fell on Uzzah, or the death that sooner or later ends all animal life, are the products of natural causes. They would operate as they now do, were there not a sinner in the world. They are not caused by the fact that Adam sinned, and all men after him. The shadow they cast over sinful consciences, the gloom and fear, and dread of God, this, this only, is what we are to attribute to sin. In proportion as we learn of Christ to know God as our Father, we learn to say with Paul, that "*all things work for good to them that love God.*" Thus Jesus corrected those who thought that a falling tower had crushed the life out of those beneath it, because they were especially sinners. Even as far back as the book of Job was written, the Bible protests against the notion which still lingers among us, that the natural evils, the catastrophes of life, are to be regarded as the punishment of sin. And so the Christian correction of this superstitious error of the times of David leads us to a profounder view of the retribution of sin. It is not without but within the man that it works to death. Not in the death of the body, but in the death of the soul; not in severance from the material world, but in severance from God; not in the loss of the breath, but in the loss of the spirit of filial trust and loving hope toward God; not in losing the body to the grave,

but in losing to the powers of inward darkness the power of living the Eternal Life through Christ and like him. This is what Christ teaches us to fear as the death which is the fruit of sin. What men call death, Christ teaches us to view as nothing but a falling asleep to wake again. It is not in the sleeping but in the waking again, that the judgment comes, in which it shall be to every man according as he is found in spirit, fitted or unfitted to see the kingdom of God and inherit its rewards.

ARTICLE VII.—THE CONDITION OF THE LABORING CLASSES OF ENGLAND.

THE condition of the laboring classes of England is a theme of vital importance to thinking men on both sides of the Atlantic; but in its consideration passion is as much out of place as indifference. A serious and candid statement of facts without exaggeration and without concealment is that which is now demanded; among such data are the following:—

1. The unprecedented increase of emigration from Great Britain shows that great numbers of the laboring classes of England are leaving the country. In the year 1882, the last year for which accurate figures are accessible, 1135 men, women, and children daily left the British shores; a continuous stream of humanity pouring out to make for itself a channel across the ocean to the ends of the earth; six-sevenths of this mighty host of 365 regiments, each more than 1100 strong, composed of the laboring classes! Could we station ourselves where we could look into the faces of this ever-increasing procession and study the phases of human life there depicted, we should ponder more and more the meaning of this modern exodus of the Anglo-Saxon race and stand in awe of the tremendous social forces whose power surpassing that of physics is capable of such an effect. What are the adequate causes? There may be forces pulling these thousands across the seas; but there must also be greater forces pushing them off from their native land.

2. Every student of English history knows that the laboring classes in Great Britain have no social standing. English society, take it all in all, is the best in the world. Its wealth, its culture, its honor, its power, its influence, its glory, its prestige, is known and respected of all men. Men may love it, or they may hate it; they may serve it, or they may fight it; but ignore it either in England or without they cannot. Its spirit rules the British Empire and makes itself felt throughout the world. To define English society is well-nigh

impossible; its reality and stability, however, are none the less appreciated. From this society the laboring man is forever debarred. He comes often in contact with it. He beholds afar off enough of its glories to excite his envy; but were the English aristocracy the inhabitants of another planet they could not be farther removed than they have been from any real interchange of thought, feeling, or purpose with the working-men. They have little or nothing in common. Their lives are diverse. Their movements are in different orbits, in different planes.

3. The laboring classes of England have virtually no political power. The nobility share their power of government with the middle classes; but the laboring classes have little influence either in the making or in the execution of the laws, though in some cases they may have the semblance of power. They are poor; no poor man's voice has much influence in politics. An election to Parliament costs a small fortune. Could a poor man be elected he must serve without salary and pay his own expenses. Should poor men combine and pay all the expenses of one of their number, this poor man's voice in Parliament would not be heard. But may not the laboring classes choose their representatives from among the aristocracy? Only a small part of the laboring classes have any right to vote. And in many cases, whatever the theory may be, the laboring man is free to vote only as his landlord or his employer dictates. The justices of the peace, whose duty it is to execute and administer the laws for the laboring classes, are independent of them, being seldom from the middle classes, almost always from the aristocracy, the appointees directly or indirectly of the crown. In the administration of the civil service the laboring classes have no share, all offices of profit and trust being monopolized by the gentry. When the best of the middle classes are put to their wits' end to find places for their own children, it is folly for a laboring man to hope for a place under the government.

4. The laboring classes in England, in that sense of the term which implies among its essentials self-reliance in thought and action, have no education; I do not mean that they cannot read and write, nor that they are ignoramuses; I mean that

they have been trained neither to think for themselves nor to control themselves. England has no free schools to-day, since the poor must pay out of their scanty wages more than they are able for the compulsory schooling of their children; and it was only in 1870 that the state established any general system of public schools. Without the power to think and act for oneself no man is truly educated. The whole trend of English life for generations has been to the end of rearing a laboring class that should neither think nor act independently. That the laboring man should think and act for his landlord, for his employer, for his king, has been taught him by fire and by sword; but when and where has he been taught to think for himself, to act for himself, to govern and to take care of himself? The government has always said: To govern you is our prerogative; to take care of you is our duty; this is a paternal government.

From the time of Elizabeth to the present the English poor law has put a premium upon shiftlessness and a burden upon thrift; it has trained the laborer to sell his manhood for a mess of pottage. In hunger, in cold, in sickness, the laboring man's first and last resort has been to the government, until self-reliance has been sadly impaired, if not wholly eliminated.

For generations England has been one vast workshop. What has been the effect of England's industrial organization upon the workingman? It has tended more and more by its increasing division of labor and its rapid multiplication of machinery to narrow the channel of the workingman's thoughts. Now and then a Livingstone may put a book upon his loom and refuse to allow his brain to be fastened to the monotonous vibration of the shuttle; but Livingstones soon leave the humdrum of the mill to face lions and savages in unknown lands. The mass of workingmen are forced by the pressure of their environment to restrict their thoughts more and more to the particular manipulation that their place in the mill demands. R. W. Emerson has a suggestive essay upon Compensation, in which he elaborates the idea that every value has its proportionate cost. England's commercial greatness has its value matched by the cost to the workingman of his power to think and to act for himself.

5. The laboring classes of England have little religion. This may seem incredible, but nevertheless as a general statement it is true. The laboring classes of Ireland, believing in and loving the church, are devout Catholics; but in England Catholicism has been rooted out. English workmen have no love for the state church, an institution adapted to the aristocracy. In the rural districts the parish church, in whose affairs the laboring man has no voice, in many cases the perquisite of the great landlords, the living of which may be given to favorites or even sold to the highest bidder, has lost its hold upon laboring men. In the cities the case is worse than it is in the country. Of the hundreds of thousands who compose the London poor very few ever attend any place of worship. Says Newman Hall: "As a rule in our large towns skilled artisans ignore our ecclesiastical arrangements. . . . As a class they do not go to church." Theirs is not so much skepticism as it is godlessness and irreligion. They know little and care little about God or religion. These facts are true of the laboring class as a whole, after making due allowance for the many individuals who are sincere attendants upon the state church and the dissenting chapel.

6. The laboring classes of England are poorly paid. This is an indisputable fact. It is denied, but without any just grounds upon which to maintain the dispute. The learned statistician has piled up his tables of figures to show the progress of the working classes in the last half century; admitting his conclusions that they are better off now than ever before may make us pity all the more their lot in the past, but can in no wise blind us to the facts of their present condition. Others have presented statistics to show that the English laborer is better paid than the American; we cannot but suspect that these figures err somehow or somewhere when we see a thousand laborers every day leaving British mills for American workshops; but admitting even this, it may be true that English laborers are nevertheless poorly paid.

As to the agricultural laborer every one admits that he is poorly paid. In good times the wages of an able-bodied man for eleven hours' work, the man boarding himself, is 50 cents. Agricultural depression which is a subject of thought to the

philosopher, pecuniary loss to the landlord, bankruptcy to the farmer, is to the farm laborer starvation or the poor house.

Yet bad as is the condition of the agricultural laborers, their state upon the whole is not worse than that of those who work in the factories and cities; for the former breathe pure air, they can live in the sunlight, they have a spot that they can for the time being call home. Poverty in the country is bad enough; in the city it is wretchedness and misery. That the laboring classes other than the peasantry are poorly fed, clothed, and housed is a fact too notorious to be successfully questioned. It is admitted by all that for the past number of years rents have been rapidly advancing; it could not be otherwise when the land is in the hands of the few and population constantly increasing. There is no place for the laboring classes of England in the country, and so they are crowding more and more into the large cities. Since 1811 the cities have increased in population 500 to 600 per cent., so that now more than half the people of England live in cities of 30,000 inhabitants or more. But neither in city nor in country can a laboring man hope to ever possess a home of his own. The system of primogeniture and entail, and above all, the fact that the possession of land in England is the surest means by which the wealthy of the middle classes can gain access to social standing with the aristocracy, combine to raise the price of land far above its real worth for agricultural purposes, to virtually keep it out of the market concentrated in the hands of the few, and so put it forever beyond the reach of the laboring man. Hence does it come to pass that 10,000 people in the city of Glasgow live in 1853 rooms, an average of more than five persons to each room, a condition of life that must involve painful results. The land tenure is such that the landholders possess a gigantic monopoly which enables them to charge £1 to £3 an acre for agricultural lands and correspondingly extravagant prices for lands in the cities, and in addition make those who rent the lands pay the poor rate, the church tithes, and other taxes. The only limit to their charges is the amount that would make it impossible for the tenants to maintain themselves. The man who owns his farm in fee simple and works it himself is land-owner, capitalist, and laborer in one;

he is the most independent of all citizens. Such yeomen were once England's strength and glory; but very few of these now remain. The small holding have been swallowed up by the vast estates or by corporations. Driven from the country and concentrated into the cities, the laboring classes have thereby lost independence. There is not a foot of land upon which they have the right to stand in their own name. Their food no longer raised in England comes from across the seas. They are therefore dependent upon others for their daily bread; but what have they to give in exchange for the necessaries of life? Their labor is all they have to give. But the individual workman on account of the system of minute division of labor now so firmly established can only do one thing. He cannot make a watch, but only the mainspring. He cannot make a pair of shoes, but only the heel. Could he make a pair of shoes, he might wear them himself or barter them for bread; but the heel of a shoe, what can he do with that? He has only his labor, which to himself is worth but little, to sell to the capitalist or the landlord who has bread, raiment, shelter, the prime necessities of existence. The capitalist and the landlord can do without the mainspring or the heel, but the laborer must have bread, raiment, shelter. In a bargain under such circumstances it is very evident who in the long run must fix the price of labor. The contest is unequal. The laboring man must take what he can get.

Making every allowance for mistaken generalizations, we must still believe that the laboring classes of England are poorly fed, clothed, housed, and paid. The more carefully and the more extensively one investigates the condition of English workingmen, the more does the fact impress itself upon even the most skeptical. It compels attention and enforces assent.

7. Debarred from society, excluded from politics, denied intellectual culture, ignoring religion, driven from the country to the city, poorly paid, fed, clothed, and sheltered, compelled to take what they could get for their labor, it is not surprising that the working classes should take to strong drink. Alcohol enables one to use up to-morrow's strength to meet the emergencies of to-day. Its immediate action is the excitement of the whole man; especially does it quicken the pulsation of the

heart and the throbbings of the brain. It animates the intellect, arousing memory and imagination, quickening the perception, and strengthening the other faculties. It warms the emotional part of man's nature, exhilarating mirth, banishing grief, calling out affection, and intensifying passion. It excites the will to action. Choices are made at once and executed remorselessly. While this transient excitement lasts and before the reaction comes on, it is indescribably delightful to the poor laborer, who for a little while has escaped from his task in the mill and from the cheerless apartment, where his crowded family eat and sleep, to the inviting rooms of the public house. As the flame of the furnace transforms dull ore into a molten stream of iron which burns a path for itself, whose heat makes summer of winter, and whose brilliant glow illuminates the darkness of midnight, and beautifies the somber walls of the foundry with silver and golden tints; so the magic power of the spirit of wine changes the common-place laborer into the life of the company and the hero of the hour. His future is to him a wholly uncertain commodity; for present delight he is ready to risk it all.

8. The laboring classes of England are heavily laden. It is remarkable how the burdens of society are shifted from one class to another, until at last they fall with all their accumulated weight upon the laborer. Does the price of manufactured goods fall through foreign competition, the remedy is to make the loss good by cutting down wages. Does pauperism increase, the poor rates are advanced; but the landlord charges them to the farmer, who in turn makes them good by economizing on the wages of the agricultural laborer. Does the shopkeeper find himself compelled to pay higher rent, he charges the increase to those who buy provisions; but as the laborers being many consume the most food the increased charge is theirs to pay.

The expenses of carrying on the Empire of Great Britain are immense. Royalty, nobility, the army and navy, the national debt, the state church, the civil service, 803,000 paupers, must be supported. From what source is this expense met? Evidently the manufactures of Great Britain pay the bills. Were the factories closed for a year Great Britain would

become bankrupt and its marvelous organization perish. Four elements are essential to England's manufactures, raw material, capital, oversight, and labor. Of these the first three are sure to get their share of the profits. The raw material coming mostly from foreign lands cannot be procured save at a fair price. Whenever capital is not remunerated it is readily withdrawn; its resources are ample to protect itself. As to oversight its excellence is so essential in manufactures and its supply so limited that it has always commanded the best of remuneration. It cannot be forced; it must be wooed and won if gained at all. In this oversight which organizes and directs both capital and labor and applies them to the raw material which it has collected, England has been wonderfully fortunate. This executive ability supplied by the middle classes has built up British manufactures so as to make England the workshop of the world; but such talent as this sees to it that itself is well paid, whoever else may gain or lose. With labor, the fourth element, however, it is different. In conflict with either of the others labor gets the worst of the contest. The history of the laboring classes from the earliest times, so far as such a history can be evoked from oblivion, shows that labor has heretofore been unable to protect itself. Without the power of self-knowledge, of self-restraint, of self-direction, without the power of organization, destitute of both materials and tools, the workmen of England have been compelled to bear the burdens of society and be content with such remuneration as the other interests deemed expedient to give them.

But now in England, the foremost industrial nation in the world, the tide has turned and labor is organizing and demanding, first, that henceforth equally with capital and oversight and raw material it shall have its just share of remuneration; and, secondly, that these shall take also their fair portion of the burden. This is the meaning of the commotion of the nineteenth century. That this demand has already been heard and is fast being granted is the encouraging sign in all the sad struggle, which saves us from despair, and fills every lover of humanity with the assurance of a brighter day for the world.

What has happened to England? She has opened her eyes to the fact that her commercial and industrial supremacy upon

which rests her existence as a great empire has been seriously threatened by foreign competition, not only in all the markets of the world but even in her own United Kingdom. To hold her own thus far England has cheapened her labor until its price has been forced down to the lowest possible rate; but to no avail. Her eyes now see that what she must have to maintain her position is neither cheaper labor nor cheap labor, but labor of the greatest possible skill and worth. This idea wrought into the English mind has already accomplished much. The nation has at last resolved to put it into execution. Once aroused to a necessity the Anglo-Saxon character never balks. In 1870 Parliament provided a system of public schools by which splendid results far beyond anticipation have been secured. This year \$15,080,000 have been appropriated in aid of national education in addition to the large sums raised by local and other measures. The employment of children under the age of fourteen unless they have first been well trained at school is restricted by law. There are now in attendance upon day and night schools no less than 5,080,000 pupils, or one in six of the entire population. Compulsory education is doing much for the laboring classes. But in addition to these public schools an extensive system of technical schools has been established in the principal manufacturing centers, where young men are trained in the application of science and the fine arts to industry. The laboring classes are now urged by every means to save their earnings. The postal savings bank even sends a clerk on pay-day to stand by the workman's side and ask him to make a deposit. There are savings banks connected with 1718 schools, that frugal habits may be encouraged in children. Great increase is noted in the number of depositors, the amount of deposits, and the average sum deposited by each person. England has come to see the folly of the old poor law and by reform legislation has with an increasing population decreased the number of paupers. An increase in the average of wages during the past fifty years is also to be admitted. A diminution of crime and a decline in the rate of mortality are also reported. The Reform Bill recently passed by the House of Commons, which aims to enfranchise 2,000,000 of men and thereby nearly double the number of voters in Great Britain,

will doubtless prevail in the end over the determined opposition of the House of Lords; for the workingmen led by Gladstone and backed by the Commons and public opinion, are no longer to be despised. The Lords must yield or be swept away by the rising storm. Bad then as the present condition of the laboring classes in England may be, we are justified in hoping that the worst has been, and that the tendency to better things will continue.

The large emigration is itself a hopeful sign. Its benefit is not so much in that every one that leaves makes a place for another, as it is that it shows English capitalists that now since modern invention has made migration so easy and America offers so many inducements to English operatives, England must ameliorate more and more the condition of her workmen, if she would keep them at home and away from the workshops of competing nations.

The abuse of a discovery of modern science will tend to make England persevere in her good resolution to give labor its fair share of remuneration—the discovery of dynamite. Labor is no longer powerless. With dynamite so easily made, concealed, and exploded, labor, if prohibited from social recognition, excluded from political rights, kept in ignorance of and aloof from religion, poorly paid, fed, and housed, crowded out of the country into the purlieus of the cities, crazed with rum, defying in its desperation all right and justice, may blow up raw material and machinery, capital and capitalists, overseers and all, into disorganization and anarchy, if not into annihilation.

English conscience and English interest are now seen to be one in the demand that the English laboring classes shall have their share in the outcome of English life. English conscience and English interest working at cross purposes have accomplished strange things in history. But when both work together they never fail of their purpose.

But what if the English working classes gain knowledge and power divorced from morality and religion? What if they have not self-restraint and self-direction? What if now they get the power and use it to settle old scores and take sweet vengeance? The thought makes the world tremble. Despo-

tism embodied in a Charles I. could be wounded to death by the headman's axe; but if the myriad-headed populace should become the despot, who could play the part of executioner?

Secular and technical education are good so far as they go. Food and raiment and a place to lay one's head are essential; but the laboring classes cannot "live by bread alone." "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things that he possesseth." Self-restraint and self-reliance can only be secured by the soul's recognition of and submission to the power and beauty of the moral law, eternally executing itself, as embodied in a personal God of justice and of love.

There are two kinds of agnosticism, that of the philosopher and that of the multitude; they seem alike, but their similarity is the similarity of extremes. The philosophical agnostic is the one who has rejected the idea of God that has been calmly scrutinized. The agnosticism of the laboring classes is that of those who have not so much as heard whether there be any deity; the name they have heard, but the real content of the idea of God has never occurred to them.

But here too is there ground for hope. There has been great increase in Great Britain of attendance upon Sunday schools, there being according to the latest returns an attendance of 5,217,000 scholars. General Booth with his Salvation Army, and Moody and Sankey with their gospel songs and homely phrases have been each in his own way preaching the gospel to the poor, healing the broken-hearted, preaching deliverance to captives and recovering of sight to the blind, setting at liberty them that are bruised. Good Samaritans have found the workingman to be their neighbor. Thousands have heard and believed, promise and first fruits of more to follow.

Jesus, the carpenter, communicated his own thoughts, his own emotions, his own purposes, to John, the fisherman, who lay in his bosom; by so doing John was made rich in thought, in emotion, in purpose; but Jesus was none the poorer for all he gave. Whatsoever of thought or feeling or purpose John received from Jesus he in turn gave to another, having freely received he freely gave; but in giving he lost nothing of it all. By giving he rather increased his own knowledge, emotion, and purpose.

Suppose the Hon. John Bright, as no doubt he may have done, should take his best thought, his most thrilling emotion, his noblest purpose, and communicate it from his own brain to the brain of one of his workmen, from his own heart to the workman's heart, from his own will to the workman's will; what would be the result of such communism as this? Would the Hon. John Bright be any the poorer? Would not he and the workman be both the richer? Suppose that the England, which John Bright so fully represents, should take the workingman to its own bosom and communicate to his brain, to his heart, to his will, England's own best thought, best emotion, best purpose, would this England be any the poorer? Would not the workingman be infinitely richer? Here is Christian communism; break this loaf to the English workingman and he will no longer cry for a stone!

Grand old England! What wonders has she not wrought? She has girdled the earth with her colonies and whitened every sea with her sails, and filled the earth with the products of her industry; she has battled victoriously for civil and religious freedom. She is our mother; God bless her! All this has she wrought with nearly a million paupers, with her laboring classes ostracized from good society, excluded from political power, deprived of education, destitute of religion, poorly paid, fed, clothed, and housed, driven from the country and penned up in the cities, with one-tenth of her vitality annually sacrificed to the demon of rum. What would she not have accomplished had she been freed from this terrible incubus? What will she not accomplish when in the near future her laboring classes shall be crowned with manhood, freed from the slavery of rum, liberally paid, properly clothed, fed, and sheltered in a home, when they and their children shall be educated, when social standing and political power may be safely put in their hands, when religion shall bind them with cords of love to a God whom they recognize as their Father and the Father of men!

ARTICLE VIII.—IMMORTALITY AND EVOLUTION.

Is it possible for a man convinced of the truth of the law of Evolution, to believe in individual immortality? The scientific specialist as a rule answers the question decidedly in the negative. The man whose one desire is to keep up with the ideas usually called advanced, accepts his dictum, and talks contemptuously of the superstition of the past. The truly broad and catholic thinker, a George Eliot or an Emerson, is driven to a position of unstable equilibrium and negative doubt, practically equivalent to unbelief. The intelligent Christian holds the two truths side by side in his mind, carefully preventing any contact between them. That there is yet another possible position, which views the belief in a future life as positively strengthened by a clear comprehension of the law of progress, it is the object of the present paper to show.

With the alleged contradictions between Evolution and Immortality, this is not the place to deal. They all rest on the assumption that the correlative development of brain and mind points to the non-existence of mind as a separate entity, and hence to the impossibility of its existence after the dissolution of the body. How groundless is this assumption, may best be shown by one or two quotations. "The utmost possibility for us is an interpretation of the process of things as it presents itself to our limited consciousness," says Spencer. "Carried to whatever extent, the inquiries of the psychologist do not reveal the ultimate nature of mind." "The relation of thought to a material brain is no metaphysical necessity," writes J. S. Mill, "but simply a constant co-existence within the limits of observation. . . . There is, therefore, in science, no evidence against the immortality of the soul, but that negative evidence which consists in the absence of evidence in its favor."

Leaving, then, all attempt at the reconciliation of two things which cannot be directly compared, let us see what results from considering the two sciences as complementary, and

bearing to each other something the same relation as does biology to mineralogy.

In the first place, it must be clearly understood that by immortality we mean to imply continuance of individual conscious existence after death. The word has shared the fate of many others, in being appropriated of late years by a school of thinkers who desire to keep the religious emotions which have formed the noblest incentives to action in the past, while sacrificing the definite intellectual beliefs which have formed the basis of those emotions. But the attenuated theory which sees in the belief in immortality only an assertion of the somewhat trite fact that the influence of our lives is destined to be unending, is not that which we shall adopt in the present paper. We accept the Christian hypothesis in its fullest significance; and this it is which we desire to study in the light of scientific truth.

To begin with, we must postulate the fact that law, in this visible, tangible world, is continuous. Phenomena vary, but force is constant, and it is on this truth that all our science depends. Destroy the continuity of law, and you destroy all possibility of a rational, inductive science. Now the phenomena of that other world whose reality is claimed by the believer, are manifestly separated by a sharp line of division from those of the visible. If we find no trace of the action of familiar laws,—if these novel phenomena are apparently governed by entirely new forces, having no continuity with the old,—the unity of our cosmic theory will be destroyed. Our belief in the super-sensible world will not indeed be annihilated; but we shall hold it in opposition to all analogy, and contrary to the principles of inductive science.

It will not surprise us to find that there is contradiction between these two departments of science. All the conditions lead us to expect it. Investigated at different times in the world's history; the one a belief of eighteen hundred years standing, the other a theory of yesterday; the one held with the greatest ardor of faith by those whom the world calls mystics, the other first formulated by men whose contempt for any pretense of knowledge concerning a world other than the physical was barely veiled; each believed for years by its

adherents to be radically incompatible with the other, each viewed with distrust and dislike by the other, and thus pursued with absolute independence; it would not indeed be surprising were they to be proved incompatible, nay, antagonistic. But should we find that these independent and hostile investigations had each reached one aspect of the same fundamental law; that each science, incomplete in itself, found its complement in the other, and that, when brought together, they showed a wonderful unity and harmony—then, indeed, although in one sense, we should have no additional proof for either, we should trust, with wonderfully increased assurance, the validity of our conclusions in both.

The older theory of Evolution represented its path, in so far as we can trace it, as a straight line. Development was orderly, gradual, unbroken. Of late years, however, it is granted by nearly all thinkers that the true expression of the law, in that sphere which is open to our observation, is a line, continuous indeed, but sharply deflected from its original direction in at least one point of its course. Such deflection cannot be accounted for by anything in the normal sequence of cause and effect; it must be due to the action of some anomalous intrusive force. Concerning the nature of such force, we need at present say nothing, we need only postulate its existence.

Once granted the substance of which the present universe is composed, existing as a nebulous mass, and the gradual evolution proceeds with all harmony until an advanced stage of development is reached. The whole inorganic world, in all its wonderful complexity of structure, can be accounted for by the orderly and gradual working of natural laws alone.

Suddenly there manifests itself an unprecedented phenomenon—a phenomenon out of the line of previous development, unaccounted for by any force hitherto recognized. Life appears upon the globe, and such appearance must necessarily cause a deflection of the straight line of development.

That science has, to the present day, failed to establish the doctrine of spontaneous generation, is now acknowledged even by those who were once the most devoted adherents of that doctrine. Between the simplest germ of living protoplasm

and the most complex mineral, there is a great gulf fixed. It is impossible for the inorganic by any effort of its own to bridge that chasm. The change can only be accounted for by the action of some new intrusive force, whose nature we can not divine. Its result is, however, evident and undisputed. Matter, by its means, is lifted into correspondence with a new environment, infinitely more complex and heterogeneous than was the former one.

The law now continues, with no break, even apparent, until we reach a point where theories diverge—the point of the introduction of conscious mind. The old idea that man was the result of a special creation has been discarded as regards his physical nature; but concerning his mental and moral character, the question is still mooted. Many, even among men of science, think that the will, and the higher moral instincts, cannot be accounted for as being in the straight line of animal development, and differing from brute intelligence in degree but not in kind. They claim that here, for the second time, we must postulate the entrance of an intrusive force, and a resulting deflection of the line of development. We can not here attempt to discuss this question. Whatever its solution, it does not, as we have before shown, alter materially the nature of the problem before us.

Here, then, is the last word of scientific evolution. It has brought us from the first appearance of matter as a nebulous and chaotic mass, to the summit of human intelligence. It has shown us the action of the law of continuity, mysteriously in harmony with the sudden lifting of matter into correspondence with an environment to which it was otherwise dead.

But its revelation is in its nature fragmentary. It answers none of our questions concerning the destiny of our race or of ourselves; it does not seek to explain the anomalous phenomenon of self-consciousness. Postulating Force and Substance, it simply traces the action of the one upon the other. It tells us nothing concerning the source of these external forces, the nature of the developing substance, or the cause of the development.

Leaving then for the present the consideration of the facts of physical science, let us pass in review certain alleged truths

concerning man's psychical nature. The ground here changes materially. Instead of studying development from genus to genus, we must now confine our attention to the genus homo. Putting on one side the phenomena of matter, we direct our thoughts to the consideration of mind. Our knowledge has so far been reached through observation; henceforth, it must rest ultimately on the testimony of consciousness.

The fundamental* belief of spiritual science viewed from the human side, is that, at a certain point of man's development, there enters an intrusive force, working an unprecedented change in his nature. This force, which cannot be reached in the continuous line of natural development, is life-giving. It transforms man's nature, forcing upon him new internal relations, which necessitate adjustment to new external relations. It brings him into correspondence with a new environment. The longer this correspondence continues the more does the spiritual nature of man advance in heterogeneity, in definiteness, in complexity. In other words, he is brought into contact with an environment which bears to the sphere of organic life such a relation as does that sphere to the kingdom of the inorganic.

Although the entrance of this force is cataclysmic, its action is gradual, its first beginnings often barely perceptible. The correspondence is at its best imperfect and partial in the present life, but in so far as it is real, it must be imperishable, for it exists between the organism and an environment which is spiritual, and hence not subject to the laws of decay which govern the material world. The man whose nature has been thus transformed, who has entered on the spiritual life, has within him something which material, physical death can not conquer. He is a partaker of immortality.

The doctrine of individual permanence after death which we have just reached, is sufficiently startling. It may well excite our suspicions from its apparent want of scientific analogy. Here, then, it will be well to pause, and compare the result of our investigations in the two directions of physical science and objective psychology.

* The treatment of this point is borrowed from Drummond's "*Natural Law in the Spiritual World.*"

To a certain point, we are struck by the identity of law. The New Testament writers, from whom the modern Christian theories are all derived, certainly had never heard of the Principle of Evolution, and had no idea that in their statements concerning the life that is from above, they were tracing the action of a scientific law, to be discovered centuries after their death; yet such is the case. The phenomena differ; but the law is the same, and the account of that new life which is in Christ gains fresh force as we see how perfectly it agrees with Mr. Spencer's definition of all life as "the adjustment of internal to external relations," and how exactly its action follows the law of Evolution.

Moreover, the complementary nature of the two sciences forces itself upon us. Where physical science ends, spiritual science begins. The former traces the development of living matter till it brings us to the human race. That race manifests phenomena so striking and peculiar that we are justified in concluding that here physical evolution has reached its limit, is contented with its work, and abruptly suspends its action.

But is that work complete? Is man, with all his varied faculties, his exquisitely adjusted organism, an end worth all this tremendous expenditure of force and material? For the answer we can look nowhere but to the testimony of man himself; and that testimony unanimously answers "No." If the complex organism serve no end beyond itself, then the whole scheme and method of evolution has ended in a gigantic failure.

Perhaps this is the truth. Perhaps a stoical agnosticism is destined to be the end of the researches of the human race into its nature and its destiny. Meanwhile, there is a science which comes to us vested with the authority of ages, which alone has given to humanity the faith and the courage to pursue those very investigations whose end may be thus suicidal. The message of this science is no uncertain one. The action of the Law of Evolution is not, it tells us, a line broken abruptly off and leading nowhere. When physical development is complete, the law does not end; it simply transfers its action to another and a higher sphere. A new direction is given to the line, and in that direction our straining eyes can trace it for a short distance before the veil of physical death

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conceals its further action from our sight. The human organism, with all its varied and subtle adjustments, is yet dead. As to the inert elements of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen, there enters an informing force, indefinable, intangible, yet real, lifting these dead elements into relation with an environment which is in truth, compared with that which they had previously known, supernatural; so to the spirit of man, with its elements of thoughts, volitions, emotions, there comes a power, a life, indefinable, yet actual, lifting these elements into relation with that which to them is indeed supernatural, showing the possibility of development unending, giving earnest of infinite environments with which in turn the expectant spirit may come in contact.

But it may be urged this scientific analogy, however plausible, is misleading. The conditions here are changed. The relations of the spiritual to the natural differ in many ways from those of the organic to the inorganic. For instance, there is the great distinction, that while the chemical elements are inert and unconscious, the spirit of man must acquiesce in the action of this new spiritual force. Moreover, your theory degrades most men, after all, to the level of the brute, and leaves them with no hope beyond the grave; for on your own showing, this higher, spiritual life is granted only to a few.

In answer it may be said, that it is one of the primary laws of evolution that as it continues and changes its action from one sphere to another, its workings become more compound. The law must adjust itself to the complex conditions which its own action has brought about. Once granted the evolution of conscious life and the power of self-knowledge, it is inevitable that the organism should, of its own choice, acquiesce in the action of the higher force. The complication of the problem does not destroy the action of the law.

Concerning the second objection, it is enough to urge once more the fact that the silence of science, and her failure to corroborate theologic beliefs does not necessarily disprove such beliefs. Our only object is to show the scientific accuracy of the statement, "He that hath the Son hath life." The law of the Survival of the Fittest seems indeed to accord wonderfully with the statement in the latter half of the same verse;

but our work is constructive, not destructive, and our aim to discuss, not possible annihilation, but probable immortality.

And this brings us again to that belief in individual permanence after death which is the crucial point in our discussion. Here, surely, we have reached a dogma thoroughly unscientific. We find in the dealings of nature no hint at the perpetuation of the individual. In the struggle to reach the highest type, she wipes whole races off the face of the earth with inexorable indifference. She uses each species as a step, by which she may mount nearer to her goal. Each individual carries the development of the race a fraction farther on, and then sinks into nothingness. It would seem that a sublime arrogance alone could inspire in man the absurd idea of an immortal destiny for his own personal self.

Moreover, we find no hint in the whole course of nature at so extraordinary and unprecedented a phenomenon as existence apart from this present material organism. The most accurate and definite testimony could hardly make us put faith in such existence; how much less, then, can we do so, when we have in its favor nothing but a few distant traditions, which bear upon them every mark of poetic legends, framed in a credulous age, for the satisfaction of man's unreasoning discontent.

At first sight, these considerations seem overwhelming. But, before condemning completely the hope of immortality as a futile and insane dream of a restless brain, let us look at the subject a little longer.

We have tried to show that the length of life is a simple inference from its quality, and that the belief in existence after death is a corollary from belief in a spiritual life for man now. Scientific proof of such life is, of course, impossible. No effort on the part of a lower species can ever enable it to foretell the nature or even the real existence, of the next higher. The reasoning must be presumptive only, and demonstration must ultimately rest on testimony. No argument concerning the efficiency of such testimony is here in place. Simply stating that it exists, and has by the majority of mankind been accepted as trustworthy, we proceed to consider such fragmentary hints on the subject as are offered us by science.

We notice first, as we have done before, the invariable

appearance of new laws to govern new conditions. As under the principles of Evolution, matter reaches higher stages of development, each increase in complexity demands the appearance of some new controlling force. The laws of Biology do not exist until the development of the living beings which they are to govern; the laws of political economy and of historical progress have no force as applied to any race of animals lower than man. For what evolution produces, it must provide, and lower laws are constantly overruled and counteracted by higher. It is urged that the law of Death is universal—man as well as brute must submit to it. In the first place, the statement that the brute perishes completely is a pure assumption. Moreover, we have no right to say that there can be no life whose nature is such as to enable the organism to survive physical death. All matter is subject to the law of gravitation. Studying the inorganic world, one would think it impossible for the law to be disregarded; yet the plant grows upward toward the sky. Death is not violated; it is superseded by eternal life.

When we consider carefully the nature of man, we are forced to the conclusion that here we find such new conditions as must demand new laws to govern them. In the first place, man is apparently the culminating point, the finished product, of organic evolution. This is no mere assumption. We are driven to the inference by the unprecedented phenomena which accompany his appearance upon the scene. The evolution of conscious mind would seem to be the final effort of the laws governing matter. When the principle of development has produced an organism which can recognize its own existence, and comprehend the forces which brought it here, we feel that it has in a sense mastered these forces, and that it is time for some new power to grant it scope for further development elsewhere.

This subjective probability is corroborated by the objective fact that nature, having apparently perfected her type, now devotes her energies to the development of the individual. We can trace no particular variety within the genus oyster; when nature describes an advance she involves a new type; but between the savage and the European, how vast a difference!

Development from genus to genus is apparently superseded by development within the genus. The growth of Personality is indeed by many regarded as the fundamental principle of Evolution. We can see foreshadowings of it in some of the higher animals, as dogs and horses; but among all the varied species on our globe, it can be said of man alone that no one unit exactly resembles any other. The principle of increase of individuality governs all historical development. From the passive absolutism of the East to the democracy of America; from the rigid art of the Egyptians to the portraits of Millais; from the Iliad and Odyssey to the poems of Browning the underlying law of growth is that of differentiation. The principle holds when we consider advance in human civilization alone no less than in passing from one genus of animals to another.

The law of Evolution has thus produced a new order of things. It has developed a number of conscious individuals, each differing from each. The old laws are inadequate to govern such anomalous phenomena. By all scientific analogy, we expect a new law to appear, which shall in some peculiar sense apply to the individual: and we claim that the requirements of the problem are satisfied by no result, save that which man reached centuries ago by a radically different method—the law of individual immortality.

For this personality, so complex and delicate in its mechanism, can not be satisfactorily developed within the brief space of seventy years. Unless we are to retrograde and return to the old principle of social as distinguished from individual development, we must believe in the possibility for every man of further growth, after that catastrophic disturbance which we call death. Man without immortality is incomplete. There is, in each individual of the race, a desire for perfection, a need for something higher than he can attain in this life. If the destiny of man be annihilation, his existence is the most tremendous scientific anomaly ever known. Here, for the first time, we find faculties with no objective correlates. The existence of respiratory organs points inexorably and scientifically to air that can be breathed; shall we say that man's consciousness of faculties that strain after a spiritual atmos-

phere points to a simple delusion? It is improbable that, as is sometimes said, these aspirations imply merely future social development. They are too definite and personal, and moreover, as we have just shown, such development would be a scientific retrogression. They must point to individual perfection, and such perfection can be attained only in a life continued after death.

The idea of immortality violates no law. The new conditions which its novel phenomena necessitate are wonderfully in harmony with the action of the law of evolution in the natural world. For what, essentially, is this spiritual life, which, it is claimed, is in its nature eternal? It is, as we have shown, the bringing the organism into correspondence with an environment which is spiritual, unchanging, everlasting. In this life, the correspondence is indeed imperfect; but so far as it exists, it cannot be subject to annihilation, dependent on the dissolution of the perishable body. Correspondence with an eternal environment is in its very nature unending, and the man who has in this world begun to live the spiritual life, cannot perish, but must live forever.

Thus we reach our conclusion. The relation of the theory of Evolution to the doctrine of immortality is obscure and involved. A direct comparison of the two sciences, is, of necessity, vague and unsatisfactory, and leaves us much where it found us. It is only when we compare the conclusions and the fundamental laws of each, that we see how wonderfully the two are complementary, and in what harmony they unite in giving us a scheme of existence, incomplete, it is true, but coherent, scientific, and clear. We have not indeed proved the truth of immortality. Such proof could only be gained by direct testimony from the spiritual world, and confident hope of the life to come must always rest upon the Resurrection of Christ. But we have tried to show that the idea is in wonderful harmony with the other workings of nature. Without it, the theory of Evolution is incomplete, fragmentary, hopeless; but when this complementary truth is added, the theory gains a scientific completeness and a noble unity. We conclude, in short, that the belief in individual immortality is the legitimate sequence of faith in the law of Evolution.

ARTICLE IX.—UNDERGROUND RUSSIA.

Underground Russia. Revolutionary Profiles and Sketches from Life by STEPNIAK. Translated from the Italian. Charles Scribner's Sons: N. Y., 1883.

STEPNIAK'S book is to me a most refreshing bit of reading. I wonder why so little has been said about it. Its preface, written by Lavroff, is dated London, March 4, 1882. There has certainly been time for its merits to become known, but I do not find that it has been adequately noticed. What is Nihilism and what are the Nihilists? Stepniak undertakes to answer these questions. It is worth while to know what Nihilism means, but how thoroughly the novelists and reporters have obscured the subject! Nihilism is a philosophical system or it is a set of blood-thirsty assassins. One who reads Turgheneff and the newspapers makes his choice or decides that the whole subject is unintelligible. But the author of "Underground Russia" speaks from his own knowledge and to the point.

Under the pseudonym of Stepniak, an energetic actor in the Russian revolutionary movement shares his experiences with the public. Of course he writes with enthusiasm and with a purpose. There is ever so much strong, personal feeling evident in his descriptions, and emphasis is laid upon such portions of his theme as are intended to call forth sympathy in the reader. However, this fact adds to the value of the book as literature; and indeed in its design and in the happy delineation of character "Underground Russia" is very good literature. It is to be regretted that the translation is not better. For example, one notices "polemist," "*sentence* of a jury," "interned," "*long* eyebrows," and a lack of taste throughout.

Lavroff claims for Stepniak's book an unique place among all the attempts which have been made to describe Nihilism. He says that of previous writers, those attached to the Russian press have failed to publish the whole truth; that such candid

writing as has appeared is still inaccessible to the European public, being in the Russian or Ukrainian language; that, as for the few European scholars who know the Russian language, the materials furnished by the revolutionary press are quite insufficient for them, and do not save them from great blunders. A perfect knowledge of Russia and of the conditions of the Russian people must be presupposed, which it is almost impossible for a foreigner to possess. The progress of the revolutionary movement must have been followed step by step, and on the spot, in order to understand the substitution, within a very brief period, of other theoretical and practical questions for those formerly in vogue.

In the progress of the revolutionary movement there are three steps to be distinguished. First in point of time came Nihilism; next, Revolutionary Socialism; last, the present phase, namely, Terrorism. The genuine Nihilism was no more than a philosophical and literary movement, which flourished in the first decade after the emancipation of the serfs; that is to say, between 1860 and 1870. The fundamental principle of Nihilism was absolute individualism. It was the negation of all the obligations imposed upon the individual by society, by family life, and by religion. Nihilism was a reaction, not against *political* despotism, but against that *moral* despotism which weighed upon the private and inner life of the individual. Nihilism attacked religion and the victory was definitely, absolutely gained. "Among people in Russia with any education at all, a man now who is not a materialist, a thorough materialist, would really be a curiosity." Nihilism proclaimed war not only against religion, but against everything not based upon pure and positive reason—for example, Art, together with everything which excites the sentiment of the beautiful. A shoemaker is superior to Raphael, because the former makes useful things while the latter makes things of no use at all! Nihilism attacked the prejudices respecting woman. Mr. Schuyler tells us that in the time of Peter the Great "except as a wife a woman's existence was scarcely recognized," and much of that tradition had come down to our days. How fully the purpose of emancipation was effected is seen in such terrible examples of devotion and heroism as

Sophia Perovskia and Vera Zassulic. "The almost religious fervor of the Russian Revolutionary movement must in great part be attributed to women."

The change from Nihilism to Revolutionary Socialism was a result of the example set by the Paris Commune. With 1871 came the more active phase of Russian socialism. The Nihilist sought his own happiness and his ideal of a reasonable and realistic life; the Revolutionist sought the happiness of others, sacrificing his own. His ideal is a life full of suffering and a martyr's death. The former, owing to inferior activity, was never known outside his own country; the latter has acquired a terrible reputation and is called in the world by the name of the former. The former argued in favor of individual freedom; the latter agitated in favor of political reforms. It was a change from words to deeds. The whole Russian social edifice was pronounced rotten and the reforms of Alexander II. inadequate. All the abundant enthusiasm of the Russian character was enlisted. Men and women devoted their lives, in every sense of the term, to the propaganda. As yet the means employed were comparatively harmless, but the devotion lavished upon the effort to make converts to the new social doctrines was unexampled. Not only young men and women of the most aristocratic families labored for fifteen hours a day in the factories and workshops and fields, in order to reach and influence the masses, but those in secure and honored positions were not less ardent. In 1877-78 came the trials of the agitators—public trials, designed to intimidate. The contrary effect was produced. Fanaticism was intensified and took a new form. The government must be attacked, but no longer with argument merely. Socialism became Terrorism. A revolution, as that is understood in western Europe, was impossible. The disproportion between the material forces at the disposal of the revolutionary party and those of the government was too great. Even a rising of importance, like those of Paris, was out of the question. Many of those who would sympathize in such an effort were scattered throughout the villages and small towns. There was no controlling city population. Secret attack was resolved upon, as the only resort left to the Revolutionists.

The first sanguinary events took place a year before Terrorism was erected into a system. They were isolated cases without political importance, but they clearly showed that the 'milk of love' of the socialists of the previous luster was already being changed into the gall of hatred—hatred directed first of all against the more immediate enemies, the government spies. In various parts of Russia some half-dozen of these were killed.

These first acts of bloodshed could not stop here. If time were consumed in killing a vile spy, why allow the gendarme who sent him forth to live unpunished? or the procurator? or the head of the police? and so on mounting by degrees to the person of Alexander II. The Russian has the courage to be logical. It is in fact one of the most striking peculiarities of the Russian character that it never hesitates before the practical consequences of a chain of reasoning.

On January 24, 1878, Vera Zassulic shot General Trepoff, who had ordered a political prisoner to be flogged. Two months afterwards she was acquitted by a jury. The press and the public were unanimous in confirming the verdict of the jury; but the Emperor went in person to visit Trepoff and ransacked the whole city in search of the acquitted Zassulic, in order to put her in prison. The general discontent grew beyond measure. The liberal party, which had sought reform by means of the existing political organization, turned in despair to the Socialists and joined hands with them in the struggle against despotism. The Emperor went so far as to annul the decision of his own Senate which had granted the petition of pardon of the accused in the trial of the 193. In a word, the government was not supported by the nation, by any class, or by the laws which had made itself. Against such a government everything is permitted.

Everyone knows what events followed when all hope had been placed in assassination—the events of 1878–1882. What of the actor in this drama of blood, the Terrorist? Stepniak's admiration is unqualified. He is noble, terrible, irresistibly fascinating, for he combines in himself the two sublimities of human grandeur—the martyr and the hero.

But the value of what Stepniak has written about the Ter-

rorist is not lessened by this outspoken partisanship. Our author expressly disclaims all political significance for the book, and the absence of effort to be or appear impartial or philosophical increases its value as well as its interest. It is candid.

In the sketches of character which follow the introductory matter, of which the substance has now been given, the author is speaking about friends or giving personal experience. These sketches have, in part at least, the value of memoirs. Strong, vivid, intensely personal, they are to be commended just as they stand. I should like to say only that the author's female friends are handled with so much confident skill, while men are treated with a deference just perceptible; the color of men's eyes and the dress and presumable age of women are noted so particularly, that there is some force in the suggestion, Is Stepniak a woman?

In these sketches the reader is introduced not only to some of the leaders in the organization for the overthrow of the government, but the system and practical working of that organization are described by a specialist. Newspaper reporters have made the public familiar with the details of the several plots for the assassination of the Emperor—those at least which have been discovered. These may be passed over: but it is certainly entertaining to be introduced to the *Ukri-vateli* (concealers), who combine with their ostensible, *non-explosive* occupations, an auxiliary service in the cause of Terrorism. "They are a large class, composed of people in every position, beginning with the aristocracy and upper middle class and reaching even to the minor officials in every branch of the government service, including the police, who, sharing the revolutionary ideas, take no active part in the struggle, for various reasons, but making use of their social position, lend powerful support to the combatants by concealing, whenever necessary, both objects and men." It is interesting to read an editor's description of the secret press—so secret that only one of the several editors of an influential paper knows where the office is situated.

It would be useless to undertake to calculate the numerical strength of the Socialists. The party is very large, numbering

hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions of men. This mass of people does not, however, take a direct part in the struggle. It entrusts its interests and its honor to those who make the revolution their sole occupation. The work is done by a committee or committees, as it seems, supported and quietly aided by a large fraction of the entire population. Such committees remain small. It is well for the cause that they should be so, but the limitation is certainly not due to set purpose. It arises of itself and in a very simple manner; that is to say, by the killing off of the superfluous. The office of executioner is taken by the government. By a tendency inherent in every political secret society, the revolutionary organization endeavors to extend itself; to attract an ever-increasing number of persons; to spread its ramifications far and wide. When once a certain point has been reached however, means are wanting, and as a consequence, there is an inevitable relaxation in the measures of security, combined with a certain relaxation of discipline, which always corresponds with the undue extension of the society. The inevitable result of this is a "disaster," a "deluge"—some blood-letting by the government. But the struggle is not so unequal as might appear. It is not a contest between a party and the nation, but between a party and the government, while the nation looks on with indecision. What is to be the end? The hope of the Revolutionists is in the support—or rather non-interference—of the people. By yielding to the reasonable requests of the nation, the government may restore things to their regular course, for in a free country terrorism cannot exist. Until such reforms the revolution will continue, for terrorism, revolutionary-socialism, nihilism, are and have been only the peculiar forms which discontent with the administration has taken, owing to the peculiar nature of the political and social problems to be solved.

It will be admitted that Stepniak pleads the Revolutionist cause with eloquence. It is not within my purpose to prescribe the quantity of salt to be taken in this connection; but having attempted to do justice to his professions I may be allowed to call attention to what seems to me an important confession. Stepniak's heroes may be worse than they are

ainted, but they are probably not better. For instance, the characters of Clemens and Ossinsky. These gentlemen apparently have not hesitated to use a decidedly low kind of deceit for the furtherance of their plans. Is this underhand character of the movement the real explanation of its unsavoriness? The agitators have many noble traits and their purposes may be all right, but their way of doing things is sneaking.

Wallace has put the matter very nicely. "In Russia reformers have been trained not in the arena of practical politics, but in the school of political speculation. As soon, therefore, as they begin to examine any simple matter with a view to legislation, it at once becomes a "question" and flies up into the region of political and social science. Men trained in this way cannot rest satisfied with homely remedies, which merely alleviate the evils of the moment. They wish to "tear up evil by the roots, and to legislate for future generations as well as for themselves."

ARTICLE X.—TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES.**III. THE INTERNAL REVENUE.**

SETTING aside the amounts received for carriage of the mails, coinage of bullion, official fees and other minor sources of revenue, the most of which are acquired under what I have called the commercial title as compensation for specific services rendered, the annual expenses of the United States are provided for by the duties on imports and the internal revenue duties. According to the statement for 1880 the minor sources yielded in round numbers \$22,000,000, the customs \$187,000,000, and the internal revenue \$124,000,000, in all rather more than \$333,000,000. The largest burden is apportioned to the customs with the distinct object of augmenting the cost of certain articles of foreign origin beyond their real values in order to ensure the sale of competing domestic articles at remunerative prices. This has been effected by laying a great variety of duties, specific, ad valorem, and compounds of the two, upon a great number of different articles, the pressure of conflicting and unequal interests upon the government having produced a confusion which defies all analysis and classification. It is quite useless to consult the tariff for anything beyond the broad principle common to all the protected interests that the public exigencies of the State must be made to subserve the private ends of business enterprise by keeping foreign products at their real values out of the American market. The public exigencies utilized in this way are not the ordinary liabilities of the State in its normal conditions of peaceful prosperity, but the enormous expenditures precipitated by the rebellion of 1860. The measure of the pressure put upon the government by private interests is given in the fact that the tariff to-day as "reformed" by the last Congress is substantially what it was in the act of 1862. This act was distinctly a war measure, drafted without sufficient precedents in our political experience and on the spur of the moment, to provide for obligations contracted in the same off-hand and lavish manner. It is an heroic

document, lifted above all the ordinary hesitations of economic science by the supreme emotion of the hour, the haste for self-sacrifice and the indomitable will to conquer. On the suppression of the rebellion and the return to victorious peace it would have disappeared in time along with martial law, the suspension of specie payments, and other extraordinary provisions for an extraordinary emergency, had not the manufacturers, enriched by the general inflation of prices put upon their goods, insisted on its continuance. So for twenty years the State at peace abroad and at home has made war on the industries of other countries at the expense of one class of its subjects for the benefit of another; at this moment is annually drawing from the customs to protect American manufacturers from the foreigner the amounts it drew from the same source to protect the commonwealth from the rebellion.

The inevitable decrease of taxation since the close of the war which should have taken effect equally by reduction all around has been effected by exaggerated reductions of the internal revenue to compensate the immovable fixity of the tariff on imports. The internal revenue act of 1862 is the companion to the customs revenue act, and is if possible more conspicuously a war measure than the other in that it expresses more distinctly and without complication of motives the readiness of the people to anticipate any requisitions of the government for the defense of the State. It is a medley like the other of specific, ad valorem, and compound duties spread broadcast over the wealth and activities of the country, but for this very reason that it was wholly the inspiration of the hour and unsustained by any interested class after the emergency had passed, it felt the first effects of the return to peace and to lower taxation. Whatever relief has been accorded to the people in twenty years has come by repealing some clause of the original internal revenue act and not by any general readjustment of the whole burden to the distribution of the national wealth. The demand for relief is to-day more imperative than ever before, for the reason that the State is at last approaching the embarrassments of a surplus which it cannot apply wholly to the reduction of its capital debt, and the demand of the protectionist is of course that the pressure on the people and the

perplexity of the State shall be removed by abolishing what is left of the internal revenue. It follows that the downward movement in one class of taxes has been accelerated by the immobility in the other and that both are in different ways parts of the policy of protection.* We need not look to the one tariff any more than to the other for the simple motive of providing for public expenses by equable taxation of the national wealth, for a particular tax of any kind admits of such adjustment only in company with all other taxes. Considering the evident interest and disposition of the manufacturing class to concentrate the whole burden upon imports, we have only to ask how any part of the internal revenue system has escaped repeal, what are the special motives which have determined the State to reserve any home products for taxation.

It is first to be observed that the ad valorem duties, which are the characteristic feature of the customs tariff, have entirely disappeared from the other, as might have been expected from the relative inaccessibility of domestic products to valuation. The taxes levied under the Act of March 3d, 1883, now in force are either special taxes, or of the nature of specific and proportional duties, classified as follows:

Special taxes ranging from \$2.40 to \$2.60 paid for business licenses by manufacturers of and dealers in spirits, fermented liquors, and tobacco. In addition to the license, manufacturers of stills pay \$20 for each worm or still; retailers of leaf tobacco 80 cents for each dollar of monthly sales in excess of the rate of \$500 per annum.

Distilled spirits pay 90 cents per proof gallon; imitations of wines 10 cents per pint; fermented liquors \$1 per barrel of 31 gallons. Manufactured tobacco and snuff 8 cents per pound; cigars \$3, and cigarettes from 50 cents to \$3 per thousand.

Banks and bankers pay one-twelfth of one per cent. each month on average circulation; and ten per cent. on certain notes used for circulation and paid out.

This last tax is what I have called a proportional duty because like the ancient system of tithes and other taxes paid in kind, of which it is a curious survival, it takes a definite proportion of a particular kind of property, namely about one

* Thus the Act of March 3d, 1883, establishing the customs tariff now in force, is appropriately entitled an "Act to reduce internal revenue taxation, and for other purposes."

per cent per annum of that form of money current as bank circulation; whereas the specific and ad valorem duties although paid in money are proportioned, the former to the quantity, the latter to the value, of some other commodity. A dollar upon a barrel of beer is a specific duty, 25 per cent. of its value upon an imported watch an ad valorem duty, but one per cent. of the circulation of a bank a proportional duty.

As a matter of fact, however, the government does not collect the proportional duty by actually appropriating the hundredth part of the circulation of any bank. It allows the bank-notes to be issued to their full amount in the regular course of business and collects the equivalent of one per cent. of them from the bank itself, so that the duty is really a certain sum of money proportioned to the amount of another sum; is a money tax levied upon money precisely as the specific or ad valorem duty is a money tax levied upon some commodity other than money.

An obvious reason for selecting bank circulation from other forms of money or its representatives for taxation is the fact that it is strictly limited by law, is a matter of official record, and is secured from depreciation by bonds of the United States deposited with the Treasurer of the United States; in other words is property perfectly accessible to the government. At first sight it might appear that another motive was furnished in the fact that bank circulation is a part of the currency of the country, which is the most conspicuous and active form of circulating capital, so that it seems to possess in the highest degree both the qualities which fit any commodity for taxation, the greatest distributing power along with the greatest accessibility. But here we come upon those peculiar properties which distinguish money as the permanent common standard of values and the universal medium of exchanges from all other exchangeable property. For by virtue of these properties money does not carry along and accumulate successive charges upon it as other commodities do, but always remains as nearly as possible of the same value. A \$5 gold piece, or a \$100 bank-note if perfectly secured, continues to be worth five dollars or a hundred dollars and no more, whether subject to taxation or other charges or not. But a Swiss

watch having paid an import duty of 25 per cent. is immediately worth that much more in the American market, carries the duty, along with all the other preceding charges upon it, to the purchaser. The reason for this notable difference between the two commodities is very obvious. The watch is not a standard of values and a medium of exchanges and does not circulate as such. Its circulation is nothing but its passage through different hands from the maker to the user, and along the whole passage its identity is never lost and its destination to be taken out of the circulation for use as a time-keeper is never forgotten, until at last, laden with all the successive charges put upon it by the maker, the carrier, the importer, the retail dealer, it reaches the consumer who foots the whole bill. Its appearance in the world of commerce as an article of purchase and sale, that is as circulating capital, is merely transitory and incidental to its final disappearance from circulation as an article of fixed capital, that is as a commodity for use. But let us suppose that a bank of issue has paid out its notes for \$100,000 and has received that amount of money, say in gold coin of the United States, in return therefor. When it comes to dispose of this particular sum of coin to its customers it cannot charge them with the government tax for the reason that the coins so taxed are indistinguishable in character and value from all other coins of the same denomination and which are untaxed. They have no individuality, no identity of their own, no distinctive properties as coin, like those of the watch, fitting them for specific use as a commodity, and are not meant to be taken out of the circulation. On the contrary they are meant to be kept in it, and all the properties which political economists dwell upon as fitting the precious metals for money, their uniformity of substance, their durability, portability and the rest, are properties fitting them for circulation in indistinguishable units, each of which is the exact equivalent of all other units of the same denomination.* Were the bank

* Money, as the political economists observe with much iteration, is originally nothing more than a commodity like any other, having an intrinsic exchangeable value determined precisely as all values are, but selected from other commodities for continuous circulation because more than any of them it has physical properties which fit it for becoming and remaining a measure and expression of values. Of these

therefore to imitate the importer of the watch and charge its \$100,000 in gold coin with the duty paid upon it, giving it thereby an individuality distinguishing it from other coin of the same denominations, its customers would simply go to the loan office over the way, or to the savings bank, and borrow money just as good which had paid no tax or other charges not common to money in general.* It follows that while all taxes must now be collected in money no tax should be laid upon money, for money is a form of property which however accessible to taxation has absolutely no direct distributing power. In fact the tax upon bank circulation takes effect wholly where it falls, is divided up in the shape of diminished profits among the several proprietors of the bank.

The only question therefore is whether this deduction from the profits of circulation is equitable to the banker, that is, is according to the uniform rate of taxation for all. His circulation is in the shape of notes, or promises to pay, say \$100,000, on demand without interest. He is therefore in possession of a fund the use of which costs him nothing and which in the

properties the most important is the one of which the text-books seem to say least, its extreme simplicity and enduring uniformity of substance, which ensures the equivalence of all coined units of the same denomination; not that a five dollar gold piece will always and everywhere purchase the same amounts of other commodities, but that it will purchase exactly as much as any other five-dollar piece at the same time and place. This is what we mean by the uniformity and stability of the currency, this immunity of any part of it from charges not common to the whole, the certainty that it will "move all together if it move at all." Hence the mistake of laying a tax upon the money represented by bank circulation in the midst of untaxed money; and the absurdity of the bi-metalist who fancies that a "flat" of Congress or the consent of mankind will create identity and equivalence where nature has put inexpugnable separation and inequality.

* Precisely the same thing, of course, would happen to the imported watch if after paying duty it found other watches in circulation, each exactly like itself, which had paid no duty. On the other hand a quantity of money shipped to a remote point would carry and distribute all the charges for freight, insurance and so on, if on reaching its destination it did not find its equivalents circulating free from charges. What the State has done is to put a tax on money which by its own law, as of necessity, brings no more than it did before, or than other, untaxed money, does at the same time and place; that is, a tax on property which has no distributing power.

course of business he could loan out at a clear profit of the current rate of interest. But here the government steps in with two requisitions in security of the circulation. First, he must keep on hand as a reserve not less than 25 per cent. of the amount of it in coin of the United States, which is unproductive wealth; and, second, he must deposit with the Treasurer United States registered bonds in the proportion of 100 to 90 of the whole circulation. It follows that of the entire amount of \$100,000 borrowed without interest only \$75,000 is available for profitable investment, which sum invested in United States bonds yields at current quotations, say, 3 per cent. or \$2250 per annum. But the government tax of 1 per cent. upon \$100,000 in circulation is \$1000 or very nearly half the whole profit, and were the rate made uniform everywhere between 40 and 50 per cent. of the annual product of the wealth of the nation would be taken by the State. This most exorbitant taxation appears therefore to be a kind of penalty inflicted upon the banker for enjoying the use of money without paying for it, a confiscation of property to which he is not so clearly entitled as he would have been had he given an equivalent for it. But this assertion of defective or inferior right on the part of the banker amounts to the assertion of a right on the part of the government to share as joint-proprietor in his profits; a right incapable of definition, for if the State is entitled to 40 per cent. of the profits why not to the whole? In any case its right is no more than that of any moral agent to enter into possession of its own, if as proprietor in a bank then certainly not as sovereign exacting tribute, and if as sovereign then certainly not as proprietor. Any amount of the profits may belong to the proprietor but to the sovereign only so much as is required for the exercise of the sovereignty according to the uniform rate for all.

The remaining taxes of the internal revenue tariff, those upon tobacco and alcoholic fluids, although complicated by the list of special taxes are more intelligible, and of far greater practical importance as the larger part of the revenue is drawn from them. As a commodity subject to taxation tobacco is exactly the opposite of property like bank circulation. Owing to the wide extent of its growth and the diffuse form in which it

is put upon the market it is peculiarly inaccessible to measurement and valuation, but on the other hand by reason of its immense consumption and its minute subdivision upon sale it has a very high distributing power; there are few articles which carry the charges upon them to a greater number of consumers. On the whole it is clearly indicated for taxation and for a relatively high taxation. But a glance at the tariff reveals, what for the rest is notorious, the presence of another motive. The use of tobacco is popularly held to be a form of self-indulgence, a hurtful or at the best an unprofitable sensuality which the State may fittingly discourage by increasing the cost of the article to the consumer. This with an added accent due to the alleged noxiousness of the drug is the complex feeling which has prompted all sumptuary laws; the feeling that with the poverty and hardship in the world indulgence in the superfluous has something deserving of punishment in it, or any how, of restraint. As matters stand the State has no answer to this reasoning, for if it is right in increasing the cost of foreign products for the benefit of the manufacturer, it is right in increasing the cost of a useless or hurtful luxury for the benefit of everybody.

It is in the taxation of alcoholic beverages that this consideration reaches its greatest force, for here we have to do with an article which in its worst, that is its cheapest and commonest form, is one of the conspicuous curses of the country and the age. It is impossible to name an article accessible to the State which invites taxation by so many different and powerful considerations. Its effects are so deplorable and the craving for it so powerful that it has divided the people into two classes, the abstinent who denounce the use of it, and the consumers who will have it at any cost; on the one hand a moral sentiment, which has more than once kindled into irresistible emotion, demanding taxation, on the other an insatiable appetite ready to submit to it. We need not wonder that the State has availed itself of the double opportunity to satisfy the sentiment and to profit by the appetite, has found its most productive single source of revenue in taxes which obstruct the sale of the most obnoxious of commodities.

But here again, only this time more distinctly than before,

and with graver consequences in the moral order, there is the same confusion as to the functions and rights of the State. Its functions are to protect the people from the common enemy, and to do this in one specific way, namely, by passing whatever laws are needed to define a wrongful act and appoint the appropriate penalty. That the sale of alcoholic fluids is necessarily and always an act of the enemy no one pretends, but everyone admits that there are circumstances in which it becomes so. What are these circumstances? It is the function of the State to say what they are, that is, to pass laws defining the wrong and distinguishing it exactly from the cases in which the same act is no wrong or is right, and declaring what penalties shall be inflicted if it is committed, and what higher penalties if it is persisted in. Has the United States done this? No it has not. There are no State definitions of it, no prohibition of it, and no penalties for it. The whole subject has been left, where for the rest it rightfully belongs to the local governments. For the national government the manufacture and sale of alcoholic fluids are no crime or misdemeanor, and in the absence of all legislation to that effect cannot be made the subject of penalties.

Now for the discharge of its functions in punishing offenders clearly specified, and suppressing offenses clearly defined by the law, the State is entitled to a certain uniform proportion of the property of each of its subjects and to no more. Wrong-doing on the part of a subject is no motive for exceeding this uniform proportion; it is not a motive for taxation at all but a motive for punishment. True the punishment inflicted according to law may be a fine or a confiscation which goes into the treasury as part of revenue, and were perfect justice possible there would be no need for any other revenue. But its destination as revenue does not affect its character as penalty or assimilate it to tribute drawn from the innocent that penalties may be inflicted. Whatever penalties are necessary to suppress and punish the immoral use of Swiss watches, Virginia tobacco, or Chicago whiskey, let the State take according to due form of law, and if fines and confiscations are among them so much the better for the law-abiding whose burden of tribute is thereby diminished. But to *tax* the wicked seller or consumer

of the injurious article is to confound the guilty with the innocent and to involve the State in the vicious circle of raising revenue to punish and prevent wrong, which it condones and perpetuates in order to raise revenue.

We reach here a fundamental and comprehensive principle both of right and of expediency, concerning equally the authority of the State and the efficiency of its action, namely, that as it is armed with no power not expressly provided in the constitution, so it should use its constitutional power for no purpose not expressly defined in the law. It is armed by the constitution with all powers necessary to avert danger from the commonwealth, but its duty is to identify publicly the foe before it strikes him, that it may strike according to the law, in which it expresses or will in time be made to express the will of the people, and not according to its own caprice or impulse or passion. But this is precisely what the State has not done. It has neither sought to ascertain and express the will of the people in legislation, nor has it waited for legislation in order to act. Under cover of the right to lay taxes, which it possesses for the exclusive purpose of providing for its necessary expenses, it has inflicted penalties of the most formidable kind for offenses which it has nowhere defined, in obedience to motives which it has nowhere avowed. And this not in one case but in all cases; its entire fiscal system is an elaborate instrument for concentrating upon certain classes of its subjects burdens which belong in equal measure to all. I think it is clear that this is a perversion of its power which cannot endure; which will disappear either by the abrupt and violent reaction, or by the steadfast pressure and slow attrition, of popular instincts and convictions. All the unconscious forces at work in the body politic converge along with the abiding purposes of the people upon the ideal of a State deriving its resources equally from the wealth, as it derives its authority from the consent, of all its constituents, and exercising its power for their common welfare.

ARTICLE XI.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE BOOK OF THE BEGINNINGS.*—It is a broad church that can find standing-ground among its clergy for the author of this little book. Let this be said to the honor of that church. It justifies its claim to Christian Catholicity. The church that will not tolerate a free and candid investigation of the Biblical documents, within the limits of a cordial acceptance of the evangelical testimony, will find itself unable to meet the moral and religious wants of a critical age. The Christian public of this country, and especially the clerical portion of it, has not yet adjusted itself to the free spirit of modern Biblical criticism. Dr. Newton will doubtless hold his ecclesiastical position, thanks to the controlling influences of his church, but it will be, as it has already been, at considerable cost of personal comfort. He has been, and will be, subjected to severe and sometimes coarse censure. The scribe, who is supposed to be instructed in the “things new and old” of the kingdom, and yet can trace the Genesis of this intelligent and honest book to a freak of insanity in its author, succeeds, if in nothing else, in displaying, on his own part, a touch of the insanity of bigotry and ignorance. The clerical commotion stirred by the presentation of Dr. Newton’s critical views, whatever our opinion of their correctness, is certainly illustrative, not so much of clerical piety, as of clerical intolerance and incapacity for intelligent judgment upon the grave questions at issue. The Episcopal Church is not the only one that is sometimes served by the devil’s attorney, and Dr. Newton is not the only one who has been summoned before the august court of the religious editor or the secular reporter. The Congregational churches have made for themselves an honorable record of devotion to Christian freedom in the discussion of theological questions. But there is an effort to dishonor the record and to lift the standard of an ignorant and intolerant revolt. The appearance of the *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture* by Prof. Ladd, a work alike honorable to

* *The Book of the Beginnings.* A study of Genesis, with an introduction to the Pentateuch. By R. HEBER NEWTON, Rector of All Souls’ Protestant Episcopal Church, New York City. G. P. Putnam’s Sons. New York, 27 and 29 West 23d street. London: 18 Henrietta street, Covent Garden. 1884.

American scholarship and to Christian reverence and faith, a work notable for the judiciousness of its critical methods and results and for its conservative and constructive character, has proved to be the signal for a campaign of caricature and detraction, on the part of some of the so-called religious newspapers and periodicals connected with the Congregational churches. Prof. Ladd and Dr. Newton have both made the acquaintance of a class of men whose chief characteristic seems to be How not to understand it, and whose vocation, How not to state it fairly when they do understand it. But in their work they part company. Their work is not to be named here in close connection. Those who would see the difference between conservative and radical criticism and between thorough and hasty work may profitably compare "The Doctrine of Second Scripture" and "The Book of the Beginnings." It must be said, however, that the work before us does not claim to be a thorough discussion of its own limited topic. Its contents originally appeared in the form of popular lectures, delivered on Sabbath afternoon in the regular course of professional duties. We have here a discussion of the unity, composite character, and gradual growth of the Pentateuch. It takes positive ground with respect to its variety of sources, its mythical elements, its contradictory traditions, its non-Mosaic authorship, and it advocates the view that the patriarchal traditions are rather tribal than personal, although not without a personal nucleus. The work bears the marks of investigation but of hasty conclusion. Its material is ill-digested. We find no self-assertion nor arrogance here, but a very guileless Omniscience. The author undertakes, after the manner of the critical school which he follows, to know more than he or any other man, at the present stage of Biblical science, is able to know. One is obliged to wonder at this tranquil sense of infallibility and at the inadequate basis of this prodigious wisdom. There is no doubt a critical sense. It finds what the ordinary student does not and cannot. But it is likely to make itself ridiculous with its capricious assumptions and inadequate generalizations. Let it be true that the Pentateuch is a composite work, that it is a historic growth, that this at once involves and explains many repetitions, confusions, and contradictions, and that in its present form it is of non-Mosaic authorship. It is difficult to see how any well-informed and candid person can question this. Let it be true that criticism hits here and there upon original sources in this composite work. Let it be true that myth sometimes gives

itself out as history, and that fragments of tribal legend and tradition emerge sometimes in the form of personal histories. It does not follow, however, that we know all about the Genesis of the records, that we can explain just how they grew, or out of what material, under what hands, or from what age or ages they emerged. Myth, as Rothe maintains, may be a necessary stage in the development of religion, but genuine history also is necessary to genuine revelation, and he who finds more myth than history in the early Hebrew records does not adequately understand them nor the Hebrew religion. The simple realism of the Patriarchal traditions forbids their identification with tribal myths and traditions. We have no criticism with respect to the honesty, the freedom, and the respectfulness of Dr. Newton's work, we criticise rather its assumptions and generalizations; we may question also his wisdom in not proceeding with greater caution in the discussions of grave, critical, ethical, and religious questions in the presence of a promiscuous audience.

BRABMOISM.*—A Christian Hindoo has here given us his view of the theistic movement in India. That movement has been watched, by the Christian world, with considerable curiosity as well as interest and hope. The possibility of a development from Theism to Christianity and of the re-appearance, on oriental soil, of an oriental type of Christianity has been contemplated, by the western world, with lively satisfaction. But if we accept Mr. Bose's view of the development of Brahmoism as the true one we shall be drearily disenchanted. And there seems to be no good reason for doubting that his view is in the main, the correct one. He is a native Hindoo and a man of training and cultivation. He knows the old religions of India. He is able to estimate them from the Christian point of view. He has knowledge of Brahmoism at first hand. He evidently has the requisite furnishing to grapple with its problems and pretensions. He writes as a Christian, indeed, but with no evidence of defective sympathy with what is good and true in it. He gratefully acknowledges its ethical purity and its influence in counter-

* *Brahmoism or History of Reformed Hinduism.* From its origin in 1830, under Rajah Mohun Roy, to the Present time, with a particular account of Babu Kesub Chunder Sen's connection with the movement. By RAM CHANDRA BOSE, M.A. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 10 and 12 Dey street. London: 44 Fleet street. 1884.

working polytheism, idolatry, and atheism, in making the name of Christ honorable, in inculcating personal righteousness and moral earnestness, and in furthering many important social reforms. But he shows also that it carries the taint of its origin, its semi-pantheistic spirit, its defective sense of sin, its failure to apprehend the necessity of sacrificial mediation between God and man, its want of intellectual consistency, its tendency to ritual and rhapsody, its lack of clearly defined principles, and its constant tendency to drift into contradiction and schism. Its latest development, in the Sadharan Bromo Somaj, seems to be its purest form ethically considered, and yet it is its most barren form in respect of theological principles, and in emotional fervor, and is as far removed as its earlier forms from all that is most distinctive of Christianity. It is certainly a somewhat amazing effort for any man or set of men to undertake to introduce a New Dispensation of universal religious unity by an artificial combination of all that is supposed to be true in the great religions of the world and to effect this by instrumentalities so inadequate. The history of Brahmoism illustrates this danger to which a subjective religion is exposed, and it emphasizes by contrast the need of an objective historic revelation and one in which redemption is its central fact. But after all that may be said against Brahmoism the Christian world will not cease to look with interest to its future and to hope that it may yet become an agency of spiritual blessing to the people of India.

MEYER'S COMMENTARY ON JOHN'S GOSPEL.* — Dr. Kendrick introduces this volume with remarks on the distinctive merit and charm of John's Gospel. He speaks of the persistency of the attack made on its genuineness. This attack, though plausible, is untenable. Not only is it overthrown in the field of argument; it flies in the face of "the instinct of the Church." The excellences of Meyer as a critic are duly stated, but the American editor might have refrained from reflections on what he calls Meyer's "loose notions of inspiration so prevalent in Germany." "Loose" is a term of disparagement, rather than of description. Dr. Kendrick can differ from Meyer on these points, but he should

* *Critical and Exegetical Hand-Book to the Gospel of John.* By H. A. W. MEYER, Ph.D., etc. Edited—from the English translation of Rev. W. Urwick, revised by Frederic Crombie, D.D.—by A. C. Kendrick, D.D., Greek Professor in the University of Rochester. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 10 and 12 Dey street, New York.

abstain from language which assumes, on his part, superiority of judgment. This whole paragraph of the American editor's preface might better have been omitted. It is easy to see that Dr. Kendrick is afflicted with the harmonistic mania, or, rather, is not yet fully cured of it. In other respects his editorial labor appears to have been well done. Even when exerting himself to correct Meyer's supposed mistakes—as in the discussion of the question as to the day of crucifixion—his remarks are worthy of attention.

DE PRESSENSÉ'S STUDY OF ORIGINS.*—M. De Pressensé is well known as the author of important works on the history of the Church, including a Life of Jesus, which have found many appreciative readers in England and in America. He has, also, been active and useful, both as a preacher and in political life. In the volume before us he takes up "the burning questions" pertaining to the foundations of religion and ethics, and, in an elaborate discussion, subjects them to a careful scrutiny. The theories of Atheists, Materialists, and Agnostics are reviewed and criticised with fairness and with acumen. The English and German authors, as Spencer and Stuart Mill, and the German naturalists and philosophers are not in the least neglected, but are fully examined. But one of the attractions of the work to us is in the incidental treatment of French writers and schools of opinion, which are less familiar to most readers. It is a book which deserves to be read by those who are interested in this class of inquiries. The lucid style, the vivacity and the keen logic, as well as excellent moral spirit that belong to it are worthy of high praise.

TRAVELS IN FAITH.†—It is not unfair to the author of this book to state at once and frankly that we have found it painful and unprofitable reading. It tells the story of how the son of an eminent and pious pastor, after many years of groping experience, passed over, not from a hard and high Calvinism to the Christianity of the New Testament, but from Christianity itself to Herbert Spencer's views about God and immortality, and to Voltaire's views of the Bible and of the morality of the Christian

* *A Study of Origins; or, The Problems of Knowledge, of Being, and of Duty.* By E. DE PRESSENSÉ, D.D., author of "Jesus Christ, His Times, Life and Work," etc. New York: James Pott & Co., 1884.

† *Travels in Faith, from Tradition to Reason.* By ROBERT C. ADAMS. G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York, 1884.

Church. What adequate motive or justifying reason for existence can such a book have? Its author assures us that he wrote from the desire to be useful in freeing others from the same bonds of orthodoxy which formerly held him. We sympathize with all his honest doubt, and with the dissatisfaction he expresses concerning much opinion and practice which passes current as Christian; but the book itself is a convincing proof that neither the "Travels" of its author, nor his mode of narrating them, are likely to be useful for either imitation or warning. The only class which the book seems adapted to profit by warning consists of the so-called "Orthodox" of Boston—on the assumption, however, that the author has correctly represented their opinions and manner of Church life (see especially pp. 93 ff., 86 ff., 168 ff., and 178 ff.).

THE OUTSKIRTS OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE.*—This interesting and helpful little book is designed and adapted for readers of ordinary information upon the subjects which it discusses, rather than for special students of those subjects. Its contents consist of four Essays which "present briefly the more important relations of the sciences of nature to faith, education, the Bible, and religious science respectively." Of the four essays, that on the "Interpretation of the first Chapter of the Book of Genesis" is, on the whole, decidedly the best. The author, indeed, lays too much stress upon the influence of an occult symbolism of numbers in determining the arrangement of the Mosaic cosmogony. For that arrangement was, it is likely, determined chiefly by the effort to bring the eight traditional works of creation into correspondence with the Sabbatic week and with the order of the world's progress as seen from the "point of view held by the ordinary observer" (comp. p. 98). But the author's remarks are in most respects excellent; and the clearness with which he maintains the religious validity and inspiration of this chapter, while admitting that its views of the order of creation cannot be reconciled in several important respects with modern science, is worthy of praise and imitation. We commend this chapter, and especially the remarks on pages 100–118, to those who have been only more perplexed by recent attempts at "reconciling" Genesis and geology.

* *The Outskirts of Physical Science, Essays Philosophical and Religious.* By T. NELSON DALE. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1884.

EXTEMPORE PREACHING.*—There has been of late years an unmistakable growth in the disposition to hear extempore preaching, and a not less marked growth in unwillingness to hear preaching that is poor. Whether this latter be due to the spread of science or to the general advance of education, our congregations certainly grow impatient of crude thought and of those forms of words that contain no thought at all. How to meet both these demands, to say something worth hearing and to say it without a manuscript, is the preacher's question. Mr. Smith's little book on *Extempore Preaching* admirably meets the popular feeling in both these respects: it is full of encouragement to the preacher to learn to preach without notes; it makes him feel how much toil is involved in making his preaching good, and it shows him how to go to work. The prize is made to seem worth trying for with great pains, and the ideal of excellence in preaching is set very high. The subject is developed in an orderly way, under the titles—relative advantages, preparation special, preparation general, arrangement, illustrations, style, memory, first attempts, delivery, physical conditions, spiritual conditions, and repeating,—the chapter on spiritual conditions being the climax, and the last chapter meeting a few final objections.

A marked characteristic of the book is that it covers a broader field than its title. This is quite inevitable and is justified by the example of Bautain and others. The book takes extempore preaching as its central theme and gathers about it many things that seemed to the author important to be said in connection with all pulpit-discourse. These things seem also to be largely lessons drawn from the author's experience and observation, so that the tone of practical helpfulness is felt on every page. Illustrations are drawn from a wide range, as from Demosthenes and Bourdaloue, as well as from the great preachers of the present day. The author makes wise use of his reading among the ancient classics; too many preachers and book-makers not only have forgotten the classics, but give no sign that they have read anything even of the literature of modern times.

As an illustration of the practical character of the work, we may give an outline of the fourth chapter, that on arrangement: Extempore preaching peculiarly needs to be methodical; the theme should be announced early, as the exordium is furnished in effect by the introductory services; often it is well to announce divisions,

* *Extempore Preaching*. By WILDER SMITH. Hartford, Conn., Brown & Gross. 1884. pp. 170.

but a multitude of divisions and subdivisions should be avoided; there need be no fear of repeating the main points; nor of giving too much thought; one illustration is generally enough, but more should be held in reserve; a climax is good but its place should not always be the same; strict arrangement helps the memory of both speaker and hearer, and helps to preserve the proper proportion of parts; little time should be given to refutation; there may well be a summing up near the close. These lessons belong to preaching and especially to preaching extempore.

It should also be said of the book that it is acute in its passing observations, as, "It seems to us a fault of much modern preaching that it confines its attention to very minute fractions of the all truth," (p. 38); the book is also high-minded and wise.

In regard to the English of the book, which is in the main simple and classic yet strong, we feel inclined to speak of two points. One is in regard to "had better;" to this old English phrase the author seems to have a dislike, once using "might better," and six times that odious modern invention, "would better," as, "This would better be done." The history and entire legitimacy of "had better" are well known to many, and it is hard to see how one betters himself by trying to devise something that, without a history to explain it, will be explainable by the modern meanings of words. Says Addison, "These are very sensible they *had better* have pushed their conquests;" we of to-day *had better* stick to the vigorous idioms of the past, without too great particularity as to the present meaning of their several parts.

The other point is as to the insertion of an adverb into the middle of an infinitive, as in "to habitually employ," (p. 81), and "to frequently review," (p. 96). In our reading of English authors we have been unable to find an example of this structure earlier than in Burns' *Cottar's Saturday Night*, and since then a few times in Cowper, if we recollect rightly, but rarely in all authors until Herbert Spencer used it with such constancy and emphasis as to give it its present vogue. So the *Nation* in one issue speaks of it as still a solecism and in another not long after goes to the extreme by saying, "to, as the newspapers would say, investigate his record." For ourselves we confess to a liking for the old ways in this respect also, and cannot help feeling that the new structure is a blemish upon an author's style. It is an interesting question whether the conservatives are to be overborne about this. It belongs to a large and interesting subject, of which few people seem to be aware,—the fact that our language changes

not only in its vocabulary and the meaning of its words, but somewhat in its syntax as well.

But this is a digression from the main point, which is that Mr. Smith has given us in compact form an instructive, stimulating, and helpful book.

THOROLD ROGERS'S SIX CENTURIES OF WORK AND WAGES.*—This is a very valuable work. Prof. Rogers has here produced a complete history of labor and wages in England from the reign of Henry III. to the present time. It is a history of England from the farmer's point of view. It has nothing to say of complications of the government with foreign powers, of the strife between powerful factions, or powerful nobles, but is nevertheless a history of England as interesting and instructive as any other. Much of the material is new, gathered by Prof. Rogers himself from the accounts of farm stewards and bailiffs, and rent rolls, to which he has had access.

Prof. Rogers is a Professor of Political Economy, member of parliament, a free trader, a radical, a professed friend of the agricultural laborer, and of the working classes. We are not surprised to find justifying causes for Wat Tyler's insurrection, and the depression of the laboring classes traced to the poor laws and the corn laws, and that method of taxation which throws the burden of taxes on those least able to bear them.

We expect to be told that an aristocratic government is not the best government, and that Aristotle was right when he said "the crowd makes better general judgment than any individual whatever." Trades Unions find in this book a warm and strong defence as well as such other methods as workingmen use for mutual helpfulness and benefit.

We have seen few books of late which have so interested as us this latest work of Thorold Rogers.

GREATER LONDON† is the title of a very charming illustrated book published by Cassell & Co. of New York. The design is to give sketches of the most interesting buildings and places of historical interest in the towns contiguous to London, together with a narrative of their history and an account of the distinguished people who have resided in them. Among these towns,

* *Six Centuries of Work and Wages. The history of English Labor.* By JANAS E. THOROLD ROGERS. New York. G. P. Putnam's Sons, West 23d St. 1884.

† *Greater London; a narrative of its history, its people, and its places.* By Edward Walford, M.A. Illustrated with numerous engravings. Vol. I. pp. 576. Cassell & Co., Limited, New York.

whose names are almost as familiar on this side of the ocean as in England itself, are Twickenham, Strawberry Hill, Hampton Court, Harrow, Epping Forest, Waltham, Chiswick, Turnham Green, Barnet, Ealing, Hounslow, and many others. The book contains some hundreds of illustrations, giving pictures of the noted houses, churches, and monuments of every description, with which these towns abound. The book furnishes a collection of pictures of just those things which make traveling in England so full of interest to the American tourist.

The August number of *THE ART AMATEUR* contains the usual profusion of designs, including decorations for cup and saucer and tiles; carved, embroidered and illuminated borders; a figure decoration for painted tapestry; a beautiful jade screen; fine examples of old lace, and numerous suggestions for workers in metal. The chief art exhibitions of London and Paris receive extended description. A fine portrait of F. M. Boggs is accompanied by a biographical notice, and some interesting pen sketches. There is also a portrait and biographical notice of Mrs. Emily J. Lakey, an American lady, who is winning reputation in London as a cattle painter. The article in the "Modern Home" series treats of the drawing room; it is richly illustrated and will prove invaluable to every one who has such an apartment to decorate and furnish. Price 35 cts.; \$4.00 a year. Montague Marks, publisher, 23 Union Square, New York.

Cassell & Company's *MAGAZINE OF ART* for August opens with a full page engraving of the painting of Walter Langley, "Among the Missing."—The leading article contains a sketch of the life and work of F. J. Gregory, A. R. A., by Frederick Wedmore, with several engravings from his paintings.—Other articles are "The Marvel of the World," by David Hannay, with seven engravings.—"A Child's Fancies," by Robert Louis Stevenson.—"Going around with the Plate," from the picture by G. Knorr.—"The Austrian Museum," by W. Martin Conway, with six engravings.—"Rondeaux of the Galleries," by Andrew Lang.—"Walks in Surrey," by H. E. Ward, with five engravings.—"With the Mahdi," drawn by E. Benninger.—"Old English Pottery," by Cosmo Monkhouse.—"Stage Royalties," with eight portraits from etchings by Lalauze.—"French Art at the Salon," by C. W. Brownell.—"Current Art," four engravings.—"The Chronicle of Art."—"American art notes."—Yearly subscription, \$3.50. Single No. 35 cents. Cassell & Co., Limited, New York.

Prospectus for 1884.

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THE

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NOVEMBER, 1884.

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
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ARTICLE I.—AN ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN ITS RELATION TO ESCHATOLOGY.

THE one department of Theology on which as yet no certain light has fallen is the field of Eschatology. The Biblical declarations are given for the most part in figures; and whether the consuming fire be literal brimstone; or the remorse of conscience; or the gradual loss of character; or the unconscious degradation of being is still matter of discussion. So long as we confine ourselves to figures we get indeed substantial truth, sufficient for purposes of practical preaching. That sin brings in its train torment and anguish, loss and destruction keen and terrible enough to justify the most terrific of material imagery no one will deny who has comprehended the real enormity of sin. Philosophical Theology is however a very different thing from practical preaching. Preaching aims at practical impressions. Theology at accurate and comprehensive ideas. One deals with sunrise and sunset; the other with the revolution of the spheres. The

preacher may regard the Trinity as a mathematical enigma; and the atonement as a commercial bargain; and justification as a legal fiction; and yet in spite of this his figurative mode of thought, nay, even on account of it, be able to accomplish good results. But in the mind of the theologian such pictures have no place. To him these words must stand for spiritual processes and relations; or else they have no right to be.

To attempt to place the doctrine of Eschatology on a philosophical basis will no doubt seem at first sight presumptuous. The theme is commonly regarded as altogether beyond the range of finite speculation. The present essay makes no pretensions to solve the problem; nor does it claim any authority for its conclusions. The most that can be hoped for is to indicate the thread by which the future explorer of this mysterious labyrinth must be guided.

The fault with nearly all speculation on this subject hitherto has been that figurative and accidental aspects of the subject have absorbed attention; while the fundamental fact of spirit has been ignored. Time and happiness: duration and misery: these have been the forms under which the subject has been discussed. These are accidental, not essential aspects of spirit. Consciousness is the essence of the soul. Time is the record or self registration of the various states of consciousness, as the barometer is the register of atmospheric conditions. Pleasure and pain likewise are effects resultant from the states of mind in which the soul exists, pleasure indicating that the soul is in a state of healthy activity and full realization; pain denoting that the full free outgo of spiritual life is fettered and restrained.

The fundamental fact of spirit is consciousness. *Cogito ergo sum.* In other words, the basis of existence is thought. Just so far as modern philosophy has sprung from this root has it been fruitful. So soon as it has become severed from it, has it withered and died; and the flames of criticism are fast consuming its lifeless branches. For brevity and conciseness, throughout this essay the word consciousness will be used to signify all forms of conscious being, including the volitional and the emotional, as well as the

purely intellectual activities of the soul. As Hegel remarks, "there are not at bottom two separate faculties, thought and will. Will is only a specific mode of thought, viz: thought going out into external existence, as an impulse toward self-realization."

Inasmuch then as consciousness is what I am; or in other words I am the consciousness I have;—the thought I think with its attendant volition and emotion, it follows that the problem of eschatology is simply to ascertain what are the ultimate and enduring states of consciousness.

If an analysis of the possible states of consciousness can be made; and if those states which have in themselves the elements of permanence can be determined; then those permanent states of consciousness will be the ones in which the soul will exist eternally.

What then, stated in the most general and inclusive terms, are the modes of consciousness in which a soul can exist? Reduced to the ultimate terms these states or modes of consciousness are three: World-consciousness; Self-consciousness; and God-consciousness. The order in which these are placed is not accidental but represents the order in which these states succeed each other in the normal development of the individual. And the best definition of these terms is to be found by tracing their genetic connection.

First, World-consciousness is that state in which the soul is occupied with the phenomena of the outer world of men and things. The Intellect is busied with unifying these various objects; reducing them to classes, and tracing between them the connection of cause and effect. The emotions are the direct product of the given environment. The Will is occupied exclusively with compelling material forces, under which head even other men and women are as yet included, to minister to the individual's own physical necessities. The typical savage, hunting and fishing for a bare subsistence; the infant, laughing when tickled, crying when hurt, and wondering on all occasions, are the perfect representatives of this stage of consciousness; though older children of more civilized pretensions retain marked traces of their primitive condition. In Scripture language this is a state without

law, or philosophically stated the man lives in a world of which he knows no higher meaning than its mere phenomenal existence. Being conscious of the world and nothing more; entertaining no thoughts; experiencing no feelings; and putting forth no volitions save such as the world without and his physical senses give rise to, the man is in all respects under bondage to his senses, and the world's obedient slave.

This is the first of our three stages of consciousness. The question of eschatology on this point is, Can this state be eternal? Has it in itself enduring life? The only answer that can be given is that it has not. This world passeth away and the fashion thereof. And the being whose consciousness is simply of the world and its fashion must perish with it. Indeed, such a being has not yet become an independent spirit, a self-existent soul. Such a being originates nothing, loves nothing, wills nothing save the fleeting variations of a fleeting world. All the faculties and joys of true spiritual life are lost to him, and he is lost to them. As St. Paul declares, "*τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς θάνατος.*" The minding of the flesh is death. The being is lost because it has not yet found itself; is dead because it has not yet come to life. This is the genuine metaphysical truth and scripture declaration which lies at the basis of the much abused doctrine that infants are lost. They are not yet endowed with the power and joy of spiritual life. This is a self-evident truth, and those who see it are not to be classed with the blind believers in an arbitrary condemnation to be adjudged them in the future. Their only hope, and this view by no means shuts them out from hope, is that either here or elsewhere they may develop into spiritual life. As yet they are spiritually nothing; or, if you wish to conceal the fact under a phrase which gives them the appearance of being something, you may say with Dorner that they are "potential punctual existences of future personality."

World consciousness, therefore, must perish with the world which is its object. It is spiritual death. This state therefore cannot be a form in which the soul is to exist eternally. One of the three modes of consciousness is therefore excluded from the sphere of eschatology.

The second stage of conscious life, whether in the individual or in the race, is self-consciousness. The understanding which unifies the various phenomena comes to know itself as distinct from those phenomena. The power of will is known as distinct from each separate volition. The capacity for pleasurable feeling is known apart from any particular joy. Instead of being absorbed in the fleeting sensation, emotion or volition of the moment, I am conscious of a universal self greater than any of its particular states. I am no longer limited to the state I happen to be in, but know myself as the capacity for an infinite variety of states. Herein I get my first glimpse of freedom. Knowing myself as the capacity for many states I can choose the one I will be in. I am no longer the passive instrument for outward force to play upon. Yet this fancied freedom is as yet but a fiction. I have as yet no reason why I should choose one state rather than another, save the old impulse of animal instinct and appetite. The liberty of indifference, though logically conceivable, is never actually realized. I must choose. There must be some reason for my choice. And as a matter of fact, in want of better reasons I do choose to gratify the natural appetites. I rise to eat of the tree of knowledge, only to fall back into conscious bondage to the same force of sense and circumstance which before I obeyed in ignorance and blindness.

In this conscious pursuit of sensuous pleasure I soon meet a new force. Of the acts which I commit some are beneficial to myself and others; other acts are detrimental both to others and myself. When detrimental to myself I feel the consequence immediately on myself. When detrimental to others I am made to feel the evil of it through the medium of punishment. Out of this distinction between the beneficial and the injurious as related both to others and to myself, is born law. Law is the assertion that choice is not indifferent, but that all possible objects of choice divide themselves into two classes. It commands that of these two classes that shall in all cases be chosen which conduces to the welfare of sentient being. This law I do not create, nor does society create it. The Giver of the law is the Creator of that order of being to whose welfare the law has reference. The law implies a Law-giver by the same force of reasoning that creation implies a Creator.

The law, in point of fact, reveals itself immediately as soon as the individual or the race becomes conscious of itself. The liberty of indifference, the being alive without the law, is a logical stage rather than a historic reality. You can distinguish it mentally from choice for or against law, just as you can distinguish the ignition from the explosion of gunpowder, but no one would risk his life on the interval of time between the two. Self-consciousness is therefore the legal stage, as world-consciousness was the natural.

Nor have we yet reached reality when we say that the stage of self-consciousness is one of choosing between the law and self. The state of choosing between these two things is no actual state in which a soul exists. The bundles of hay are not equal, and man is not an ass to stand still between them if they were. As soon as a man reaches the power of arbitrary choice or formal freedom he leaves it; just as the circumference of a circle leaves its direction the moment it assumes it; just as a falling body ceases to have any given velocity the moment it has attained it. This is the metaphysical truth on which as on a rock of adamant, rests the much-abused "old-school" doctrine of man's natural inability to fulfill the law of God. You must stand somewhere while you are choosing where to stand. And the place whereon you stand gives the color of its own atmosphere to your prospect, and makes its own proximity the irresistible claim to determine your choice. In unfigurative language you, a sensuous, selfish being, are to choose between the unselfish law and your selfish interests. But if you choose the law you would do it from your own selfish standpoint; therefore would be choosing self under that name. Such is our fate inherited from the sensuous origin of our humanity. Logically I have the ability to choose either way. But I am primarily conscious of my own selfish appetites and interests. To these the soul is immediately linked when it first comes to consciousness; while the wider and universal interests on which the law is based are known only as they appeal through their advocates, prudence and fear of punishment, at the bar of enlightened self-interests. The particular interests of my selfish nature have the inside track. They are my own; while the general good presents itself as an outside and foreign claim.

Thus though possible from the point of view of abstract logic, obedience to the law of God by the unaided human will is metaphysically impossible; and, as all will agree, as a matter of fact and experience it is an unreality. Disobedience to the law of God or sin is therefore the only actual form in which a soul in the stage of self-consciousness can exist. The liberty of choice is excluded from the possibility of permanence. It is not only not permanent; it is not even real in the true sense of the word. It is a logical abstraction. And therefore our question as to the stage of self-consciousness reduces itself to the question whether a soul can exist eternally in sin. To answer that question, we must clearly conceive just what sin is.

"Sin is the transgression of the law." Philosophically viewed, the characteristic of sin is its dual character. The Deuce is in it. In sin the consciousness has a double object, the Divine Law and self. The harmonious unity of the primitive world-consciousness is lost; the peaceful unity of Spirit in consciousness of God is not attained. God and self are present to the conscious soul as two unreconciled opposites. The house is divided against itself. Yet nowhere, least of all in consciousness, can two unreconciled elements stand side by side and maintain the same proportions. One must gain at the expense of the other. Self will crowd out God, or God will crowd out self. Sin cannot remain stationary. It hastens on to judgment. Before the sinner only two paths are open. Either sin must lead to a consciousness in which self is supreme, and from which God is excluded; or else to a God-consciousness from which sin is excluded. Our only remaining task is therefore to examine the two possible resulting states which this alternative presents.

First take the case in which self gains the ascendancy; and the intensifying consciousness of self-interest crowds out the sense of law and obligation. In this case man's consciousness is narrowed down again to its starting point; and man becomes a conscious servant of sense and appetite. With this difference however. Before it was God's creation; and God had a way for him to rise out of it. Now it is the man's own doing; and he cuts off the way to rise above it. God revealed

to him the holy law, in identifying himself with which he might escape the limitations of his individual self-life. In refusing obedience to that law, and excluding from consciousness and sympathy the beings whose welfare is the object of law, the sinner has come back down the only way God opened for him to go up in, closing the gates behind him. Henceforth his consciousness partakes more and more of the finite and perishable elements of sense and appetite, and empty pride and hollow vanity; and becomes more and more the inheritor of the perishable nature of the objects it embraces. Sin is ever holding an increasing intercourse with the finite and perishable and when it finally conceives, its offspring is death. The wages of sin is death. In completed, ultimate or, as the Scripture calls it, consummate or eternal sin, there is complete privation of that conscious union with God and his spiritual creation, which constitutes spiritual life, in the only sense in which that term can have a precise and intelligible meaning. This however is a second death. Because in the case of mere world-consciousness; the faculties of sympathy and reverence and love through which the soul becomes linked in conscious union with God and fellow-men had not emerged; and in its latent form remained unimpaired. But in ultimate sin, these faculties die with the soul forever. When self has gained complete ascendancy, the man as a spiritual force and life, in conscious active relation to other spiritual beings, and a member of a living spiritual kingdom ceases to be. Sin is the very opposite of spiritual life. Sin is death as opposed to spiritual life. Whoever is in trespasses and sins, with full and final commitment to them, is dead in them. If by spiritual life you mean conscious participation in the spiritual being of God, angels and men, sin is in its very essence the negation of that; and eternal or ultimate sin is the complete exclusion of that spiritual being from the sinner's consciousness. Completed sin therefore is a permanent state; though it is a negative one. It is eternal death. In completed sin spiritual life ceases, and the faculty of such life is killed.

The question will arise in many minds, Is this eternal death;—this eternal loss of participation in the spiritual life of God and his creation, properly called eternal punishment? From

one point of view, yes. From another, no. From the point of view of the onlooker; even from the point of view of the individual himself before the punishment is inflicted and death ensues, it is the most severe and terrible of punishments. And the more exalted any man's spiritual life, the more terrible to him will seem this punishment which consists in the privation of the blessings and joys of spiritual life. From the point of view of the individual after the punishment is inflicted it would not be punishment. Indeed the soul dead in sin has no point of view whatever. His sin has blinded him to the objects of spiritual vision, and sealed forever his sightless eyes. The companions of Ulysses, changed by Circe into swine, suffered the most terrible and degrading of evils that conceivably could come to man. Yet they could have no consciousness of their loss. To have been conscious of lost manhood, would require them still to have been men. By others only could the dreadfulness of their condition be realized. In German phrase they suffered "an sich," but not "für sich." So it is with the completed sinner in eternal spiritual death. He realizes not the horrors of his condition. If he did it would not be so horrible. For he could only realize his own absence of life in case he had a consciousness of Divine life with which to compare it. But suppose him to be conscious of God;—a God who if God at all, must be a God of love even toward him; then there would still be the possibility that he might embrace that love revealed to him in his consciousness of God and so escape from death. To make the case at all supposable you must make God over into a Devil; in other words you must suppose the man to be conscious of a God who wills him evil. But such a God would be no longer God. And such a consciousness would be no real consciousness of God at all. The man would still, even on this supposition, be dead to all true spiritual life. For spiritual life that is not love, is unthinkable. He that loveth not abideth in death. And even God himself, if he ceased to love any creature with whom he was in conscious relation, would cease to be. The God which this hypothesis assumes is a dead God. It is not the living Lord of life. Conscious remorse could constitute no permanent state; for it would have God really present to

itself; and hence would carry in itself the hope of redemption. And conscious despair which should be shut out from God completely, would have present to itself no object by which to measure its fallen condition. It is therefore unthinkable. That a soul should consciously exist in eternal hopeless misery, is as inconceivable, as that one of Circe's swine should itself lament its loss of manhood. If a man should know that he was completely and utterly lost, he would not be lost; for he would be conscious of higher things and that consciousness would have in itself the possibility of growth. The outcome of ultimate sin is eternal death. But eternal conscious despair is a phrase only, to which no conceivable state of consciousness can be found to correspond.

It only remains to examine the other alternative—the case in which the divine side of the dual consciousness gains the victory. The reason why self-consciousness inevitably results in sin, is as we saw, the fact that sense and self-interest is immediately present to consciousness; while the divine law or the will of God is present only mediately and inferentially, as something foreign. As it was then expressed, sense and self get the inside track. In Christ, the divine Son of God, the case was the reverse. In him dwelt an immediate consciousness of God. The glory of the kingdom of God was the immediate object of his holy will. This immediate God-consciousness constituted Christ sinless and deathless. In him was life eternal. As the object of his consciousness was infinite and eternal, so his consciousness partakes of the nature of its object and is itself infinite and eternal. As Jesus expressed it, "The living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father." Thus, by virtue of his sonship, or immediate God-consciousness, Christ is one with God, and has eternal life in himself even as the Father hath life in himself. Through the Holy Spirit, the outgoing spirit of the conscious union of Son and Father, this immediate God-consciousness that is in Christ is imparted to all who in penitence, humility and self-abnegation open their hearts to its reception. To such as receive him, to them gives he power to become sons of God. Becoming thus sharers with Christ of a consciousness whose object is infinite and eternal, they likewise share its nature,

and become with Christ joint-heirs of everlasting life. "This is eternal life, to know God and Jesus Christ whom he has sent." The man in whom Christ dwells by his imparted spirit has an immediate consciousness of God and of God's love to all his creatures. In this state he cannot sin, because sin is the consciousness of self as opposed to God. But this Christian consciousness is a state in which God's own eternal nature, and his love to all his creation is an object of immediate consciousness and the direct aim of every outgoing act. The full realization of this consciousness is gradual. The raw material of sense and self is not at once wrought over into an expression of this higher consciousness. But the goal is really seen in the dim distance; and the attainment of it is already assured to the soul who keeps the eye fixed upon it, and follows the straight and narrow way that leads thereto.

A Christ-given, spiritually mediated God-consciousness is therefore the only positive form in which a conscious soul can exist in an unchanging eternity. Eternal life, or immediate conscious union with God, and eternal death, or the deprivation of that consciousness, and with that of all true spiritual consciousness, are the only alternatives which an analysis of the possibilities of consciousness presents, as ultimate and eternal conditions of a soul, the essence of which is consciousness.

Whatever may be thought of this conclusion, the method by which it has been reached is the only one that can lay claim to a strictly metaphysical basis. Formal logic starting with premises picked up in imperfect and superficial courts of what men call justice, and dwelling exclusively on certain temporary aspects of a guilty conscience which knows not as yet the full grace of God, may work out forms of figurative statement which, if the realities corresponding to them could be conceived, would give a different conclusion. But wherever metaphysics has been brought to bear upon the problem, whether among the early Greek Fathers, or the German Mystics of the Middle Ages, or English Broad Churchmen of the present day, the tendency has been to attach precise rather than figurative meaning to the scriptural terms spiritual life, and spiritual death; and to regard these as constituting the ultimate alternatives of human destiny.

The chief objections likely to be urged against such a view are that it is unscriptural and unpractical. "The Bible," it will be said, "does not teach it"; "it would be unsafe to preach it."

First, as to its being unscriptural. To completely discuss that point would involve volumes of exegesis. Two general facts, however, deserve consideration before the view here presented is condemned on scriptural grounds. From the declaration in the second chapter of Genesis, "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," to the closing chapters of the Apocalypse where the fate of the wicked is described as the "Second Death," and the destiny of the righteous is recorded in the book of life, the phrases signifying spiritual life and death constitute the vast majority of all the terms employed to describe the ultimate state of the righteous and of the wicked. And again, the comparatively few passages in which the idea of eternal conscious suffering is supposed to be taught, are found chiefly in those popular and parabolic and figurative portions of the teaching of our Lord with reference to which he expressly said that the inner and precise significance was for those who had ears to hear; while the majority of men would of necessity see the symbol without perceiving the fact, and hear the description without thinking out understandingly the precise conception to which it corresponds. On the other hand the words life and death are almost uniformly used in the fourth gospel and the Epistles of Paul and John—the writings in which especially speculative truth is intended to be conveyed. Not until these two facts have been well considered may any one venture to pronounce unscriptural a view of man's final destiny which gives to these terms life and death more than the conventional emphasis and meaning. Then, too, the Scriptures have left a great many questions unanswered that we may find the answer for ourselves. Perhaps the question whether a finite soul could be eternally conscious of hopeless opposition between itself and God may be one of them.

Finally, the objection that this view fails to make vital connection with the actual instinct and experience of mankind at large, even if valid, would be nothing more than might be

said of any of the prevailing views of eschatology. No doctrines of man's future destiny have at present any considerable influence over the practical conduct and character of men. And what little motive power is drawn from that source is quite as likely to be low and debasing as worthy and ennobling. This view, however, when clearly and profoundly grasped is intensely practical. No more searching and awakening question was ever put to the soul of man than the question of Jesus, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own life; or what shall a man give in exchange for his life?" That question, filled out to the full with precise and definite significance, would be the key-note of the practical preaching of this view. The instinct to which it appeals is the most practical and fundamental in human nature. Men are not afraid of pain and suffering. They undergo that every day in the pursuit of their worldly ends. And threats of eternal pains, while they may rouse the thoughtless and disturb the self-complacent hypocrite, are not calculated to scare any save the weak and the effeminate. Like Schiller's Robber, the strong man would find a sort of stoic satisfaction in having an eternity in which to contemplate the scene of boundless woe.

Dwarfing of being, loss of true spiritual life is on the contrary the thing above all others from which men shrink with instinctive horror. The most repulsive aspect of sin is its meanness. The most detestable quality of soul is smallness. And it is just that aspect of sin and the sinner, its narrowing and belittling character, on which this view of eschatology seizes. The final outcome of this dwarfing of the soul, resulting in the ultimate extinction of all high and lofty aims, all sublime aspirations, all broad and generous sympathies, and all pure and holy loves—this is the fearful outer darkness of endless perdition which it holds before the persistent sinner as his dreadful destiny. It asks men to strip themselves, like Job, of fortune, family and friends, and then see whether they have anything left to live for. If they have not; if in such a case they would curse God and die; or in modern language, if they would then drag out a mere soulless, mechanical existence, destitute of any true enthusiasm or noble aim, or generous

emotion, it tells them that they have no real life within them, and points them to the self-sacrificing life and spirit of Jesus Christ as their only escape from death, and to active service in his righteous kingdom for their sole hope of life eternal. It does not promise to scoop up the mean, the selfish, the miserly, who cling blindly to some pet form of dogma as a policy insuring to themselves a well-fed, soft-bedded bliss, from which all who dared to differ from them shall be excluded. It declares with merciless rigor that from him who hath not the genuine spirit of Christ and true, self-sacrificing participation in his kingdom of love to all mankind, from him shall be taken beyond all hope of recovery the little semblance of life he has. And to him that hath this true union with God in Christ, though at first it be faint and scarcely perceptible even to himself, it promises the infinite riches of the Divine life which only eternity is adequate to unfold.

ARTICLE II.—VIRTUE, FROM A SCIENTIFIC STANDPOINT.

THE term virtue is used in two slightly different senses: (1), As a *quality* of a mental exercise or state. (2), As a mental exercise or state itself. Using the word in the latter sense, I propose to enquire what is virtue, or what state or exercise of the mind does the word represent—a question which though much discussed is still unsettled, and to-day divides theology into two great schools.

Moral exercises—such as are virtuous or the opposite—“are such,” says the great Edwards, “as are attended with the desert or worthiness of either blame or praise.” “A moral action,” says Prof. Cochran, “is (1) one of which it may rationally be said, it ought or ought not to be done; or one which a moral being may justly be required to do, or forbear doing: (2) One for which the agent is blame- or praiseworthy, and therefore deserving reward or punishment.” In other words it is an exercise to which obligation pertains, or one which accords or discords with Moral Law.

Virtue then is identical with *love*, the great imperative of that law. “All virtue,” says Edwards, “may be resolved into love for others, God, or his creatures.” “All virtue,” says Dr. Dwight, “is summed up in the fulfillment of these two commands: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and thy neighbor as thyself.” “Love,” says Dr. N. W. Taylor, “is the sum of God’s requirements, as it fully meets and satisfies the claims of God upon men.” “On these two commands,” says the great teacher, “hang the whole law and the prophets.” “Love is the fulfilling of the law,” is the declaration of the inspired apostle. Love and virtue, then, I shall use as interchangeable terms, and my enquiry is, what is their exact scientific import?

Mental phenomena are divided into two classes, *free* and *necessary*. An exercise is free when the agent could, at the time and in the circumstances, do otherwise; necessary, when

at the time and in the circumstances he could not do otherwise. This distinction is perfect. Every exercise of the human mind is either free or necessary. No one can be both.

In which of these classes resides the moral element? "In both, but primarily in the latter," answers the hyper-Calvinist, putting, as he does, moral character into something back of the will, and making sin and holiness entities which may be created and transmitted. The question is a vital one—What does God require and forbid, and for what does he call the sinful soul to repentance?—one in reference to which no Christian teacher should remain in doubt.

Do we find the moral element in *necessary* phenomena? Are exercises which could by no possibility be avoided either good or ill deserving? Is a child justly punished for remembering the experiences of yesterday, or for the prevalence of the Asiatic cholera, or for any event in which it had neither choice nor voluntary agency? By definition, a necessary act is one the agent could not in the circumstances avoid; to say he *ought* is saying he ought to perform, not a miracle, that is thinkable, but an impossibility, that to which infinite power is inadequate. If there be a first and self-evident truth, challenging the assent of all minds, and never questioned outside the domain of theology, it is that ability is commensurate with obligation, that men are responsible for only such exercises as they could avoid. "Ask," says Prof. Stuart, "all courts of justice from the highest to the lowest. . . . Ask all legislative bodies who have any sense of justice, whether they make laws which render guilty those who never voluntarily transgress them, and they give but one answer. Indeed, there never has been, is not, and from the nature of the case there never can be any difference of opinion on this point of personal guilt."* "No man," says Prof. Harris, "can blame or praise himself, or feel reponsible for any event which is in no way dependent on his own free will."† I will not insult the intelligence of my readers by fortifying a position so obvious, but will assume, as an axiomatic truth, that only *free* exercises can be either right or wrong, sinful or holy.

To what department of the mind do free exercises belong?

* *Bib. Rep.*, 1839.

† *Phil. Basis of Theism*, p. 366.

Is freedom an attribute of the intelligence? Is perceiving, thinking, believing, remembering, knowing, or any other mere intellection a *free* exercise? Let us test the question: The agent, we will suppose, stands with open eyes, gazing into the cloudless sky. In these precise circumstances can he avoid *perceiving* it to be blue? The act of gazing and that of perceiving are distinct. The former is admittedly free; is the latter? Evidently nothing is more necessary. In the full possession of his powers he *remembers* what occurred yesterday. Is there any more freedom here? Certainly not. With his present knowledge he *believes* the earth is round. Can he believe otherwise? He *knows* the whole is greater than a part. Can he avoid knowing this, or cease knowing it, as he can cease talking or writing? Is any intellectual exercise free? No; our cognitions, no sane man can doubt, fall into the category of the most iron necessity. Therefore they do not, and cannot involve the moral element.

We control, to a limited extent, it is readily admitted, the conditions of these intellections. We can gaze into the sky or decline doing so. We can turn attention to or away from truth, and render ourselves indirectly responsible for perceptions and opinions, but to attach moral character to anything beyond voluntary complicity with them, would indicate a great lack of discrimination.

Is freedom an attribute of the sensibility? That feelings are helpful or hurtful, that they are a pretty accurate index of moral character there is no doubt, but do they fall into the category of free and moral phenomena? The word *love*, I am aware, is used, used correctly, to designate emotions of fondness, attachment, etc. The mother, as she presses her babe to her breast, says, "I love it." She does love her darling, but are these emotions of the nature of virtue? Are they the *kind* of love the moral law requires? If exercised supremely toward God, and equally toward men, would they satisfy its claims?

Let us apply the test: I put my hand into the fire. The act is free, is the feeling of pain which results also free? In the precise circumstances in which I suffer, can I avoid suffering? Certainly not. No event more clearly falls into the

category of necessity. Consequently, whatever may be said of the act, the *feeling* can be neither right nor wrong. I turn my attention to some object of suffering, and feelings of pity result. Is not the relation here between the act and feeling precisely the same? I call to mind some wrong to which I have been subjected, and feelings of indignation are aroused, plainly by a law just as necessary. I look upon some object of beauty or deformity and feelings of admiration or aversion instantly arise, and as the current of thought changes, so changes the current of feeling, with as little fealty to my will as the flow of the river from its source. I can put into operation causes, doubtless, which will arrest or increase these feelings, as I can causes which will divert the current of the stream, but certainly moral character can be ascribed to nothing but the voluntary act.

So fixed and necessary is this relation between thought and feeling, the skillful artist can sit down and play upon the strings of another's soul, evoking from that wondrous instrument melody or discord, as he can from his cathedral organ, but the emotion and the music are equally devoid the free, consequently the moral element.

The drunkard is indirectly responsible for his appetite, for it is the result of his own conduct; but it is in the *conduct* exclusively the moral element resides. When the intoxicant is swallowed, the whole guilt is incurred. Were the Divine Hand at that moment to interfere, and set aside the effect, his ill desert would neither be increased nor diminished. As well call the fire the incendiary kindles sinful as the drunkard's appetite, or any other appetite or feeling human beings experience.

But are not anger and envy, revenge and hate wrong, and fortitude and patience, and complacency in goodness right? They are desirable or undesirable, and therefore it is right or wrong to cherish them, as it is to harbor stolen property. Many of these passions also involve the voluntary element. Revenge, e. g., is a purpose as well as a feeling, but it is to the former only moral character attaches. We look in vain for the voluntary or the moral element among the phenomena of the intellect or of the sensibility. Our intellections and emo-

tions are in the circumstances necessarily what they are, and can be neither good nor ill-deserving.

May not feeling enter as an essential element into virtue? Is not the love which fulfills the law the blending of the emotional and voluntary factors? This is the generally accepted view. "Loving God supremely," says Albert Barnes, "is fixing the affections supremely upon him." Here are both factors, and as they are so inseparably allied perhaps no practical harm comes of this definition. Still it is scientifically incorrect, and attended with insuperable difficulties.

(1.) As feeling is in itself a necessary phenomenon, and as no combination can change its nature or invest it with the moral element, it is difficult to understand how it can become a constituent part of virtue.

(2.) This definition makes moral character of all things the most unstable and fluctuating. It comes, and goes, and changes, as the ever restless feelings change. The cloud on the sky and the spray on the river are not more obedient to every surrounding influence.

(3.) Feeling, if an essential element of virtue, must be present in every virtuous act. An honest purpose to obey God, if they are absent, is not obedience. The tired and worn spirit, incapable through exhaustion or paroxysms of pain, of any particular emotions, is incapable of virtue, or any exercise acceptable to God.

(4.) If emotions are essential to love, it is not always easy to exercise this virtue. Can any one tell us how to love our enemies, if this be the meaning of the word; or how to put forth any feeling worthy the name, toward the traducer, the evil doer, or the "evil one;" or how the hardened sinner, or the dying impenitent, whose half delirious thought can hardly reach the idea of God, can exercise toward him gratitude or affection? Would any intelligent man urge him to attempt it? Yet God requires of him supreme love even then and there, and his destiny depends upon rendering it.

(5.) We are required to love God with *all* the heart and mind and might. This certainly implies feelings, if they are an essential part of love, up to the very verge of one's capacities—a degree which would unfit him for the ordinary duties

of life, and soon destroy life itself. Is suicide what the great commandment of the law requires? Christ loved the Father with all his soul; was he constantly wrought up to the highest point of emotion? No.

“ Christ had his sorrows when he shed
Those tears, Jerusalem, for thee ;
And when his trembling followers fled,
In his dark hour of agony.”

And he had his joys. He was the subject of all the variety and diversity of feelings which ordinarily play over the field of human consciousness, yet when roused like the billowy sea, and when calm as the summer noon, he loved with equal and perfect strength. Surely his love was deeper than the fluctuations and spray of emotion.

(6.) The law requires us to love our neighbor as ourselves, or to love every one with given, and consequently equal strength; and if emotion is an essential element of love, to exercise equal affection for all. The wife is required to feel the same attachment to the stranger and the debauchee she does to her husband, and the loved ones who call her mother. All the special endearments which bind families together are forbidden, and the sweetest, holiest relations of this life are legislated against.

(7.) Just now it seems to me it is the *ethical* element of our religion, rather than the emotional, which needs to be emphasized. The latter is cheap and very common. Ancient Israel while “fasting for strife and debate” “took delight in approaching to God;” the word of the prophet, while they did it not, fell on their ear “like a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice and can play well on an instrument;” and few now can gaze out on the wild bright spring or autumn day, or on the wilder and more mysterious night, spreading its great mop of stars above them, without emotions of reverence and gratitude toward the great artificer; and fewer still can go to dark Gethsemane, where the man of sorrows “weeps in blood,” without kindred feelings. Multitudes take this mere sentimentalism for Christian experience, and make its reproduction the *ne plus ultra* of Christian endeavor. The Christian teacher should avoid definitions which foster delusions so common and fatal.

Virtue or love resides in the *will* exclusively. Nothing is right or wrong, sinful or holy, blame- or praiseworthy but its exercises and states. "The element of morality," says President Fairchild, "is found in the will alone; this is a necessary and intuitive judgment and must be accepted as an axiom in morals."* "The love," says Prof. Harris, "which it [the Law] requires is not natural affection; it is not emotion, or desire, or passion; it is the *free choice* of the supreme object of service." How perfectly this accords with the formal definitions of the sacred word! "This is the love of God, that ye keep his commandments." "This is the love of God, that ye walk after his commandments." "He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me." "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." "Let us not love in word and tongue but in *deed* and in truth." "Love is the fulfilling of the law." This truth is woven into the very texture of the Bible. It stands forth on every page. It is not the thinker, the feeler, but the *doer* who is justified or condemned. There is not in the sacred volume a single command which can be either obeyed or transgressed by a simple intellection or emotion.

In the realm of metaphysical theology, this is a pivotal truth. It is decisive of the whole question of innate or constitutional sinfulness. Sin resides in choice alone, therefore it cannot be predicated of "nature," "taste," "propensity," or of anything back of the will, and all the theories of inherited, constitutional, and transmitted sin are mere figments. The child may be born with strong animal propensities, but this is a calamity rather than a crime, and demands pity rather than punishment. On the other hand, regarding those amiable natural traits which adorn the youth and age of so many impenitent men as *virtuous*, is equally illogical. Like rainbows and cloud-pictures they are beautiful, but only right choices are meritorious. The prevalent idea also that some occult holiness may be buried in the heart of one whose life is sinful, or some occult sin in the heart of one whose life is holy, is equally absurd and untruthful.

Our inquiries, then, after virtue must be limited to the will.

* *Moral Phil.*, p. 17.

† *Phil. Basis of Theism*, p. 207.

Here we find two classes of exercises, (1) choices, (2) executive volitions. No one will claim that the element for which we are in search resides in the latter. These, therefore, we rule out, and narrow our enquiries to choices. And here we find it necessary to make another subdivision. There are two distinct classes of choices, (1) ultimate, or choices of *ends*, or of objects for their own sake. (2), Subordinate, or choices of *means* to secure ends. The object of one is the good, of the other is the useful; one is the choice of absolute, the other of relative good. One, for convenience, we may call intentions, the other, choices.

We see, e. g., a man laboring in his field, or selling goods over his counter. On enquiry we ascertain that the choice which actuates him is that of money. But as money is not a good in itself, and therefore cannot be chosen for its own sake, we recognize his choice as *subordinate*, and look for an ulterior end to which money sustains the relation of means. This, on farther enquiry, we ascertain to be the welfare of the kingdom of God, or "the good of being in general." This choice we recognize at once as *ultimate*, for we can hardly conceive the "good of being" to be chosen for other than its own sake. In one or both of these classes we must find the moral element, for we look for it in vain elsewhere.

Does it reside in subordinate choices? Such choices are free, and we ordinarily speak of them as good or ill deserving. Still a little reflection will satisfy us that the moral quality we ascribe to them resides primarily in the ultimate choices, of which they are but the manifestation and expression.

(1.) It is not possible to characterize any conduct as subjectively right or wrong which fails to reflect, or somehow reveal the intention behind it. Ask the child whether one is good or ill deserving for preaching the word, "bestowing all his goods to feed the poor," or even taking human life. "It depends upon the motive," is his answer. He knows it is the *intention* which determines the moral quality of actions—that purposeless conduct is as void the moral, or even the rational element, as the contortions of epilepsy.

(2.) I repeat the same thought substantially in saying that it is not possible for a man to condemn himself or for any one

to condemn him, for conduct, however unfortunate in its results, knowing his intention was right; or to approve himself, or for any one to approve him, for conduct, however fortunate, knowing his intention was wrong. No man was ever justly rewarded or punished for anything but his intention, for in nothing else is he blame- or praiseworthy. This principle is, I think, recognized by all just tribunals. It accords with the unerring verdict of conscience and with the word of God. "Reward them according to their endeavors," is the decision of the highest court.

(3.) Carrying into execution one's intentions, or failing to do so, neither adds nor detracts from his merit or demerit. The assassin is none the less guilty because he is unable to strike the fatal blow; nor is the dying saint less virtuous because his hands and tongue refuse longer to execute the behests of his benevolent heart; nor has God added anything to his original holiness by peopling space with worlds. "There is," says Kant, "nothing in the world, and we cannot conceive of anything out of the world, which can be held to be good without qualification except a good will. . . . This good will is good not on account of its effects or its fitness to accomplish any given end, but simply in itself as a right choice or purpose. It is therefore to be prized incomparably higher for its own sake than anything which comes to pass to gratify any desire, or even all desires together. Even if the good will is unable to carry its purpose into execution still the good will would remain, and it would have its worth in itself, like a jewel which glitters with its own luster. Success or failure neither adds to or takes from this worth. These are like the settings of the gem, convenient for handling, and setting it forth to notice, but unheeded by the lapidary in estimating its real worth."*

I am safe in saying there is but one right thing in itself, and but one wrong thing in itself; that is *ultimate choice*—the purpose lying back of executive choices and volitions, more permanent than the eternal hills, the incarnation of character, the fountain of actions, the supreme, responsible, controlling principle of the soul. Here, and here only, we find the object of our search.

* *Metaphysical Ethics*, pp. 2, 8.

The primary error of the hyper-Calvinistic school lies in not only overlooking this fact, but in ignoring any such thing as intention. It is not in all their theology. "Taste," "nature," "disposition" have taken its place. These, and not the supreme choice, dominate the human soul; they are the primary seat of good and ill deserving, constitute the heart, and are the fountain whence all other streams flow. Hence, by logical necessity, the doctrines of Passive Regeneration, Unconditional Election, Limited Atonement, Necessitated Will, and Propagated Sin. The enthronement of *ultimate choice*, its restoration to its proper place, and a little logic would relieve this system of all such absurdities, and evolve a theology in harmony with the word of God and the nature of man. To show that I do not overstate the importance of such a substitution, allow me to quote from Prof. Charles Hodge:* "We proceed," he says, "therefore, to state where the difference [between the Old and New Calvinist] really lies. All the old Calvinists hold that the *result* of the Holy Spirit's operation on the soul is a holy *principle* or *disposition*; Dr. Cox, if I understand him, holds that the result is a holy *act*. This is the whole ground of debate, and to lookers-on it may appear rather too narrow to be worth disputing about. Dr. Cox, however, seems to think this is a subject of vital importance affecting deeply our views of the whole system of divine truth, and our manner of preaching; involving the high questions of the grounds of man's accountability, the nature of sin and holiness, and of human liberty. And here we are sorry to say we agree with him. We are afraid this is a turning-point. We do not see how it is possible to hold together the tattered shreds of Calvinism if this ground be assumed. Is Calvinism then a mere metaphysical system? We think not, but there are some metaphysical principles utterly inconsistent with it; that *indifference* is necessary to freedom is one, and that morality consists in *acts* alone, we fear is another."

Defining virtue then as *right ultimate choice* it remains to enquire what is a *right* ultimate choice, on what object does it terminate? The answer to this question is given in the reason and consequently there can be no difference of opinion respect-

* *Princeton Review*, 1880. Art. Regeneration.

ing it. What is a rational being bound to choose? *Good*, evidently, the valuable. He cannot conceive of obligation to choose anything else. Good will, then, or *benevolence*, is the equivalent, the synonym, the scientific definition of virtue. It is the essence of all right character, "the fulfilling of the law," and of all the claims which can rest upon a moral being. All virtuous choices and conduct are but expressions of benevolence, and borrow their moral quality from it, as the moon borrows its light from the sun. Nothing else is strictly right; nothing else secures the approbation of conscience and of God.

Just what this good is which the reason reveals as the proper object of choice—whether it be happiness alone, or whether other elements enter into it, it is not important to enquire. I will call it *well being*, or the "welfare of being in general." The choice of this for its own sake I conceive to be the *essence* and *totality* of virtue.

Is there any other virtue? Is more than *one* right intention possible? I answer no; virtue wherever it exists is essentially the same thing. It is the choice of good for its own sake. But good cannot be chosen for its own sake without choosing the highest good—all good, good as such. Choosing more than all is impossible; choosing less is sinful; choosing anything else would not be a moral, or even a rational exercise. Benevolence then, and nothing else, is virtue.

We come to the question, what is *sin*, or a wrong ultimate choice—the most difficult question of ethics. (1.) It cannot be a mere negation, or a *refusal* to choose the end intelligence dictates, for the sufficient reason such a choice is not ultimate. (2.) Nor can it be the choice of *evil* for its own sake. Whether such a choice is possible or not, it is so far as we know never made. (3.) Nor is it the ultimate choice of one's personal good, for this would be right, were there no other interest to choose. It cannot then be *per se* sin. It is doubtful, also, whether one could aim at his own highest welfare without becoming benevolent, as the only rational means of securing this end. Sin must be the preference of some lesser to the greater good—a choice which carries with it a disregard of the good of being—a self pleasing at the virtual expense and sacrifice of the general welfare—a betrayal of infinite

interests at the dictates of impulse and passion. "Sin," says Prof. Harris, "which is the essential evil, consists in self-isolation. . . . Sin and evil arise when a person by his own free choice isolates himself from the system by choosing himself as his supreme object of service, and so puts himself into antagonism to both God and man, and does what he can to mar the order and beauty of the system and resist and annul its supreme law."*

Are there *degrees* of virtue and sinfulness? Of the latter there certainly are. The Saviour asserts the fact, and gives the ground on which it rests, in speaking of the relative ill-desert of those who know, and of those who do not know their master's will, and yet do things worthy of stripes. He makes the guilt of sin increase with the light under which it is committed, or with the apprehended value of the good which it sacrifices. The murder of Garfield was a greater sacrifice of apprehended interests than the cheating of a landlord, and therefore a greater crime.

There are also degrees of virtue. God is infinitely more virtuous than any and all created intelligences together. The reason doubtless is, the good he apprehends and chooses is infinitely broader than that apprehended and chosen by any other being. Virtue and sinfulness then vary by the same law—one, by the apprehended value of the good regarded, and the other by the apprehended value of the good disregarded. The virtue of the Christian then may vary from time to time, as his sense of the value of the general interest, which he lives to subserve, is stimulated or obscured.

If the views presented in this paper are correct, it is not possible for virtue and sin to coëxist in the same mind. They may alternate; the virtuous man may become sinful, and the sinful man virtuous, but they cannot be both at the same time. Virtue is the choice of the welfare of being. Sin involves the refusal to make this choice. To say the two may blend, or that a choice may be both sinful and holy, or in part sinful and in part holy, involves the contradiction of asserting that one may both make a virtuous choice and at the same time refuse to make it. Sin and holiness mutually exclude each

* *Phil. Basis of Theism*, p. 211.

other. Moral character is either sinful or holy, wholly right or wholly wrong. A mixed moral action is in the nature of things an impossibility.

May not virtuous choices vary in *intensity*, and in this respect be more or less perfect? We speak, I am aware, of strong and feeble purposes, but I incline to the view that these qualities pertain to the considerations and feelings which solicit and sustain a purpose rather than to the purpose itself. A purpose or choice, it seems to me, is in its own nature complete and perfect. What can be the meaning of the injunction, "choose strongly," "purpose intensely?" Color and weight may, I think, be as properly predicated of choices as intensity.

May not the Christian, under the influence of sudden impulse, act inconsistently with his ruling choice and commit sin while retaining his benevolent intention? This question involves the absurdity of asking whether one may not sin in doing what he had no intention of doing; or whether one may not do wrong while intending to do right. In the estimation of men he possibly may, but not in the sight of God, "who seeth not as man seeth," nor in the view of conscience, or of any intelligent, impartial judge. To say he may, is a denial of the unquestioned fact that intentions determine the moral quality of actions.

We may, I think, assert as a great philosophical as well as biblical truth, that "no man can serve two masters;" that "a good tree cannot bring forth corrupt fruit, nor a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." "Make the tree good and its fruit good, or the tree corrupt and its fruit corrupt," is a precept of science as well as of revelation.

Our subject affords us the scientific definition of *regeneration*. The word designates a change of moral character—a change from a condition of blame-worthiness to that of praise-worthiness, or from an object of the divine disapproval to that of the divine approval. But moral character lies primarily in the ultimate choice; then regeneration is primarily a change of the ultimate choice. It is the acceptance of the welfare of being in place of self-pleasing as the end of pursuit. The Holy Spirit is active, doubtless, in all such changes, and we

may reverently ascribe them to him, but the idea that the influences, by which he secures them, are physical or compulsory, or other than persuasive, is at war with all the laws of the human mind, and all the teachings of the Sacred Word.

Regeneration sooner or later carries with it, as results, new thoughts, and feelings, and choices, and conduct, and we may, if we choose, include all these in its definition. I only contend that it is primarily a change of the *supreme choice*, and in the nature of things must be made by the subject himself.

It is objected that the view presented in this paper makes moral character exceedingly unstable—that like the pendulum one may swing from one moral extreme to the other, back and forth, as the hours pass. Viewing moral character, not as the prevailing predominant condition of the agent, but as the attitude of his will at the moment toward the right end of life, such fluctuations are doubtless possible and frequent. The will of the newly-made convert, in the imperfection of his knowledge and feelings, may oscillate for a season, like the disturbed needle, but its whole tendency is to permanence, and when fixed there is nothing in the universe more unchanging.

Even subordinate choices are often exceedingly persistent. The youth chooses wealth as the means of self-gratification, and when age has shed its snows on his temples his trembling hands are still reaching out for gold. If this is true of a subordinate, what shall we say of an ultimate choice! These heavens will probably pass away sooner. There is almost nothing else about a human soul so immovable. The choice of self-pleasing is made in the early years of childhood, and unless yielded through an influence greater than human the subject will bear it to another world, and retain it while life and being last. The change of such a choice may well be denominated "*the new birth*" for there can be none other so deep, and radical, and far-reaching. Prof. Phelps has well said, "such is the imperial will of man, by which it is his privilege and peril to be what he will, that a purpose toward immutability grows out of its nature, and accumulates with time. Once bent one way, the spring coils that way forever. Once set in the chosen mould, the compound indurates into granite. Such is character in the ultimate notion of it. A

creation by man's own act—a free creation, a creation which can be reversed—yet once in being it *tends* to deathless being like that of God.”* The chief danger is that we shall accept as conversion to God some change less radical than that of this “imperial will.”

It is farther objected that putting religion primarily into the voluntary department of our nature makes it cold, intellectual, and simply ethical. But here is precisely where the inspired apostle placed it. “Pure religion and undefiled before our God and Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and keep himself unspotted from the world.” In other words benevolence, or the principle which finds expression in benevolent and upright conduct, is before our God and Father pure and undefiled religion. Is such a religion as this cold, intellectual, heartless? Precisely the opposite is true. From a soul dominated by the selfish principle all the fresher springs of feeling are gradually drying up; all the tenderer, sweeter emotions, like buried embers, are dying out and giving place to the cold, gloomy and malign. This silent process is going on in every unrenowned heart. Selfishness is self isolation, and cannot but deaden the affections, wither the soul, and dissever every link which binds it to kindred being. Benevolence is the panacea. With the power of an enchantress it makes the soul's emotions gush forth like the waters from the smitten rock.

With the great Edwards and Finney, I make virtue the synonym of benevolence. What else can it be? What else satisfies the reason, hushes the murmurs of conscience into song, fills the soul with the peace of God? What else is so fascinating? What other beauty like “the beauty of holiness?” Whose are the graves we keep fresh with our tears, the memories we weave into our songs, the names we will not let die? The men of consecrated lives, the servants of their generation. Even infidelity and atheism honor and revere such names.

With this definition of virtue how dread and obligatory the Divine law! Were its great imperative “thou shalt feel supreme affection toward God, and equal toward men” the question would instantly arise “*What for?*” The combined

* *The New Birth*, p. 55.

feeling of the world cannot feed a starving beggar, or comfort a homeless child, or control a human choice. Such a law would fail to secure the sanction of reason, for it would be neither feasible nor obligatory. The conviction that this is what the law of love requires, and that the sanctions of heaven and hell are behind it, cannot but be terrible in its practical workings. On the other hand, the requirement of *good will* among the offspring of God, of the devotion of each to the highest welfare of all, commends itself to every man's conscience, and compels every man's intellect, whether his heart shall accord or not, to unite in the great acclaim, "Just and righteous are thy ways, thou King of Saints."

ARTICLE III.—THE STATES GENERAL OF FRANCE.*

I. THE ORIGIN OF THE STATES GENERAL.

THE States General of France, like the Diet of Germany and the English Parliament, first took shape in the political and social conditions accompanying the decline of Feudalism. They survived only three centuries; during that period even they did not remain a fixed and definitely constituted factor of the government. Yet they had a mission, a history full of significance; they exerted an influence that even to-day has not wholly ceased to be felt. The iron hand of absolutism seemed to crush out for centuries among the French all disposition toward popular rule; but the Revolution of 1789 with its violence and horrors was only the penalty France had to suffer for allowing the States General to decline. It is a striking illustration of the persistency of force in natural tendencies that to-day France is a representative democracy.

The great "law of perfectibility" applies to human institutions as well as to human lives. All fall short of the ideal; yet some seem to have fulfilled the purpose of their existence much better than others. Failures, however, are often more instructive than successes; they reveal with greater clearness causes, dangers, possible remedies. No portion of political history is more suggestive, or presents more sharply the difficulties which popular government has to meet, than the record of the attempts of the French to establish a representative institution.

The States General first assembled in 1302. But that first meeting marked the climax of centuries of progress; in the

* It is proposed in a series of articles to treat briefly the Origin, Organization, Powers and Functions, and Causes of Decline, of the States General of France. For a preliminary discussion see the July *New Englander*, Art. III., "The Genesis of Modern Free Institutions." I regret that lack of space precludes the insertion of references to authorities, as well as the text of the laws and ordinances upon which many of the statements are based.

mind of a people great ideas mature but slowly. Dim fore-shadowings of representative government may be traced in the very beginnings of French history. All the various elements that blended together to make up the French nationality contributed each a part to the structure of French liberties. The Kelt, the Roman, and the Teuton, each had something to do with fixing in the mind of the people the principle of representation, which, when well-nigh obliterated amid the strife and anarchy of temporal powers, was retained and handed down to a brighter day in the organization of the Church.

Long before the birth of Christ the Keltic peoples of Gaul had reached the highest point of their independent development. They had made some progress in the arts; and in the rudiments of civilization far surpassed their Teutonic neighbors. The soil was cultivated under a tenure much like that of Feudalism. Each man of wealth was surrounded by a band of retainers who, under an honorable and easy clientship, tilled the fields and conducted his business or served as his force in war. Politically Gaul was pervaded by a spirit of independence and love of freedom. The country was divided up among many tribes or peoples, each of which jealously defended its territory and guarded its autonomy. The tribal organization was essentially democratic, the underlying principle everywhere being that of election. Each year a civil chief and a military leader were chosen by the people. In the Gallic character however there was a spirit of restless impulse and fickleness that twenty centuries has not obliterated, that appears among the French of to-day; changes in government were hence very frequent. Sometimes a man becoming more influential than the rest usurped the supreme power; occasionally a circle of aristocrats for a time held sway; but sooner or later the people asserted their rights and regained their authority. War was the usual occupation of great landholders, who, supported by their clients, were continually engaging in private battles. To so great an extent was individuality made prominent that at times there was almost complete anarchy. More than once foreign powers gained a foot-hold in Gaul by being called in to settle intestine difficulties.

But behind all the strifes of both tribes and parties there

was an influence that tended to bring about the unity and harmony of all Gaul. The Druids formed a mysterious and powerful hierarchy from whose mandates there was no appeal. Above the individual, above the State, as endowed with authority from the unseen world, they terrified into submission the fierce spirit of a people that owned no other control. With austere countenance and strange dress, with an imposing ritual of service, always attractive to the Gaul (as to his French descendant), and with the horrible rites of human sacrifice they held the worshiper in awe. They alone had knowledge; from generation to generation they handed down a body of science both physical, moral, and political. To them therefore was entrusted the administration of justice. Whoso obeyed not their decrees was ever after treated as an outcast. In each state the Druids formed the supreme tribunal; but further than this there was a religious and judicial unity of all Gaul. Once each year the Druids from every part assembled at a point in the country of the Carnutes, probably in the vicinity of modern Dreux. Hither from all quarters were brought disputes and dissensions, and with the assembly of priests the ultimate decision rested. Differences between states, as well as between great men or parties of the same state were thus settled. At the head of all the Druids was one who possessed well-nigh supreme authority over them. At his death the members of the order most eminent in wisdom and dignity succeeded; but if no one stood forth prominently above the others, the office was filled by election.

In Caesar's time the Gauls were degenerating. The growth of towns and the rapid increase of wealth had introduced marked divisions of classes, while the decline of society was hastened by corrupting contact with the Greeks. Honorable clientship had sunk to slavery. Only two ranks, the Druids and the Knights, possessed any authority or dignity. Of the common people "the greater part," says Caesar, "being overwhelmed by debt or by the weight of taxation or by the oppression of the powerful, place themselves in subjection to the nobles. These have over them the same rights as masters over slaves." The country was in a state of ceaseless ferment. Some states were struggling for the supremacy of all Gaul,

and to these most of the others were forced to pay tribute. The authority of the Druids both as administrators of justice and as arbiters in disputes had declined; their strongest influence was no longer in Gaul but in Britain. In each state there were factions, and usurpations of power were frequent. Yet the public offices were filled by election, and no tyranny was long endured. A council, or senate, formed an essential part of the machinery of government; its nature however cannot be definitely determined. It appears to have been a body of considerable authority, and to it were restricted all discussions on matters of state. Some have maintained that the Gauls had a national or federal council, at which deputies from the different states met and took measures for the general good. The evidence for the existence of such an organization is, however, not conclusive. There were frequent leagues and coalitions, but nothing like a regular assembly with representation from each state. Nevertheless the Gauls seem to have united to oppose the progress of Caesar, and through their delegates the states were bound to furnish for the war fixed supplies of men and money. Here indeed we see a trace of the federative principle, but there was yet no political unity.

The Gauls formed the substratum of the French nation; and the principles of election and federation, which were common to both their political and their religious organization, were too firmly fixed in the national character ever to be wholly effaced. Though doomed twice to become a subject race, and even to have their language replaced by another, the Kelts, in political as well as social elements, have transmitted to the French much more than is commonly supposed.

In the organization and administration of Gaul under the Romans also the operation of elective and federative principles may be traced. Three years of merciless warfare left Gaul prostrate at Caesar's feet. But for a conqueror she had a man of great constructive, as well as destructive, powers. The Roman policy was to treat with kindness a fallen foe—not indeed from any feeling of humanity, but for purely selfish ends. Caesar, therefore, so far from destroying the old federations, maintained them and turned them to his own account. He appointed assemblies, at which delegates from the states

loyal to Rome were expected to be present. He himself presided, and advised—crafty ruler that he was—with the representatives of the states regarding the common weal. Here public measures were presented, taxes were levied, and the wishes of the people in some degree, we may suppose, were made known. On one occasion the Senones being absent he at once marched against them on the ground of rebellion. He frequently chose some city easy of access for the holding of a court, or judicial assembly, at which all who had complaints to make or disputes to settle could receive justice.

Thus the ancient institutions of Gaul were preserved as far as was consistent with Roman dominion. No sooner, indeed, was the country thoroughly subjugated than Caesar began to make use of its resources for the carrying out of his own designs. A legion of hardy Gauls, drilled in the Roman fashion, aided him in the civil war. Citizenship was bestowed on many, and some of his trans-Alpine friends were even admitted to the Roman Senate. In many ways the Gauls were the recipients of special favors. During the reign of Augustus the country was placed under a more regular administration. The Latin language and the Roman law became definitely established through numerous schools and the courts. From this time the Romanizing of Gaul went on rapidly. The municipal system replaced the old tribal organization, while the confederations of states gave way to provincial assemblies. These now became largely religious in design, providing for the maintenance of a common sanctuary, but at the same time treating political matters that concerned the province. Strabo gives an account of a temple to Caesar Augustus at Lugdunum to the building and support of which sixty tribes (peoples) contributed.

With increasing absolutism at Rome the provincial governors grew more and more tyrannical, the burdens of taxation heavier, and it was evident that the strength of the empire was gradually wasting away. At length, in the latter part of the fourth century, an effort was made by the Roman government to revive the energies of its subjects by restoring to them at least the semblance of former liberties and by giving them incentives to united action. In the year 380 a decree

was issued giving cities the right of appeal directly to the supreme authority. If several cities desired to present complaints or requests they were to hold a general assembly and to elect there three delegates to carry their petitions to the emperors. Another law, of the year 385, has reference to the sending of deputies by several provinces; instructions were to be furnished to the delegates by general assemblies. There is also a law bearing the date 392, which is concerned with the extraordinary or unusual provincial assemblies. To the assembly were summoned all who held higher offices or rank, and deliberation on matters of common interest in a public place was enjoined. The opinion of the majority was to prevail. But all these attempts to introduce new strength into the Empire by means of the popular voice failed. Despotism had done its work too well. The individual will was crushed, and there could be no earnest, united action. Out of cities the Roman Empire had been built up; into cities it must sooner or later be resolved. The local tendency prevailed over the national, for there was no unifying, binding force, except the will of an absolute ruler. The provincial assemblies, though meeting yearly, were after all granted no powers of real significance. Their functions remained to the last principally religious.

In the year 418 special effort was made to establish a regular political assembly of the seven provinces of Gaul. A mandate addressed by the Emperors Honorius and Theodosius the younger to Agricola, Prefect of the Gauls, and containing explicit directions, is still extant. According to its provisions an assembly was to be held each year, in August, at the city of Arles. Its membership was to be made up of public officers, large landed proprietors and provincial judges. Novempopulana and Aquitania Secunda, as being the most remote provinces, had "the power, according to custom, if their judges should be detained by necessary duties, to send deputies in their stead." Non-attendance was punishable by heavy fines. The purpose of the assembly was to provide for "both public and private interests . . . by the union of the most influential inhabitants in the presence of their most illustrious Prefect (unless he should be absent from causes affecting

public order) and by their deliberation upon every subject brought before them." Notwithstanding the fair and liberal terms of the ordinance, the institution did not have a long existence. Coöperation under despotism was impossible. Soon the irruptions of the barbarians introduced new elements of political organization and changed the course of history.

While the provincial administration of the Romans left upon the institutions of France no outward, visible impress, their municipal system met a far different fate. It is well established that after the Roman conquest there were in Gaul both colonies and municipal towns. The former, in accordance with the long-standing policy of the conquerors, were composed principally of veteran soldiers to whom lands had been assigned for settlement, and had a city organization modelled after that of Rome. The latter were cities already existing in subject territory, that were suffered to retain a measure of independence in the management of their local affairs. Under the unifying tendencies of the imperial legislation the differences between the colony and the municipal town rapidly disappeared, and though the Roman element was more prominent in the former, there was one general type of city organization. The local government of the provincial towns was very similar to that of Rome. The Digest, Code and Novells of Justinian, as well as the Code of Theodosius, contain many laws bearing upon the organization of cities throughout the Empire, and some indeed concerned only with the towns of a single province. Not a few of these provisions were enforced later by the barbarian codes, such as the Roman Law of the Visigoths.

The provincial city included not only the territory within its walls but also a portion of the surrounding country, and the basis of the enjoyment of its privileges was the possession of land. Of the inhabitants there were in general three classes, a privileged order, consisting mainly of the clergy and the members of the army, who were exempt from taxation and had no public burdens; the curials, who possessed more than twenty-five *iugera* (about sixteen and three-fourths acres) of land; and a third class comprehending those who had either no property at all or an amount of land less than

twenty-five *iugera*. These distinctions were strictly maintained. It is with the second class especially that in this connection we are concerned. The curials were either the sons of curials or had been elected into the *curia*; for any man, whether citizen or foreigner, who had acquired the requisite amount of landed property was liable to be chosen by the curials into their number. Once summoned into the *curia* he could not refuse to accept the responsibility; and stringent laws restrained him from passing into any other condition. The sons of curials were bound in like manner.

In the hands of the body of curials, the *curia*, were the administration of the affairs of the city and the collection of taxes; for the latter they were held directly and individually responsible by the central authority at Rome. They treated in general assembly all public matters of importance, while from their number the officers of the city were elected. The principal magistrates were the *duumviri*, the *principales*, and the *defensor civitatis*. The *duumviri* were elected usually for two years, but sometimes for one. Their duties in general corresponded to those of the Roman consuls in the time of the Republic, and hence were mainly executive, in carrying out the decrees of the *curia*, but were also in a greater or less degree judicial. They could even bind the city by contracts. The *principales* were a board of directors, the permanent executive council of the *curia*, having charge of the government impost, the inspection of roads, fortifications, and public buildings, and the supervision of inferior officers. Their term of office was fifteen years. The *defensor civitatis* corresponded to the tribune at Rome, and was elected by all the people of the city, non-curials and curials together. The law required however that he himself be not a curial. Later no one was eligible to the office that was not a Catholic, and it was generally conferred upon the bishop of the diocese. The principal duty of the *defensor civitatis* was the protection of all from injustice, and he had the right of appeal direct to the Emperor. He was elected at first for five, afterwards for two years. Moreover, in the large body of people below the *curia* the principle of election was not unknown. Those who possessed less than twenty-five *iugera* of land were yet not with-

out rights. Although not members of the city they were Roman citizens. They had a voice, as we have seen, in the election of the *defensor civitatis*; but further than this, they were formed into associations or corporations, according to occupation, each of which through the votes of its members chose a patron to protect its interests. The position was one of honor, and the patrons were among the most influential men of the city. Besides the municipal officers, each city received from the central government a prefect, who did not however interfere materially with its local administrations.

Such was the compact organization of the cities, that enabled them to maintain their individuality amid the conflict of elements that accompanied the downfall of the Roman Empire. There is abundant evidence to prove that in France the cities remained under the first and second dynasties substantially the same in organization as under the Roman supremacy. The only noticeable changes are those of terms; for the Latin names have been replaced by German or French. Instead of *curiales* and *principales* we now read of *rachimbourgs* and *bonhommes*, *echevins* and *prudhommes*, while the prefect, the representative of the Roman authority, has given place to the German count. During the age of Feudalism the cities passed under the shadow of oppression; but their local institutions were still preserved. Under the third dynasty they aided the rising monarchy against the feudal aristocracy, and in return received royal charters, recognizing and confirming their ancient liberties. From the time of Louis VI. the concessions of special privileges and the grants of charters increased rapidly in number, until by the middle of the fourteenth century the cities of France were subject to no feudal obligations. The old Roman towns in southern France have now become *communes*. Through centuries of turmoil they have retained their individuality and their local organization. The municipal régime, with its self-government, principles of election, and traditions of popular rights, is one of the most precious of Rome's bequests to modern civilization. Its influence was stronger in France than in any other country. It did not however extend to the cities of the north; here different causes were in operation to further the development of

local liberty. Here, as well as in Flanders and England, the Teutonic boroughs grew into burgher cities, with their town halls and local freedom.

Associations for mutual aid and protection have existed in all ages and under all forms of civilization. Among the Germanic peoples from the earliest times there were sworn fraternities, existing independently of the towns, whose sole reason of being was the preservation of property, and mutual defence. These associations soon became extended to every craft and condition of life. From them arose the guilds of the Middle Ages. Peculiar ties of self-interest bound together those who had adjoining estates. Gradually land-owners, especially in the towns, formed themselves into guilds, and the principles of guild organization in many cases became those of the town. Equality of rights, and the management of common interests by those elected by the suffrages of the people, characterized the burgher towns. These also in France sided with the King against the feudal aristocracy, and like the towns in the south received charters of privileges and were made *communes*.

Thus at the close of the Middle Ages throughout France there were city organizations enjoying the right of self-government, with only a nominal allegiance to a higher authority, and maintaining in opposition to the feudal distinctions the rights of man as man and the principle of election. These were so many centres of liberty. But the horizon was very contracted, the interests local, the policy toward neighboring cities in the highest degree selfish and suspicious. Yet any emergency which imperatively demand united action would almost of necessity call into operation the principle of representation.

It was not however through the borough system with its outgrowth in free cities that the Teutonic race influenced most directly the development of representative government. Popular deliberation was one of the marked characteristics of the early tribal organization. Tacitus states that "regarding minor matters the chiefs deliberate, regarding those of greater importance all the people, yet in such a way that even those things the final decision of which rests with the tribe are thoroughly discussed beforehand by the chiefs." The will of

the people was supreme, their voice was law. After the conquest and settlement of Gaul the popular assembly was retained, but in being adapted to new conditions it underwent important modifications. Under Clovis (Chlodwig) there was held each year in the month of March an assembly, called Mallum, which seems to have been a sort of military review, and of which the principal design was the division of booty and the planning of campaigns. It was at the Mallum of the year 487 that Clovis slew the warrior who had broken before his face the beautiful vase taken at the sacking of Rheims and set aside for himself—an incident that sets forth in clear light the independent relations between warrior and chief. To these assemblies of the tribe of Clovis, and later to those of the other Salic Franks, were probably submitted for approval the articles of the Salic law. In this code the previous existence of regular general assemblies is assumed, and provision is made for their continuance. Those of the nation are to be presided over by the King, those of a district by the Count, and those of still more limited membership, comprising a few households, by the ordinary magistrates, or centeniers.

The sixth century was even more full of strife and turmoil than the two preceding. The force of arms, and the principle laid down in the Salic law that upon the death of a ruler his realm should be divided up among his sons, kept the country in a continual ferment. Yet the assemblies were not discontinued. They had however changed in character. They were now not so much gatherings of warriors as of landholders; for the followers of the conquering chief had become the possessors of the subject territory. It was a period of transition from the military to the feudal, the personal to the territorial relation. But under the new conditions the principle of election was still made use of. In 567 came the "definite division of northern Gaul into the three real Frankish Kingdoms of Austrasia, Neustria, and Burgundy;" and about the same time a new officer appeared in each kingdom. The Mayor of the Palace, for so he was called, was elected by the chiefs acting together independently of the King, and resided at the court as a sort of prime minister. Being committed to the interests of those who had elected

him, and sustained by their authority, he exercised a check upon the royal power. In each of the kingdoms the national assembly came to be merely a means of conference between the King and the aristocracy. Thus in 584 King Gontran of Burgundy summoned his principal lords to discuss with him some important matters of state, and to assist in the adjustment of them. Three years later a similar conference was held to settle the difficulties between Burgundy and Austrasia. On this occasion, besides the nobles and the representatives of the royal families many bishops were present. Finally, in 614 an assembly of lords and bishops at Paris sanctioned the union of the three kingdoms, and demanded the adoption of certain measures which were promulgated by the new King of all the Franks in an ordinance called the "Perpetual Constitution." In the concessions here made may be found evidence of the growing independence of the great land-holders, lay and ecclesiastical; add to this the fact that a few years later (628) the lords of Burgundy refused to elect another mayor of the palace in place of the one who had just died. The power of the kingship had so waned that the nobles cared no longer for a counterpoise, and did not wish to elevate any one of their number above the rest. When Dagobert came to the throne of Austrasia the lords chose him King of Neustria and Burgundy also in place of his brother, in direct violation of the Salic law of inheritance. This step is an indication, not of any desire to restore and maintain Frankish unity, but merely of the indifference on the part of the aristocracy to all matters connected with the kingship.

The occurrence of assemblies under Dagobert is well attested. Thither came the bishops, the nobles, the land-holders, "all the Christian folk subject to the Merovingians." It is not to be supposed, however, that the lower orders had any voice in the discussions, if indeed they really had the right of attendance. All political prerogatives were in the hands of the King and the aristocracy. Dagobert himself was a man of great ability and tireless energy. He has been called the "Louis XIV. of the Merwing time." Yet his power was not lasting. He left infant sons upon the thrones of Austrasia and Neustria; with them began the rule of the mayors of the palace

in those realms. Whether from this time on till the establishment of the second dynasty assemblies were held cannot be determined; but it is certain that to gatherings of the nobility and the clergy the puppet kings were occasionally shown. The central authority, what still remained of it, was in the hands of the mayors of the palace. The clergy and the nobility were alike indifferent to the fate of the monarchy.

But with Pepin of Heristal there came a change. As mayor of the palace he possessed virtually regal authority, while as the holder of vast estates he stood at the head of the Austrasian nobles. By their aid he was made first of all the Franks, under the title of Duke. The Germanic institutions now reappeared, and the popular assembly was revived. The army was made the prominent factor in the social and political order; to all soldiers special privileges were assured. Pepin's son, Charles Martel, was too closely engaged with foreign wars and domestic uprisings to have much opportunity for gaining a peaceful expression of the will of his people. Yet during his stormy reign the assemblies, though irregular and infrequent, still survived. Pepin the Short threw off entirely the mask of subordinate authority. Under him the reality supplanted the shadow of power and the Carolingian line was firmly established on the throne. But Pepin had need to strengthen his position in every way. Having made an alliance with the clergy and having received coronation from the Pope, he imposed new life into the national assembly, transferring the time of meeting for convenience from March to May. He brought the bishops into prominence, and through their influence for good order he gave the martial gatherings a more harmonious and regular character. During his reign of sixteen years there were eight assemblies, called now *Placita*.

Charlemagne continued the work of his father in building up a great empire. To aid in this, he gave the national assembly a permanent organization. Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, has left us, in a celebrated letter, a full account of the meetings. Two were held each year, one in the spring, the other in the autumn. To the assembly were submitted those "articles of the law called *capitalia*, that the King had drawn up by the inspiration of God, or the necessity of which had

been made manifest to him in the interval between the meetings." The initiative of legislation was thus with the Emperor, but there was full and free discussion. For one or more days the assembly deliberated upon the matters presented to it, and constant communication was kept up between the palace and the place of meeting. The ecclesiastics and the laity deliberated separately, and some of the time the nobles appear to have sat apart from the multitude of lower rank. No free-man, however, seems to have been excluded. From all, no matter whether of high or of low degree, the Emperor sought suggestions and advice—but nothing more. The assembly had no real powers; in the words of one whose right to speak authoritatively on this point all will concede (Guizot), "there was no great national liberty, no true public activity; but there was a vast means of government."

The national assemblies had become so firmly established under Charlemagne that during the two succeeding reigns, even in the midst of political and social revolutions, they remained without essential changes. Under Louis the First (*Le Debonnaire*) twenty-five were held. On one occasion (year 819) Louis by general ordinance directed each count to bring with him to the meeting twelve "of the better sort of men" (*meliores homines*). In this however no trace of the principle of representation can be seen; for the men so designated were simply the count's vassals who sat with him in the court and council of the fief. During the reign of Charles the Bald, which lasted thirty-six years, according to Boulay-villiers there were forty-six assemblies. But the feudal régime had well-nigh replaced the monarchical, and these assemblies met only to demand and receive from the King immunities and privileges for lords and clergy.

The Carolingian line met the same fate as the preceding dynasty. Witless weaklings could do nothing to stay the disintegrating tendencies of the age. The kingship became attached to the Duchy of France, which was only one among seven great fiefs. A nominal allegiance was paid to the King as suzerain, but he had no real powers. The assembly was replaced by the council of the fief. Each lord gathered about him his vassals for consultation on matters of common interest, and

with them formed a tribunal for the trial of violations of feudal usages. A King of France and a Duke of France for a time existed side by side. Finally Hugh Capet, a Duke of France, in 987 assumed also the kingship, about which still lingered traditions of power. The great peers, Capet's equals, thought little of the movement; yet from this humble beginning dates the French monarchy. The earlier Capetian Kings sought in every way to revive the memory of the Frankish rule. They often appeared before the people clad in the rich trappings of royalty; they attempted also to institute anew the ancient Placita. Besides the feudal assembly of the immediate vassals of the royal estates, they summoned from time to time the great peers of the whole region acknowledging the King as suzerain, to sit in a council modelled after that of the fief. During the eleventh century, owing to the power of the feudal aristocracy and the incapacity of several of the Kings, the monarchy made little progress; convocations of the great peers were hence very infrequent.

Beginning with Louis the Sixth, however, the kingship gained rapidly in power. By receiving cities under his protection Louis brought them into prominence as a counterpoise to the feudal nobility. To his own court of the Duchy of France, moreover, he received appeals from the courts of his immediate vassals, thus bringing his authority to bear directly on his subjects. It was now the interest of the throne to keep the great peers as much as possible in the background, and at variance with one another. During this reign therefore we hear little of meetings of lords and barons. Louis the Seventh, who aimed even more directly at the abasement of the feudal power, carried still further the policy of his father. Three times only during his reign was the great council convened. Just before he started for the Holy Land on a crusade an assembly of lay and ecclesiastical potentates sanctioned the bestowal of the regency during his absence on the Count of Vermandois and the Abbé Suger. The divorce of the King from his wife Eleanor was ratified by a council of nobles at Beaugency, but no details of the meeting have come down to us. Finally, the year before his death (1179) Louis the Seventh made a great convocation of princes and barons,

at which his son was crowned King of the French. Up to this time the council of the King had been indefinite in its function, as well as irregular in its composition and times of meeting. Philip the Second (Auguste) gave it new prominence, and an important place in the machinery of government.

History presents few stronger characters than Philip Augustus. Bold and imperious, yet crafty and cunning, he knew how to avail himself of every opportunity for the aggrandizement of the royal authority. Although making great accessions to the domains, still he could not wholly overthrow the institutions of feudalism; rather in carrying out his designs he sustained himself by the aid of the feudal power and at the same time undermined it. Thus he often convened the great council, being careful however to summon to it not all the vassals holding of the crown, but only those that could be influenced to his own ends. Twelve peers, six lay, and six ecclesiastical, tried King John of England, and condemned him to the confiscation of the fiefs that he held of the French crown, on the ground of the violation of a feudal obligation in the putting to death of Prince Arthur. Having established a significant precedent by this decree and the execution of it, Philip took care that the throne itself should suffer no detriment; he gradually lessened the authority of the great power he had raised up. Into the royal council he introduced the officers of the court, on the same footing and with the same prerogatives as the peers. The nobility protested, but in vain; the King always carried his point. In different parts of the realm he established inferior magistracies, which, under the pretence of attending to the King's business, received appeals from the baronial courts; moreover being in charge of skillful lawyers permeated with the spirit and traditions of the Roman law, with its centralizing tendencies, they proved an efficient means in quietly extending and strengthening everywhere the royal authority. During the short reign of Louis the Eighth the barons made attempts to regain their power, but the monarchy stood firm. The court of the King met even more frequently than under Philip and continually extended its jurisdiction; it now began to assume the name of Parliament (*Parlamentum*, *Parlement*.) Its functions and

powers, advisory as well as judicial, were exceedingly indefinite, and dependent for the most part upon the royal will.

Louis the Ninth continued the work of the centralization of the monarchy. It was especially by introducing unity of law and jurisdiction throughout the realm that he supplanted the authority of the barons with that of the crown. Hence he surrounded himself with legists (*légistes*) who, learned in the Roman law, were powerful allies in extending the influence of the throne. They acted as secretaries in the baronial courts, where in time they replaced the unlettered barons, who found judicial duties irksome and sought to escape attendance. They were also made judges of the inferior courts established by the king. Some, like the *missi dominici* of Charlemagne, were sent on circuits through the kingdom to see that justice was everywhere done, and to receive appeals from the regular courts, baronial as well as royal; thus the power of the monarchy was directly felt throughout the country. The Parliament was frequently convened; in it also the influence of the legists became strong in favor of the crown. In 1240 for a single time a new element appears in the organization of the Parliament. An ordinance rendered in that year bears the signatures of twelve citizens from six different cities. This is the first recognition of the third estate in French legislation. After this it was retained as a constituent element in the provincial estates of Langued'oc, but it was not summoned again by the monarchy till 1302.

In the reign of Louis the Ninth the Parliament was permanently divided into three sections. Two of these, one confined to judicial and the other to financial functions, were made sedentary and were to remain at Paris. The third, whose functions were political, was to be convened by the monarch whenever and wherever he might think best, and took the name of the Council of the King, or Royal Council. Under the feeble rule of Philip the Third the same organization was retained, but the council met only twice, and the nobility won back some of its former privileges. Philip the Fourth and his successor remodeled the Parliament and gave to it the organization which, with only slight modifications, remained the

same until 1789. The Royal Council, however, was always fluctuating and uncertain in both membership and functions. Out of it, by the introduction of the third estate through representation, the States General were developed.

In following the history of the Germanic popular assembly through various changes down to its outcome in the court and council of the kings of France, we have found no trace of representation. In the meetings of the tribe each spoke simply for himself, while at the martial gatherings under Clovis and his successors the soldier expressed only his own views or desires. Under the feudal system, although the council numbered only a few, these could in no respect be considered as representatives of the rest, for they sat by virtue of the possession of land and were concerned only with their own interests. Individuality, personal independence, lay at the basis of the Teutonic polity. But the principle of representation through all these dark centuries was attaining an independent development. It became inwrought in the organization of the Christian Church.

The polity of the early Church has always been the subject of controversy. Too often, it is to be feared, the judgments of those who have investigated it have been warped by preconceived notions, and ideas belonging properly to later times have been projected back into the past. On fundamental points, however, there is substantial agreement among the acknowledged authorities. In accordance with the plain facts it is proposed to trace the unfolding of the principle of representation in the Catholic Church.

The churches founded by the apostles were no doubt under their supervision as long as they lived. To them were submitted directly all questions of importance that came up concerning doctrine and discipline; yet from the first there were some believers, preëminent for maturity of Christian experience, exalted character and good works, that by common consent were set apart to teach the rest and to minister to the poor. These were the bishops (or presbyters), and the deacons. Each humble congregation met for common worship and the celebration of the ordinances, acknowledging Christ only as the head of the Church and looking upon its officers as only in a

marked degree servants of Him and of their fellows. The members all stood on the same footing and had an equal voice in the government. The ecclesiastical organization, therefore, apart from the general supervision of the apostles, was essentially democratic. When the apostolic founder was removed by death, his office as councillor was filled by an overseer, or bishop, elected by each church, in most cases, no doubt, from among its own members. Chosen to his position by the voice of the people and directly responsible to them, the bishop at first possessed only limited authority; he had supervision over the other officers and special charge of the common interest of the congregation. He was a man of marked piety and as such in the time of persecution was generally the first to suffer martyrdom.

But the church was usually in a large city; from it went forth zealous converts to preach and to teach. Around it in the course of time thus arose a group of smaller churches. The work of evangelization naturally fell under the direction of the bishop; as a consequence, soon the nomination, then the appointment, of under-bishops fell into his hands. Yet every church in its internal organization was independent of all others. For a century and a half there was no recognition of a central authority, and hardly a trace of united action. Each body of believers held itself responsible to the great Head of the church alone. Deference was paid by the older churches to those founded by the Apostles; but no one congregation thought of directing the affairs of another. In the mutual relations of churches, as of individuals, there was perfect equality. Coöperation, however, was a natural outgrowth of Christian doctrines. Were not all united by bonds of brotherly love and by service under a common Master? If, moreover, as it was believed, each congregation were guided in its deliberations by the Holy Ghost, would not the Spirit's power be the more bountifully present and the more directly manifest, the larger the assembly of the faithful? Persecutions too and common sufferings made still closer the union in Christian fellowship. Such were the causes that led to associations of churches.

The gathering described in the fifteenth chapter of Acts is

regarded by many as the first ecclesiastical council. But there were present, besides members of the church at Jerusalem delegates from Antioch only; and these were seeking not so much an opportunity for common deliberation as authoritative advice from the Apostles on certain points of doctrine and observance, concerning which sharp discussion had arisen. It was not till the latter half of the second century that we hear of regular assemblies of the delegates from different churches. This feature of ecclesiastical organization first made its appearance in Greece, where in the early time confederations of independent States were not uncommon, and where under the Roman rule provincial assemblies were regularly held. Its advantages were so great and so much in harmony with the spirit of Christianity that soon throughout the empire, wherever the Gospel had taken root, the churches of the different provinces formed themselves into associations, and held assemblies to which each sent its delegates to deliberate in common on matters of general interest. To these gatherings the Greeks gave the name Synod, the Latins, Council; the articles there adopted as embodying the general opinions were known as canons, or rules.

The institution of councils brought about great changes. The bishops were naturally the most prominent and influential representatives of their congregations. Most of the councils came to be left entirely in their hands. Though at first acknowledging themselves to be simply the delegates of their respective churches, they imperceptibly acquired great authority. The decrees of councils were ere long announced as laws, promulgated authoritatively; for, it was claimed, Christ and the Holy Spirit gave to the heads of the churches sitting in council wisdom to guide and power to bind those under their supervision, in short, to prescribe rules of faith and action. While the election of the higher clergy by the people remained a fixed principle, the appointment of the lower clergy by the bishops became equally established, as early as the third century. Gradations of rank among bishops even were ere long introduced. The bishop of the chief city of the province was naturally in most cases called on to preside at the assemblies; hence arose an episcopal

headship, and the position of metropolitan. Only one thing more was needed to complete the organization of the church as a whole. That was supplied by Constantine, when in the year 325 he convened the first general council at Nicæa. The church then received the impress of unity. To each of the eighteen hundred bishops of the empire was sent, together with an invitation to be present, means for the conveyance to the place of meeting both for himself and for two presbyters. Although but three hundred and eighteen of the bishops responded to the call, the precedent was established, the principle was once for all sanctioned that the opinion of the majority of the representatives of the whole body sitting in general council is the authoritative judgment of the Catholic Church. The right to bind the individual will by that of the majority was distinctly recognized. From the express sanction of this principle in the course of time momentous results followed.

For centuries the bishop was elected in the same manner as the *defensor civitatis*. At first all bishops were called popes; but the Bishop of Rome, as metropolitan of the entire Latin Church gradually gained prestige over all the rest and alone retained the title; yet for centuries he was elected to his position in the same manner as the rest, by the clergy and the laity of the city of Rome. About the opening of the sixth century the choosing of bishops began to pass out of the hands of the people; yet decree after decree of courts and councils aimed to assure the maintenance of the primitive custom. The Council of Clemont (year 549) declared that the bishop must be ordained by the Metropolitan, with the consent of both clergy and people. The same principle was reaffirmed at the Council of Chalons, a century later; while at the Council of Rheims (year 1040) it was decreed that no one should be "raised to the government of the churches without the election of the clergy and the people." In France more than in any other country the right to the choice of religious leaders and governors was tenaciously adhered to. An edict of Clotair the Second, dated 645, sanctions the election of bishops "by the clergy and the people;" similar edicts of Dagobert, Charlemagne, Louis the First, and others of the early Kings are

still extant. Occasionally, as in the case of Carloman, the throne usurped the power of naming candidates for episcopal investiture; but it was not till the general council of the Lateran in 1215 that the right of choosing bishops passed entirely from the power of the people. Down to this date the records of French towns and cities are full of the records of episcopal elections. The office of bishop had grown to be of great importance on account of the control of the vast estates and revenues of the Church. To the disposal of it therefore both Pope and King looked with longing eyes. The wonder is not that the people lost the privilege of election to the see so early, but so late. No doubt the retention of this early custom so long was due to the influence of the municipal system, with its organized self-government.

In France national councils early became a marked feature of the ecclesiastical organization. In the fourth century fifteen were held, at which were present all or at least a large part of the bishops of Gaul or deputies in their stead. In 439 at the council of Riez it was enacted that a council be held twice a year; and in 441, at Orange, that no council should be dismissed without designating time and place for another, in case "the severity of the weather" should prevent the holding of the two councils as provided. The same principle was often reaffirmed in the course of the fifth and the following centuries. It does not appear that perfect regularity in the holding of councils was ever attained; but they continually increased in influence and authority. They could not, in the strict sense of the term, be representative, especially after the bishops ceased to be elected by the people. Yet they were deliberative bodies, possessing in Church matters both judicial and legislative functions; and the utmost freedom of discussion was allowed. The French clergy never forgot their former privileges as members of the Church. To the time of the Reformation they were always prepared by united action to repel aggressions on the part of either Pope or King.

How the Catholic Church, influenced and sustained by the traditions of the Roman supremacy, extended its dominion to things temporal as well as spiritual it is not needful here to

show. Suffice it to say that in western Europe, above cities, states and peoples, there existed a vast system of government the foundation principles of whose organization were election and representation. With the gradual centralization of all authority at Rome both principles were partially lost sight of; yet not till they had served an important end in the development of modern principles and forms of government.

In thus tracing the origin of representative institutions in France, a careful examination of the facts shows that down through the ages many influences were tending to the same end. The Gauls were characterized by a bold independence and a tendency toward federation that centuries of subjection could not eradicate. The Roman provincial administration kept alive the federative principle and foreshadowed that of representation, while in the municipal system was cherished through long periods of darkness the precious boon of civil rights and the elective franchise. The Germans, through the borough founded in principles of freedom, supplemented the influence of the Roman municipal town in the development of local government; and through the popular assembly, with its outgrowth in the feudal court, established a recognition of the rights of the governed through common deliberation. Finally the Church, by exalting the dignity and responsibility of the individual, and inculcating doctrines of self-sacrifice, humanity and mercy, furthered the cause of popular liberties; at the same time in its organization it furnished to the secular world the model of a representative body. There was needed in France only a centralizing power which by breaking down local and personal interests should unite the people; then would the nation's voice find natural expression through a representative institution. The first meeting of the States General therefore marked a new era in the development of the French nationality.

ARTICLE IV.—MR. SCHUYLER'S PETER THE GREAT.

Peter the Great. A Study of Historical Biography. By EUGENE SCHUYLER, Ph.D., LL.D., author of "Turkistan." New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884.

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Quarterly Review. July, 1884.

WHEN the Tsar Alexis was still in the prime of manhood, he lost his wife, a princess of the Miloslávsky family. Within the following year, two sons by this marriage died, and of the remaining two, Theodore was very infirm and sickly, and Iván was almost blind, had a defect of speech, and lacked little of being an idiot. Under the circumstances it seemed probable that the Tsar would marry again, and preparations were made for the inspection of candidates. According to custom the young girls, either in Moscow or the distant provinces, whose position and beauty rendered them suitable to be the Tsar's bride, might appear for inspection and review. Of course opportunity would always be furnished the Tsar to make his choice with deliberation; but in this instance the review was a mere formality. Alexis had already chosen a lady whom he had met at the house of his chief minister, Matvéief. This lady, Natalia Naryshkin, became the mother of Peter. From

the first, the rivalries and jealousies of the Miloslávsky-Naryshkin families divided the court. Matvéief was accused of sorcery and witchcraft and of using magic herbs to win a royal husband for his ward. A strict investigation followed, accompanied, as was customary, with torture. The marriage was put off for nine months, but was finally celebrated on the first of February, 1671. On the ninth of June, 1672, Peter was born.

The formal and splendor-loving Alexis rejoiced in the event, and rejoiced scarcely less in the opportunity which the birth of a son afforded him to arrange processions and feastings,—with great display of sanctity and sugar-work. Peter's measure was taken on the third day after his birth,—that is, the image of his patron saint was painted on a board of cypress-wood of the length and breadth of the child. Nineteen and a quarter inches long and five and a quarter inches broad!—such, without flattery, were once the dimensions of the great Tsar. In August, 1673, we find orders for one of the rooms of his nursery to be hung with leather stamped with silver, and a year later new apartments were prepared, the walls of which were hung with fine red cloth, and the furniture covered with crimson, embroidered with yellow and blue. In 1676, the walls and part of the ceiling were decorated with paintings. In his earliest years, Peter enjoyed all the luxuries which at that time surrounded a prince, and from which, later on, he so readily broke away. Cradles covered with gold-embroidered Turkish velvet; sheets and pillows of white silk, coverlets of gold and silver stuffs; caftans, coats, caps, stockings and shoes of velvet, silk, and satin, embroidered with gold and pearls. Peter's first impressions were not of the rude surroundings which he preferred in after life. When we are told, therefore, that at the same period his most common toys were miniature bows and swords, pikes, spears, wooden guns, banners, and all sorts of military equipments, the conclusion that he acquired a taste for war thus early is by no means obvious. In fact we may be allowed to doubt if Peter ever developed a genuine passion for war, or cared more for a cannon than for a hammer,—except as the former happened to be more serviceable against Charles XII.

When Alexis was in Moscow, life at court must have been very uniform and sometimes monotonous. A round of dull ceremonial; to be thoughtfully considered, this court life, for in such school the Miloslávskys were trained, and this empty formalism may be taken as an expression of the ideas of the party of reaction, afterwards opposed to Peter,—to action and progress. Comparatively indifferent to affairs of state, Alexis scrupulously observed all the prescriptions of the Eastern Church, rather a priest than the ruler of a vast country. The Muscovite idea of woman, founded on the teachings and traditions of the Byzantine theology, was purely a monastic one. The virtues of the cloister, faith, prayer, charity, obedience, and industry, were those most commended, and the life of a cloister was best suited to preserve her purity. Socially, woman was not an independent being; she was an inferior creation, dependent on her husband, for except as a wife her existence was scarcely recognized. Whipped for her faults, having no share in the education of her children, ignorant of all things outside of her household work, counting obesity her principal charm and drunkenness a venial fault, the Russian woman of the seventeenth century added little to the finer side of life. In the family of the Tsar, the seclusion of the *Terém*, or women's apartments, was almost complete. This was in part due to a superstitious belief in witchcraft, the evil eye, and charms that might affect the life, health, or fertility of the royal race. Neither the Tsaritsa nor the princesses ever appeared openly in public. Von Meyerberg, Imperial Ambassador at Moscow in 1663, writes, that out of a thousand courtiers there will hardly be found one who can boast that he has seen the Tsaritsa, or any of the sisters or daughters of the Tsar. Even their physicians are not allowed to see them. When it is necessary to call a doctor for the Tsaritsa, the windows are all darkened, and he is obliged to feel her pulse through a piece of gauze, so as not to touch her bare hand! It is true there had been some relaxation of these strict Oriental rules under Basil and the false Dimitri; but with the establishment of the Románofs, ecclesiastical ideas prevailed, and it was only in the latter part of the reign of Alexis that foreign customs began again to edge in, owing in part to the annexation of Kief and

Little Russia, and to the influx of teachers educated after Polish and Western standards, to the greater intercourse with the West of Europe, and in part to the increasing influence of the "German Suburb," or foreign colony at Moscow. It should be added here, anticipating somewhat, that the Tsaritsa Natalia Naryshkin, although she had been educated more after the "German" fashion,—that is, more liberally,—could not sympathize with her son in his taste for innovation.

In 1676, the Tsar died, after having given his formal benediction to Theodore. After the burial of Alexis and the coronation of Theodore, everything was changed. The Naryshkins went into retirement and Miloslávskys came again into power. A few months later, Matvéief was exiled as a state criminal. Two of the Tsaritsa's brothers, Iván and Athanasius Naryshkin, were also exiled. Others of her friends were removed from Moscow, and she and her children,—for a daughter, Natalia, had been born in 1673,—were sent away from the palace of the Krémelin to live at Preobrazhénsky, a villa about three miles from the center of Moscow. This change, however, which at first seemed a misfortune, turned out to be an advantage. The freer life of the country was better for the development of Peter than the formal life at Moscow would have been.

Soon after Theodore ascended the throne, he appointed as teacher for Peter a certain Zótof, a man enjoying a high reputation for his learning and morality. The Psalter, the Gospels, the Hours, were the books from which, like other boys of his age, he was taught. Besides learning to read, he acquired much by heart, and was able, even at a later period of his life, to recite many passages from the Scriptures. Apparently he learned to write late, when already seven years old, and his handwriting was always extremely bad. At the same time he learned to sing by note—an accomplishment which in later years afforded him amusement, when in country churches he would enter the chancel and add his deep bass voice to the strength of the choir. These modest attainments were supplemented by a general knowledge of Russian history, a rude idea of natural history, a slight acquaintance with gods and heroes of antiquity. The sum of Peter's education—if such it may be called—is complete! Education in the usual

sense, including both discipline and protection, he never had. The experience of after life, he himself recognized as education, — telling the Swedish captives after Poltáva that they had taught him how to conquer them. Indeed, throughout his public life he was ever eager to put himself and his whole Russian people at school wherever masters in any department were to be found. But always the tasks were imposed by his own will. Peter had never been taught to doubt himself or to *defer*. A loss, this, and a gain. The force of natural desires was left in all its original strength. Peter's characteristic was self-assertion. It may be questioned how much he would have accomplished for Russia through the practice of self-restraint. All this time, Peter was doubtless hearing from his mother much sad talk of what she thought their wrongs and uncomfortable position, much criticism of people in power. The impressions which were then made upon him were deep, and would have sufficed greatly to influence his subsequent life, even without the events that followed.

During their lease of power the Miloslávskys had been arrogant and self-willed. They had not conciliated the old nobility. Theodore abolished *precedence*, January, 1682. According to the system of precedence, every noble kept strict account of all services which he or his ancestors had rendered to the State, and of the positions and offices which they had held. He felt that he could not accept a position less distinguished than any of those which his ancestors had previously occupied. For this reason it was almost impossible to put capable men into positions which the public welfare required them to fill, because incapable men of higher social rank refused to serve under them. The descendants of Rúrik were almost in open opposition. Taken with other things the abolition of precedence helped to make them unite their forces to support Peter.

Now the death of Theodore, May 7, 1682, left two possible candidates for the throne: Iván, the elder brother, the son of Alexis by his first wife, Marie Miloslávsky, blind, lame, and half idiotic; and the son of Natalia Naryshkin, the strong, healthy, and clever Peter. Although there was no law regulating the succession to the throne, except that it should be

hereditary in the Románof family, yet primogeniture was consecrated by usage. Theodore had appointed no other successor, and Iván had therefore the superior claim. The accession of either Iván or Peter would necessitate a regency; but with the incompetent Iván upon the throne, the regency would continue in the hands of the obnoxious Miloslávskys, whereas Matvéief, who had never offended the great nobles, would be entrusted with the direction of affairs, in case the younger candidate should be chosen. There remained, therefore, no doubt as to the decision; for the whole power of choosing was in the hands of the nobles. There was, indeed, pretence of appealing to the "Muscovite State." The Patriarch and archbishops proceeded from the assembly of boyárs to a balcony overlooking the grand square of the Krémelin, and put this question to the crowd waiting below: "To which of the princes do you give the rule?" But the crowd, composed of adherents of the boyárs, replied with loud cries of "Peter Alexeivitch!"

On the day of the funeral of Theodore, the Princess Sophia, daughter of Marie Miloslávsky, contrary to all etiquette, insisted on accompanying the body to the church. On returning from the services, Sophia wept bitterly, and turning to the people cried out: "You see how our brother, the Tsar Theodore, has gone suddenly from the world. His ill-wishers and enemies have poisoned him!"

So much for court intrigues. More important is the popular fermentation which they assisted in bringing to light. The need of reform had long been felt everywhere, — in the Church, in civil life, in education, in the administration, especially of justice and the finances, and, more than anywhere else, in the army. Russia was entering upon a period of transition, and a period of transition is always a period of discontent. She had arrived at that state where all thinking men saw very plainly that the old order of things had been outlived and must soon come to an end. With new ideas, new systems must be introduced from Western Europe. At this juncture, the army entered its protest. The military forces of Russia at this time consisted of the armed peasants, who were brought into the field by their lords and masters, after special summons at the beginning of every campaign, — an undisciplined and

unwieldy mob; a few regiments of soldiers, officered by foreigners and drilled in European tactics; and the Streltsi (literally, archers), a sort of national guard, founded by Iván the Terrible. The Streltsi, composed of twenty-two regiments of about a thousand men each, served exclusively under Russian officers and were governed by the old ruler of Russian tactics, though subjected to regular discipline. They were concentrated at Moscow and a few other towns, where they lived in quarters by themselves. Much disorder and corruption had crept into their organization, and many complaints were made that their commanders withheld a portion of their pay and otherwise treated them unjustly.

The Miloslávsky party naturally took advantage of this discontent. They spread disquieting rumors, and gave themselves out as the true friends of the Streltsi. The dissatisfaction increased, the new government had no counsellors on whom to rely, and finally the Streltsi, after all their claims, just and unjust, had been granted, feeling that the power was in their hands, marched under arms to the Krémelin. No doubt the majority of them sincerely believed the reports which had been circulated, that the Tsar was in danger, that the Naryshkins were desirous of mounting the throne, and that they were themselves patriots going to save their country and to rescue their rulers from the traitors and the hated boyárs. The surprise was complete. No resistance could be offered, and the Streltsi proceeded to slaughter all whom they thought implicated in the plot. Matvéief and the Tsaritsa's brothers did not escape. Retaining undisputed control of the city, the Streltsi imposed such conditions as they saw fit upon the government. To satisfy their demand for money, a general tax was laid, and for the necessities of the moment much of the silver plate of the palace was melted down and coined. The Tsarévitch Iván was associated with Peter as Tsar, while the government was confided to Sophia, as Regent. The honorary appellation of "Palace Guard" was conferred upon these successful rioters, and a column erected on the Red Place, on which was inscribed the names of the "evil-doers" (victims of the massacre) and the crimes for which they had been killed.

While the court was thus a hot-bed of unscrupulous factions, with a riotous soldiery and a government which could not govern, what was the outlook in religious matters?

The Church was divided into two great parties, the Orthodox, supported by the government and using the reformed liturgy of the Patriarch Nikon, and the party of dissent, adhering to the ancient ceremonial and strong in its democracy, both civil and religious, and in its protest against autocracy both in Church and State. The Dissenters were, then, the *popular* party; but so far from being *popular* in the political significance which we attach to the word, that they were *conservative*, and opposed to progress: for progress was associated with and dependent upon the establishment of autocracy.

The Dissenters thought that the apparent triumph of the "popular" principles which had been proclaimed in the riot of the Streltsi would be advantageous to the cause of what they considered true religion; that there would be a revolution in the habits and maxims of the government and a return to old Russian ideas and practices in religion as well as in politics. Supported by the Streltsi, many of whom were Dissenters, they demanded a public discussion of disputed points with their antagonists of the new faith. After much maneuvering the solemn dispute was agreed to, and the day chosen, July fifteenth. The account of this dispute given by Mr. Schuyler makes a very entertaining chapter, (IX). The Dissenters were unruly, some of them calling upon the Princess Sophia to resign: "Get thee to a nunnery! Thou hast troubled the Empire quite enough!" Sophia behaved with great firmness, succeeded in detaching the Streltsi and winning them over by bribes, promises, and favors. The reign of Sophia was a grievous time for the Dissenters after that. They were persecuted and suppressed, and often drawn into open conflict with the troops sent against them. As an effect of the persecutions of Sophia, they began to consider the Tsar as Antichrist, a feeling which increased during the reign of Peter. The Dissenters were mistaken in putting themselves forward so soon as representatives of the popular feelings and aspirations; the nation was disunited and divided, and no hearty support was accorded to them. But this was one of the last of the many

struggles of the Russian people against autocracy and centralization; and the boldness and courage of Sophia, while warding off a present danger, made at the same time a clearer field for the development of the Imperial power by her half-brother Peter.

After this came still further disturbances from the side of the Streltsi, fomented by the Commander-in-chief Havánsky and his son. The court removed from Moscow, and order was not restored until Havánsky and his son had been executed.

During the earlier part of Sophia's regency, Peter was left very much to himself and to the indulgence of his taste for mimic warfare and music at the villa Preobrazhénsky. Foreigners who saw him at this time have left record of the impression made upon them by his strong, genial, and confident nature. Peter entered upon his military exercises with such zest that they ceased to be mere child's play. At the end of the year 1683, a new regiment was organized for his amusement, Peter himself enlisting as bombardier. He performed every exercise, giving himself no rest day or night. He stood his watch in turn, took his share of the duties of the camp, slept in the same tent with his comrades, and partook of their fare. There was no distinction made between the Tsar and the least of his subjects. It being necessary to draw on the German Suburb for officers and instructors, Peter was thus brought into close relations with many foreigners. Precocious both mentally and physically, he took part in their entertainments, which were always accompanied with plentiful beer, wine, and tobacco. With such associates he gained not only knowledge of men and of the world, but his inquiring mind led him to be curious about many subjects which had never before attracted the interest of a Russian prince. Without regard to rank or position, he was always glad to make the acquaintance of those from whom he could learn anything, and was especially attracted by all that was mechanically curious. Frequently, for amusement, he used to hammer and forge at the blacksmith's shop. He had already become expert with the lathe, and had practically learned the mechanical operation of printing as well as binding books. Although, in 1697, "he knew excellently well fourteen trades," we have yet

to hear that he learned anything under compulsion. Peter's education was such as he chose to give himself. The way in which he seems to have slipped through the hands of his instructors, tutors, and guardians, shows not only his strong self-will, but the disorganization of his party and the carelessness of his family. But it is not to be supposed that he looked upon what he was doing as education. He was gratifying a natural love of physical exercise and a taste for mechanics. His interest once aroused by something he had seen or heard, he would spare neither himself nor any one whom he could command in the effort to understand it; but there is no record of his ever having proposed a problem to himself. Seeing distances measured by means of an instrument he does not understand, he is delighted, and works with a will over his copy-books,—for arithmetic and geometry must be learned before he can be instructed in the use of the astrolabe and sextant. A few weeks later, in June, 1688, as Peter was wandering about one of his country estates, he pointed to an old building in the flax yard and asked one of his attendants what that was. "A storehouse," replied the man, "where all the rubbish was put that was left after the death of Nikíta Ivánovitch Románof, who used to live here." With the natural curiosity of a boy, Peter had the doors opened, went in and looked about. There in one corner, turned bottom upward, lay a boat, yet not like those flat-bottomed, square-sterned boats which he had seen on the Moskvá or the Yaúza. "What is that?" he asked. "That is an English boat," replied Timmermann. "What is it good for? Is it better than our boats?" "If you had sails to it, it would go not only with the wind but against the wind," said Timmermann. Peter wished to try it at once, but it was found to be too rotten for use; it would need to be repaired and tarred, and besides that, a mast and sails would have to be made. A certain Carsten Brandt was found, a ship carpenter, who made the needed repairs, launched the boat on the river Yaúza, and began to sail up and down. Peter's excitement was intense. He called out to him to stop, jumped in, and began himself to manage the boat under Brandt's direction. "And mighty pleasant it was to me," he writes in the preface to his "Maritime Regulations," where he describes the beginning of the Russian navy.

Such is in substance the account which is given of Peter's childhood by his most recent biographer (I. pp. 1-112). A few obvious comments have been interspersed; but the purpose in offering the foregoing *résumé** is simply to illustrate Mr. Schuyler's method. That may be made plain in a few words: Distinct and careful narration of all such facts, resting upon sufficient evidence, as are needed to enable the thoughtful reader to form independent views of the life and work of the famous Tsar. Not that this method has been carried to extremes. In biography there are evidently two opposed tendencies, equally dangerous and equally unproductive: the one, in yielding to which the writer contrives by eloquence and uncritical statement to produce a desired impression; the other, an excess of conscientiousness, concealing the writer's personality altogether, inconclusive, not stimulating. To take familiar examples, Oldenberg's "*Buddha—Sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde*" gives us *not* a living, teaching reformer, but at most a lifeless instrument of reform. All is reliable; a text for every statement. But Buddha remains dead. On the other hand, we owe to Mr. Arnold's inspiration (if it were fair to criticise the "*Light of Asia*" as a biography) a Buddha, living in the subsequent development of his doctrine,—in the exquisite taste of an English man of letters. Mr. Schuyler has laid his course in the safe middle way. Peter lives again in these pages. All his force, his activity, his intense personality, are felt to be present; but force and activity adequate to the work actually accomplished by him—not Titanic, inexplicable, wasted. It is the merit of such temperateness to dispel illusions, indeed, but not to take away the substance. It is to be added that no claim to this excellence has been, at least publicly, made by the author. On the contrary, he even studiously avoids emphasizing the *points*, as this method brings them into clear view, and goes quietly on his way through the thousand pages, telling the story of Peter's life and expecting the reader to draw his own conclusions.

Does the story not lose in interest through this impersonal, unimpassioned handling? Yes, a certain kind of interest must

* In this *résumé* the author's language was retained here and there, so far as possible unchanged.

be sacrificed ; but there is distinct gain of interest in a way of which more will be said after I have stated some of the conclusions which specially affect the popular estimate of the subject of this biographical study. In general, it is believed that the popular estimate of Peter will be modified, when Mr. Schuyler's book has exerted its due influence, in two ways : First, through the exclusion of much that is fictitious. This results from careful sifting of evidence, and from the reasonable, common-sense spirit to which have been sacrificed startling contrasts and epigrammatic half-truths. Second, through the exhibition of causes and forces, at work before Peter's accession, during his minority, after his accession,—forces forming and transforming Russia—every Russian—Peter among the rest ; forming Peter and preparing him to cast the influence of autocracy and great personal activity *with* these, helpfully, and not *against* them, fruitlessly. Stated plainly then, Peter was not such an ogre, not even such a giant, as he has often been represented. Further, he was no God, creating an epoch, but himself created by his times, working in them unfeignedly and they through him mightily. In Mr. Schuyler's hands, Peter is *humanized*.

Was he a hero ? The answer rhymes : No. The candid reader will look in vain for encouragement to worship. In cutting away the extreme of admiration, for his supposed creative power, and the extreme of abhorrence excited by the current legends of savage excesses, Mr. Schuyler has destroyed the sentiment of strangeness. Throughout the literature of this subject (which in itself would form a considerable library) the *strangeness* of Peter's life, its extravagance and remoteness from the rule otherwise prevailing among mortals and curbing their impulses whether for good or evil, has been the prevailing *motive*. So far as I know, this prepossession has not before been so thoroughly overcome as to admit a warmer feeling than distant admiration. It may therefore be reckoned the distinctive novelty of Mr. Schuyler's work, that he had made Peter in a sense lovable,—or not, according to one's taste—while at the same time, rather deepening than effacing our impression of his willfulness. Here is a reconciliation.

It will have been noticed in the *résumé* which has been given, that circumstances conspired to foster in Peter the impulses with which nature had endowed him. He had no training, in the ordinary sense. His nature was uncoerced. It is impossible not to be attracted by the spectacle of this fierce young life, tirelessly and, from the beginning almost, resistlessly making its way to what it desired. Fearless and inconsiderate; domineering, but unsparing of himself; enjoying, loving, hating with his whole heart; carousing and working, learning and teaching, because he liked one as the other; frank, vivacious, hopeful, appreciative; but exacting, relentless, unscrupulous: at least there was no grain of meanness in his whole make-up. Nothing was sacred to him except what he saw to be true and useful; but that which was true and useful, though it should be found in humblest guise, he would surely welcome and honor. To his quick intelligence, busy among realities, the prejudices of weaker men were a thin veil,—indeed it is doubtful if he was often conscious of them at all. His commands *must* be obeyed, his will *must* have its way; but commands are not degrading when they proceed from a superior, not in social rank more truly than in activity and in willingness of devotion. But if we are to trust many eminent critics of hostile disposition or inadequate information, his character in spite of its complexity was without the tenderer quality. His love for women, we are told, was no more than brutal indulgence, and his love for men was to be measured by their serviceableness in the State, and more especially by their abilities as drunkards and practical jokers. Such a conclusion is readily enough explained. In the struggle preceding the birth of the Russian Empire, vast interests came to the front. And not alone the historian naturally overlooks the evidences of such gentler characteristics as actually existed: those finer traits received and could receive little attention and cultivation from their possessor,—never became developed and supreme, controlling. Peter never became and could not possibly have become both “the Great” and a “domestic man,” with the corresponding virtues. But one does find germs of character—even playful affectionateness, hearty comradeship, tender offices, and a deep warm feeling—which in a more

peaceful age might have ripened into social excellence. Critics abusing their privilege in a peaceful age suggest the exclamation of Count Rasumovski:—In the reign of Catherine, when a celebration in honor of her great predecessor was in progress, the orator of the occasion solemnly invoked the shade of the first Emperor to appear and review the creation of his hands. “Why call upon him?” said Rasoumovski. “If he *should* appear, it would be a cold day for us!”

Returning now to the question, was Peter a hero?—It has been stated that Mr. Schuyler does not treat him as such in divesting him of strangeness, unapproachableness, and making him quite human. But that is not enough. Did the strength of his untamed will surpass human limits and partake in the heroic? That would of course appear in his plans.

I remember seeing in a very rare book the progress from human to divine represented mathematically in a series. As the work in question will not be accessible to many readers of the *New Englander*, the context is given in a note.* The

* God, individuality asserting itself incontestably—Will; Heathen God, individuality asserting itself within limitations imposed, suggested by those observed; Hero, divine spark struggling unconquerably to assert itself, towards freedom,—against the most obnoxious forms of oppression, foul spirits,—leading the associated human to tragic extinction. To these add: Christian Hero, reflected divine light, passivity and activity—*not* self-assertion, but—showing God; Buddhist Philosopher, reflected divine light, not struggling but *tending* to union with its original.

These all proceeding from assumption of *conflict*, suggested by imperfect observation. Stated simply: Activities we see have not their own way, but are met by opposing activities. Above all opposition to sit, were best of all. There is or is not *one* there, ruling or not ruling the conflict below. Of individuals, the more easily one makes one's way, the more divine; the more mightily one struggles to quell opposition, the more heroic. Furthermore, when freedom to act is greatest, freedom to think is least. The divine nature *acts*: thinks, broods, then first, when the extinction of its divinity impends. Heroism also acts; but is less than divinity as its action is agony: unconquered pure will fighting its way to tragical extinction. (Here occurs the series.) But of course Nature is not vicious, does not intend obstruction. The tendency of all matter is to take its own place and state,—of planets to avoid other planets, and from vaporous, then fiery, to become pacific, mild and *moony*,—of pedestrians, to keep to the right! Mere impact of

series stands :

$$\frac{1}{\text{Fate}} = \text{Human} ; \quad \frac{\text{Will}}{\text{Fate}} = \text{Hero} ; \quad \frac{\text{Will}}{\frac{x}{y}\text{Fate}} = \text{Heathen God} ; \quad \text{Will} = \text{God}.$$

The whimsical author apparently means that it is a question of the ratio of will to fate. Overlooking its whimsicality we may accept this statement for its brevity and essential correctness, so far at least as concerns the relation of heroes among the people to the ordinary mortal. It is will which marks and makes the hero; and we must admit that Charles XII. was a hero far more truly than was his conqueror. Charles was "unconquerable pure will fighting its way to tragical extinction." He would not or could not change. He, his plans, and his life, were not three, but one. Peter too had set before himself a great aim—or rather many—but his purpose was thoroughly practical, not concentrated but diffusive, not inflexible but adjusted to his resources. His plans were not the outgrowth of an ideal, but were generally expedients. Voltaire said, *On juge aujourd'hui que Charles douze méritait d'être le premier soldat de Pierre le Grand*. Yes, and one thinks so still,—for while Charles was unquestionably the superior in his own speciality, in his enthusiasms and in his own person, Peter understood his age, working in and with and for realities. Charles was an anachronism; Peter came in the very nick of time.

It is impossible to pass over the last consideration—the opportuneness of Peter's advent—without noticing its bearing upon a certain partisan interpretation of Russian history. Mr. Wallace calls attention (p. 416) to the Slavophil theory in the following striking passage :

bodies there is as the source of life and change ; to be comprehended, this, not deplored. To know this tendency of things is to be wise ; to live in it is to live well. It is implied in the tendency of matter to take its own place, that until the final rest all, and indeed the finest particular organism, has temporary limiting associations. Self-assertion is therefore no perfect ideal, for that were to include the temporary with the real. Self-sacrifice is at once nearer the gold and quite out of the target : for it recognizes the superiority of the real, while damning the universal with an unthinkable stigma of destructiveness. Neither the self-asserting heathen heroes, nor the self-denying Christian hero, will do ; and history offers not one example of perfect life, but may.

“The fundamental characteristics of the Graeco-Slavonic world have been displayed in the history of Russia. Whilst throughout western Christendom the principle of individual judgment and reckless individual egotism have exhausted the social forces and brought society to the verge of incurable anarchy and inevitable dissolution, the social and political history of Russia has been harmonious and peaceful. It presents no struggles between the different social classes, and no conflicts between Church and State. All the factors have worked in unison, and the development has been guided by the spirit of pure Orthodoxy. But in this harmonious picture there is one big, ugly, black spot—Peter, falsely styled “the Great,” and his so-called reforms. Instead of following the wise policy of his ancestors, Peter rejected the national traditions and principles, and applied to his country, which belonged to the Eastern world, the principles of Western civilization. His reforms, conceived in a foreign spirit, and elaborated by men who did not possess the national instincts, were forced upon the nation against its will. The attempt to introduce foreign culture had a still worse effect. The upper classes, charmed and dazzled by the glare and glitter of Western science, threw themselves impulsively on the newly-found treasures, and thereby condemned themselves to moral slavery and intellectual sterility. Fortunately, however,—and herein lay one of the fundamental principles of the Slavophil doctrine—the common people had not been infected by the imported civilization. Through all the changes which the administration and the noblesse underwent, the peasantry preserved religiously in their hearts ‘the living legacy of antiquity,’ the essence of Russian nationality, ‘a clear spring, welling up of living waters, hidden and unknown, but powerful.’ To recover this lost legacy by studying the character, customs, and institutions of the peasants, to lead the educated classes back to the path from which they had strayed, and to re-establish that intellectual and moral unity which had been disturbed by the foreign importations—such was the task which the Slavophiles proposed to themselves.”

Beyond all doubt this complaint has something to rest upon. The trouble is, it presents only one side of the question. It is true that the normal development of native Russian institutions was interrupted, and it is true that the future weal of Russia depends largely upon the perfecting of the peculiar national character and institutions. In the same way, we are accustomed to regard the Norman Conquest as an interruption in the development of English institutions, and to trace in the recovery of liberties, in the modern expansion and prosperity of the English people, the operation of ancient principles, long dormant, “a lost legacy recovered.” But we do not overlook the vast gain in depth and breadth and strength resulting to the national life from the Conquest. As for the “black spot—

Peter," he gets rather more than his fair share of the blame. Die Thatsachen- und Entwicklungsreihen in der Geschichte vollziehen sich von selbst unabhängig von einzelnen Menschen. Russland wäre auch ohne Peter europäisiert worden. . . . Er hat keine neue Richtung der Geschichte Russlands geschaffen, aber sein Volk in der bereits vorhandenen mit kräftiger Hand um ein gewaltiges Stück weiter geführt, (Brückner, p. 573). Mr. Schuyler has laid the emphasis where it should fall: "If Peter, with his energy and activity and his ready intelligence, could only have let war and foreign politics alone, and studied his own Russian people as well as he had studied the civilization and ideas of the West, what real and lasting benefits might he not have conferred upon his country!" (II., 467.) Unless indeed the doubt be allowed, which was suggested to me above, as to the possibility of coercing a temperament such as Peter's. I humbly submit that this energy and activity were products of an uncurbed naturally strong will. Imagine such restraint as suggested, laid upon him from without or from within, and you have something very fine, but no longer Peter.

If indeed Peter is to be held responsible for the present state of Russia, then plainly we may not venture to speak with even so much confidence of our *to-day* as Voltaire did of his. In our to-day, the structure which he reared is being examined, questioned, and in some quarters threatened with destruction. Even Mr. Wallace wrote before a new class of critics had begun to make themselves terrible—the Revolutionary Socialists.

By a few words of comparison with selected eminent contributors to the same department in biographical study, Mr. Schuyler's position may perhaps be made distinct better than by extended analysis.

The charming *Histoire* by Voltaire has the limits and the style rather of an essay than of an exhaustive historical study. It has served and must always serve as a model for those attempting to say clever things in praise of its hero—for Peter is a hero with Voltaire. Some of Voltaire's sentences, taken from this work, are immortal, as for example (p. 96), *Enfin Pierre nâquit, et la Russie fut formée*. It has the dramatic quality of sprightly observations upon startling situations, and

it is safe to say that no subsequent attempt to cover the same ground has been or ever will be one half so entertaining. His *Histoire* is mentioned by way of contrast; for the antitheses of Voltaire are one expression of that surprise from which the next generation after Peter had not recovered, while the even, plain diction preferred by Mr. Schuyler, corresponds perfectly with an intention not to startle, but to reconcile.

In the *North American Review* of October, 1845, appeared an eloquent, somewhat declamatory, fifty-page article by Mr. Motley; in 1858 were published the first installments of Carlyle's "Friedrick the Second," including a chapter entitled "Transit of Czar Peter," which chapter has tainted many unsuspecting minds. Both have attracted much attention, have been read, re-read and quoted until judgments therein contained have become rather articles of faith. Mr. Motley is engaged in defending Peter as against denunciation for importing his civilization. It is to be regretted, not so much that Mr. Motley rests his defense upon the analogy of civilizers such as Cadmus and Cecrops and Theseus, Solon, Lycurgus, and Pythagoras (although this would hardly seem a sufficient answer to a thorough-paced Slavophil), as that he begins his consideration of Peter with the year 1697,—that is, with a twenty-five year old enigma—"Peter Baas,"—an assumed name and the disguise of a ship-wright superadded to the inherent difficulties of solution. Understanding, if that be in quest, must be sought earlier that it may be found. The boyhood and the influences surrounding the boyhood of Peter contain the solution. Mr. Schuyler has done well in directing the careful inquirer especially to this period. It may or may not be just to refer to the Tsar's participation in the death of his son Alexis as the "public, solemn, and judicial murder, of which the Czar stands accused and condemned to all eternity" (Motley, 308); but there certainly are advantages in being able to notice that even this revolting tragedy was only the culmination of an unnatural feud which had been growing up between Peter and his family,—between progress and reaction, between what was "German" and what was Tatar-Byzantine.

Carlyle's chapter, the "Transit of Czar Peter," is so striking that it will always be read, and so one-sided, out of all decent

proportion, that the reading of it will always sadly mislead. Who can help remembering what Carlyle says about "barbaric. semi-fabulous sovereignties," "certainly the strangest mixture of heroic virtue and brutish Samoeidic savagery the world at any time had"? And then he adds a lot of court scandal, beastly, now discredited. That is all.

First destruction and then reconstruction. First to be rid of the legendary, and then to rebuild with fact for building-material and common sense for overseer. In 1849 appeared Herrmann's "*Geschichte des Russischen Staates*." Its fourth volume from Sophia's Regency, 1682, to the accession of Elizabeth, 1741, presents the results of painstaking examination conducted in a thoroughly judicial spirit. In the same spirit, thirty years later, Dr. Brückner made effective the results attained by special inquirers among the Russian scholars,* thus accomplishing, once for all it would seem, the purposes of destructive criticism, and leading the way in reconstruction.

The Grand Dukes of Moscow had established the tradition of cold, unfeeling, unscrupulous, self-seeking. The emancipation from Mongol supremacy and the establishment of the hegemony of Moscow among Russian States had been accomplished through such means (pp. 4, 5). The idea of Occidentalizing Russia was not by any means original with Peter. Related to him in disposition, had been Demetrius and Boris Godunóf (p. 171). This is to be said not only of the invitation extended to foreigners to settle in Russia, but also of the encouragement to travel and study in Western Europe. While the universal genius, Liebnitz, was professing superiority to consideration of purely national interests, the West was actually coming to meet the Russian advances half-way. In fact the West, acting through the foreign colony at Moscow, occasioned Peter's travels (pp. 12, 13, 137). The excesses, following upon sudden emancipation from Eastern ceremonial, were such in kind and hardly greater in degree than one would expect (p. 113). These citations will suffice to show the tendency of Brückner's work. Peter was no *wonder*; not a man out of his time. Instead of declaiming with Motley, "His was one of the monarch minds, who coin their age, and stamp it with

* Especially *Ustridlof*, History of the Reign of Peter the Great, St. Petersburg, 1858; *Solovief*, History of Russia, Moscow, 1870.

their image and superscription," the fact is simply noted: The conflict between old and new, between Oriental stagnation in exclusiveness and European cosmopolitanism, between civic narrowness and universal human principles, had already begun when Peter was born (p. 9). He was a product of the contact of the Russian "Volksgeist" with the prevailing culture (p. 573).

The next advance—a very long step—we owe to Mr. Schuyler. It has been his privilege to perfect the criticism by original studies, and then to complete the picture of that epoch in Russian history which saw in one forceful person the culmination of the power of the Tsars of Muscovy and the beginning of the opportunity of the Emperors of Russia. As a good illustration of the handling of the same incidents by representative authors, I beg to refer the reader to what is said about the behavior of Catherine and Peter during the disastrous campaign on the Pruth. It will be noticed that Peter's despair and Catherine's inspired heroism—qualities appearing on this occasion only—are employed with dramatic effect by the earlier biographers; but that the uncharacteristic behavior of the Tsar is dismissed to the realm of myths by Brückner's criticism, while the improbable portion of the legend about the Tsaritsa falls away under the examination to which it has been submitted by Mr. Schuyler. The whole campaign, restored to due proportions, is described by Mr. Schuyler without comment, but simply and distinctly.

It is a surprise and a disappointment to find in the July number of the *Quarterly Review*, an extended notice of our author's volumes, which displays a misconception of the method employed and the purpose kept steadily in view. The reviewer says, "One thing we miss, for which we should have been thankful if Mr. Schuyler had seen fit to give it, and that is, a critical summing up and final sentence, as the issue and crown of the narrative."—The very thing which Mr. Schuyler has conscientiously avoided!—"And since the apology for his vices and devilries is to be found in his ancestry and surroundings, we feel that it will not be possible for us to present him fairly to our readers without giving a somewhat fuller picture of the Russia into which he was born than Mr. Schuyler has had room to put before us." Rather, it would seem

that in this very point Mr. Schuyler has shown admirable judgment and independence. He has said no more about the "vices and devilries" of Old Russia than was necessary. These studies in the history of manners are seductive and entertaining; but much of this element introduced into the modern life of Peter would destroy that just balance, to preserve which Mr. Schuyler has been willing to sacrifice factitious attractions. Too much of this sort of thing has already been associated with the popular conception of Peter. Mr. Schuyler, wishing to place him before the reader as a man not wholly unlike other men, would have made a great mistake if he had first excited the reader's fancy by a recital of extravagancies. The stamp of *bizarrierie* would have been set upon the book. But it is not necessary to seek for justification in this consideration. Ample justification is found in the fact that the reader of this biography will certainly reach the conclusion that Peter was like his contemporaries in Russia in "vices and devilries." But perhaps the reviewer had not read all of these many pages; for he says of Catherine and Peter: "With the mutual affection and respect which are the charm of wedded life it is impossible to credit them." It seems improbable that one could say that after having read their letters at the end of the first volume. The simple fact is, of course, that the reviewer's account of Old Russia, and the startling picture he makes of Peter, need not be separated. They are one and the same thing in effect—made out of one piece of cloth. Remember, to the rest of the world Peter was a strange monster, and by his own people he was hated. With the people, the priesthood, his own family, in opposition, is it strange that such stories were circulated about him? But to accept them now in this easy fashion is more than we are prepared for. That would be to decline again into the unmeaning confusion of fact and fable from which Mr. Schuyler has opened an avenue of escape. Why—if such nursery-tales of Ogres and Samoeidic savagery are to be soberly repeated—why not include the best of them all and insist that the Tsar *was* Antichrist, as he was currently reported to be?

Mr. Schuyler has not spoken the final word about *hero* Peter, but he has finally made a road by which calm, dispassionate judgment may attain to knowledge of the *man* Peter. Is this

not the proper offering of a biographer? May not all that is more than this be left to the individual reader with his own peculiar tastes and needs? By his temperateness, Mr. Schuyler has humanized what was before by turns Ogre and Demi-God. The reader will supply the "critical summing up and final sentence, as to the issue and crown of the narrative" for himself and right gratefully.

I am tempted to refer in conclusion to the condescension of our author, who feeds the literary sense with bits of small fact, or *particulars and details*. Mr. Freeman complains that Ælfred is to the vulgar the king who let the cakes burn. Of course: and if the truth were told, would we not all rank with the vulgar in this taste for simple, characteristic facts about historical personages? Our interest is aroused, and legitimately aroused, by those acts of theirs which are of a nature apparently assorted with our own lives. Everybody wants to know even about their faces — that William II. had a red beard, whereas the Normans at Senlac were clean shaven; and Cromwell a wart above his nose. Comparatively few really care to remember that Haroun the Just sent an elephant to the great Karl. Either we or some of our friends have facial adornments or otherwise: none of our friends has an Empire. But further, the object of historical writing is confessedly the exposition of the past for the sake of the present. We of the present, readers of history, owe to-day to the development of political institutions, and to-morrow we shall owe to their continuance. But we owe our to-days and to-morrows to them very much as the Hollander owes his plate of cheese to the dikes:—they enable us to live as we wish without interference. We have practically little to do with them. We ask them to let us alone and make other fellows stand out of our sunshine. Such is the ideal of political institutions according to the latest theory. They and the great or small men and women who have made them or have been made by them, belong not to our sphere. Our interest extends only at rare intervals beyond the private lives of ourselves and of the great or mean men and women about us. Certainly then, to make events long past and the dead of former generations vividly present and real, actions and actors alike may properly be summoned to appear by the spell of homely incidents.

ARTICLE V.—THE HISTORICAL METHOD AND PURPOSE IN PHILOLOGY.*

IN an eloquent discourse entitled "The Mediatorial Office of Philology" (*Das Mittleramt der Philologie*), Ernst Curtius points out the fact that every science has a historical basis and method, in the following words: "Thus, however many groups of facts there may be that form a distinct series and that demand a separate line of investigation; however manifold the articulations of the great body of science; whether the facts to be investigated are those of the development of the human mind, or those of the movements of planets; whether they lie in the relations of space and number, in the life of an organism or in inorganic matter, or in the hidden forces of nature that present no visible object to the perceptions of sense,—one effort inspires and informs every investigation, to wit: to recognize the ground of existence for that which *is*, the motive force in that which moves, in phenomena to find the producing cause, in the accidental the indwelling purpose, and in the isolated the connection with the whole. In this broad sense all scientific research is resolved into the history of nature and of man."

Philology has to do with the history of man; and a true conception of it, as we shall try to show, can be gained only by contemplating it as the historical study of man as revealed in language, literature, and art. This compass and aim of philology are clearly marked in the successive stages of its development as a science.

The epochs of this growth are not difficult to determine; they are marked by the names of Scaliger, Bentley, Heyne, Wolf, Bopp, Hermann, Boeckh, and Ritschl. Each of these names stands for a tendency and a development.

* An Address delivered at Hanover, N. H., July 8, 1884, before the American Philological Association by Martin L. D'Ooge, Professor in the University of Michigan.

The Address was prefaced by a survey of the progress of philology during the current year.

The Italian renaissance in art and letters delivered the humanities from the barrenness and bigotry, the pedantry and prudishness of mediæval scholasticism. With open-eyed wonder the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries read the long-buried treasures of classical literature, and philology, if we may use the term here by way of anticipation, which before had been simply a knack, a hair-splitting of words, a dead routine, now became the art of imitating the great models of Greece and Rome. The disclosure of the old classical world to the gaze of the newly awakened age aroused an unquenchable desire to gain complete possession of the entire store of the material that had so long been locked up. This was the epoch of the *external reconstruction*, so to say, of antiquity. No nook or crypt of research that was supposed would yield even the slightest result in the study of the ancient civilization was left unexplored. Scaliger, the chief name of this period, was not only the polyhistor "of infinite reading," but he is the first to deserve the name *philologist* in any sense, inasmuch as he sought to grasp and to combine—superficially though it was—the various parts and different sides of philological study, such as grammar and antiquities, text criticism and chronology.

But philology was not yet a science. It was hardly a true discipline; it was reserved for England to produce the man who should make it that—Richard Bentley. Bentley's greatness lies in his wonderful grasp of all related facts and his unerring induction. He was able to array and to set in order all single and separate parts, and to concentrate, as it were, all rays of light into one focus. In his "Letters of Phalaris" we have the first brilliant example of objective literary and historical criticism. Nothing but a complete acquaintance with the monuments of ancient literature, informed by a sharp discernment of the conditions of ancient life, could so clarify his vision that he was enabled to separate the genuine from the false and to disclose to view the secrets of authorship. If we may not say with Bunsen that Bentley is the founder of historical philology, we can at least subscribe to the opinion of another German scholar, that he inaugurated a new era in literary criticism. Under his influence, perpetuated by the school of Hemsterhuis, the vague conjectures and fanciful specula-

tions of the earlier criticism gave way to rigid inductions and methodical divinations that were well-nigh reduced to a certainty.

In tracing the development of a science it is interesting to observe its unconscious endeavor to combine and to organize its varied parts,—to construct a consistent unit out of many fractions. The two men to whom above all others is due the praise of making philology a separate science are Heyne and Wolf. Heyne, recognizing the fundamental principle of all science to be the procedure from the special to the general, from the separate to the combined whole, to contemplate all sides, the outer and the inner life, directed attention especially to the value of the historical and archæological side of classical studies. To him belongs the credit of being the first to introduce into the academic curriculum the study of the archæology of art, in which he laid special stress upon the study of mythology as illustrated in ancient art. The value of this discipline in philology has ever since been fully recognized in the German and French schools. In England and with us the place that archæology should hold in a complete course of classical study has not yet been determined. The recent establishment of a course of lecturers on archæology and of a museum of classical art at the University of Cambridge promises well for that branch of philological study in England. Signs of a new interest in the study of classical archæology are appearing among us also, and American scholars are beginning to recognize its value as the means of a better appreciation of all philological research.

But Heyne, with all his breadth of view and insight into the life of classical antiquity, did not bring it to pass that philology was recognized as an independent and true science. At most it was still a discipline, in the service of theology. And so long as it remained in this menial position, the handmaid of a despotic master, it must needs be greatly circumscribed and trammelled in its life. When, therefore, Wolf, a stripling of eighteen years, persisted, against the wishes of the Rector of the University of Göttingen, in matriculating as *studiosus philologiae*, he struck a blow for the independence of philology better than he knew. As teacher and critic it

was his constant aim to show the organic relation of the various parts of philological study, and to build a systematic structure in which each discipline should find its proper place. Whatever fault may be found now with Wolf's analysis of philology into twenty-four different disciplines, his efforts to make philology an independent science and to correlate its parts must always be regarded as marking an epoch. Wolf seems to have assigned to the historical-archæological side of philology a disproportionate place, or at least to have underrated the function of grammatical study and the value of textual criticism. This predilection may be inferred from his definition of philology as "the science of classical antiquity, the final goal of which is the acquaintance with the ancient Greek and Roman man himself, an acquaintance which is to be gained from the study of the monuments of classical antiquity pursued with the purpose to trace the development of an organic and real national life and culture." The utterances of Wolf against a certain class of grammarians were doubtless deserved at the time, and may still have some pertinence. So, e. g., in his edition of the "Phædo" he allows himself an outburst of passion against grammatical collectors and statisticians, who, "without mastering the principle of analogy or any other fundamental truth, are forever occupied with collecting separate items which never produce an idea; and who, wandering about in the chase after words and phrases and allowing the catch of yesterday to be canceled by that of to-day, never come to any insight or decision why and under what conditions a usage must be grammatically correct."

But if the grammatical-critical side of philology was disesteemed to any degree by Wolf, it received speedy and complete vindication by Hermann, and if Hermann undervalued the archæological-historical side, there stood August Boeckh ready to strike telling blows for "the reconstruction of classical antiquity."

It is a well-known paradox that in the growth of a science there must always be present at one and the same time a conscious aim at organic unity and the energy of diverse tendencies working towards different and yet harmonious ends. The historical development of a science depends accordingly

upon two factors: *its separate achievements, and its united movement as a whole in relation to the science of the age.* To those who were in the midst of the conflict fifty years ago between the "Sach-philologen" (philologists of pots and stones) and the "Wort-philologen" (philologists of roots and alphabets), under the leadership of Boeckh on the one side and of Hermann on the other, it appeared that the future of our science was identified with the triumph of one party and the downfall of the other. But when the smoke was blown away, it was discovered that both had been really fighting the same battle for the prevalence of a sound historical philology; and Ritschl simply proclaimed the fact of this fundamental harmony when in his monograph on "The Newest Development of Philology" he defined the aim of classical philology to be "the representation of classical antiquity through the knowledge and contemplation of all its most significant utterances." We can see, as the contemporaries of Hermann and Boeckh could not, how each supplements and corrects the other, and in his own way wrought under the influence of the historical and inductive spirit. Not that they were wholly absolved from the traditions of authority and the power of the *a priori* method. Hermann had reasoned it all out, you remember, that it was impossible that there should be originally more than *six* cases in any language; but just after his argument was published in his "Reforms in Grammar," the first Sanskrit grammar came to Europe and with its *eight* cases upset all his fine theory. It was possible for Hermann occasionally to treat matters of textual criticism in the old style, and for Boeckh to generalize on a narrow basis of facts; but that is possible even now, and, it is to be feared, always will be; only with this difference: it can never be done again with impunity, and for that we have to thank these two scholars especially.

There are two branches of philological study in which Hermann's historical sense comes to view most clearly; we refer to his theory of Greek mythology and to his studies in Rhythmic and Metric. We may not agree with Hermann that the key to the interpretation of classical mythology is to be found in the etymology of the names of its divinities and

heroes; but we give him credit for treating mythology, in opposition to the fantastic and subjective notions of Creuzer's "Symbolik," in an objective style and as a real part of the history of a people. We may laugh at Hermann's strange theory, based upon the philosophic categories of Kant, that the arsis and thesis of verse are to be explained by the law of causality; but we must not forget that his predecessors, with the exception of Bentley, contented themselves with counting syllables and with a few empirical observations.

Boeckh's contributions, however, to our knowledge of Greek Rhythm and Metre are of more enduring value. His claim of being the first to discover that in the Odes of Pindar no division of words is found at the end of a verse cannot be disputed, nor can he be denied the praise of being the first to emphasize the value of the traditions and writings of the ancients respecting the art of music and rhythm. But unquestionably Boeckh's greatest service to the objective and historical method in philology was rendered by his "Public Economy of the Athenians," and by his greatest work, the "Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum." Boeckh's original plan was to portray in a comprehensive work, to be called "Hellen," the spirit of the Greek people as it appears in their external life, in their art and science. But such an undertaking could not be accomplished in any worthy manner before separate parts of the entire field should first be explored, and of this exploration the "Public Economy" was to be the herald. With the exception of the "Prolegomena" of Wolf to the "Leptinea" of Demosthenes, Boeckh's treatise was the first to give anything like a systematic and intelligent representation of the public life of an ancient State; all before was simply a wilderness of citations and of disjointed facts. It was Boeckh's preliminary studies in preparation for his "Public Economy of the Athenians" that led him to see the indispensable value of a comprehensive collection of inscriptions for the scientific study of the life of the Greeks. And ever since Boeckh's time no student of classics, no editor of a Greek or Latin text has dared to be wholly ignorant of "Sach-philologie"—of the *realien*—and of the general results of the study of epigraphy. The bearing of these studies upon the interpretation and

emendation of texts has become generally acknowledged, and such a monograph as Wecklein's "*Curae Epigraphicae*"—invaluable as an aid in correcting traditional errors in texts—is but the promise of what may be expected for textual criticism from the collections of inscriptions that are now in process of editing and collecting. Nor is this the only fruit to be plucked from the study of epigraphy. Inscriptions on sepulchral monuments, on coins, tablets, and votive offerings, are recognized more than ever before as the *codex diplomaticus* of our historical knowledge of the past, and as one of the chief sources from which we may hope to draw additional knowledge of antiquities.

It is not our purpose to describe in detail Boeckh's contributions to historical philology. His enduring influence may be summarized in two statements: First, he established the principle, that in philology, as in all true science, an ounce of testimony that is direct and at first-hand is worth more than any amount of hear-say and indirect evidence, and that accordingly the philologist must always seek to know the objective and primary fact and witness. This principle is distinctly implied in Boeckh's definition of the aim of philology: "the true aim of philology," he says, "is the knowledge of what has been produced by the human mind;" "for the science of philology," he says further, "there is always to be presupposed a definite and real amount of knowledge which has to be recognized (*ἀναγινώσκειν*) by the process of learning. This rigid and objective method of research, this self-restraint in the presence of many temptations to speculate, this scrupulous regard for the naked truth, attests its own value. We have this significant illustration of it in the case of Boeckh; he republished his "*Public Economy*" thirty-four years after its first appearance without being obliged to change or to retract a single statement of any importance. But, secondly, his influence may be observed also in another direction: Boeckh, more than any one of his predecessors, succeeded, by his broad survey and complete mastery of the different lines of philological research, in bringing philology into relations with other sciences, and particularly in constructing it as a department of history taken in its broadest sense.

Up to this time, classical philology had been content to contemplate its own life and to study its own monuments with little regard to any supposed relationship of Greece and Rome with the rest of the ancient world, certainly with no consciousness that the life of the classic nations was but a part of the common life of the ancient world, out of which and together with which it grew. Even the connection between the Greek and the Roman language and life was but vaguely apprehended. To show the true relation of Roman to Greek, and of these to Phœnician, Assyrian, and Hindoo civilization and letters, is the work and the fruit of the *Comparative Method*,—the method inaugurated by the studies of Franz Bopp. We are concerned now only with the results of this method which Bopp, through his studies in comparative philology on its linguistic side, was the means of introducing into all philological investigation. That the comparative method has thus far produced its best results in linguistics, in the *formal* rather than in the *material* part of philology, need not be a matter of regret; for it was just here that the need of this method was most sorely felt. In its language perhaps more than in any other single expression of its life, does a nation betray its exact place in the line of march of the world's history, and a language is the last thing to be really known by isolated study. It is idle to talk of a knowledge of the phonetics and laws of inflection, of the syntax and etymology of any tongue that is studied simply by and for itself. Nothing else has made scientific etymology a reality and historical syntax a possibility save the comparative method. And teachers of classical philology cannot too often pay their tribute of gratitude to such scholars as Georg Curtius, Adalbert Kuhn, and Leo Meyer, for their application of the results of comparative philology to the study of Latin and Greek, whereby the grammar of the classical languages has been transformed from a dead fetich into a living organism. The race of those who sneer at comparative philology probably became extinct with Moritz Haupt, whose proclivity to scold in elegant Latin at the "*Wûrzelgräber und vergleichende Mythologen*" is remembered by some who are here present. More and more all disciplines of philology feel the quickening

breath of the comparative method. To know the history of the development of metrical forms among the Greeks, Westphal and Allen must first discover an Indo-European primitive verse. To know how to interpret the mythology of the Greeks and Romans, Kuhn and Weber must first tell us what were the myths of the Hindoos, and from Grimm we need to learn what the old Teutons believed, and Roscher must trace for us the history of myths among the Greeks and Romans with reference to identities of cult and form. Perhaps in no other department of classical philology has the historical comparative method done so much to revolutionize current views and opinions as in this very one of mythology and religious antiquities. The learned vagaries and follies that passed fifty years ago for the science of classical mythology are perhaps unparalleled in their absurdity. The theological dogmatic treatment of mythology by Creuzer in his "Symbolik," and the strange physico-solar theories of Forchhammer, found their legitimate culmination in the views of Schelling, the depths of whose speculative theories (to borrow the phrase of Bursian) the weaker vision of the historical investigator is unable to penetrate. We may not yet be able to determine satisfactorily which interpretation of mythology is the true one; whether the literary-allegorical, represented by Welcker; or the physical, represented by Preller; or the etymological, represented by Weber and, in part, by Max Müller; or the more strictly historical, represented by Preuner and Roscher. But this is certain, that all fruitful studies in mythology will henceforth be pursued in harmony with the principle laid down more than a century ago by Heyne, though never applied until recently, according to which the material investigated must be arranged with reference to the age and the nature of the sources in which it is found; and further, this material is to be interpreted in the light of the facts and the circumstances which surround the locality with which the separate myths are associated.

With the widening of the sphere of philology under the leadership of Boeckh, and the more close identification of philology with history under the influence of Niebuhr and W. von Humboldt, it became important that the exact limits of philology as a science should be more sharply determined, and

that its separate and distinct life should be carefully guarded, if its activity was to be kept free from one-sidedness, and its function was to be something different from a mere auxiliary discipline of general history. The scholar to whom belongs the distinction of constructing a better cosmos out of the disjointed parts of philological study, of affording the most brilliant illustration hitherto known of what the historical method can achieve, of defining the true bounds of our science and of bringing it in truer harmony with modern life and with all science, is Friedrich Ritschl. In agreement with Boeckh, Ritschl defines the aim of philology to be the reproduction of the life of classical antiquity through the recognition and contemplation of all its essential representations and utterances; but he maintains that this reproduction is not simply *ideal* but also *real*, and is directed especially to the preservation and restoration of literary monuments. In the view of Ritschl, philology is a good deal more than a discipline of history; it is the historical study and representation of all the activities of the mind of a people during some definite period of time. To him no side of philology was complete in and by itself; each was complementary to all the rest. He could study the tesserae of the gladiators with as much antiquarian zeal as Boeckh, and could describe the bronze statuette of Ino Leucothea with the poetical appreciation of Welcker; and in the deciphering of a Plautus MS. he could be as keen as Hermann and more conscientious and objective.

The achievements of Ritschl are so fresh in the memory of all students of classical philology that we need not stop to name them; but the method after which he wrought it is worth our while to notice somewhat fully. He defines it as follows: "That which has hitherto been observed to be true in much the larger number of well attested cases, must be acknowledged to be the rule to which the ever-diminishing number of contradictory instances must under circumstances otherwise similar give way." "In the manifold to find unity, and to refer a majority of analogous phenomena to one common law, is the aim of the true method." "No important event in the history of civilization springs from the ground all complete and ready of a sudden, but is conditioned by previous

processes and grows in connection with a steady movement onward; and similarly, no real progress, no achievement which carries within itself the germs of further development, ever disappears without leaving some trace behind, or remains wholly barren of good for the future." This inductive and historical principle we find applied by Ritschl to the consideration of every philological question. For example, in his treatment of the Latin, he always directs attention to the language not as it existed in a complete form at some definite period, but as a *growing*, a *becoming* creation, which must be studied in its varied phases and zig-zag lines of growth. Not to speak in detail of the epoch-making studies of Ritschl in the Latin dialects and in the antiquities of the Roman stage, we may not forget his unremitting, inexorable chase through every by-way of research after every scrap and bit of information that could contribute anything to the sum total of knowledge. So, for example, he makes an ingenious collation of passages of the *Bacchides* of Plautus in comparison with the fragments of Menander, and discovers that the original of this Plautus Comedy was the *Δις Ἐξαπατῶν* of Menander; and thus he gains a new point of view for the interpretation of Plautus. The same rigid, inductive method marks his manner of dealing with the rhythmic and metric of Plautus. Bentley and Hermann contended for the regular rhythmical structure of the Plautinian verse, but Ritschl first proved it by his painstaking studies of the Plautus palimpsest in the Ambrosian library. Perhaps nowhere else did Ritschl bring to view so clearly the happy results of the historic method as in matters of textual criticism. His rule of procedure in the treatment of the text of Plautus, laid down in the Preface to the *Miles*, may be taken as the canon of sound criticism of any text of a poet: *integritas linguae Latinae; concinnitas numerorum; sententiae sanitas; consuetudo Plautina*. Ribbeck, his biographer, says: "Ritschl did not belong to that class of text critics who think their task fulfilled when they have simply copied the oldest and most trustworthy codex, and adopted the emendations that are undisputed, and then decorate the remaining wounds and riddles of the MS. with a crucifix of pious resignation,—to serve as an admonitory sign-board that no one

be found sinning against this holy spot!" Yet no one insisted more than he on the prime importance of first ascertaining the true and exact tradition of the text. Accordingly, when he planned for carrying to completion the edition of Plautus, he advised the youthful triumvirate of scholars, to whose hands he committed this task, to exclude from their work at the outset all processes of higher criticism, and to be content with the exposition of the actual text. On the other hand, he stoutly maintained the right of conjecture, and gave as one of his ten commandments, "Thou shalt not bow down before MSS." But conjectures must approximate moral certainty, the circle of possibilities must become more and more contracted until that which is at least the *most probable* and the limits of investigation have been reached. "Conjectures," he once said, "we must serve as we do our children; those which are dearest to us we should treat with the greatest severity." But Ritschl's method was historical not alone in that it was objective and inductive, but also in that it was comprehensive and complete. This appears first of all in his constant effort to place his pupils in the possession of a vivid acquaintance with the whole life of classical antiquity in all its features. Accordingly, he opposed the tendency then beginning to show itself, to cut off archæology from the original stock, and deprecated the pursuit of any discipline in an exclusive spirit. Recognizing the fact that the productive study of classical philology must always take its departure from the critical knowledge of the *literature*, and that the study of the writings of the ancients can alone furnish the bulk of the material of philological investigation, he also insisted that to get the true interpretation of ancient literature we must know the conditions in which the writer lived and the contemporaneous reader thought and felt. Thus, on the one hand, while he recognizes in philology a historical purpose and makes it a key to the interpretation of history, he distinguishes it from the pursuit of history by emphasizing the prime importance of the study of a people's language and literature as the basis of all knowledge of its culture; and, on the other hand, he shows that philology is more than linguistics, which is content when it constructs etymology and grammar. This historical spirit,

which views things in their relations, characterizes also Ritschl's idea of what constitutes a true history of literature. Such a history requires that literature be conceived of as the product and reflex of the national mind and energy, and be viewed in closest connection with the development of the entire civilization and culture of the people. Of Greek literature such a history is still to be written.

After this brief account of the growth of the historical spirit and method in philology and of what it has achieved, it is pertinent to enquire what this method and purpose may accomplish for philology to-day. That it is worth the while to make this enquiry a few facts will convince us: (1) The present unsettled state of many questions in philology. Problems that were once supposed to be solved have arisen to trouble us anew, problems in metric, in the theory of accentuation, in phonetics, in antiquities. When all its questions are completely answered a science has ceased to live; from this point of view philology never gave more promise of a long and vigorous life than at present.

(2) But this unsettled state of many questions in philology is due in part to the vast increase in the material of study, and to the tendency to regard philology as an exact science. The collections of inscriptions and of the remains of ancient art have grown rapidly within the past few years, and, thanks to the tireless activity of explorers and the enterprise of learned societies, are likely to increase at an enormous rate for years to come. Unexpected light from many quarters is falling upon old paths, and bringing to view unsuspected turns and way-marks. In solving its problems philology is challenged to take its place with the physical sciences of the day, and to be weighed in the same balance with them of positive and plain truth and fact. The philologist to-day as never before is bound to avoid taking his own shadow for the object itself.

(3) But again, as a third fact characteristic of the science of our day, we would name the absence of systematic coöperation and of coördinate advancement. This characteristic philology shares, perhaps somewhat disproportionally, with the other sciences. A survey of the work that has been done in its

various departments in a single year, is calculated to leave a painful impression of scattered and disjointed effort that has no common aim in view. A host of specialists, each shut up within his own small apartment whose partition-walls are gradually becoming higher and thicker, with no interest in correlated studies, with no wide vision of the greatness of truth, with no purpose beyond his own separate branch of investigation,—one scholar investigating the history of the use of bull's blood administered by the ancients as a poison; another tracing the history of the kiss in antiquity; a third writing a dissertation on the ancient alloys of copper, and threatening to give us a library on "Metal-Cultur"; this is the tendency of our specializing age, that needs to be counteracted in the interest of true science.

(4) Growing out of this is the failure properly to relate philology with the sciences of to-day and with modern life as a whole. The present discussion, now earnest and now flippant, as to the place of Greek in a liberal education, is at bottom the strife between the ancient and the modern that comes to issue most sharply in this field, where a purely theoretic interest in antiquity seems to stand opposed to the demands of practical life and the interests of the present.

This bare statement of the present condition of philology, which we believe describes with peculiar emphasis its status among us in America, itself indicates the demands that our special science now makes upon its votaries.

If we mistake not, the only solution of these problems lies in the application and prevalence of the principles whose genesis we have been setting forth and whose operation we have sought to illustrate. We believe, therefore, that the furtherance of philology demands that it should receive recognition and be pursued as a historical science and study,—using the term historical in its widest sense. And this involves first of all, that all special investigations should be made with the distinct aim to interpret the spiritual and intellectual life of antiquity as expressed in its literature and art, and in its institutions of government and religion. Any inscription that will help us to understand an allusion in Thucydides or a peculiar form in Homer will be welcome; but one that illustrates

simply a vagary or blunder of the lapidary can have but an accidental interest to the philologist. A vase that helps us to interpret a myth, or throws light on some ceremony, or explains a custom, will be highly prized; but one that shows us only the quality of the clay used in its construction, or the style of pottery of a particular period, interesting though this may be for some to know, need not occupy our attention. If then the researches of the German student in the history of the ancient mode and meaning of *osculating* can be shown to have any bearing upon the interpretation of any literary or historical monument, they are perfectly legitimate as a philological study; otherwise, they shall be relegated to the historian, who is content with the fact for its own sake. The mere annalist is not affected by Seneca's depreciatory observations on a certain kind of learning which he called "that disease of the Greeks," which consisted in enquiring how many rowers Odysseus had, and whether the Iliad or the Odyssey was first written; but the philologist who is satisfied and stops with answering these questions must justify himself, if he can, to the old Roman. The mere linguist, who is content when he has gained the knowledge of certain facts of language for their own sake, indispensable as the service is that he renders, is not entitled to the name of philologist in its historic sense, nor must he wonder if sometimes his true worth is overlooked, and if to him the sneering epigram of Herodicus is applied:

γωνιοβόμβυκες, μονοσύλλαβοι, οἷσι μέμηλεν
τὸ σφῖν καὶ τὸ σφῶν καὶ τὸ μῖν ἢ δὲ τὸ νῖν.*

To the philologist every fact, whether of language or of art, of custom or of belief, stands not simply and barely for itself, but is clothed, so to say, with the flesh and infused with the blood of that organic life of which it is at once an expression and a producing cause. A word of caution may possibly not be amiss against the present danger of over-interpretation of *statistics*. Figures in philology, if they do not lie, are not always sure to yield valuable results, and need to be interpreted historically. For instance, the fact that Sophocles uses the final particle *ἵνα* only half as often, bulk for bulk, as Euripides,

* "Bumble-bees in a corner, monosyllables, whose sole care is for σφῖν and σφῶν, and for μῖν and νῖν."

and *δπως* more than twice as often, cannot prove anything unless we know first the history of *δπως* and *ἴνα* in other writers contemporary with and before and after these.

But again, it is only when pursued in this historical spirit that the study of philology can hope to gain its true place in the interest of men of to-day. Here we recall the significant words of W. von Humboldt: "The study of the various languages of the world misses its aim, if it does not always keep in view the course of intellectual culture and find therein its true object."* I cannot undertake to say how far in other countries this aim of philological study may have been ignored; but in our own land it seems to me that a more just and broad view of philology needs to be cultivated, and the historical side of it needs to be made more prominent. I for one cannot doubt that the preponderance given among us to the formal and linguistic side of philology has led to its estrangement from the historical spirit of our age, and from the interest and sympathy of certain circles of intelligent men. No one can dispute that our American scholarship in philology has been one-sided. In looking over the Proceedings of this Association during all its history, one is struck with the slight consideration that has been given to archæological and historical study and criticism. The *Revue Critique*, in commenting on the Transactions of the American Philological Association for 1882, says: "It is noticeable how small a part relatively is devoted to the studies that are strictly philological, i. e. studies of criticism and interpretation. Grammar receives a little more attention, but that which prevails is linguistics." I am not aware that this volume is peculiar in these characteristics. Doubtless there has been reason for this predominance. We have no original documents in our libraries to collate and to edit; we have no monuments of art to interpret, no inscriptions to decipher, no ruins to explore (except such as belong to the semi-civilized antiquity of the prehistoric races of this continent); and so we have

* "Das Studium der verschiedenen Sprachen des Erdbodens verfehlt seiner Bestimmung, wenn es nicht immer den Gang der geistigen Bildung im Auge behält, und darin seinen eigentlichen Zweck sucht." Ueber die Kawi-Sprache, Werke, vol. vi, p. 428.

had to be content with taking our knowledge at second hand from English, German, and French explorers and critics. But all this is changing. Thanks to the zeal of our American Archæological Institute and the promise of our American School of Classical Studies at Athens, we are coming into the possession of original material; and we may hope to have American scholarship honored in the same field in which Foucart, Newton, Köhler, Smith, and other archæologists of Europe have gained their laurels. It is a matter of congratulation that we are not compelled to accept the views of an honored member of this Association which were expressed at our last meeting, to the effect that American scholars need not expect to have opportunity for original work in diplomatic and higher criticism, but must relegate this department of philological work to their more fortunate compeers in Europe. The project of the London Society for the promotion of Hellenic learning to publish facsimiles of the chief Codices of the Greek classics promises better things for us.

But after all, it is not so much the increase of original material for study that is to reinstate and fortify the study of philology among us in an honored place; it is rather the recognition of the fact that in studying classical philology our young men are studying that period in the history of human culture that is most inspiring and creative for the culture of our own day; that in studying what the old Greek and Roman said and did, they are unconsciously learning much that is truest and noblest for the modern American and European to say and to do. Jean Paul says: "Life would sink into an abyss, were our youth not to pass through the silent temple of the great ones of ancient days to the mart of daily life."

"Das Alte stürzt, es ändert sich die Zeit,
Und neues Leben blüht aus den Ruinen,"

says Schiller. In so far as the science of philology undertakes to make new life bloom for the modern from the ruins of the ancient world, its pursuit must be infused with the historical spirit which makes the present the child of the past and the parent of the future.

ARTICLE VI.—TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

IV. THE FUTURE OF TAXATION.

THE exceptional influences which have determined the fiscal legislation of the United States for the last twenty years have ended in the perversion of its constitutional power to purposes not foreseen by the constitution inasmuch as they are purposes not defined by the law. The State has charged all its expenses, or nearly all, to certain classes of its subjects selected from the others for acts which it has nowhere declared to be reasons for imposing exceptional burdens, which on the contrary it authorizes in the very act of imposing the burdens. The consumers of certain articles of domestic and foreign production furnish far the larger part of the national revenue, yet so far are they from having been found guilty of the real punishment they suffer that the continuance of the acts which bring the punishment is looked for as the continuing source of State revenue. We may, I think, be sure that this passing *equivoque* will be cleared up in the natural evolution of the commonwealth, notwithstanding the powerful array of interests which have created and maintain it: that the political instincts and intelligence of the people, the resentment of the classes which suffer, with the moral sentiment of the classes which profit by their suffering, will recall the perverted power of the State to the necessary distinctions, will effectually separate between the sovereign right of raising revenue, and the sovereign function of suppressing wrong, for which the revenue is raised. When this inevitable evolution has accomplished its term we shall have a State which no longer seeks to effect its ends in the act of providing the necessary means for them, but gets the means first and the ends afterward; which calls upon all its subjects impartially for their rightful portions of tribute, and then expends the tribute openly, without equivocation, indirection or disguise, for purposes of public and common import plainly defined in the law.

These two most distinct things, now confused in the action of the State, having been perfectly differentiated from one

another, will the sale and use of Swiss watches or alcoholic beverages, be regarded as a public wrong, calling for intervention of the State? If yes, then they will be declared to be so by laws expressing the will of the people to that effect, laws which convert the articles in question from sources of revenue into occasions of expenditure, and transfer the seller or user of them from the class of subjects held for taxation to the class held for punishment. That this rectification will take place speedily in the matter of pernicious articles, like intoxicating spirits, is unlikely, for in the face of all the obstacles to effective prohibition the moral sense of the community will insist upon such restraints as are to be had by increasing the cost of the article to the consumer. It is undeniably the purpose of the people that if drunkenness and ministering to drunkenness cannot be defined and punished as a crime according to the law, it shall be checked by heavy taxation; if its suppression cannot be made an end of expenditure its continuance shall furnish a source of revenue. And we need not look for any clearing up of the confusion in the action of the State until we have got it first in the purpose of the people. But for the sale and use of commodities which have nothing against them but their foreign origin the case is different. The feeling which actually exists as to the disloyalty or lack of patriotism in using these articles, is too ill defined, and when defined too preposterous to admit of serious discussion. We may be sure therefore, that in time the good sense and real interest of the people will get the better of a prejudice unworthy of them, and of the selfish interest of the class which profits by it.

But although the issue is certain, it is not yet at all easy to predict by what circuits and gradations the aberrant power of the State will be recalled to the strict exercise of its specific functions. I write at the opening of the debate upon Mr. Morrison's new tariff, a most inconclusive measure, full of partisan precautions, whose significance is that it indicates with the sensitiveness of a barometer the complex and delicate equilibrium of political forces which always precedes a new departure in public policy. On the one hand there is concentrated upon the legislature the powerful pressure of the alarmed manufacturers, who have finally succeeded, it would seem, in

identifying the fortunes of the party which is the author of the protective tariff with their own; on the other there is the body of the people, still under the spell of old prevailing notions and habits, confused in its economical ideas and distracted in its political allegiance, but slowly charging like a Leyden jar or a thunder-cloud, as in the years before Lincoln's election, with a new impulse and a new intelligence and already needing but the right sort of a conductor and the provocation of a new contact to discharge with irresistible power. The simple question is whether the slowly forming purpose of the people will take effect as it forms, forcing the State to undo step by step the legislation of the last twenty years; or will be held in check by the interest of the manufacturers, the timidities of commerce, and the exigencies of political parties until it is fully formed and escapes all restraint in instantaneous and exhaustive action. The latter is indicated by the organization of the present Congress and the consequent disarray of the Democratic party, the effect of which will probably be to leave a diffuse public sentiment without an accredited organ in presence of an imperilled interest and a powerful organization. There is, I think, no reason for impatience in this, as positive convictions and decisive action when they come at last are always better than irresolution and half measures. The business of the country could more easily adjust itself to the certainty that the artificial prices created by the protective tariff would disappear at a given time, than to the vicissitudes of experimental reductions. On the whole, therefore, we may hope that the deadlock at Washington will be prolonged until the constituency is ready to issue a peremptory and conclusive mandate to the State, and that the State in the meanwhile will be spared the necessity of consulting the constituency by tentative legislation before it has fully made up its mind.

But the final result in either case is practically the same and is now inevitable at no distant date. The classification of taxable commodities according to the accidental fact of origin will give way to a selection according to real differences, namely, first the relative accessibility to taxation of any article no matter where it comes from, and secondly its relative power of distributing the tax among the subjects. We may profitably

inquire how this change will take effect, what articles are likely to remain upon or to be added to the list as the future source of State revenue.

I. It is evident to begin with, that the opposition of the interested classes once out of the way, the reduction hitherto confined to the Internal Revenue tariff will be immediately extended to the Customs Tariff, but with this capital difference, that while the taxation of domestic articles was lessened to concentrate the burden on foreign articles, the latter will be lessened in order to apportion the whole burden equally to the distribution of the national wealth. First of all, to the list of articles which have never figured in either tariff because practically inaccessible to measurement or valuation, will be added all those articles of foreign origin, which in spite of their relative inaccessibility have been subject to duty for the sole purpose of protecting the domestic article. The latter motive removed, the first question for consideration will be whether the duty on any given article is worth the difficulty, the cost, and the consequences of collecting it. Articles for example of very small bulk and high value, like precious stones, or fine laces, are always driven by a customs duty into the hands of the smuggler, with the effect that the honest importer is undersold, the market deranged, and the government defrauded by wares which have escaped all taxation. In like manner of articles which although they cannot escape the eye of the government are difficult of valuation. Sugar for example, is not easily smuggled over the frontier in considerable quantities, but it is so susceptible of disguise by its chemical character that costly scientific tests are necessary to determine what any consignment of it is really worth, and what duty it should bear. It is further to be remembered that an article like sugar, or tissues of cotton or wool, may be perfectly accessible if the whole supply is delivered as an import at a few points on the frontier, and the contrary if partly produced within the country and put upon the market at a hundred different points, without concentration. Evidently under any rational classification a multitude of commodities now taxed in the interest of some manufacturer or manufacturing class will disappear from the list as unproductive sources of revenue, and this process of natural selection

will go on until the several commodities are found which upon actual trial yield the largest return at the smallest expense, and with the least derangement of the market. So far as the character of accessibility is concerned nothing could be better than an article wholly of foreign origin and consumed in large quantities, like tea or coffee, of which the whole supply is necessarily concentrated at a few ports of entry before reaching the market.

But to the character of accessibility to taxation must be added in the second place the power of distributing the tax to the subjects. It is not enough that an article lie well in the way of the government if it concentrates upon a few a burden which should be borne in equable proportion by all. This is why real estate and other forms of fixed capital, although by reason of their immobility the most conspicuous and accessible kinds of wealth, are unsatisfactory sources of public revenue. A farm or farm-building cannot be hidden away, nor can its real value well be understated without collusion of all the landowners in the neighborhood, but it has a low power and a round-about way of distributing the charges upon it to other property. It is not unfitted for local taxation, where prompt and wide distribution are not required, but the central government whose revenues are gathered from a great population spread over half a continent, has already been driven to restrict taxation to circulating capital, that is, to forms of property held for exchange and thus brought within easier reach before dispersion upon final sale as fixed capital. But here again there is wide range for selection, for if any form of circulating capital has a higher distributing power than any form of fixed capital, some forms of circulating capital have higher distributing power than others. Superiority in this respect is determined by two things, first the subdivision of the commodity upon final sale for consumption, and second the extent of the consumption. A machine like a watch, a steam engine, or a ship, cannot be subdivided at all, and the whole duty upon it must be paid by the single individual who purchases it for use. To be sure he will reimburse himself gradually for the duty he pays, as for the other charges which make up his whole investment, by interest and profits collected from those who take

time from his watch, or find work for his engine or ship, but this is the round-about and remote distribution of charges which disqualifies all forms of fixed capital for national taxation. Only such forms of circulating capital therefore as admit of minute subdivision upon sale are fittest for taxation where wide distribution is required. Cotton, woolen, and linen tissues, fluids and foods of all kinds, in general commodities taken out of circulation for immediate consumption and not for permanent occupancy or use, are instances in point. But, again, this capability of minute subdivision upon sale for consumption is not enough unless the consumption itself is considerable. Crude opium, for example, besides being recommended as an article wholly of foreign origin, is absorbed in minuter portions than spirits or tobacco, but the demand for it is so limited that its effective distributing power is indefinitely less. So other things being equal an article consumed by many persons is fitter for taxation than one consumed by few, and the fittest of all is one of universal consumption. Here, however, it is to be observed that other things are not at all equal for the multitude among whom the duties are to be divided, differ widely in the amounts of their wealth and therefore in the amounts of tribute they severally owe to the State. Unless we can bring it about that the rich man will consume more of a dutiable commodity in the proportion of his wealth, the larger fortunes will nearly escape and the main burden fall upon those who are less able to bear it and who owe less. Hence arise the necessities of a compound and compensating tariff, which are the chief obstacle to any system of equitable taxation. There are articles of prime necessity produced at small cost in great abundance to meet a universal demand, which are well fitted to carry the duties upon them to the whole population, but requiring to be supplemented by others fitted in another way to carry the duties principally or entirely to the larger fortunes. Such are articles of convenience or luxury produced at high cost in small quantities, and therefore within reach of those only who can afford them. The object of the State is the strictly impersonal one of making the wealth of each of its subjects wherever situated and however held, pay its rightful share of tribute. The commodity which carries the

tax upon it to the greatest amount of wealth, whether by its costliness or its subdivision and dispersion upon sale—so to say by the intensiveness, or by the extensiveness, of its distributing power, is the fittest for taxation.

To sum up: when the alien motives which now obstruct the action of the State are withdrawn the natural development of our fiscal system will be resumed by the abandonment, at once or one after the other, of the larger number of articles now subject to duty, and the concentration of the whole burden upon a few articles selected for superior accessibility and distributing power as the most economical, productive, and equitable sources of revenue. This is the result indicated by the experience of Great Britain, the only considerable state which has escaped the trammels of a protective tariff. The larger part of the British revenue is now drawn from duties on imported tea and tobacco and on alcoholic fluids, whether of domestic or foreign origin; a tariff whose greatest defect is its inadequate taxation of the larger fortunes. Granting that the State is to return to intelligent legislation in behalf of the whole people, this with the needful compensations is the probable form of our own system in the future.*

II. But now we have to inquire whether this is the last term of our fiscal evolution, the mode in which the revenues of the United States will be raised in all time to come; or whether

* I do not raise the question of the relative superiority of the specific and ad valorem duties, as both so far as the purpose of this discussion is concerned involve the same principle. The specific duty is a tax proportioned to the quantity, the ad valorem to the value of a given commodity. The former, which has been adopted by Great Britain, and retained in our present Internal Revenue tariff, is more convenient for the government, as the quantity of any article is more easily ascertained than its value. The latter, which characterizes our Customs tariff is more equitable for the people by reason of its more perfect distribution. I incline to the opinion that the ad valorem duty will prevail in our future system of national taxation, at any rate until the wants of the State are so slight in proportion to the wealth of the country, that it can consult its own convenience more freely than it is likely to be able to do for years to come.

Upon this decrease in the proportion of State expenses to the wealth of the country, depends too the rapidity with which the revenue can be charged to a decreasing number of commodities. As things are, we are not likely to reach the extreme simplicity of the British tariff until the national debt is extinguished.

like the present mode, it is a mere halting-place and stepping-stone on the way to a better. When the revenue which twenty years ago was drawn from almost every form of property at all accessible to the government, from capital fixed and circulating, from capital and the earnings of capital, has at last been apportioned to the dozen or half-dozen commodities best fitted to yield it, will it remain there, or will this new apportionment suggest and prepare the way for another? According to the hypothesis, the half-dozen commodities will have been selected under actual trial solely for their superior capacity of putting the State exactly in possession of its own, that is of an equable proportion of the current income of each of its subjects. Now we know by simple calculation of the forces at work and by the experience of other states that no commodity or set of commodities can be found which will perfectly distribute the charges upon it in the manner desired. An article may be had, like cotton or grain, which will divide the duty among the whole population, but it will always be in the proportion of each person's consumption and not in the requisite proportion of his income. This inequality again may be diminished by adding other articles which reach the larger incomes alone, but no possible combination will overcome all inequality. It follows that the forces of fiscal evolution have not been entirely expended in its latest product; the system of taxation already reached in Great Britain, and which we are slowly approaching, holds in it a tendency to farther evolution. Now this tendency has been definitely arrested in Great Britain and in the same circumstances will be arrested here. Like most of the older states Great Britain has reached what looks like a permanent equilibrium between revenue and expenditure; after long experiment it has found the combination of articles which draws from the wealth of the nation the highest tribute it will yield; and as this tribute barely suffices for the current expenditure, including provision for emergencies and slow reduction of the capital debt, it follows that Great Britain has not the power to experiment much farther. It must take what it can get and what the people are used to and will put up with. So Mr. Lowe's famous tax on friction matches, borrowed from us for temporary increase of the revenue, was fairly beaten out

of parliament by fierce invasion of public opinion, although the article was recommended for taxation by its power of wide and equable distribution. It will be long before any British ministry will be able or will dare to undertake any considerable readjustment of public burdens because it has no room for experiments which the people will not bear. But we are in a different case. With the disappearance of the last traces of the rebellion, and of all complications other than those created by our own incompetence or perversity, we shall have reached that happy situation of fiscal plenitude which statesmen of all times have dreamed of without seeing, an expenditure admitting of progressive diminution with an inexhaustible and ever increasing source of revenue. For the first time in the history of political finance a great state will have the opportunity of unobstructed experiment, of working out to the end the historical problem of securing the private rights of the subject in the very act of enforcing its sovereign right to tribute.

Now I think there is no doubt that the system I have described is the highest and last possible form of indirect taxation, the form better fitted than all others of the kind to put the State exactly in the possession of its own. If it goes farther there is only one step left for it to take, namely from this last form of indirect taxation, to the direct appropriation of what really belongs to it, an equable proportion of the income of each of its subjects.*

The objections to an income tax have been carefully studied by writers on political economy, and may all be included under two heads. There is first the inaccessibility of the property subject to tribute, due to its remoteness from the centre of government, to the interminable variety of forms in which it is produced, and to the difficulty of estimating the different

* I take occasion to repeat here what was said in a former paper, that by fixed capital I mean simply capital which is *fixed*, that is property of any kind kept out of circulation for occupancy, use, or consumption; and by circulating capital, property of the same kinds held for exchange with other kinds. In the evolution of our fiscal system taxation has already been transferred from all kinds of fixed to certain articles of circulating capital, with a prospective tendency to diminution in the number of articles. I hold that if the evolution goes any farther it can only be by transferring taxation from capital to the one form of wealth left to tax, namely, the product or revenue of capital, which is the income-tax.

forms according to any single standard of values. We have a population of over 50,000,000, in all conditions of penury and riches, drawing revenue out of the rents of real estate, the dividends upon stocks, the interest of bonds and other evidences of indebtedness, the profits of business, the wages of labor; wealth flowing much of it in varying volume, from hidden sources, through obscure channels, apparently defying all scrutiny without the good-will of the holder. Secondly, although there is no question here, as in the tax on circulating capital, of the inequalities of distribution, yet were the amounts of incomes ascertained and reduced to a common standard, and the proportion due to the State determined, the direct appropriation of this proportion would work with the most curious inequality of effects. Let us suppose that the proportion called for is one per centum of the annual product of the whole wealth of the nation and that it is taken indiscriminately from an income of \$1000 yielded by invested capital, a salary of \$1000 paid to an employé, and the wages of a laborer who earns \$1000. Ten years hence the clerk and the laborer may be disabled for work, both without resources, yet having paid the same tribute as the capitalist who still has his investment. It may happen too that the earnings of the clerk or the laborer have provided for the wants of a growing family, so that his effective income has all along been less than that of the capitalist who has paid tribute for himself alone, and not also for those dependent on him. There is here, and in other like effects of the income tax, a grievous inequality in the very equality of the burdens, and the evident necessity of compensations to adjust the tax to the nature as well as to the amounts, the quality as to the quantity of different incomes.

But it must be observed that all these are inconveniences inseparable from taxation in any form, and that the thing to be ascertained is the particular form which offers the minimum of inconvenience. In any case the rightful property of the State is a uniform, or to speak now with entire precision, an equable proportion of the income of each of its subjects, that is, a uniform proportion full allowance made for the character as well as the amount of the income; and so the question is whether the indirection of the tax upon circulating capital reaches this

proportion more satisfactorily than the direct income-tax ; not whether a particular commodity is more accessible than the incomes of all the subjects, which of course it is, but whether the incomes are more accessible through the commodity by reason of its distributing power, than they are in themselves. In other words, shall the State send out its commissioned agents through the length and breadth of the land to take its own wherever it lies and by whomsoever it is held ; or avail itself of the wide flowing currents of commerce to carry its requisitions for it, taking what it needs from the dealers in certain commodities who reimburse themselves on sale to their customers, that is, who collect the tribute as unaccredited agents of the State ? There is a good deal to be said on both sides and I am rather inclined to submit the question than to attempt an answer. But this much I think is clear, that the practicability of the income tax depends more than that of the other upon the temper, habits, and character of the people. As things are the inconveniences of the indirect tax are patiently borne, partly because the payer is accustomed to them, partly because the tax does not take effect where it is levied, but later on where it disappears among all the other charges paid together as whole cost by the consumer, who is really no more aware that he is paying duty to the government than freight to the carrier or insurance to the underwriter. So an indirect tax of any kind must be peculiarly oppressive if it is distinctly felt and resisted by the consumer of the article on which it is laid. Contrariwise the income-tax takes effect when and where collected and is wholly borne by the person who pays it, so that whatever oppressiveness there is in it comes out undisguised and unrelieved. This I take to be an unanswerable objection to the income-tax as levied by the State hitherto, and the only one seriously considered by the political economists, which is an occasional, supplementary tax added to the ordinary sources of revenue, and paid only by a single class. In these circumstances it cannot but be an odious impost which the class directly affected may be counted on to resist or evade. But what we are considering is an income-tax which supersedes all others, adjusted to the qualities of differing incomes, and paid by all the subjects alike each in the measure

of his resources and obligations, therefore a tax which escapes the odium of invidious and oppressive distinctions, and commends itself to the conscience and good sense of the whole population. No doubt it leaves with the payer the irritating consciousness of the burden he bears, but a people whose obligations to the State must be carefully concealed from it under the appearance of other forms of indebtedness, which can only be trusted to pay tribute under the illusion that it is part of the cost of some commodity, has its political education to make and is not yet fit for self-government. Add that this exact consciousness of the burdens it bears is of inestimable value in maintaining the vigilance of the people and so putting upon the State the perpetual restraint of power held to strict accountability. It is the absence of this control and the opportunity of disguise and evasion in its fiscal measures, which has permitted all the abuses of taxation in our own as in other governments. On the whole we may conclude that the tendency of fiscal evolution in the United States will be to the substitution of a direct income-tax for all other forms of taxation, and that this result will be averted only by the persistence of such other forms.

Now there are no taxes of the national government which it is not able to relinquish whenever it chooses to do so. The one obstacle in its way, and for a long time to come no doubt the insuperable obstacle, is the fact that its own subjects are taxed by other governments over whose fiscal measures it has no sufficient control. Beyond a certain point its action is paralyzed by the unrestrained and discordant license of local taxation, the tribute collected by all sorts of imposts on all forms of property in each of the little and large republics superposed upon one another over the whole surface of its domain. How can it definitely resolve a problem in applied science complicated, for example, by the Milesian financiering of the municipality of New York? The truth is that one of the most formidable dangers of all modern societies is what I have called the license of local taxation. With us it is aggravated beyond measure by the anomalous autonomy of the several States, which historically are the perpetuation of the colonial system of Great Britain, the one restraint upon the

normal development of our polity which we omitted to throw off in the war of Independence. As to the utilities of the sovereign state as the constituent unit of the United States there can of course be no doubt or it would not have survived, but they are all essentially of a provisional and transitory kind, and accompanied by all the disadvantages of ill-regulated and irritable power, of discordant and incalculable action. All the great convulsions of our political history and half its discrepancies and futilities, so far as they have depended on political forms, have followed directly from the licentiousness of state sovereignty. It is not to be regretted, for the premature disclosure of its pretensions has brought down upon it a mightier power, the abiding and irresistible tendencies of American civilization. Whether by violent blows or by incessant abrasion the exaggerated power of the separate state in our political system has continually declined, and is declining, and will in good time be reduced to its just proportions. When that time comes, along with a multitude of other simplifications, we may perhaps look for an assimilated system of taxation over the whole realm, a tribute drawn for all the purposes of public administration, national or local, by accordant measures from a single source, the current product of the wealth of the people. Under a system so unified the needless multiplication of public functionaries commissioned for the same purpose by separate authorities will cease, and the central government will be able to avail of all the real efficiency of local taxation, the intimate knowledge which the local authorities have of the property to be assessed. I see no sufficient reason why in these circumstances the whole tribute of the people may not be collected directly by taxation of incomes. It may be assumed that pending their arrival the revenues of the United States will be collected by the system to which we are now visibly approaching; and the revenues of the several States with their dependent republics—anyhow, according to the wisdom of man and the patience of heaven.

ARTICLE VII.—THE TEACHING OF MORALS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

A CAREFUL discrimination between morals and religion, as branches of study, must be maintained, in examining this subject. Forty years ago, more or less, evangelical religion was taught in the public schools. This was not desirable or defensible, and reaction culminated in excluding the formal teaching of even morals. The two extremes are each unfortunate, and there is a growing readiness to recover from the present extreme, if the people may be sure that it will not go over into the teaching of theology. There is a system of morals, aside from and independent of the systems of religion. The former is indispensable to the highest style of citizen, and may be taught as a study, separate from any type of religion. While doubtless the system of Christian morals is the highest and noblest, the State may labor morally and successfully for the construction of the best citizen without direct appeal to the Christian system for authority and support. This policy is suggested in view of the different opinions on religion, and in view of the provision in its constitution, that the State may not hurt, molest or restrain one "for his religious profession or sentiments."

The reader will indulge the expressing of an opinion as to the nature and office of law in this matter. Civil law is a stationary and not a progressive power; it is not a reformer, but a conservator, and can only hold and not get. It is as the ratchet on the capstan, when one is heaving the anchor; it cannot gain an inch, but will hold every inch given to it. Under our popular government, the statutes are the finality or last forms of the popular will, as the castings for a machine. In them the people become the government and say: "We propose to work in this way." To obtain a law, therefore, adroitly, or with a concealed intent, or that is openly in advance of the popular will, is as foolish as it is unphilosophical. The people will say: "We did not ask for this law, we do not

like it; we do not propose to enforce it." The people and the government are one and the same power or will, in different but not antagonistic positions. On the question before us, therefore, there is no place for a civil statute or utility in one, unless the people have made up their mind that they want one to define what they wish to do.

The theory and practice of Massachusetts will serve well in illustrating our general topic. The report of the Board of Education for 1877-8 says: "The public schools were established that they might train the youth to be good citizens."—p. 86. The report for 1880 says: "The State holds in its own hands the power to determine what must be the character and extent of that education which its own safety requires all its children to possess." "Whatever may be said of other institutions, it is still true that in our common schools are to be found the sources of those influences that are to mould the character of our Commonwealth."—p. 15. And again: "It is the opinion of many thoughtful men that our schools are not as fruitful in morals as in intellectual results. This ought not to be; for that education is not worthy the name which does not imply a symmetrical training of the whole nature."—p. 118.

The following is a noble passage in the Report of the Secretary for 1877-8: "The omissions of the moral element from the public instruction of the children of a State will soon produce a State not worth preserving."—p. 86. The remark of Macauley in the House of Commons in 1847 is a good companion to this: "The education of the people ought to be the first concern of the State."

And in the Report for 1877-8, the Board themselves say: "If our schools are to be the safeguards of our republic, as we fondly trust, our teachers must feel that upon them rests the responsibility of so training the youth committed to their care that they shall go forth from the schools, imbued with the principles of sound morality."—p. 9. And the Secretary adds: "Moral philosophy is to be added to the course to make it complete." "The children are to be carefully taught what are their moral relations to one another, to their teachers, their parents, to the State, and to God." Superintendents and teachers would do well "to keep constantly in mind in all they do

for the schools," "that one of the two ends sought in a common school education is the complete training of the whole nature of the children." "These children should be kept in the schools until they have acquired a knowledge of their own wants as physical and moral beings, . . . of the relations they bear to one another, as members of Society, and of the relations they bear to the State, whose institutions they are to perpetuate." And yet again: "However important may be the knowledge of reading, writing and arithmetic, that knowledge sinks into insignificance in comparison with intellectual and moral training." And it is pleasing to notice that Ohio and Missouri express the same high sentiment.—pp. 97, 117, 63, 89.

These are noble conceptions of public education, and worthy this ancient commonwealth; and it is now next in place to enquire what ways and means the State is using to put so good a theory into the most practical use.

As to Law. The fact leads, that the Constitution of Massachusetts makes it the duty of legislators and magistrates "to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their dealings, sincerity, good humor and all social affections, and generous sentiments among the people."—*Const.*, Chap. V, Sec. 2.

This is the constitutional warrant and basis for legislation in specific laws. One of these and the principal is this:

"It shall be the duty of the president, professors and tutors of the University of Cambridge and of the several colleges, of all preceptors and teachers of academies, and of all other instructors of youth to exert their best endeavors to impress on the minds of children and youth committed to their care and instruction, the principles of piety and justice and a sacred regard to truth; love of their country, humanity and universal benevolence; sobriety, industry and frugality; chastity, moderation and temperance; and those other virtues which are the ornament of human society and the basis upon which a republican constitution is founded; and it should be the duty of such instructors to endeavor to lead their pupils, as their ages and capacities will admit, into a clear understanding of the tendency of the above mentioned virtues to pre-

serve and perfect a republican constitution, and secure the blessings of liberty as well as to promote their future happiness, and also to point out to them the evil tendency of the opposite vices."—*General Statutes*, Chap. 38, Sec. 16.

The editor of the Massachusetts School Laws well says of this one: "This provision of the constitution contains an emphatic expression of the will of the people concerning the introduction of the moral element into all our public instruction."

Perhaps the magnificent sweep of this law makes it a little impersonal to common school teachers, since it includes the presidents and professors and teachers in all our colleges, academies and private schools, who are not the employes of the State, and so not the direct subjects of a State order. Possibly this feature of a splendid legislative paragraph has led the paid servants of the State in education to regard it as hortatory rather than mandatory. At least so it appears to have been treated. So much, however, the statute *permits* in the teaching of morals. We pass now to notice what provisions there are in detail to make this grand statute operative.

"Laws have been passed requiring . . . uniform courses of study for the different grades of schools."—*School Laws of Massachusetts*, p. 11.

The laws, collective, name about forty studies, and make it imperative that those *shall* be taught. These range from the simplest primary up through the Grammar, High and Normal schools. No other than those named is made imperative. *The study of morals is not one of them.* The teacher of a high school in a town of 4,000 inhabitants is required to be *able* to teach moral science, but it is optional with the committee whether it be taught or not. Of the other ten branches for a high school the law says, he "*shall* give instruction" in them; but of moral science it says only that he "*shall be competent* to give instruction" in it.—*School Laws*, p. 23.

In defining the purpose of the six normal schools the Board of Education say, in 1880, that one design is to acquire in them "the most thorough knowledge of the branches of learning required to be taught in the schools." They then give a list of forty-one, and add to it this: "The above is an enumeration of the studies."—*School Laws*, pp. 57–8.

But moral science is not one of them as required by law to be studied in the normal schools. The explanation of the omission may be found in the statement of the Board that normal pupils are to study there only "the branches of learning required to be taught in the schools."

The nearest approach to statute obligation to teach morals in the public schools is where "good behavior" is specified. This is named once only and in connection with the lowest or primary studies.—*School Laws*, 1883, p. 22.

"Good behavior" pertains, generically, to manners rather than morals. Worcester says: "Behavior relates especially to the corporeal actions and to the minor morals of society. Carriage, manners, deportment and demeanor are different species of behavior."

The law is very clear and honorably high in requiring good morals in the teacher, and the expression of this imperative pre-requisite is varied, frequent and abundant.

Moreover, the School Committee of any town or city has power to exclude from a school "a child whom they deem to be of a licentious and immoral character" and, if this is done in good faith, the act is not subject to revision.—*School Laws*, 28, 45.

Among the duties of the School Committee the statute says: "The School Committee shall direct what books shall be used in the public schools, and shall prescribe, as far as practicable, a course of studies and exercises to be pursued therein."—*School Laws*, 32.

Under this law it is presumed that the power of the committee to prescribe a course of study is confined to the list of studies specified by law for the different grades of schools. In other words, their power is the power of selection for adaptation and not for the original nomination of a study which the statutes have not named. They may select from the State list of studies what the school in question seems to need, and "direct what books shall be used" for those studies. If it be a high school the committee have the option to prescribe moral science; and if the view given of the duties of the committee be correct, they have no power to prescribe it as a study in any other school below a high school.

Of high schools there are about 220 in the State, and they are so located that about ninety per cent. of all the school-children may have the advantage of them. They are the only schools where the law authorizes moral science as a study, and its introduction into any one of these is left optional with the local School Committee. To what extent local option is now introducing it, cannot be said, but four years ago this question was sent out quite widely among the principals of our high schools and received a unanimous negative: "Are morals taught as a topic in your high school?" Some answers brought the addition that they seized incidents and occasion for moral teaching.

At this stage of our inquiry we discover, therefore, these three facts: that morals are not enjoined as a study in any grade of the public schools in Massachusetts as is arithmetic or botany or military drill; that it is permitted to the high schools and left optional with the committee; that instruction in morals is incidental, occasional, and optional with the teachers, if given at all.

Probably so grave a trust does nowhere fall to a body so worthy, morally and intellectually. The presence of their daily life, in and out of the school room, clothed with those virtues which are the highest ornament of society, is a constant lesson on morality. We cannot too highly commend the conscientiousness and zeal of those who comprehend their opportunity to do the State great service. This they are to render, not so much through an organism as an atmosphere. For their other duties, apparatus and methods are officially furnished; for this they have only their own admiration and love of moral worth, and sense of obligation to promote it. Under the pressure of multiplied topics and recitations by assignment and authority, and a crowding complexity of duties that are always impatient of the irregular, unexpected and extempore, this chance for the intrusion of moral lessons is flitting about them. The chance is fascinating and tempting to the susceptible, who may have command of the occasion and the time.

This is the leading theory and reliance of Massachusetts for the teaching of morals. It is left or committed to the good will and sense of obligation on the part of the teacher, and to

such contingencies as may usurp moments from systematic proceedings. The branch is not honored with mention, even, in the laws of the Commonwealth, except where it is assigned with equal authority, if not expectation, to "the president, professors, and tutors of the university of Cambridge and of the several colleges, and preceptors and teachers of academies."

Of course here, as elsewhere, in human administrations, the practice falls behind the theory, and it does not surprise us to hear the Board of Education say, as in their Report for 1877-8:

"The importance of the public schools, as an agency for teaching morals and the duties of citizenship, is a point often ignored or neglected."—1877-8, p. 9.

In the same Report the Hon. Secretary, Mr. Dickinson, confesses with regret that "there is a tendency in modern times to separate the æsthetical and moral from other forms of culture in the public schools. . . . The training of the conscience they would leave to home influences and to the teachings of the church. Such sentiments have a tendency to degrade the public schools, and to divert them from pursuing the very ends they were established to attain."—pp. 85, 6.

We think the Secretary is correct in his apprehension of the public will when he adds: "The people are demanding more and more of their educational institutions. . . . They desire above all other things to have their children subjected to those educating influences which mould the character into the highest forms of moral strength and moral beauty."

And we think, as we eminently desire, that his prophecy is correct when he says:

"The schools of the future will do more than the schools of the immediate past have done toward training up the children to live a moral as well as intellectual life."—*Report*, 1878-9, p. 68.

Dr. R. H. Newton does not too strongly set forth obligation in this line:

"The supreme need of ethical instruction in our public schools ought, surely, to need no assertion. In any rational theory of education, everything should lead up to character, and conduct."—*North American Review*, August, 1883.

Plato has the same: "I mean by education that training which is given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue in children."—*Laws, Book II.*

The popular disappointment over moral results from the schools, and the desire for something more, has probably been mildly stated in the extracts given from the Reports of the Board and of the Hon. Secretary. The demands coming up from the circles of business for a higher and more reliable moral tone grow imperious and almost clamorous. State and Wall streets are inclined to put financial estimates on business morals, and there are many, whose names are quoted for honor and integrity, as some stocks are quoted, and never below par.

We now come to a final turn in this paper under two questions: What is Needed? What is Possible?

The State needs a good citizen and proposes to produce one through her schools. She proposes to furnish not a religious but a municipal person—not a Protestant or Catholic, or even a national, nominal Christian, but a citizen. It ought not to be necessary to say that an indispensable element in a fair citizen is a fair secular morality. This is somewhat natural but largely cultivated and acquired. But the State has, to the extent we have showed, ignored or left out the moral nature in educating the citizen. The child, furnished by nature as raw stock, for the State to manufacture into a good citizen, has three elements of personality, physical, mental, and moral. He is put in preparation for a citizen with this third element of stock recognized, it is true; but it is barely, optionally touched by the workman, as compared with his use of the physical and mental stock. The result—the article produced—shows an inherent, organic defect, because the manufacturer has not worked in all his stock. This policy is unphilosophical and the process unscientific in not recognizing and suitably educating the three-fold nature to produce symmetrical manhood in the citizen, and the result is proportionally unsatisfactory. Painful failures are constantly occurring in domestic, social, business, and political life. What is the matter? A third part of the falling man or woman has not had fair play and a good chance, as compared with the other two parts, and the falling is the philosophical result of an organic weakness.

Such falling ought not to surprise us. Natural consequences ought not to surprise the intelligent.

Many of the native born, whom Massachusetts is trying to reform at Westboro and elsewhere, are now pupils of her penal code, to whom she failed to teach the moral code. Boston is more philosophical in effort to secure pure water. It goes first to the fountains and not to the faucets. The Board of Education says correctly: "The Public Schools were established that they might train the youth to be good citizens." And for such a purpose Massachusetts no more needs the physical athlete, or the intellectual, than she does the moral. The highway of the human race has had too many of the first two and not enough of the latter to make the road safe and the travel comfortable. "The State holds in its own hands the power to determine what must be the character and extent of that education which its own safety requires all its children to possess." And this is said wisely by the Board, on the principle that right living between man and man, and good citizenship, are mostly matters of education into which one must be developed.

And to quote once more and more emphatically: "The omission of the moral element from the public instruction of the children of the State will soon produce a State not worth preserving."—1877-8, p. 86.

Evidently there is not enough moral power generated in Massachusetts to meet her business and civil necessities. The supply is not up to the demand in the market, and the unsupplied are waiting to be furnished in the reformatory institutions of the State. The public rather than the penal schools should be administered and expected to furnish them.

From the early workings of that magnificent Lyman plan and foundation laid at Westboro, Massachusetts has been laboring with tentative variations on the problem of juvenile waywardness and criminality. Mostly the processes have been curative rather than preventive. The moral nature, where alone waywardness and criminality can have origin and growth, seems to be first discovered, or at least recognized by the State, after it has become vitiated and damaging to the Commonwealth. Cannot the State touch the moral part of its three-

fold child and coming citizen, before it reaches Westboro in a damaged and criminal condition? If the State did not assume control, to an extent, over the other two-thirds of the child, and on the ground that it has a governmental right to provide for itself good citizens out of its native born material, it might, with some consistency, decline to take the other or moral third in hand, till it becomes viciously impaired and hurtful to the common good. But if the State may so far rise above the private rights of the family as to make compulsory an amount of intellectual and physical training of its children for a public end, why suspend authority and work, when the moral nature is reached? Does the right of eminent domain, so to speak, end for the State and begin with the family on a moral boundary?

Of course the State is not barred by any theory that the moral nature cannot be aided in its development, and towards the virtues.

What is possible in teaching morals in the Public Schools? To teach them is of course possible. Geography for beginners. History for beginners. Why not Morals for beginners? The question answers itself. The awakened mind is hardly more responsive to the declarations of the multiplication table than to a table of primary, juvenile morals. Moral truths can be received intellectually as well as any others on the same grade, and if not heartily always, yet as heartily as a child of ten receives many other important and useful truths.

It is possible to teach morals without teaching religion. There is a moral code clearly distinguishable from Judaism or Christianity, or Romanism, or Protestantism, a code on which each of these religionists can unite, together with an intelligent and virtuous theist. So much of a system of morals could be taught, not only with the assent, but to the delight of the community. Corporations, banks, civil and commercial offices, neighborhoods and dwelling houses would welcome heartily the practice of such a code and be immediately benefited. Moral qualities complete and crown such a citizen as the State wants and proposes to make. Before a duty so high and so imperative, Massachusetts has not been wont to hesitate and confer about impossibles. The question, whether it is possible

for her to teach her own children morals in her own schools, carries with it an unpleasant implication.

The problem concerning juvenile immoralities and crimes is becoming more and more imperious for solution, and the working of it is almost entirely in the line of reformation and not of prevention. It is much as if we should ignore vaccination, and move extensively for small-pox hospitals. Is not the time at hand for the higher civilization and an almost idolized public school system to take in hand the education of the neglected and best third in the nature of the child?

ARTICLE VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE LOVE.*—This book, as its second and longer title shows (see below), is a treatise on Christian Ethics written from the theological point of view held by a devoted advocate of the more strictly confessional sort in the “Evangelical Church.” It might almost equally well be said that it is a treatise on systematic theology written from the point of view furnished by New Testament Ethics of the Johannean type. For the complete blending or fusion of Biblical (almost wholly that of the New Testament) theology and systematic moral philosophy is the avowed principle and purpose of the author. This is more true of Sartorius than of Nitzsch, in his *System der Christlichen Lehre*, whom the former praises (p. xiii.) for taking a similar point of view. In the judgment of Sartorius it has been the bane of both Christian Ethics and Christian systematic theology, that they have so often been separated, and treated as though they sprung from a different root and had a different content. Such separation has caused a harmful *contrast* (p. x.) between “theory and practice,” “doctrine and love.” The author of this book, therefore, opposes “this severance of the moral and the theological, which is of Pelagian origin, and which places ethics in a position of self-sufficient independence.” His opposition is open, hearty, and maintained throughout (see p. xv.). A living science of Christianity does “not consist of two divided and coördinate branches of dogma and morals, but in an individual life of God in man and man in God.” Hence his striking phrase,—“a Holy Ethics.” The Spirit of truth—ethical and scientific truth—is the Holy Spirit.

There is a certain pious warmth and spiritual *con amore* about this work. In his opening sentence the author exhibits on his breast the signs of what was called in Neander, a “pectoral theology.” “Theology,” says Sartorius, p. ix., “is a sacred science, it is practical knowledge, i. e. a combination of the apprehension of the intellect with the dispositions of the heart.”

* *The Doctrine of Divine Love*, or Outlines of the Moral Philosophy of the Evangelical Church. By ERNEST SARTORIUS; translated by SOPHIA TAYLOR. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1884.

Such honor we are quite ready to do to *Theology* in the abstract, and in the concrete examples of certain men like Neander, Müller, Dorner, and their like; but *the* theology of not a few, of most of the writers and teachers whose words are in the papers, reviews, and lecture-rooms of the theological world, we esteem to be far from "sacred" as to "the dispositions of the heart."

The point of starting for Sartorius is, "instead of the usual definitions of religion, reason, revelation, etc.," "that scriptural definition of God, as brief as it is excellent, God is Love (1 John iv. 8), which is not merely the commencement, but also the vital principle from which theology . . . is developed in that community of believers called the Evangelical Church" (xi. f.) The last part of this sentence assures us afresh that we are to expect, not simply a Christian, but a strictly *confessional* theological ethics. Later on in the Introduction (xxiii.) the author announces his undying adherence to the "Confession of Augsburg," which he characterizes as "the only orthodox and anti-heretical basis of true Christian union and ecclesiastical association."

From the one principle "God is love," the author *deduces* his system of theological ethics in four main branches, comprised in two Parts. Part I. treats (1) of "the primary Divine love and its opposite;" and (2) of "Redeeming Divine love." Part II. brings before us in two sections,—the reasons for maintaining which are not so clear,—(3) the "Renewing," and (4) the Obeying Divine love. The necessities of the deduction obviously make the divisions, and their treatment, somewhat artificial and uncomely.

Proceeding with his plan, Sartorius deduces the doctrine of the Trinity from the necessities of Divine love. It is this love which both unites and distinguishes the three persons of the Trinity. Did not Augustine long ago declare: "Thou seest the Trinity when thou seest Love, for the Loving, the Beloved, and their Love are three?" (p. 16 f.). The alternative which the denial of the necessity of the Trinity as a deduction from the Divine love forces us into, is the assertion of the eternity of the World as the object of this love (p. 19). Creation also seems to be considered by the author as a necessity deduced from this one essential attribute of the Divine Tri-personality: it is the forth-going of condescending love (see pp. 23 ff.). But the question is not plainly asked, and if asked could not be answered satisfactorily from Sartorius' point of view,—Why is not condescending love also a permanent and eternal necessity of the Divine Being?

What first moved condescending love to create a World as an object for itself? What, indeed, but the same love? Why then must it not have eternally gone forth, and why must not creation, therefore, have been eternal,—as the author blames Rothe for affirming? Creation, accordingly, is to be regarded as a fact and not as “an immanent productivity of the Divine Nature” (p. 24). And yet we are assured in another connection (p. 129) that “nothing was antecedent to creative love.” Surely no “Thing” was thus antecedent. But was the primary Divine love which God is, antecedent to the condescending love which is creative love? And if so, why did this primary love at length, after so many countless ages of exercise restricted within the immanent Trinity, at the last become creative love?

As to the Atonement we are told (p. 128) that Redeeming love is greater than the creative, because “God as the Redeemer conquers the contradiction of Himself (Heb. xii. 3), the enmity of sin, by this Divine *love of his enemies, or grace*. This is well said. But with respect to the Incarnation, Sartorius seems to dissent from all realistic views. The only union (*unio hypostatica*) of the Divine and human natures in Christ is a *loving union* of Godhood and manhood in the oneness of his “personal consciousness” (p. 135).

Passing over all that lies between, we find the author maintaining that in the final judgment we reach the summit of the long struggle between Divine love and its opposite. “All living spirits and all resurrection germs will (then) be quickened to new and spiritual developments and formations” (p. 364). It is the scene of eternal separation and decision. Sentence will *then* be passed on all “unreconciled, unconverted, obdurate sinners” (p. 369). Its justifying reason lies chiefly in an “obstinate and proud rejection of Divine grace” (p. 371). There is no doubt whatever that on this point Sartorius defines the “orthodox” doctrine of the Church Catholic, rather than those who have knowingly (?) stated this doctrine as being, that “all who *die impenitent* suffer conscious everlasting torments.”

On the whole, this work of Sartorius has considerable interest and value. But its dry and rather narrow treatment of the topics discussed, its quite complete disregard of almost everything more modern than the Augsburg Confession on the subject of philosophical ethics, its lack of sympathy with the “*natural man*” and with the Divine discipline of humanity in anticipation of and

preparation for Christian morals, its gleams of ecclesiastical heat over confessional divergences, detract from both its interest and its value. It furnishes, indeed, new occasion for readers of theology to thank the publishing firms who have done so much for them. But it is the least valuable of the four (the other three being Martensen, Harless, Wutke) foreign books on Christian Ethics, brought forward by T. & T. Clark.

THE DISCOVERIES OF AMERICA.*—This is a book which will be read with pleasure and profit by students of history and the general public. Mr. Weise has collected the most entertaining accounts of early voyages to this continent; reduced these to order and due proportion by judicious pruning; completed the outline by explanation, criticism, and the reproduction of rare maps. The story is full and vivid, yet not too long. It is a story of inexhaustible interest. Surely there is no other chapter of universal history which has such power to stimulate the imagination. While one is reading the story of those earlier adventurers, there seems infinite possibility of material well-being still. The globe has not yet been circumnavigated, nor has any economist as yet pointed out the consequences of limitation. So it is that the voyage of Magalhaens (1519–1522) seems the crowning disappointment of history,—for this “proved limitation.” We think it proper to say that the first twenty-one pages of Mr. Weise’s book do not seem worthy of their position. They contain much that is suggestive and entertaining, but they do not fairly represent the truth-seeking spirit which appears in subsequent portions of the work. We caution the reader to suspend judgment until at least all of the first chapter has been thoroughly examined. Especially pp. 25–41 contain a fine specimen of readable criticism. The question therein discussed is stated as follows: “Among the traditions preserved of the voyages of the Northmen in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, there are several that have caused considerable controversy respecting the historical and geographical value of the information contained in them; for a number of eminent writers have made use of this information to show that the Northmen were the first discoverers of America and the explorers of a large part of the eastern coast of the continent Other distinguished writers consider these traditions as too mythical and vague to be deemed valuable,

* *The Discoveries of America to the year 1525.* By ARTHUR JAMES WEISE, M.A. G. P. Putnam’s Sons. New York. 1884.

either historically or geographically, and argue that what is thought to describe the physical features in productions of parts of the present territory of the eastern coast of the United States describes the topography and fruits of Greenland" (p. 25). The conclusion is stated (p. 41): "No geographical information contained in the sagas of Iceland and Greenland verifies the statement that the Northmen discovered America and explored the coast of a part of the present territory of the United States."

LIFE AND LABOUR IN THE FAR, FAR WEST.*—The author is an English country gentleman who has visited the far, far West and examined the relative value of the various localities as fields for colonization by the English agricultural class. His observations are intelligent and presented in a fairly attractive form. Some of his comments upon men and manners will be appreciated. In a description of travel in America, we notice: "Each car, or number of cars, has a conductor and porter; each separate Pullman has both officials. *They invariably bang the doors with a louder crash than anyone else on entering or leaving the car.*" It is pleasant to notice the hearty good feeling which appears in the following acknowledgment: "I think there is no one in the world so hospitable and kind as the American gentleman: whether in the Eastern or Western States, it is just the same—the same courtesy and kindness, the same readiness to be of any help or service to the stranger, who is fortunate enough to be possessed of an introduction to him, always distinguish him." There is an agreeable touch of humor in the following: "The next morning (June 11) I was up at 5 A. M., and indulged in a wash in a basin in the lavatory, which rather surprised a Californian who came in and found me making the best of my time, with nothing on but a pair of trousers tucked up to the knees. After a good stare he said 'Good morning,' to which I responded, 'Good morning, but hot,' which terminated the conversation." British Columbia is highly commended, especially for its climate and unequalled scenery. In that connection, however, Mr. Barneby observes: "I do not think that British Columbia is making nearly such rapid progress as Washington Territory, which has a very similar climate; at

* *Life and Labour in the far, far West: Being Notes of a Tour in the Western States, British Columbia, Manitoba, and the Northwest Territory.* By W. HENRY BARNEBY. With specially prepared map, showing the Author's route. Cassell & Co., Limited, New York. 1884.

any rate many emigrants, having come out to the former, soon pass over the Sound into the States." The Northwest territory seems to have made a less favorable impression. Reckless and unscientific farming is the rule and the winters are long and severe. This extreme cold, however, works advantage to the farmer in rather a surprising way. The soil remains frozen quite hard several feet below the surface even as late as the end of July. "This is believed to explain the wonderful fertility of the soil; as the frost, in gradually coming to the surface during the summer months, creates a moisture which, meeting the warmth from above, forms a kind of natural hot-bed. This moisture counteracts the scarcity of rain during the spring and summer, and accounts for the grain being forced with such amazing rapidity after the late sowing; for in point of fact, corn crops are not usually sown until early in May and yet are harvested at the end of August. (p. 242).

THE HOLLANDERS IN NOVA ZEMBLA.*—"De Overwintering der Hollanders op Nova Zembla," by Tollens, is spoken of as the *chef d'œuvre* of Dutch poesy. It celebrates an adventurous voyage in search of the Northeast passage, undertaken at a time to which no Hollander can refer without enthusiasm. The poem recalls the struggle for freedom and the infancy of the Dutch navy. Consistently with this inspiration, its tone is patriotic throughout. Unsupported by the sentiment of patriotism, the "Overwintering" would never have become widely known. The English translation offered by Mr. Van Pelt is quite spirited, but it is not poetry. Such lines as

"By hardest toil or violent exercise,
Freezing the chill sweat over all their frame,"

are far from pleasant to the ear.

"The bold design progresses step by step,
And soon two ships with *dapper* crews are theirs."

Dapper, in the sense of *brave*, is surely no longer English. However, we will not add to the already sufficient commentary contained in the volume itself. Of 120 pages, nearly one-half are taken up with prefaces, historical introduction, and notes.

* *The Hollanders in Nova Zembla* (1596-1597). *An Arctic Poem*. Translated from the Dutch of Hendrik Tollens. by Daniel Van Pelt, A.M. With a Preface and an Historical Introduction, by Samuel Richard Van Campen, F.R.G.S. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1884.

THE ART AMATEUR for November contains "Lessons in Wood Engraving," "The Art of Embroidery," "How to Paint on China," "Materials for Oil Painting," and an article on "Working Art Clubs," of special value to everyone desirous of self-improvement. The large array of designs embraces decorations for a cup and saucer (snowdrop), six butter plates (various flowers), a menu frame (honeysuckle), a tea cosy (jasmine), an altar front (sixteenth century Spanish work), a figure panel for painting, four panels of carved wood, a page of butterflies, and a variety of designs for industrial art work. Among the more striking illustrations are two spirited groups of nymphs and cupids by Solon, in *pâte-sûr-pâte* decoration, "Love Set Free," and "Love's Mastery;" two full-page fac-similes of etchings by A. Legros, "Sir Frederick Leighton," and "Death and the Woodman;" some bold figure studies by Joseph de Nittis, and a carved hanging cabinet designed by Benn Pitman, of Cincinnati. "The Modern Home" series is concluded with articles on "The Bedroom," by Roger Riordan and Clarence Cook. The Art Amateur announces the early issue of three designs in color by Miss Dora Wheeler, viz: a decorative figure composition; a fan with cupids; and a charming decorative head of a child for a plaque. Price per annum, \$4; single numbers, 35 cents. Montague Marks, Publisher, 23 Union Square, New York.

MAGAZINE OF ART.—The frontispiece of the November number is from Mr. F. A. Bridgeman's last salon picture, "The Bath at Home, Cairo." This picture accompanies an article on "The American Salon." Mr. Richard Heath continues his entertaining and amusing papers on "Head-gear in the Fifteenth Century," with their droll cuts, and in an entirely opposite style Mr. J. Penderel Brodhurst describes the delights of a day "By Stream and Chase." A page illustration is devoted to Glindoni's Prince Henry before Judge Gascoigne. Jane E. Harrison discusses Greek Art at Cambridge. A very interesting paper on "Early English Painters" is contributed by Edmund Ollier, and Eustace Balfour discusses "French Furniture." Each one of these papers is illustrated with numerous engravings, some of them from nature, others from rare prints and notable paintings. A complete record of the art news of the month, both in Europe and America, will be found in the Magazine. Price, \$3.50 a year; single numbers, 35 cents. Cassell & Company, Limited, New York.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

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